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The mawlid of as-Sayyida FÁÔima an-NabawÐya
Cairo, 2-3 June 2003 (2-3 RabÐÝ II 1424) 6 p.m. - 3 a.m.
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1. Shrine of as-Sayyida FÁÔima an-NabawÐya (under construction). 2. Mosque of as-Sayyida FÁÔima an-NabawÐya (under
construction). 3. Shrine of SÐdÐ ÝAbdallÁh ad-DisÙqÐ. 4. Sufi Æikr in a café. 5.  Park filled by café chairs, normally closed
for public. 6. Circus show of ÑalÁÎ al-MaÒrÐ 7. Café serving beer. 8. Amusements and gambling stands in at-TabbÁna
St. 9. Ëidma of Sheikh Íasan ad-DirÐnÐ 10. Police roadblock. 11. Fire brigade. 12. Area of neighbourhood celebration
continues along the street up to the district of BÁÔlÐya, ca. 300 m further. 13. Aslam SilÁÎdÁr Square. 14. Banners greeting
the visitors of the mawlid in the name of local politicians.
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Dutch summary)
Deze dissertatie ‘Hapjes en Heiligen: Mawlid festivals en de politiek van feestelijkheid,
vroomheid en moderniteit in het huidige Egypte’ analyseert de controverse omtrent
mawlids, ofwel festivals ter ere van moslimheiligen in het huidige Egypte. Het richt zich
op twisten rondom feestcultuur, benadrukt het politieke karakter van feestelijkheid en
laat zien hoe de debatten over mawlids verband houden met de strijd om religie en
maatschappij in het algemeen. Daarmee impliceert het ook een kritische herziening van
de onderlinge relatie tussen religieuze bewegingen, verlichting en moderniteit. Het laat
zien dat islamitische politieke en sociale bewegingen geen terugkeer naar de traditie
vormen. Integendeel, ze geven vaak blijk van een sterk vooruitgangsgeloof en een kritische
kijk op traditionele opvattingen en praktijken. Aan de andere kant moeten de
hervormings- en  moderniseringsprojecten niet gelijkgesteld worden aan een liberale
utopie van vrijheid en emancipatie. Moderniteit in het Midden-Oosten is, zoals overal,
altijd gekenmerkt geweest door krachtige elementen van morele en bestuurlijke discipline
ten opzichte van de burgers en de uitsluiting van degenen die deze discipline niet
navolgden. 
De verering van heiligen, die in de islam bekend staan als ‘vrienden van God’, is
wereldwijd een belangrijk onderdeel van moslimspiritualiteit. Pelgrimages naar hun
graftomben behoren in vele landen tot de belangrijkste openbare festivals. Zo is dat ook
het geval in Egypte, waar duizenden festivals ter ere van islamitische mystici (soefis),
geleerden en afstammelingen van de profeet Mohammed plaatsvinden. Deze festivals
vormen een combinatie van de spirituele ervaring van een pelgrimage, de
gemeenschapszin van een buurtfeest en het amusement en de handel van een kermis.
Maar terwijl vele Egyptenaren de mawlids zien als een uiting van vreugde en liefde voor
de Profeet en zijn familie, kijken veel anderen kritisch tegen deze festivals aan. Zij
beschouwen ze als een on-islamitische innovatie (bidÝa) en als een uiting van een
achterlijke mentaliteit. 
Het is belangrijk om vast te stellen dat de debatten over mawlids niet verlopen volgens
de scheidslijnen tussen islamisten en secularisten, noch volgens die tussen orthodoxe en
volks-islam. Islamisten en secularisten, hoezeer ze in sommige situaties ook tegenover
elkaar mogen staan, delen in feite in sterke mate de nadruk op rationele vooruitgang en
op het ‘authentieke’ culturele erfgoed, zoals dat tot uiting komt in hun
gemeenschappelijke kritiek op ambivalente feestelijke tradities. Dit kan zeer goed
geconstateerd worden aan de hand van de manier waarop vele (maar niet alle) stedelijke
Egyptenaren uit de middenklasse proberen om de uitingen van vroomheid en
feestvreugde van hun landgenoten te beteugelen of te bespotten in naam van religie én
in naam van moderniteit. Verder zijn orthodoxe en volks-islam in de praktijk geen
gescheiden werelden. Datgene wat als de correcte islamitische doctrine en praktijk wordt
beschouwd heeft aanzienlijke veranderingen ondergaan gedurende de laatste 150 jaar. Wat
tegenwoordig door vele moslims alsmede door westerse geleerden wordt voorgesteld als
authentieke orthodoxe islam is het vernieuwende resultaat van een beweging van
hervorming die, geconfronteerd met kolonialisme en Europese kritieken op de islam, een
herdefiniëring formuleerde van religie en samenleving, waarbij deze werden begrepen als
onderling afhankelijke systemen, die gebonden waren aan de criteria van rationaliteit en
functionaliteit.
Zowel het feestelijke karakter van de mawlids als de manier waarop vele moslims de
religie, de samenleving en de eigen identiteit in de afgelopen honderd jaar zijn gaan
interpreteren hebben bijgedragen aan hun omstreden karakter. Op zich is er niets
on-islamitisch of anti-moderns aan mawlids. De mensen die ze vieren zijn vaak modern
opgeleide mensen en vrome moslims die zich terdege bewust zijn van hun religie. Het
probleem is eerder dat zij vroomheid samen met vreugde uiten op een manier die
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ongepast wordt gevonden door degenen die geloven dat samenleving en religie
gekenmerkt moeten worden door een plechtstatige, beheerste houding en een stevige
ordening die alle dingen en emoties hun eigen duidelijke, aparte plaatsen toebedeeld. In
die laatste optiek moeten hapjes en heiligen gescheiden van elkaar worden gehouden. 
De ambivalentie van mawlids verstoort de gedachte (die vooral sterk leeft bij de
middenklasse) dat moderniteit en religiositeit met ernst omgeven dienen te zijn. Tevens
doorkruist het de fragmentatie van de eigen identiteit in een vroom aspect en een profaan
aspect. Mawlids vieren de gemeenschap, het heilige en het individu dat hieraan toegewijd
is. Maar door hun publieke en uitbundige karakter vormen zij ook plaatsen waar de
grenzen tussen deze categorieën (individu, gemeenschap, het heilige) worden opgeheven,
doorbroken en gerelativeerd. Dat maakt ze altijd in zekere mate problematisch voor een
religieus gelegitimeerde morele en maatschappelijke orde. De islamitische spiritualiteit
van vroegere eeuwen kon mawlids bevatten omdat die ingebed waren in een begrip van
religie als gemeenschappelijkheid, waarbij de maatschappij feestvieren erkende als een
oncontroversieel onderdeel van het leven. Maar voor een zienswijze die modernisering
van bovenaf voorstaat wordt een feestelijk moment dat op zichzelf staat en geen duidelijk
doel dient beschouwd zowel als een uiting en als een oorzaak van verval. Doordat festivals
van het volk zich onttrekken aan definitieve categoriseringen en een eenduidige
functionaliteit ontberen, mislukken pogingen om ze in te zetten voor allerlei projecten
ten behoeve van ontwikkeling of hervorming. En dus lijken ze nutteloos te zijn waar
productiviteit wordt verwacht, lijken ze rusteloos juist daar waar kalmte opportuun is,
subversief op punten waar conservatisme vereist is en reactionair waar ze progressief
zouden moeten zijn.
Maar kritiek op mawlids is niet alleen een reactie op de uitdaging die mawlids vormen
ten aanzien van een modernistisch wereldbeeld; het bekritiseren van mawlids is belangrijk
voor vele Egyptenaren omdat het hen helpt om hun eigen begrip van de orthodoxe islam
en de moderne maatschappij te definiëren. De bepaling van de mawlids als ‘afwijkend’
wordt zodanig geconstrueerd dat de afwijzing van de mawlids past in de formulering van
een moderne identiteit. Naarmate de modernistische visie in de 20e eeuw steeds meer
terrein won raakten mawlids, die eens centraal stonden in de religieuze cultuur van
Egypte, steeds meer gemarginaliseerd. Voor degenen die mawlids verdedigen tegen de
critici ervan betekent dit dat ze ofwel kunnen proberen te bewijzen dat mawlids in
werkelijkheid voldoen aan de criteria van eerbiedig en beschaafd gedrag die door de critici
worden hooggehouden, ofwel dat ze die criteria in twijfel kunnen trekken. In dat laatste
geval zullen ze echter uitgesloten blijven van het dominante culturele discours. Niettemin
heeft de kritiek op de mawlids ook de weg geëffend voor hun herinterpretatie en
waardering juist vanwege hun uitsluiting. Dezelfde mensen die mawlids bekritiseren
omdat die on-islamitisch en achterlijk zouden zijn geven vaak uiting aan fascinatie en
waardering ervoor. Maar in plaats van dit als een gelegenheid op te vatten om de kritiek
op mawlids ter discussie te stellen, herdefiniëren ze mawlids als iets dat onderscheiden
dient te worden van religie en moderniteit, en dus als iets potentiëel waardevols uit de
erfenis van het volk. Tenslotte wordt de marginalisering versterkt door direct
overheidsingrijpen: herstructurering van mawlidterreinen hebben tot gevolg dat het
volkse karakter van mawlids in de marge verdwijnt.
De resultaten van deze dissertatie wijzen op de centrale en betwiste rol die
belichaamde praktijken en esthetische stijlen spelen in de definitie van religie en
samenleving, ofwel: de relatie tussen habitus (geïnternaliseerde gewoonten) en ideologie.
Door het vieren (of het niet vieren) van mawlids op een specifieke manier en door het
bekritiseren, verdedigen, vertegenwoordigen of reorganiseren ervan toont men toewijding
aan een visie op religie, samenleving en identiteit dat geplaatst is in handelingen en
verschijningen. Voor mawlidgangers verschaft het zitten in een tent en het delen van een
bord eten een moment van transcendentale spiritualiteit. Mensen die kritisch zijn ten
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aanzien van de festiviteiten wijzen op de mensen in de tent en verwijzen naar dit tafereel
als ‘bijgeloof’. Overheidsambtenaren geven opdracht om de tenten te verplaatsen naar
achterafstraatjes en noemen dit dan een maatregel ter verbetering van de openbare ruimte
en het bewustzijn van de burgers. Feestelijke praktijken zijn van belang omdat ze worden
gelijkgesteld aan overtuigingen en levenshoudingen. De relatie tussen habitus en ideologie
is echter nooit een vaststaand gegeven; het is onderwerp van een voortgaande strijd van
het soort dat plaatsvindt rond de kwestie van de mawlids.
English summary
This thesis, ‘Snacks and Saints: Mawlid Festivals and the Politics of Festivity, Piety, and
Modernity in Contemporary Egypt’, analyses the controversies surrounding mawlids,
festivals held in honour of Muslim saints, in contemporary Egypt. Focussing on the
contestation of festive culture, it emphasises the political nature of festivity and
demonstrates how the debates on mawlids are related to struggles over religion and
society in general. In doing so, it implies a critical revision of the relationship between
religious movements, enlightenment and modernity. It shows that Islamic political and
social movements do not call for a return to tradition. On the contrary, they are often
characterised by a belief in the progress of society and a critical view of traditional beliefs
and practices. These projects of reform and modernisation should, however, not be
equated with a liberal utopia of freedom and emancipation. Modernity in the Middle
East, like elsewhere, has been strongly characterised by the moral and administrative
discipline of citizens and the exclusion of those who do not comply.
The veneration of saints, known as ‘friends of God’ in Islam, is an important part of
Muslim spirituality around the world. Pilgrimages to their burial sites form some of the
most important public festivals of many countries, among them Egypt, which houses
thousands of festivals in honour of Muslim mystics (Sufis), scholars, and descendants of
the Prophet Muhammad. These festivals combine the spiritual experience of a pilgrimage,
the communal reunion of a neighbourhood celebration, and the amusements and
commerce of a fair. But while many Egyptians see mawlids as an expression of joy and
love for the Prophet and his family, many of their compatriots view these festivals in a
harshly critical light. They see them as an un-Islamic innovation (bidÝa) and an expression
of a backward mentality.
It is important to note that the debates on mawlids do not follow simple divisions
between the views of Islamists and secularists or orthodox and popular Islam. Islamists
and secularists, antagonistic as they may be in some situations, in fact often share a
strong common ground in their emphasis on rational progress and authentic
civilisational heritage, as expressed in their shared criticism of ambivalent festive
traditions. This can be very well seen in the way many (but not all) urban middle-class
Egyptians try to, in the name of religion and modernity, curb and ridicule the forms of
piety and festive joy their compatriots express. Furthermore, orthodox and popular Islam
are, in practice, not separate fields, and what is considered to be correct Islamic doctrine
and practice has undergone significant change over the past 150 years. What is today
presented as authentic orthodox Islam by many Muslims and Western scholars is the
innovative outcome of a movement of reform that, in confrontation with colonialism
and European critiques of Islam, has undertaken a redefinition of religion and society,
conceiving them as  interdependent systems bound to the criteria of rationality and
functionality.
Both the festive character of mawlids and the way many Muslims have come to
interpret religion, society and the self over the past hundred years contribute to their
controversial character. There is nothing un-Islamic or anti-modern per se about mawlids.
The people who celebrate them are often modern professionals and pious Muslims well
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versed in their religion. The problem is, rather, that they express piety and joy in an
interrelated manner that appears improper to those who believe society and religion
should be characterised by a solemn, constrained attitude and a firm order that allocates
all things and emotions their clear, separate places. Snacks and saints, in their view, have
to be kept apart.
The association of modernity and religiosity with a tone of seriousness and a purified
but fragmented self that keeps different fields of life carefully apart (a world view to
which many middle-class Egyptians adhere), is compromised by the ambivalence found
in mawlids. Mawlids celebrate the community, the sacred, and the individual committed
to these. But through their openness and atmosphere of the extraordinary, they also are
sites of suspending, breaking, relativising and questioning these categories. This makes
them always to some degree problematic to any religiously legitimised moral and social
order. The Islamic spirituality of earlier centuries was able to embrace mawlids because
it was embedded in a communal concept of religion and a vision of society in which
times of celebration appeared as legitimate segments of the circle of life. But for a view
promoting top-down modernisation, a festive time in its own right beyond clear
utilitarian purpose is conceived of as an expression and cause of decay. Eluding definite
categorisation and clear functionality, popular festivals resist attempts to employ them
for any great project of development or reform. Hence the people celebrating mawlids
have come to appear as idle when they should be productive, restless when they should
be calm, subversive when they should be conservative, and reactionary when they should
be revolutionary.
But the opposition to mawlids is not only a response to the challenge mawlids form
to the world view of modernism; criticising mawlids is important for many Egyptians
because it helps them to define their particular understanding of orthodox Islam and
modern society. The ‘otherness’ of mawlids is constructed and used as a marker of
exclusion to distinguish a modernist view of society. As this view has gained ground in
the 20th century, mawlids, once central in the religious culture of Egypt, have become
increasingly marginalised. For those who defend mawlids against their critics, this means
that they can either try to prove that mawlids actually fit the criteria of reverent and
civilised behaviour held by the critics, or challenge them but remain excluded from the
public debates. Yet the criticism of mawlids has also opened the way to their
reinterpretation and appreciation through their very exclusion. The same people who
criticise mawlids for being un-Islamic and backward often express fascination with and
appreciation for them. But instead of taking this as an occasion to question their
criticism, they redefine mawlids as something distinct from religion and modernity, and
thus potentially valuable as a form of popular folkloric heritage. Finally, government
projects restructuring pilgrimage sites physically bring these lines of exclusion into
mawlids themselves as their central spaces are turned into spectacles of state presence and
most other celebrations are moved to the area’s margins.
The results of this thesis point at the central and contested role of embodied practices
and aesthetic styles for the definition of religion and society, in short: the relationship
between habitus and ideology. To celebrate (or not to celebrate) mawlids in a specific way,
to criticise, defend, represent or reorganise them, is to show commitment to a vision of
religion, society and the self that is located in actions and appearances. For pilgrims,
sitting in a tent and sharing a plate of food provides a moment of spirituality. People
critical of the festivities point at the people in the tent and refer to the scenery as
‘superstitions’. Government officials order removal of the tent to the back streets and
phrase this measure as raising the sophistication of the citizens’ consciousness. Festive
practices matter because they are equated with beliefs and attitudes. Yet the relationship
between habitus and ideology is never a given; it is subject to an ongoing contestation of
the very kind that takes place around the issue of mawlids.
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اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ و ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎل و اﻟﺤﺪاﺛﺔ و اﻟﺘﺪﻳﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ : اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺔ و اﻟﺤﻼوة " هﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻳﻬﺘﻢ 
وﻟﺪى  . ﺑﺘﺤﻠﻴﻞ اﻟﺠﺪل اﻟﺪاﺋﺮ ﺡﻮل اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺕﻘﺎم ﻟﻸوﻟﻴﺎء ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﺹﺮة " اﻟﻤﻌﺎﺹﺮة
ﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻟﻬﺬﻩ اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎﻟﻴﺎت، وﺕﻮﺿﺢ اﻟﺘﺪﻗﻴﻖ ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻟﻨﻘﺎﺷﺎت، ﻧﺠﺪ أﻧﻬﺎ ﺕﺆآﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﻟ 
آﻤﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻳﺤﺘﻮي  .  ﺡﻮل اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻨﺎﻓﺲ اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻲ واﻻﺝﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﻋﺎم ﺎت اﻟﺠﺪﻟﻴﺔ ارﺕﺒﺎط اﻟﻨﻘﺎﺷ 
 .ﻣﺮاﺝﻌﺔ ﻧﻘﺪﻳﺔ ﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﺤﺮآﺎت اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻨﻮﻳﺮ واﻟﺤﺪاﺛﺔ
ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﻟﺬﻟﻚ، ﻓﺈن اﻟﺤﺮآﺎت اﻻﺝﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ واﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺕﺪﻋﻮ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﻮدة 
ﺑﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻌﻜﺲ ﻣﻦ ذﻟﻚ، ﻓﺈن ﺝﺪول أﻋﻤﺎﻟﻬﻢ ﻏﺎﻟﺒًﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﺼﻒ ﺑﺎﻟﺪﻋﻮة ﻟﻠﺘﻘﺪم و . ث واﻟﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺪ ﻟﻠﺘﺮا
ﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺡﻴﺔ أﺥﺮى ﻓﻼ ﻳﺠﺐ ﺥﻠﻂ  ﻣﺸﺮوﻋﺎت . ﺑﺮؤﻳﺔ ﻧﻘﺪﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻤﺎرﺳﺎت واﻟﻤﻌﺘﻘﺪات اﻟﻤﻮروﺛﺔ 
إن اﻟﺪﻋﻮة ﻟﻠﺤﺪاﺛﺔ ﺕﺘﻤﻴﺰ .  اﻹﺹﻼح واﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺚ ﺑﺎﻟﺪﻋﻮة ﻟﻠﻤﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻠﻴﺒﺮاﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺤﺮﻳﺔ و ﺡﻘﻮق اﻹﻧﺴﺎن 
 ﺑﻮﺝﻮد ﻣﻨﻈﻮﻣﺔ أﺥﻼﻗﻴﺔ وﺕﻨﻔﻴﺬﻳﺔ ﺕﻄﺒﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻓﺮاد - آﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ أي ﻣﻜﺎن ﺁﺥﺮ -ﻟﺸﺮق اﻷوﺳﻂ ﻓﻲ ا 
 .وﻳﺘﻢ إﻗﺼﺎء ﻣﻦ ﻻ ﻳﻠﺘﺰم ﺑﻬﺎ
ﻓﻲ اﻹﺳﻼم، ﻓﺈن ﺕﻮﻗﻴﺮ أوﻟﻴﺎء اﷲ ﻳﻌﺘﺒﺮ ﺝﺰءًا ﻣﻬﻤًﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻤﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﺮوﺡﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﻠﻢ 
ﻢ اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎﻻت اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ  ﻣﻦ أه - ﻓﻲ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪول -آﻤﺎ ﺕﻌﺪ زﻳﺎرات اﻷﺿﺮﺡﺔ . ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ آﻠﻪ 
وﻣﻦ ﺿﻤﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺼﺮ واﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻘﺎم ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺁﻻف اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﺕﻜﺮﻳﻤًﺎ ﻟﻠﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮﻓﻴﻴﻦ واﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎء وﺁل ﺑﻴﺖ 
 . اﻟﻨﺒﻲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺼﻼة واﻟﺴﻼم
واﻟﻨﺸﺎﻃﺎت اﻻﺝﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ، ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ  ﺕﺠﻤﻊ هﺬﻩ اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎﻻت ﺑﻴﻦ آﻞﱟ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺠﺎﻧﺐ اﻟﺮوﺡﻲ 
اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﺕﻌﺒﻴﺮًا ﻋﻦ اﻟﻔﺮح وﺡﺐ اﻟﻨﺒﻲ وﺁل وﻳﺮى ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ ﺕﻠﻚ . ﻟﻠﺘﺴﻠﻴﺔ واﻟﺘﺠﺎرة 
 .اﻟﺒﻴﺖ، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻳﻨﻈﺮ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﺒﻌﺾ اﻵﺥﺮ ﻧﻈﺮة ﻧﻘﺪﻳﺔ ﻣﻌﺘﺒﺮﻳﻦ أﻧﻬﺎ ﺑﺪﻋﺔ و ﺕﻌﺒﻴﺮ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺘﺨﻠﻒ
ﻣﻦ اﻟﻀﺮوري أن ﻧﻼﺡﻆ ﺑﺄن اﻟﺠﺪل ﺡﻮل اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﻻ ﻳﻌﺪ ﺝﺪًﻻ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻴﻴﻦ 
اﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﻳﺘﻌﺎرﺿﻮن ﻓﻲ إذ إن اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻴﻴﻦ و . واﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﻧﻴﻴﻦ أو ﺑﻴﻦ ﺹﺤﻴﺢ اﻟﺪﻳﻦ واﻟﺪﻳﻦ اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻲ 
وﺝﻬﺎت اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﺡﻮل ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﻮاﻗﻒ، إﻻ أﻧﻬﻢ ﻳﺘﻔﻘﻮن ﻓﻲ ﺕﺄآﻴﺪهﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺘﻘﺪم اﻟﻌﻘﻼﻧﻲ واﻟﺘﺮاث 
 أن ﻧﻼﺡﻆ هﺬا ﺑﺈﻣﻜﺎﻧﻨﺎ . اﻟﺤﻀﺎري اﻷﺹﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺘﻤﺜﻞ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻘﺪهﻢ اﻟﻤﺸﺘﺮك ﻻزدواﺝﻴﺔ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺪ 
ﺮﻳﻴﻦ اﻟﺤﻀﺮﻳﻴﻦ اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺼ (  وﻟﻜﻦ ﻟﻴﺲ آﻠﻬﻢ )ﻟﺪى ﻋﺪد آﺒﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻨﺘﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻄﺒﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺳﻄﻰ 
 . اﻟﺴﺨﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﺘﻘﻮى واﻟﻔﺮح ﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﻴﻬﻢ وردهﻢ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ،ﻳﺤﺎوﻟﻮن ﺑﺎﺳﻢ اﻟﺪﻳﻦ واﻟﺤﺪاﺛﺔ
 ﻋﻦ ذﻟﻚ، ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺹﺤﻴﺢ اﻟﺪﻳﻦ واﻟﺪﻳﻦ اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻴًﺎ ﻣﺠﺎﻟﻴﻦ ﻣﻨﻔﺼﻠﻴﻦ، ﻓﻀًﻼ
وﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﻢ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻩ ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﺔ ﺳﻠﻴﻤﺔ وﻣﺬهﺐ إﺳﻼﻣﻲ ﺹﺎﺋﺐ ﻗﺪ ﺕﻌﺮض ﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮات واﺿﺤﺔ ﺥﻼل 
ﻓﻤﺎ ُﻳﻘﺪﱠم اﻟﻴﻮم آﺠﺰء أﺹﻴﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺹﺤﻴﺢ اﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ . اﻟﻤﺎﺋﺔ وﺥﻤﺴﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻣًﺎ اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ 
اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﺸﺮﻗﻴﻦ ﻳﻌﺪ ﻧﺘﺎﺝًﺎ ﻣﺴﺘﺤﺪﺛًﺎ ﻟﺤﺮآﺔ إﺹﻼﺡﻴﺔ، ﺥﻼل ﻓﺘﺮة اﻟﻤﻮاﺝﻬﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻻﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎر 
ﺎﺑﻬﻤﺎ واﻟﻨﻘﺪ اﻷوروﺑﻲ ﻟﻺﺳﻼم، وﻗﺪ ﻗﺎﻣﺖ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺤﺮآﺔ ﺑﺈﻋﺎدة ﺕﻌﺮﻳﻒ اﻟﺪﻳﻦ واﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ، واﺳﺘﻴﻌ 
ﻋﻠﻰ أﻧﻬﻤﺎ ﻣﻨﻈﻮﻣﺘﻴﻦ ﻣﺘﺮاﺑﻄﺘﻴﻦ داﺥﻠﻴًﺎ، ﺑﺤﻴﺚ ﺕﻠﺘﺰم هﺎﺕﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻮﻣﺘﻴﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻌﺎﻳﻴﺮ اﻟﻌﻘﻼﻧﻴﺔ 
 .واﻟﻮﻇﻴﻔﻴﺔ
وﻳﺴﺎهﻢ آﻞﱞ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻄﺎﺑﻊ اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﻤﻮاﻟﺪ، واﻟﻄﺮﻳﻘﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ وﺹﻞ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ  
 . ف ﺡﻮل اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪﺕﻔﺴﻴﺮ اﻟﺪﻳﻦ واﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ واﻟﺬات ﺥﻼل اﻟﻤﺎﺋﺔ ﻋﺎم اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ، ﺑﺨﻠﻖ اﻻﺥﺘﻼ
ﻓﻐﺎﻟﺒًﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻜﻮن . ﻻ ﻳﻮﺝﺪ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﺎرض ﻣﻊ اﻹﺳﻼم واﻟﺤﺪاﺛﺔ ﺑﺤﺪ ذاﺕﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ 
ﺑﻞ ﺕﻜﻤﻦ اﻟﻤﺸﻜﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ أﻧﻬﻢ ﻳﻌﺒﺮون . اﻟﻤﺤﺘﻔﻠﻮن ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ ورﻋﻴﻦ وﻋﻠﻰ دراﻳﺔ آﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﺑﺪﻳﻨﻬﻢ 
 ﻳﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﻋﻦ ﺕﻘﻮاهﻢ وﻓﺮﺡﻬﻢ ﺑﻄﺮﻳﻘﺔ ﻏﻴﺮ ﺳﻠﻴﻤﺔ ﻣﻦ وﺝﻬﺔ ﻧﻈﺮ أوﻟﺌﻚ اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻳﻌﺘﻘﺪون ﺑﺄﻧﻪ ﻳﺠﺐ أن 
اﻟﺪﻳﻦ واﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ  ﺑﺎﻟﻮﻗﺎر واﻻﻟﺘﺰام واﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﺤﺎزم اﻟﺬي ﻳﻔﺼﻞ آﻞ اﻷﺷﻴﺎء واﻟﻤﺸﺎﻋﺮ ﻋﻦ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ 
 .اﻟﺒﻌﺾ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ واﺿﺢ، ﻓﻼ ﺑﺪ ﺑﺮأﻳﻬﻢ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺔ و اﻟﺤﻼوة
إن ارﺕﺒﺎط اﻟﺪﻳﻦ واﻟﺤﺪاﺛﺔ ﺑﻈﺎهﺮ ﺝﺪي وﻧﻔﺲ ﻧﻘﻴﺔ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﻤﺰﻗﺔ، ﺕﻌﺰل ﻣﺠﺎﻻت اﻟﺤﻴﺎة 
 ، (هﺬا ﻣﺎ ﻳﻠﺘﺰم ﺑﻪ اﻟﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ أﺑﻨﺎء اﻟﻄﺒﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺳﻄﻰ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻴﻦو)اﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ اﻟﺒﻌﺾ 
ix      yrammuS     
 
 
ﻓﺎﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﺕﺤﺘﻔﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ وﺕﻌﻤﻖ ﻋﻼﻗﺎﺕﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻘﺪﺳﺎت . ﻳﺘﻢ ﺕﻘﻮﻳﻀﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺥﻼل ازدواﺝﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ 
ﻟﻜﻦ وﺑﻔﻌﻞ اﻻﻧﻔﺘﺎح واﻟﺠﻮ اﻟﺒﻬﻴﺞ اﻟﺬي ﺕﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﺑﻪ، ﻓﺈﻧﻬﺎ ﺕﻘﻮم ﺑﺈﻳﻘﺎف و . وﺑﺎﻷﻓﺮاد اﻟﻤﻠﺘﺰﻣﻴﻦ ﺑﻬﺎ 
وهﺬا ﻣﺎ ﻳﺠﻌﻠﻬﺎ ﺕﻌﺘﺒﺮ داﺋﻤًﺎ إﺷﻜﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﺤﺪ ﻣﺎ . ل ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﻤﺠﺎﻻت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺕﺤﺘﻔﻲ ﺑﻬﺎ إﻋﺎدة اﻟﺘﺴﺎؤل ﺡﻮ 
 .ﻷي ﻣﻨﻈﻮﻣﺔ اﺝﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ أو دﻳﻨﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﺰﻣﺘﺔ
 ﻗﺎدرة ﻋﻠﻰ اﺳﺘﻴﻌﺎب اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ - اﻟﺘﻲ ﺕﻌﻮد ﻟﻘﺮون ﻣﻀﺖ -آﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﺮوﺡﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻴﺔ 
 ﻓﻲ اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎل ﻷﻧﻬﺎ آﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﺤﺘﻮاة ﻓﻲ اﻟﻔﻜﺮ اﻻﺝﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻟﻠﺪﻳﻦ وﻧﻈﺮة اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ اﻟﺘﻲ آﺎﻧﺖ ﺕﺮى 
ﻟﻜﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻟﻮﺝﻬﺔ ﻧﻈﺮ اﻟﺤﺪاﺛﺔ ﻓﺈن اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﻀﺎﺋﻊ ﻓﻲ . ﺝﺰءًا ﻣﺸﺮوﻋًﺎ ﻣﻦ  دورة اﻟﺤﻴﺎة 
 .اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎﻻت ﺑﺪون ﻏﺮض ﻧﻔﻌﻲ  ُﻳﻌﺪ ﺕﻌﺒﻴﺮًا ﻋﻦ  اﻻﻧﺤﻄﺎط  وﻣﺴﺒﺒًﺎ ﻟﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺁن واﺡﺪ
ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﺕﺼﻨﻴﻒ اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﺿﻤﻦ ﻓﺌﺔ ﻣﺤﺪدة ووﻇﻴﻔﻴﺔ واﺿﺤﺔ، ﺡﻴﺚ ﺕﺴﺘﻌﺼﻲ 
. ﺤﺎوﻻت ﺕﻮﻇﻴﻔﻬﺎ ﻷي ﻣﺸﺮوع ﻃﻤﻮح ﻣﻦ ﻣﺸﺎرﻳﻊ اﻟﺘﻨﻤﻴﺔ واﻹﺹﻼح اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎﻻت اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣ 
ﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﻳﺒﺪو زوار اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ آﻌﺎﻃﻠﻴﻦ ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻳﺠﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮا ﻣﻨﺘﺠﻴﻦ، وﺹﺎﺥﺒﻴﻦ ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻳﺠﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮا 
 .هﺎدﺋﻴﻦ، وﻣﻔﺴﺪﻳﻦ ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻳﺠﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮا ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﻴﻦ، ورﺝﻌﻴﻴﻦ ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻳﺠﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮا ﺛﻮرﻳﻴﻦ
ﻓﻌﻞ  ﻟﻠﺘﺤﺪي اﻟﺬي ﺕﻘﺪﻣﻪ ﻟﺮؤﻳﺔ اﻟﺤﺪاﺛﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﺎﻟﻢ ، ﻟﻜﻦ ﻻ ﺕﻌﺪ ﻣﻌﺎرﺿﺔ اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﻣﺠﺮد رد 
هﺬا اﻟﻨﻘﺪ ﻟﻪ وﻇﻴﻔﺔ ﻣﻬﻤﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻴﻦ ﻷﻧﻬﻢ ﻳﺴﺘﺨﺪﻣﻮﻧﻪ ﻟﺘﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﻬﻢ اﻟﺨﺎص 
 .ﻟﺼﺤﻴﺢ اﻟﺪﻳﻦ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ وﻟﻠﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ اﻟﺤﺪاﺛﻲ
وﻣﺎ أن أﺡﺮزت . ﻳﻤﻴﺰ وﺝﻬﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ اﻟﺤﺪاﺛﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ " ﺁﺥﺮ"إن وﺹﻒ اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﺑﺎﻟ ـ
اﻧﺘﺸﺎرًا ﻣﻠﺤﻮﻇًﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻌﺸﺮﻳﻦ، ﺡﺘﻰ أﺹﺒﺤﺖ اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﻣﻬﻤﺸﺔ ﻟﺪرﺝﺔ وﺝﻬﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ هﺬﻩ 
وهﺬا ﻣﺎ ﻳﺠﻌﻞ اﻟﻤﺪاﻓﻌﻴﻦ ﻋﻦ . آﺒﻴﺮة ﺑﻌﺪ أن آﺎن ﻟﻬﺎ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﻣﺮآﺰي ﻓﻲ اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﺔ 
اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎل ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﻳﺨﺘﺎرون ﺑﻴﻦ ﻣﺤﺎوﻟﺔ إﺛﺒﺎت أن اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﺕﺘﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﻣﻊ ﻣﻌﺎﻳﻴﺮ اﻟﺴﻠﻮك اﻟﻮﻗﻮر 
ﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺡﻴﺔ أﺥﺮى . ﺑﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻳﻨﺘﻘﺪون اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ، وﺑﻴﻦ إﺑﻌﺎدهﺎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﺠﺎل اﻟﻌﺎم واﻟﻤﺘﺤﻀﺮ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻄﺎﻟﺐ 
إن اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮﻳﻦ ﻣﻤﻦ ﻗﺎﻣﻮا . ﻓﻘﺪ ﻓﺘﺢ ﻧﻘﺪ اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ اﻟﻄﺮﻳﻖ ﻹﻋﺎدة ﺕﻔﺴﻴﺮهﺎ وﺕﻘﺪﻳﺮهﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺥﻼل إﻗﺼﺎءهﺎ 
. ﺑﻨﻘﺪ اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻬﺎ ﺑﺪﻋﺔ وﺕﻌﺒﻴﺮ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺘﺨﻠﻒ هﻢ أﻧﻔﺴﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ ﻳﻌﺒﺮ ﻋﻦ اﻓﺘﺘﺎﻧﻬﻢ ﺑﻬﺎ وﺕﻘﺪﻳﺮهﻢ ﻟﻬﺎ 
 ﻣﻦ أن ﻳﻜﻮن هﺬا داﻓﻌًﺎ ﻟﻤﺮاﺝﻌﺔ ﻧﻘﺪهﻢ، ﻓﻘﺪ أﻋﺎدوا ﺕﻌﺮﻳﻒ اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ أﻧﻬﺎ ﺷﻲء ﻟﻜﻦ ﺑﺪﻻ ً
 .ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺪﻳﻦ واﻟﺤﺪاﺛﺔ وﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﺕﻌﺪ ذات ﻗﻴﻤﺔ آﺠﺰء ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺮاث ﺷﻌﺒﻲ
أﺥﻴﺮًا، ﻓﺈن ﻣﺸﺎرﻳﻊ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﺮﻣﻴﻢ وإﻋﺎدة اﻟﺒﻨﺎء ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮاآﺰ اﻷﺿﺮﺡﺔ ﻋﺰزت 
ﺡﺘﻔﺎل اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي ﻟﻤﺸﺎهﺪ ﻟﺘﻮاﺝﺪ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﺕﻢ هﺬا اﻹﻗﺼﺎء ﻟﻠﻤﻮاﻟﺪ، ﺡﻴﺚ ﺕﻢ ﺕﺤﻮﻳﻞ ﻣﺤﻴﻂ اﻻ 
 .اﻟﺴﻤﺎح ﻷﺷﻜﺎل اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎﻟﻴﺎت اﻷﺥﺮى ﺑﺎﻻﺳﺘﻤﺮار ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻬﺎﻣﺶ
ﺕﺸﻴﺮ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ هﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺪور اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي واﻟﺠﺪﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﻤﻤﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﻤﺠﺴﺪة واﻷﺳﺎﻟﻴﺐ 
 -ن اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎل إ.  اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﻈﺎهﺮ واﻷﻳﺪﻟﻮﺝﻴﺔ : اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﻌﺮﻳﻒ اﻟﺪﻳﻦ واﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ، أو ﺑﺎﺥﺘﺼﺎر 
 ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ ﺑﻄﺮﻳﻘﺔ ﻣﻌﻴﻨﺔ أو ﻧﻘﺪهﺎ أو اﻟﺪﻓﺎع ﻋﻨﻬﺎ أو اﻋﺘﺒﺎرهﺎ  ﻧﻮﻋًﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻠﻜﻠﻮر -أو ﻋﺪم اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎل 
أو إﻋﺎدة ﺕﻨﻈﻴﻤﻬﺎ، آﻠﻬﺎ ﻃﺮق ﻟﻠﺘﻌﺒﻴﺮ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺘﺰام ﺑﺮؤﻳﺔ ﻣﻌﻴﻨﺔ ﻟﻠﺪﻳﻦ واﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ واﻟﺬات ﻳﺘﻢ اﻟﺘﻌﺒﻴﺮ 
ﺨﻴﻤﺔ واﻟﻤﺸﺎرآﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻄﻌﺎم  ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺜﺎل، ﻓﺈن اﻟﺠﻠﻮس ﻓﻲ اﻟ .ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﺼﺮﻓﺎت واﻟﻤﻈﺎهﺮ 
ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻳﻤﺮ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻳﻨﺘﻘﺪون هﺬﻩ اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎﻟﻴﺎت ﺛﻢ . ﻳﻤﺜﻞ ﻟﺤﻈﺎت ﻣﻦ اﻟﺮوﺡﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻟﺰاﺋﺮي اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ 
. ﻳﺸﻴﺮون إﻟﻰ ﻣﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺨﻴﻤﺔ وﻳﺼﻔﻮن ﻣﺎ ﻳﺤﺪث ﻋﻠﻰ أﻧﻪ ﺕﻌﺒﻴﺮ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻌﺘﻘﺪات هﺆﻻء اﻟﺠﺎﻟﺴﻴﻦ 
ﻪ إﺝﺮاء ﻟﺰﻳﺎدة اﻟﻮﻋﻲ وﻳﺄﻣﺮ ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻮ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﺑﻨﻘﻞ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺨﻴﻤﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺸﻮارع اﻟﺨﻠﻔﻴﺔ ﻗﺎﺋﻠﻴﻦ إﻧ 
 .اﻟﻌﺎم
ﻟﻜﻦ . إن اﻟﻤﻈﺎهﺮ واﻟﻤﻤﺎرﺳﺎت اﻻﺡﺘﻔﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﻬﻤﺔ ﻷﻧﻪ ﻳﺘﻢ ﻣﺴﺎواﺕﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻌﺘﻘﺪات واﻟﻤﻮاﻗﻒ 
ﻋﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﻤﻈﺎهﺮ ﺑﺎﻷﻳﺪﻟﻮﺝﻴﺔ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﺛﺎﺑﺘﺔ، إﻧﻬﺎ ﺕﺨﻀﻊ ﻟﻠﺠﺪل اﻟﻤﺘﻮاﺹﻞ، وهﺬا ﻣﺎ ﻳﺤﺪث ﺡﻮل 
 .ﻗﻀﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﻮاﻟﺪ
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Transcription of Arabic 
Arabic names and terms are transcribed in this thesis according to the guidelines of 
the German Oriental Society.1 If there are different pronunciations of a term, for 
example classical mawlid, colloquial mÙlid and hypercorrect mawlad, the classical 
pronunciation of the term is preferred, unless the colloquial and classical 
pronunciations have different meanings (such as classical muÝallim “teacher” and 
colloquial maÝallim “master of a craft”). Arabic text passages and purely colloquial 
terms are transcribed as phonetically as possible within the system of Orientalist 
transcription. Some letters, however, are pronounced differently in different Egyptian 
dialects. The letter ج is pronounced as g in Cairo and large cities, and Ê in Upper 
Egypt and the Lower Egyptian countryside. The letter ق is pronounced as Þ (glottal 
stop) in Cairo and large cities, g in Upper Egypt, and g or q in the Lower Egyptian 
countryside. For the sake of clarity, ج and ق are transcribed consequently as Ê and q, 
following their pronunciation in classical Arabic (and parts of the Nile Delta region). 
 
Transcription table 
 
Consonants س s ن n 
ء Þ ش š ﻩ h 
ب b ص Ò و w 
ت t ط Ô ي y 
ث × ظ Û Vowels 
ج Ê ع Ý ا Á 
ح Î غ È و Ù 
خ Ì ف f ي Ð 
د d ق q َـ (fatÎa) a 
ذ Æ ك k ُـ (Ãamma) u 
ر r ل l ِـ (kasra) i 
ز z م m  
 
  
                                                          
1Die Transliteration der arabischen Schrift in ihrer Anwendung auf die 
Hauptliteratursprachen der islamischen Welt, reprint of a memorandum issued by the 
19th International Conference of Orientalists in Rome, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1969. 
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Image 1: Map of Egypt with province capitals and fieldwork sites.
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“This is Islam!”
(young man distributing drinking water at the mawlid of as-Sayyida NafÐsa)
“Why mawlids? There are no mawlids. Why don’t you study something based on the
Sunna?”
(Salafi hotel owner in al-ManÒÙra upon hearing the subject of my research)
12See Hallenberg, Helena: IbrÁhÐm al-DasÙqÐ (1255-96) – a Saint Invented, Helsinki: Department
of Asian and African Studies, University of Helsinki, 1997.
3Service taxis, usually extended Peugeots with three rows of seats that can take up to seven
passengers, are an important form of public transportation between provincial cities. Service taxis
drive throughout the night and charge slightly lower fares than micro-buses and overland coaches.
4LÁ tušadd ar-riÎÁl illÁ ilÁ ×alÁ×ati masÁÊid: al-MasÊid al-ÍarÁm, al-MasÊid al-AqÒÁ, wa-masÊidÐ anÁ.
Muslim, ÑaÎÐÎ: KitÁb al-ÎaÊÊ, ÎadÐ× 511.
5MadÐnat NaÒr (Nasr City), on the eastern side of Cairo, is one the city’s up-scale districts that
are often associated with loose morals in the popular imagination. The district of Haram
(Pyramids Road), on the western side of Cairo, hosts Egypt’s largest red light district.
Chapter One: Introduction
1. A controversy
In October 2002, the city of DisÙq was in a festive mood. The annual mawlid festival
held in honour of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ, a Muslim saint who lived in the 13th century
A.D.,2 gradually built up steam, attracting larger crowds day by day. Growing streams of
pilgrims and visitors crowded the city while colourful tents, stalls, and carpets filled its
squares and streets. But even as an atmosphere of celebration enveloped the city, not
everyone was enthusiastic about the approaching festival.
I was travelling in a service taxi3 to DisÙq two days before the final night of the
mawlid when I witnessed a heated argument about the festivity among the passengers. It
began as a matter-of-fact discussion between the driver and the passengers about the
growing amount of traffic during the mawlid, until one of the passengers, sitting in the
front, declared in a loud voice:
‘But of course the mawlid means undertaking a pilgrimage (šadd ar-riÎÁl), and the Prophet
said: “Undertaking the pilgrimage is only allowed to three mosques: the mosque of Mecca,
al-AqÒÁ mosque, and my own mosque [in Medina].”’4
Another passenger, sitting in the middle, disagreed:
‘The people go there out of love! They go there saying “There is no deity but God and
MuÎammad is the apostle of God!”’
Man in the front: ‘No, they don’t say “There is no deity but God” at all! Ninety per cent
of the people there don’t even pray! And there is gambling and drugs and prostitution
and all that filth!
Man in the middle: ‘Well go to Cairo, check it out, you’ll find the same filth. From
MadÐnat NaÒr to Haram5, from south to north, you’ll find it all there as well! You
shouldn’t judge the whole thing [i.e. the mawlid] because of some deviations!’
Man in the front: ‘And what about the people who stay there on the street and in tents, you
see them using the street as a toilet!’
Man in the middle: ‘Then why won’t the government build them toilets!?’
The heated discussion then calmed down a little and turned to the qualities and miracles
of saints, until a man in the middle row on the right brought it back to mawlids again:
‘But it’s clear that the mawlids are all (rises his voice) a bidÝa! (i.e. an illegitimate
innovation in religion)’
Man in the front: ‘BidÝa!’
A man sitting on the left: ‘BidÝa!’
Man on the right: ‘Even the mawlid of the Prophet, peace be upon him, is a bidÝa that has
been invented by the people, he is innocent of it.’
Driver: ‘And these things are an invention of the Fatimids.’
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The man in the middle tried to add his opinion but he was clearly the minority in this
discussion, and thus the talk moved on to other topics.
The men in this service taxi were not alone in their views. Mawlid festivals are highly
controversial in contemporary Egypt. While great numbers of Egyptians attend these
festivities in honour of saints and describe them in terms of love, spirituality and joy, a
critical view of mawlids is widespread in the public sphere and among a significant
proportion of the population. But what is so striking about this discussion is not so
much the fact that some people like or dislike mawlids, but rather the passion with which
they do so. Critics’ vehement treatment of mawlids has nothing of the easy-going
statements of taste that people make in regard to movies or food, nor of the tongue-in-
cheek fanaticism that people display when they speak about football. Of course, there are
people who simply do not particularly like mawlids, be it due to the crowds, the noise,
or any other reason. But for the men in the service taxi who criticised the mawlid, the
festivity is not a matter of taste that one is free to like or dislike. For them, the mawlid
is a grave issue indeed, and much more than personal preference is at stake.
What is it about a mawlid, then, that bothers them so much? Or, to ask the same
question from a different perspective, what kind of a view of society and religion informs
their critical judgement of the mawlid? These questions form the subject of this study in
which I look at mawlids as a subject of interpretation, controversy and representation.
This thesis does not, therefore, only concern mawlids.  It takes the debates on mawlids
as a point of crystallisation for much wider issues of concern in Egyptian society: What
does it mean to be a modern citizen and in what relation does this stand with being a
Muslim? How should a society inhabited by modern Muslim citizens be structured and
organised? What kinds of visions of religion, civility and social order are attached to
festive practices? 
My primary aim is not to present a historiography or an ethnography of the customs,
rituals and milieus of mawlid festivals. Of course these issues cannot and are not be
ignored, but my primary focus is on the various understandings of piety, festivity, social
order, and the self that inform the different interpretations people give to mawlids. Such
an approach differs from an ethnography of a festive tradition or an argumentation
analysis of a debate through its focus on the relationship between discourse and practice,
or, in a different formulation, its view of discourse as a practice, that is, the active – and
potentially strategic – definition and construction of social reality that informs the
actions one takes. In other words, this study problematises the relations between festive
practices, public discourses, and ongoing religious and social transformations in order
to explore the discursive commonplaces that guide festive practice and its criticism. These
commonplaces are typically treated as self-evident to the degree that they are not made
explicit at all. Yet they become visible in matters of controversy like that surrounding
mawlids, often less through the exact reasoning of the arguments put forth than by the
ellipses and gaps that point at unspoken premises.
This focus on the contestation of piety, festivity and social order can be described as
one centring on cultural politics: the way different understandings of and control over
society, morality and polity are contested on the level of cultural practices or
representations. To speak of mawlids from the perspective of politics implies a focus on
power, or more specifically, on hegemony, that is, ‘the power to determine the structuring
3Introduction
6In this understanding, hegemony, like discourse, is not confined to the field of ideas and
ideologies, but must also be seen as a mode of action. Crehan, Kate, Gramsci, Culture and
Anthropology, London: Pluto Press, 2002, p. 204.
rules within which struggles are to be fought out’.6 When people celebrate, organise,
reform, criticise, defend or describe mawlids, they are engaged in a struggle over
hegemony that involves wider issues. In the case of mawlids, the contested issues are:
– festivity, its meaning and function;
– piety, that is, the way religiosity is expressed in habitus and its place in social practice;
– civility, that is, the spatial, temporal and bodily structure of moral and civic
boundaries;
– modernity, that is, the function of these boundaries for the development of the nation
as whole; and
– the body and the self, that is, the way these issues are expressed in a disposition of the
body and a state of mind, and the way the relationship between appearances and inner
states is conceived.
In the following chapters, I do not discuss these issues separately. They are inseparable
in the debates, and so must be addressed together in their analysis. Instead, I structure my
argumentation as a sequence of changing perspectives that, step by step, sheds light on
the foundations, functions, genealogies and consequences of the debates. The form and
elements of mawlids, the interpretation of the festivities by their participants, the critical
discourse on mawlids including its emergence and significance, the defence of mawlids,
the attempts to rationalise the ambivalence characteristic for many perceptions of
mawlids, and the enactment of the debate on mawlids in administrative and festive
practice, all have a logic of their own and require an analysis of their own.
After a critical review of previous research on the subject and a discussion of
fieldwork and method, the analysis begins with a third-person view on the structure of
mawlids. It then moves to the interpretations given to the festivities by their participants,
followed by the criticism of mawlids and its genealogy and function in the current
hegemonic constructions of religion and the nation, and the attempts to defend mawlids
against criticism. The focus then turns to the complex representations of mawlids as
popular heritage and folkloric art, finally followed by the transformations of the
festivities along their discursive representations throughout the 20th century.
2. Studying mawlids
Mawlids have been often described and studied, most commonly in the context of
research on Sufism (Islamic mysticism) and popular Islam. Yet our understanding of the
complex nature of these festivities and their place in society has remained limited. This
limited understanding has been mainly due to a long-standing Orientalist paradigm of
a definition of Islam that ignores the historicity of its subject, but it is also to some
degree attributable to the complex nature of the festivity that is difficult to grasp through
research conducted among clearly limited social groups, notably Sufi orders.
The first works with extensive ethnographic documentation of mawlids appeared in
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7Lane, Edward William, An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, reprint
of the 1895 edition, London et al.: East-West Publications, 1989 (18361), pp. 241-249, 436-462.
8MubÁrak, ÝAlÐ BÁšÁ, ÝAlam ad-dÐn, Alexandria: MaÔbaÝat ÊarÐdat al-MaÎrÙsa, 1299/1882, vol. 1,
pp. 139- 163; Idem, al-ËiÔaÔ al-ÊadÐda li-MiÒr al-QÁhira wa-mudunihÁ wa-bilÁdihÁ al-qadÐma wa-š-šahÐra,
Cairo: al-MaÔbaÝa al-kubrÁ al-amÐrÐya, 1305 [1886/1887], e.g. vol. 13, pp. 50 f.
9McPherson, J.W., The Moulids of Egypt (Egyptian Saint-Days), Cairo 1941.
10Biegman, Nicolaas H., Egypt: Moulids, Saints, Sufis, Den Haag: Schwarz / Kegan, 1990.
11The Moulids of Egypt, e.g. pp. 3-5, 29 f., 228 f., 306 f. Another, more individual theoretical trait
in McPherson’s work is the determined anti-modernism he expresses, for example, in his sympathy
for the communal experience of the mawlid, his repeated lamentation of the ‘kill-joy’ tendency of
modernity, and his short excursion against jazz (see pp. 6-28, 93-97). It is possible that McPherson
was either involved in or sympathetic to Traditionalism, an spiritual-intellectual movement that
enjoyed some presence among the European community of Cairo in the 1930s and 40s. See
Sedgwick, Mark, ‘Against Modernity: Western Traditionalism and Islam,’ ISIM Newsletter 7 (2001),
p. 11.
12Goldziher, Ignaz, Mohammedanische Studien, Halle: Niemeyer, 1889, vol. 2, pp.  275-378.
13Ibid., p. 338.
14Mayeur-Jaouen, Catherine, ‘Égypte’, in Henri Chambert-Loir / Claude Guillot (eds), Le culte
des saints dans le monde musulman, Paris: École française d’Extrême-Orient, 1995, pp. 61-73, here p.
71.
15Most recently, Georg Stauth has drawn on Goldziher’s work in an attempt to reconstruct the
ancient Middle Eastern god-king in the figure of the Muslim saint. Stauth, Georg, ‘Skizzen zur
materiellen Kultur des religiösen Ortes (Islam)’, in H. Schrader / M. Kaiser / R. Korff, Markt,
the 19th century, most notably those by Edward William Lane7 and ÝAlÐ MubÁrak Pasha,8
both of whom included public festivals as a part of their descriptions of Egyptian culture
and society. Likewise, the two most prominent 20th century works on mawlids are also
characterised by a primarily descriptive nature. The Moulids of Egypt9 (1940) by the British
colonial officer J.W. McPherson, a standard work to this day, contains a detailed account
of a great number of mawlids around the country but only a little in terms of
interpretation. Egypt: Moulids, Saints, Sufis10 (1990) by Nicolaas Biegman, the former
Dutch ambassador to Cairo, is a photo book that, although well-researched and
systematic, was not written as an academic study. Highly valuable in terms of
ethnography, both books share a focus on documenting mawlids, but not on interpreting
their various meanings in Egyptian society.
That said, such descriptive studies are never devoid of some implicit theoretical
framework. McPherson, for example, is frequently engaged in a search for traces of pre-
Islamic cults.11 In doing so, he stands in a line of interpretation that was current in his
time. This theory, concerning mawlids in particular and popular festivals and the cult of
Muslim saints in general, made its first appearance in the 19th century. Its most
prominent, although not first, representative was Ignaz Goldziher, who in his
Mohammedanische Studien (1889)12 interprets the cult of saints in its entirety as a trace of
pre-Islamic customs that, in the form of popular piety, have been superimposed on the
presumably original pure and rigid monotheism of Islam. For Goldziher, the mawlids
of Egypt are consequently ‘the last heirs of those ancient Egyptian rites’.13 
More recent studies (notably those by Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen) have shown that
both the material evidence for such trans-historical continuity and its value for
understanding the meaning of the tradition to the people involved in it are in fact very
weak.14 Despite this, Goldziher’s analysis and its likes have remained influential to date15
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Kultur, und Gesellschaft, Münster: Lit Verlag, 2001, pp. 149-166.
16See, e.g. ibid., pp. 277-290.
17This approach has become increasingly questioned in recent studies, notably by Abu-Zahra,
Nadia, The Pure and Powerful: Studies in Contemporary Muslim Society, Berkshire: Ithaca Press, 1997,
pp. 37-49; and Mayeur-Jaouen, Catherine, Histoire d’un pèlerinage légendaire en Islam: Le mouled de
Tantâ du XIIIe siècle a nos jours, Paris: Aubier, 2004, pp. 15-23.
18ÝAbd al-LaÔÐf, MuÎammad FahmÐ, as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ wa-dawlat ad-darÁwÐš fÐ MiÒr (Maktabat
ad-dirÁsÁt aš-šaÝbÐya; 30), Cairo: al-HayÞa al-miÒrÐya al-ÝÁmma li-l-kitÁb, 1999 (19481); ÝUways, Sayyid,
‘Min malÁÎim al-muÊtamaÝ al-MiÒrÐ al-muÝÁÒir: ÛÁhirat irsÁl ar-rasÁÞil ilÁ ÃarÐÎ al-imÁm aš-ŠÁfiÝÐ’,
in al-AÝmÁl al-kÁmilÁ li-d-duktÙr Sayyid ÝUways, Cairo: Markaz al-maÎrÙsa, vol. 1, pp. 9-314; Idem,
‘al-IzdiwÁÊÐya fÐ t-turÁ× ad-dÐnÐ al-miÒrÐ: dirÁsa ×aqÁfÐya iÊtimÁÝÐya tÁrÐÌÐya’, in al-AÝmÁl al-kÁmilÁ
li-d-duktÙr Sayyid ÝUways, vol. 1, pp. 624-699.; MuÒÔafÁ, FÁrÙq AÎmad, al-MawÁlid: dirÁsa li-l-ÝÁdÁt
wa-t-taqÁlÐd aš-šaÝbÐya fÐ MiÒr, 2nd ed., Alexandria: al-HayÞa al-miÒrÐya al-ÝÁmma li-l-kitÁb, 1981.
19In 1965, the šayÌ al-Azhar MaÎmÙd ŠaltÙt issued a fatwÁ condemning the celebration of
mawlids. Abu-Zahra, The Pure and Powerful, pp. 205 f.
because they offer a simple analytic grid and a strongly normative view of Islam.
Goldziher’s Islam is one that is originally pure, rational and abstract, but which has been
influenced by syncretisms over the centuries.16 This view has left a lasting mark on
Western Islamic studies whereby certain scriptural intellectual traditions have been
identified as the ‘proper’ orthodox Islam and everything else has been conveniently
labelled as ‘popular Islam’ and left for ethnographers and anthropologists to study, who,
in turn, long ignored the ways popular piety is embedded in the scriptural tradition.17
In its normative construction of true Islam, this view has also been eagerly taken on
by Salafi modernists who, as I argue in chapter five, have been engaged in the active
redefinition of Islam in confrontation with colonial and Orientalist representations.
Egyptian folklorists and social scientists, notably MuÎammad FahmÐ ÝAbd al-LaÔÐf,
Sayyid ÝUways and FÁrÙq MuÒÔafÁ18 have further developed the image of mawlids and the
cult of saints as a popular tradition separate from but attached to religion, accompanied
by a clear normative judgement in disfavour of the popular tradition (see chapter seven).
The result of this line of interpretation has been that the study of mawlids has very often
been framed by the opposition of orthodoxy and popular religion, while these categories
in and of themselves have remained strikingly unquestioned.
In May 2003 I presented some of the results of my fieldwork at the German Academic
Exchange Service in Cairo. After the lecture, a man from the audience spoke up to
criticise me for showing things that, in his opinion, presented a terribly incorrect image
of Islam. His advice to me was to inform myself of the opinion of al-Azhar university
because this honourable institution, as Egypt’s highest religious authority and the true
guardian of the orthodoxy, could provide me with the objectively true Islamic point of
view. Indeed, ordinary Egyptians and western and local scholars alike display a deep and
profound faith in the orthodoxy of al-Azhar. Some Egyptians have told me that al-Azhar,
of course, is opposed to mawlids, while others have said that al-Azhar, of course, is
supportive of them. In conferences and discussions with academics in Europe I have
repeatedly encountered the assumption that ‘the orthodox ÝulamÁÞ’ are opposed to
mawlids and anything of the like. This is rather strange, however, because al-Azhar as an
institution has published no official views on mawlids at all since the 1960s,19 while
individual sheikhs of al-Azhar have in fact published views of all kinds. The reason for
this distorted perception is the long-standing Orientalist tradition of defining a strictly
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21See also Ñawt al-Azhar, 23.5.2003: MuÎammad Sayyid ÓanÔÁwÐ, ‘Li-mÁÆÁ naÎtafil bi-l-mawlid
an-nabawÐ aš-šarÐf’, p. 7.
22Ibid. p. 216, note 7. It is worth noting that Schussman refers to Goldziher to substantiate this
interpretation.
23Ibid. p. 215.
24Ibid., p. 233, citing Lazarus-Yafeh, H., ‘MuÎammad MutawallÐ aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ – a Portrait of a
Contemporary ÝÀlim in Egypt’, in G.R. Warburg / U.M. Kupferschmidt (eds), Islam and
Nationalism in Egypt and the Sudan, Praeger: New York, 1983, pp. 281-297, here p. 282.
scripturalist intellectual reading (that is opposed to ecstatic and mystic tendencies) as the
orthodox Islam. Based on this often implicit assumption, many researchers of popular
Sufism have reached rather questionable results.
An outstanding and recent case of this assumption is Aviva Schussman’s study on a
fatwÁ by al-Azhar concerning the legitimacy of mawlid an-nabÐ.20 The birthday of the
Prophet Muhammad is celebrated widely throughout the Muslim world, and in Egypt
it is a major public holiday. Although some Salafis consider it illegitimate, their view is
marginal in Egyptian public media and scholarly debates. And unlike the case of mawlids
held in honour of saints, there is enough consensus within al-Azhar to actually issue a
fatwÁ on the matter.21 Schussman, however, starts with the unquestioned assumption that
the cult of saints and the Prophet is ‘contrary to MuÎammad’s early message’22 and that
orthodox Muslim scholars are opposed to mawlid an-nabÐ.23 The fatwÁ that legitimises the
festivity in principle but stipulates certain conditions concerning the form of celebration
is, according to Schussman, nothing but a half-hearted compromise to popular religion
and does not even fulfill the formal criteria of a legal fatwÁ, sounding, rather, more like
a popular sermon:
‘In conclusion, the fatwÁ seems evasive, tenuous, vague, and to some extent – erroneous.
It creates the impression that the muftÐ hardly approves of the mawlid and totally
disapproves of the popular ceremonies involved; but for pragmatic reasons he carefully
considers – first and foremost – his audience’s social needs and wishes. This may be the
reason why he does not establish his legal attitude to the mawlid. Thus, on the one hand
the fatwÁ reflects the flexibility of a religious leader towards his people; on the other hand
it reflects a concession by a scholar to popular religion. Is this a sign of “the general
decline of modern religious thought in Islam and in contemporary Egypt?”’24
In fact, the fatwÁ in question is a very typical example of the fatwÁs that are issued by al-
Azhar: scholarly discussion is kept to a minimum and the line of reasoning is easy to
follow but diplomatic, producing a careful balance between different currents. Claiming
that, formally, this is not really a fatwÁ at all is only possible if one takes the scholarly
conventions of a different era as an ossified, ahistorical ideal to which contemporary
orthodox scholarship should adhere. More importantly, however, there is no urgent
reason to assume that the fatwÁ only makes concessions to ‘popular religion’ (a highly
problematic term I address in chapter seven). It is equally reasonable to assume that the
scholars who wrote the fatwÁ actually like the popular mawlid celebrations but need to
phrase their opinion carefully in order not to compromise their habitus as stern,
orthodox scholars. After all, the ÝulamÁÞ of al-Azhar grow up in ordinary Egyptian
families, and it is quite likely that they have at some point thoroughly enjoyed the festive
joy and tasty sweets of mawlid an-nabÐ. Finally, it makes very little sense to suggest that
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(Gellner, Ernest, Muslim Society, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 4 f.).
Gellner’s interpretation has been followed by some attempts to reinterpret ‘popular’ in order to
also include populist political movements (Waardenburg, Jacques, ‘Popular and official Islam:
Contemporary developments with special reference to Iran’, The Arabist: Budapest Studies in Arabic
such a fatwÁ is an expression of decline just because it does not work the way Orientalist
common sense would expect.25
Orthodoxy, to stick with the exemplary case, is produced, not given. It makes little
sense to blame al-Azhar for not playing orthodox because what is recognised as the
dominant, authoritative reading of Islam varies in different historical settings. Itzchak
Weismann and Leila Hudson, in their studies on the Sufis and scholars of 19th century
Damascus,26 have demonstrated that there was never a precise moment of dramatic break
when popular, heterodox Sufism was replaced by orthodox Salafi Islam. What actually
happened was that some of the Sufi-oriented and maÆhab-based orthodox scholars
initiated a Sufi-minded reform movement that slowly shifted – in consecutive waves of
reform and not without conflict – towards a Salafi-oriented rationalism and the
rehabilitation of iÊtihÁd. In a process that lasted more than 50 years and involved
successive generations of orthodox scholars, the meaning of orthodoxy shifted. Hence,
it makes little sense to ask what orthodox Islam says about mawlids. The question that
does more justice to Islamic scholars and is more fruitful to analysis is how orthodoxy
is constructed through certain judgements of controversial issues.
Schussman’s article exemplifies the way many researchers of contemporary Islam still
start their research with ready-made assumptions about the actors, ideologies and
interests involved. Meanwhile many scholars in the field have credibly questioned such
assumptions including those about ‘orthodoxy’, most notably Malika Zeghal in her study
on the ÝulamÁÞ of al-Azhar,27 and Nadia Abu-Zahra in her study of the veneration of as-
Sayyida Zaynab.28 Yet it remains very common to draw a dividing line between official
or orthodox Islam, or Great Tradition (meaning intellectual scholarly trends and modern
Salafi movements), and popular Islam, or Small Tradition (meaning communal and
mystical traditions), without considering the historical and contextual character of such
categories.29 Moreover, orthodoxy is only one case of contextual categories that are far too
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easily taken as general distinctions to guide one’s research without adequately analysing
their theoretical and practical validity. Other cases relevant to this study are the
construction of a fundamental ideological split between secularists and Islamists,30 the
dissociation of Islamism and modernism, and the assumption that the public sphere is
a site of empowerment and contestation of state hegemony.31 As I show in chapters four
and five, all these assumptions are valid in specific contexts but might turn highly
misleading in others.
For this reason I abstain from analysing the debates on mawlids along the usual lines
of dichotomies such as Islamists and secularists, government and opposition, or
orthodox and popular Islam. Instead, I approach the debates on mawlids by beginning
with what people say about them and then moving on to reconstruct the relevant
discursive fields. This approach quickly compelled me to give up distinctions that I, in
the early stages of my research, had assumed to be relevant. The general image given by
much of Egyptian public debate, but also Western literature, is that traditional(ist) Sufis
support mawlids as a part of the popular religion they represent while orthodox scholars
of al-Azhar and the Islamists oppose them because they are un-Islamic, and secular
modernists stand above the debate. This image represents one particular point of view in
the contestation of religion and modernity in Egypt. It is neither an accurate nor
comprehensive description of the debates surrounding mawlids. While holding mutually
exclusive points of view on issues such as, say, family law, Islamists and secularists may
in fact share very similar views in regard to Sufism, mawlids, and popular culture.
Moreover, al-Azhar, the institution taken to represent unified Islamic orthodoxy, is far
from united on the issue of mawlids.
Just as categories like orthodoxy and modernity do not exist beyond the social actions
that construct them, festivities, beliefs and rituals do not have a hidden authentic
meaning inherent in them but obscure to their believers and practitioners. On the
contrary, they are given meanings by their participants. These meanings are subject to
change, and only understandable through their construction via forms of discourse and
modes of action. This is why I consider research based on fixed classifications such as
orthodoxy and popular Islam biassed and misleading. Instead of taking these
classifications for granted, it is necessary to explore how they are defined and established
through social practice and discursive description and contestation.
Prior to the 1960s, the focus on textual traditions in Oriental studies and on small
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Istanbul: The Isis Press, [ca. 2000].
village communities in anthropology left urban Muslim piety largely beyond the focus
of research. Large mawlids were never restricted to village communities, however, and by
the mid-20th century they had developed into a primarily urban affair. Yet for a long
time, they remained lumped under the diffuse category of popular Islam that effectively
isolated them from the study of ‘proper’ Islamic piety.32 With the transformation of the
methodological and theoretical foundations of both historical and anthropological
research, Sufism and the veneration of saints slowly developed into a relevant topic for
researchers, and cities became a respectable place for anthropologists to conduct their
fieldwork. Simultaneously, the focus of research shifted towards attempting to interpret
the social construction of tradition and the meanings given to it by the people involved.
The ground-breaking work in this direction was Michael Gilsenan’s Saint and Sufi in
Modern Egypt, based on fieldwork conducted in the mid-1960s and published in 1973.33 A
study on the reformist Sufi group al-ÍÁmidÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya, Saint and Sufi was a crucial
step towards an understanding of the ways religion, religious practice, and orthodoxy are
constructed and established in a given social and historical setting. Although partly
limited by restrictions imposed on Gilsenan’s fieldwork by the Egyptian authorities,
Gilsenan’s study of the way a Sufi order works, including a remarkable investigation of
how the ÍÁmidÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya employs the mawlid of its founder for mobilisation and
self-representation, remains useful to date.
Saint and Sufi has since been followed by a number of empirical studies on Sufism in
Egypt. In The Hidden Government34 (1990), Edward Reeves presented the first Western
ethnography on mawlids and the veneration of Muslim saints in the Nile Delta region35
and a much too little appreciated analysis of the cult of saints from the perspective of
clientelism. Between 1991 and 1993, Pierre Luizard published several articles on Sufi
orders, mawlids, and their relationship to the state.36 Luizard, like many of his successors,
relied heavily on Fred de Jong’s historiography of Sufi orders in 19th century Egypt, a
standard work until today.37 The first extensive ethnography of contemporary Sufism was
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Publications IFPO, 2005; Chanfi, Ahmed (ed.), ‘Nouveaux visages du soufisme”, theme issue of
Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions, Vol. 133 (January-March 2006), forthcoming.
43de Jong, Frederick/ Berndt Radtke (eds), Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of
Controversies and Polemics,  Leiden et al.: Brill, 1999.
provided by Valerie Hoffman in her  Sufis, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt (1995),38 a
monumental work of broad scope on Sufi practice in contemporary Egypt that
significantly contributed to correcting the image of Sufism being on the brink of
extinction. The following years saw a rapid increase of studies on Sufi rituals and
reformist Sufism. Julian Johansen’s Sufism and Islamic Reform in Egypt (1996)39 was the first
study devoted to the debate on Sufism and Sufi traditions and the attempts of reformist
Sufis to respond to the criticisms directed at them. The Pure and Powerful (1997), by Nadia
Abu-Zahra, focusses on the saint veneration of as-Sayyida Zaynab in Cairo. Michael
Frishkopf’s PhD thesis Sufism, Ritual and Modernity in Egypt (1999)40 looks at the way
some Sufi orders reshape their rituals to fit modernist standards of ritual and bodily
disposition. Rachida Chih’s Le Soufisme au Quotidien (2000)41 offers a detailed and
profound study of the ËalwatÐya Sufi brotherhood. At the same time, Sufi movements,
local Muslim pilgrimages, and the debates surrounding them have become a subject of
research at sites around the Muslim world, most prominently in the Indian sub-continent
and West Africa.42 From a historical perspective, the transformations of and debates on
Sufi practice have become an established field of research, most notably represented in
the edited volume Islamic Mysticism Contested (1999)43.
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44Madoeuf, Anna: ‘Les grands mûlid-s: des vieux quartiers du Caire aux territoires de l’islam’,
in Guy Di Méo (ed.), La géographie en fêtes, Paris: Ophrys, 2001, pp. 155-265. Pagès-El Karoui,
Delphine, ‘Le mouled de Sayyid al-Badawî à Tantâ: logiques spatiales et production d’une identité
urbaine’, in Chiffoleau / Madoeuf (eds), Les pelerinages, pp. 237-264.
45Mayeur-Jaouen, Catherine, Al-Sayyid AÎmad al-BadawÐ: un grand saint de l’islam égyptien, Cairo:
Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 1994; Idem (ed.), Saints et Héros du Moyen-Orient
contemporain, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2002; Idem, Histoire d’un pèlerinage; Idem, Pèlerinages
d'Égypte. Histoire de la piété copte et musulmane (XVe-XXe siècles), Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS, 2005;
Idem, ‘Le corps entre sacré et profane: la réforme des pratiques pèlerines en Égypte (XIXe-XXe
siècles)’, Revue d’Etudes des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée, forthcoming.
These studies have contributed to a better understanding of mystical and communal
spirituality and the significance of mawlids to it. Yet they all focus on Sufi orders, with
the exception of Reeves and Abu-Zahra, who focus on specific pilgrimage sites. The
consequence of this  focus is that mawlids do not appear as a discrete phenomenon, but
rather as an epiphenomenon of Sufism or the Muslim cult of saints. This perception very
much reflects the point of view of the mystics and pilgrims who are the main empirical
source of these works, but it largely overlooks elements of mawlids that are not
immediately related to Sufism and the veneration of saints.
Mawlids are based on, but are not identical with, Sufism and the veneration of saints.
A saint’s festival would be impossible to celebrate without the presence of a saint’s tomb
and the collective effort of active mystics. To a large extent,  pilgrimage to the saint’s
tomb is the core of the mawlid festivity. But while most participants share a general
sympathy for mystical spirituality, they need not be fully devoted to it. For them a
mawlid is a complex festive experience that involves more than mysticism and sainthood.
And in fact, for many participants, spirituality and sainthood play only a marginal role,
and some of the people who wholeheartedly celebrate a mawlid may actually be openly
hostile to Sufism and the veneration of saints.
The complexity of mawlids is acknowledged by devout Sufis who readily agreed when
I explained that I did not study Sufism but rather mawlids and that mawlids are not only
about Sufism just like Sufism is not only about mawlids. Yet in studies that look at
mawlids in a Sufi context, much of the festive practice, most notably the neighbourhood
festivities and the wild, unruly celebrations of roaming youths, appear as a background
scenery at best. To fill this gap, some researchers have recently turned their attention
specifically to mawlids. The geographers Anna Madoeuf and Delphine Pagès-El Karoui44
have chosen a direction of analysis very different from the studies on Sufi orders, looking
at the spatial and temporal construction of festivity and the ways a mawlid transforms
and establishes urban space and social order. Their work has been highly influential to
this thesis, as have been the recent works of Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen who, from the
perspective of a historian, has written extensively on mawlids and the cult of Muslim
saints. Her work includes a study on the biography of as-Sayyid AÎmad al-BadawÐ, a
historiography of his mawlid in ÓanÔÁ, and a long-needed general historiography of
mawlids in Egypt.45
This thesis builds on the empirical and analytical findings of these works but takes
a somewhat different perspective. With its focus on mawlids as a subject of contestation,
it stands in a line of research on Islamic religion and Muslim societies (notably the work
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46Mitchell, Timothy, Colonising Egypt, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988; Starrett,
Gregory, ‘The hexis of interpretation: Islam and the body in the Egyptian popular school’,
American Ethnologist 22 (1995), 4, pp. 953-969; Armbrust, Walter, Mass Culture and Modernism in
Egypt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Abu-Lughod, Lila, ‘Feminist Longings and
Postcolonial Conditions’, in Lila Abu-Lughod, (ed.), Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity
in the Middle East, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1998, pp. 3-31.
47Foucault, Michel, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. New York:
Pantheon Books, 1972, p. 46.
48Such as suggested by Shepard, William E., ‘Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology’,
International Journal of Middle East Studies 19 (1987), pp. 307-336.
of Timothy Mitchell, Gregory Starrett, Walter Armbrust, and Lila Abu-Lughod)46 that
seeks to deconstruct the nationalist narratives of reform and modernisation and to
analyse their underlying mechanisms of exclusion and relations of hegemony. In doing
so, it is a critical project that questions the validity of the narratives of progress and
development commonly offered in Egyptian nationalist historiography and political
discourse, but also in a number of international academic and non-academic
publications. This does not mean, however,  that I propose a nostalgic view of the subject:
mawlids are based on their own relations of power, and it would be naïve to view them
as a site of popular empowerment in the face of modernist hegemony. My intent is not
to take sides with any of the models of society and the self offered by the participants in
the debates, but rather to show the complex and partly contradictory character of those
models and the exclusions they need to make in order to create the harmonic and organic
whole they take as given.
3. Method and fieldwork
The methodological approach of my research has been influenced by my personal
trajectory in the academic field. Originally trained in German Islamic studies with a
strong emphasis on textual study, I later increasingly moved towards the methods and
analytical tools of cultural and social anthropology. In an attempt to exploit the benefits
of both traditions of research whenever possible, I came to combine different analytical
perspectives that may together be labelled as discourse analysis: the study of the ways
people describe, judge and construct social reality through various forms of
communication, be it through informal conversations, oral histories, or literary and
academic writing, to name just a few examples.
The concept of discourse has become heavily inflated in the social and cultural
sciences over the past two decades, to the extent that is has lost much of the power it had
in Foucault’s formulation of ‘discourse itself as practice’.47 To provide more than a mere
trendy label, the study of discourse in the social sciences has to account for this
imminent relationship between saying and doing, of constructing objects through
discourse and acting in a world inhabited by such objects. This is a fairly trivial insight,
but realising it in a study of a controversial social practice requires a complex approach
to the subject, both in the collection of empirical data and in the structure of the text.
I began my research with some hypotheses in mind, most notably expecting to find
a triangle of secular modernist, Islamist, and traditionalist positions.48 However, my early
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49Glaser, Barney G. / Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for
Qualitative Research, 3rd ed., Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970 [19671].
50See Ricoeur, Paul, Histoire et vérité, 3rd ed., Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964 [19551].
51See Marcus, George E.. ‘Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited
Ethnography’ Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995), pp. 95-117.
52Especially to be mentioned are Niek Biegman, Wendy Dunleavy and Jennifer Peterson, who
have offered me a look at their unprocessed material and preliminary conclusions.
hypotheses soon turned out to be inaccurate, and I discarded them in favour of an
approach that bears some similarity to grounded theory, even though I was not versed
with its methodology at the time. Discarding fixed classifications or theories as a starting
point, the first task of an analysis such as that proposed here is to map the classifications
and theories presented by the people involved and the discursive constructions they make
of the subject of mawlids. Only upon completion of this task does it become possible to
move forward with the analysis in order to understand the significance and function of
specific classifications in a specific historical context, and to trace their relationship to
the administrative and festive practices that form and transform the object of debate.49
The method of sampling I have chosen bears some similarity to the work of a
historian: searching for available clues from available sources in an attempt to reconstruct
an accurate and intelligible narrative of what happened or, in this case, continues to
happen.50 The purpose of the data collection was, thus, to find reoccurring patterns of
celebrating, describing and judging mawlids, not to measure their frequency in relation
to other variables. Such a sample must represent the variety and complexity of the issue
with some accuracy but it does not need to be representative in quantitative terms.
Following this approach of theoretical sampling I proceeded with my fieldwork with no
formal criteria for my material, instead allowing the preliminary results of fieldwork and
archive research guide my next steps. This approach quickly enabled me to generate new
interpretations in place of my discarded early hypotheses. It also lead me to opt for multi-
sited fieldwork (not confined to a fixed location or group of people)51 that best suited my
analytical approach.
Researching mawlids, in the plural, I had to take various locations and discourses into
account. My fieldwork was based on a combination of interviews, participant observation
and written sources. This choice of fieldwork and method had its limits, of course. It
broadened the scope of analysis at the cost of the depth that might be reached through
intensive research within a given group. But while analyses of the latter kind have become
readily available and the inner dynamics of a Sufi movement or a site of pilgrimage quite
well understood, our understanding of mawlids as festivities embedded in complex social
relationships and public representations is still far from comprehensive.
The main primary sources for this study are interviews, notes from participant
observation, sound recordings, and photographs taken during fieldwork conducted
between 2002 and 2005. Additionally, I have used press articles covering a period from
the late 1980s to 2005, selected historical sources, contemporary religious and academic
literature, secondary literature on related subjects, motion pictures, television, literary
fiction, historical photographs, maps, and unprocessed data provided by other
researchers in the field.52
In the course of fieldwork I discussed  the subject of mawlids with a variety of people,
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54Meinardus, Otto F.A., Coptic Saints and Pilgrimages, Cairo: The American University in Cairo
Press, 2002, pp. 67-82, Mayeur-Jaouen, Pèlerinages d'Égypte.
sometimes in arranged interviews but usually in informal encounters, and travelled to
mawlids around Egypt to observe the festivities and talk with participants and local
residents. I attended some thirty different mawlids, mostly in Cairo and the Nile Delta
region (Lower Egypt, the region between Cairo and the Mediterranean Sea). This selection
was based on pragmatic considerations: because I stayed in Cairo during my fieldwork,
Greater Cairo and the Nile Delta region were geographically nearby. Additional factors
played a role: state-imposed restrictions concerning the movement of foreigners in Upper
(that is, southern) Egypt were still in force, which caused some limitations on conducting
fieldwork. These factors have together contributed to the landscape of this study: that of
Greater Cairo’s popular districts and Nile Delta cities and villages, a densely populated
region that houses rapid religious and cultural changes. A research focussed on Upper
Egypt, a region poorer and more conservative than Lower Egypt, and characterised by a
strong local identity and the traumatic experience of political and tribal violence, would
have produced different questions and different answers.53
A further limitation to the sample is that this thesis is more about men than it is
about women. This is due to the patterns of gender segregation and standards of modesty
that in Egypt often make it more difficult for women than men to engage in discussion
with a male researcher beyond an exchange of greetings. When available, I have tried to
include women’s accounts to balance the image but the reader should remain aware that
this was not always possible.
Although there is also a strong tradition of Christian saints-day festivals in Egypt,54
this thesis is almost exclusively about Islamic mawlids, the reason being that Christian
pilgrimages have a very different position in the discursive field and would thus require
a separate study. For one thing, they cause significantly less controversy. But more
importantly, the place of Christian pilgrimages in Coptic piety and identity in the wider
public sphere shows some significant differences to related issues in the Islamic tradition.
Christian mawlids are not wholly overlooked in this thesis but they appear primary as
a contrastive case that allows us to question whether and to what degree the debate on
mawlids is specifically Islamic.
Some of the people whose voices are quoted in this thesis present views that are not
accepted in the Egyptian public sphere, in some cases not even within their own circle.
For this reason, most of the people interviewed appear either anonymously or by only
their first name. For the same reason, some locations and Sufi groups have been made
anonymous. On the other hand, many scholars and sheikhs saw the presence of a foreign
researcher as an opportunity to present their views and public persona to an international
audience, a fact they often made very clear to me. These people, as well as persons of
public prominence (for example politicians and public intellectuals), appear with their
full name and credentials.
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55In general, the mawlids of Cairo and Upper Egypt follow the Islamic lunar calendar while in
the Nile Delta they usually take place according to the solar calendar. The fact that the celebrations
often take place on the day of the saint’s death has pragmatic reasons: the saint’s date of birth is
not always known, and the saint cult of a Sufi sheikh often begins with the funeral that becomes
the starting point of an annual ritual. But religious reasons also play a role: death is seen as a union
with God, thus being the real birth of a mystic. The mawlids of descendants of the Prophet
Muhammad in Cairo are usually celebrated near the day of the saints’ death according to the lunar
calendar and based on a fixed day of the week, such as the second Wednesday of ÉumÁdÁ II (as-
Sayyida NafÐsa) or the last Tuesday of RaÊab (as-Sayyida Zaynab). Recently it has become common
to additionally celebrate the birthday (mÐlÁd) of major saints in Cairo. These celebrations, like the
small secondary mawlids known as raÊabÐya (although they usually do not take place in the month
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Chapter Two: At the mawlid
Sometimes when I asked people what the mawlid of their town looked like, they told me:
‘It looks just like a mawlid!’. On one occasion, I met a young man at a shooting stand
during the mawlid of as-Sayyida NafÐsa in Cairo. He was having the time of his life and
exclaimed: ‘The mawlid is mawlid!’ (meaning approximately: ‘This mawlid is really
rocking!’). The mawlid, it seems, has a specific imagery and atmosphere so vivid that
‘mawlid’ is description enough.
So what does a mawlid look like, then? To an outsider, the initial appearance is utterly
chaotic. It is characterised by a colourful mixture of Sufi pilgrims, roaming youths,
families in front of their homes, amusements, trade, ecstatic piety and solemn
commemoration, all framed by colourful lights and very loud Sufi music. 
The character of different mawlids varies greatly depending on the regional and social
setting of the festivity as well as the public in attendance. But certain characteristic
features can be observed at almost all mawlids: The celebration usually takes place around
a shrine in which the saint, or parts of his or her body, is believed to be buried. Although
‘mawlid’ literally means birthday, the festivity usually takes place on the day of the saint’s
death, or at another convenient time following either the lunar or solar calendar.55 A
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of RaÊab) are smaller, primarily Sufi events and have less if any trade and amusements. Twentieth
century saints are usually celebrated according to the solar calendar. The exact timing of a mawlid
is commonly adjusted according to pragmatic considerations. Many mawlids in the Nile Delta
follow the agricultural calendar, most importantly those of as-Sayyid AÎmad al-BadawÐ and SÐdÐ
IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ, which take place in October following the cotton harvest. Most of the mawlids
of Alexandria take place during the summer holiday season (July-August). During RamaÃÁn no
mawlids are celebrated, and festivals that follow the solar calendar are either held earlier or
postponed. See McPherson, The Moulids of Egypt, pp. 43-50, 100-102; Reeves, The Hidden Government,
pp. 136 f.
Image 3:
Crowds in front of
the mosque at the
mawlid of
as-Sayyida NafÐsa,
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mawlid is almost always a public festivity open to everyone to participate in, and the
celebrations usually include a complex mixture of pilgrimage, ecstatic piety, community
celebration, trade and amusements. The festivity typically takes place on the squares and
streets of a village or an urban quarter, but sometimes a mawlid is celebrated on
agricultural land adjacent to a settlement in order to take advantage of wider space. The
celebrations take place at night and often last a week or longer, culminating in the final
‘great night’ (al-layla al-kabÐra).
In this chapter I offer a third-person description of mawlids, beginning with an
ethnographic introduction to the shape and appearance of one particular mawlid,
followed by an analysis of the structure of mawlids and the conditions that make them
possible. My main argument in the following is that mawlids are characterised by a
temporally and spatially limited suspension of social boundaries and a festive
organisation consisting of numerous separate celebrations with little or no overarching
programme. In this chapter I do not discuss the significance of this festive atmosphere
from the point of view of the participants; a separate chapter is devoted to that issue.
Here I stick to the perspective of a sociological observer, attempting to recognise what
happens in a mawlid and how it works.
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56See, e.g., ‘ZiyÁra’ in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., Leiden: Brill, Vol. 9, pp. 524-539.
57The Jewish mawlid of YaÝqÙb AbÙ ÍaÒÐra (Yaakov Abu Hatzeira), the legendary founder of
the AbÙ ÍaÒÐra tribe, has been celebrated near DamanhÙr in the Nile Delta region whenever the
political situation has permitted. The festival, dating from the 19th century, was discontinued in
the 1950s and reestablished in the late 1970s. Since then it has attracted a few hundred pilgrims
annually, mainly from France and Israel, followed by the rage of the Egyptian media which has
regularly used the occasion to channel anti-Israeli sentiments. In the year 2001, the Egyptian
government banned the festival following growing tension caused by the second IntifÁÃa. In the
course of improving relations between the governments of Egypt and Israel the festivity was
reopened in January 2005. What has remained less known in the debates about this festival is that
it has a strongly tribal character and used to also attract Muslim members of the tribe that extends
from Morocco over Egypt to Palestine/Israel. (Interview with Muslim members of the AbÙ ÍaÒÐra
tribe, Gaza City, June 1999; YÙsuf, SÙzÁn as-SaÝÐd, al-MuÝtaqadÁt aš-šaÝbÐya Îawl al-aÃriÎa al-yahÙdÐya:
dirÁsa Ýan mawlid YaÝqÙb AbÐ ÍaÒÐra bi-muÎÁfaÛat al-BuÎayra, Cairo: ÝAyn li-d-dirÁsÁt wa-l-buÎÙ× al-
insÁnÐya wa-l-iÊtimÁÝÐya, 1997; aš-ŠaÝb, 20.11.1998: MuÎammad as-SaÝdÁnÐ, ‘al-YahÙd yataÎaddawn
mašÁÝir al-muslimÐn fÐ ramaÃÁn wa-yaÎtafilÙn bi-ÆikrÁ AbÙ ÍaÒÐra fÐ DamanhÙr!!’, p. 8; al-AhrÁm,
23.1.1999: ZakarÐyÁ NÐl, ‘Min HunÁ .. wa-hunÁk! ŠaÌÒÐyat AbÙ ÍaÒÐra wahmÐya fa-lÁ huwa walÐ aw
iskÁfÐ’; NRC Handelsblad, 10.9.2001, ‘Egyptische rechter: joodse graftombe “kwetst” moslims’, p.
4; ‘Controversy Over Abu Hasira Tomb Rages On’, The Egyptian State Information Service,
16.9.2001, http://www.sis.gov.eg/online/html4/0160921.htm, viewed 27.6.2005; ‘Egypt Cancels
Jewish Festival After Protests’, 25.12.2000, http://hsje.org/ egypt_cancels_jewish_festival_af.htm,
viewed 27.6.2005; Cairo Magazine, February 2005 (zero issue): Lina Attala, ‘Return of the pilgrims:
With the thaw in relations, Egypt's only Jewish moulid is being celebrated again’.
58The only exception seems to be the Jewish mawlid of AbÙ ÍaÒÐra (see previous note) who has
been venerated in the past as a Muslim saint by Muslim members of the AbÙ ÍaÒÐra tribe, and
more recently claimed as a Muslim by Egyptians opposed to the presence of Jewish pilgrims in
Egypt.
59According to one estimate, there are as many as 2,850 mawlids all over Egypt, although most
of these are very small (DiyÁb, MuÎammad ÍÁfiÛ, ‘ad-DÐn aš-šaÝbÐ .. aÆ-ÆÁkira wa-l-muÝÁš’, SuÔÙÎ,
30 (May 1999), pp. 16-18). According to a press article from 2003, there were 742 mawlids that took
place with the approval of the Ministry of Religious Endowments (awqÁf) (al-MuÒawwar, 27.6.2003,
SulaymÁn ÝAbd al-ÝAÛÐm, ‘Man hum awliyÁÞ AllÁh’, pp. 18-20, 69, here p. 20). The Supreme Council
of Sufi Orders and officially registered Sufi orders were responsible for 259 mawlids (most of which
were probably included among the above-mentioned 742) in the year 1995 (TaqrÐr al-ÎÁla ad-dÐnÐya
fÐ MiÒr 1995, ed. Markaz ad-dirÁsÁt as-siyÁsÐya wa-l-istrÁtÐÊÐya bi-l-AhrÁm/al-Ahram Center for
1. What a mawlid looks like
The term mawlid literally means ‘birthday’ and derives from the celebration of the
birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (mawlid an-nabÐ). It is used to denote local
celebrations of saints in Egypt. In other Muslim countries similar festivities are held
under different names: mawsim in Morocco, Îauli in East Africa, mevlud in Turkey, Ýurs
in the Indian sub-continent and Îawl in Indonesia.56 Yet the term mawlid is not specific
to Islamic pilgrimages in Egypt. Christian and Jewish pilgrimages (of the latter only one
is still celebrated)57 are equally known as mawlids and share many similarities with the
Muslim tradition: the festive atmosphere of piety and entertainment, the character of
pilgrimage, the festive commodities and amusements, and the belief in miracles of the
saint. But  although mawlids certainly have strong syncretic elements, they are always
clearly either Muslim or Christian, never both.58
Egypt hosts countless shrines of Muslim and Christian saints.  Although not all of
them have an annual festival, almost every city and village in Egypt celebrates a mawlid
in honour of a local saint.59 Most of them, though, are small local  festivities, and the
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Political and Strategic Studies, Vol. 1, 5th ed., Cairo: al-AhrÁm, 1997, p. 278). Yet these figures are
not exhaustive because not all mawlids fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religious
Endowments or the Supreme Council of Sufi Orders. All mawlids require permission from the
Ministry of Interior, but I have not been able to obtain their figures.
60All estimates about the numbers of visitors at mawlids must be treated with utmost
scepticism. Policemen and visitors, if asked, may easily give figures reaching up to ten million. The
only serious attempt known to me was undertaken by Reeves, who made an estimate of the number
of visitors at mawlids in and around ÓanÔÁ based on their ‘catchment area’. His estimate of visitors
to the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ in ÓanÔÁ in the late 1970s was 500,000 to one million, which
is significantly less than the commonly mentioned figure of two million visitors (Reeves, The
Hidden Government, p. 141). The fragmented character of mawlids makes it very difficult to produce
any reliable figures on the number of visitors at a given mawlid. The festive space is vast and
fragmented, and since mawlids last several days, not all participants are present at the same time.
The only large mawlid for which somewhat reliable figures exists is that of SÐdÐ AbÙ l-Íasan aš-
ŠÁÆilÐ, located in an uninhabited region, where local authorities reported the number of vehicles
arriving at the mawlid as 28,000 in 2001 and 30,000 in 2002. Because most of the vehicles
transporting pilgrims to the mawlid were trucks and minibuses, the number of visitors could have
reached as high as 300,000 (Interview with FatÎÐ ÝAbd as-SamÐÝ, poet and journalist, QinÁ, 22
October 2002).
61FÁÔima bint Íusayn ibn ÝAlÐ ibn AbÐ ÓÁlib, d. 110 H / 728-29 A.D. IbrÁhÐm, MuÎammad ZakÐ,
MarÁqid ahl al-bayt fÐ l-QÁhira, Cairo: MaÔbÙÝÁt wa-rasÁÞil al-ÝAšÐra al-MuÎammadÐya, 5th ed., 1997,
pp. 93-95; AbÙ Kaff, AÎmad, Àl bayt an-nabÐ ÒallÁ llÁh Ýalayh wa-sallam fÐ MiÒr, Cairo: DÁr al-maÝÁrif,
2nd ed., 1998, pp. 71-85.
number of large mawlids that attract pilgrims from all over the country is much smaller.
There are some twenty to twenty-five Muslim mawlids and five to ten Christian ones that
have importance beyond their immediate local settings. The largest of all, the mawlid of
as-Sayyid AÎmad al-BadawÐ in the Nile Delta city of ÓanÔÁ is said to draw up to two
million visitors,60 most of whom come from the Nile Delta region and Cairo. In Cairo,
the mawlids of SÐdnÁ al-Íusayn and as-Sayyida Zaynab  gather pilgrims from the entire
country. In Upper Egypt, people from the entire region travel to the Islamic mawlids of
SÐdÐ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm al-QinÁwÐ in QinÁ and SÐdÐ AbÙ l-Íasan aš-ŠÁÆilÐ in the eastern
desert, and to the Christian mawlid of the Virgin Mary in Durunka near AsyÙÔ. This
study cannot cover the entire variety of these various festivals. The focus in the following
will be on urban (city and small town) mawlids, both large and small, in Cairo and the
Nile Delta.
1.1. The shrine
One of the many mawlids celebrated in Egypt is the festival of as-Sayyida FÁÔima an-
NabawÐya,61 a third-generation descendant of the prophet MuÎammad. I have selected it
as an illustrative case because it is relatively small in size, thus allowing a detailed
description, and because there is relatively little state involvement in it. It stands as an
example of a festive order that allows for a high degree of ambiguity and mixture of
different festive elements, and exhibits only a few aspects of the moral, spatial and
temporary discipline imposed by the state upon many of the more famous mawlids.
Nevertheless, one should not mistake the mawlid of FÁÔima an-NabawÐya to be
representative of what the atmosphere of mawlids might have been like in the 19th
century. Instead it stands as an example of mawlids as they are celebrated in the early 21st
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62In this respect it differs from many other major shrines of Cairo that are located at central
squares or intersections.
63‘Verily upon the friends of God rests no fear, nor do they grieve (62). Those who have
believed, and have been God-fearing (63) – for them is the good tidings in the present life and the
Hereafter; there is no alteration in the words of God; that is the mighty success (64).’ (alÁ inna
awliyÁÞ AllÁhi lÁ Ìawfun Ýalayhum wa lÁ hum yaÎzanÙn (62) al-laÆÐna ÁmanÙ wa-kÁnÙ yattaqÙn (63)
la-hum al-bušrÁ fÐ l-ÎayÁti d-dunyÁ wa-l-ÁÌira; lÁ tabdÐla li-kalimÁt illÁh; ÆÁlika huwa l-fawzu l-ÝaÛÐm
(64))Transl. freely after Bell, Richard (transl.), The QurÞÁn: Translated, with a critical re-arrangement
of the Surahs, Edinburgh: Clark, 1937, Vol. 1, p. 198.
64The biographies of saints are often highly topical in nature and it is often impossible to
reconstruct the historical person of a saint beyond his or her legendary figure. As the cult around
a saint develops, more and more hagiographic material is produced, and the memories of
contemporaries give way to more topical descriptions of saintly qualities (see, e.g., Reeves, The
Hidden Government, Hallenberg, IbrÁhÐm al-DasÙqÐ, Mayeur-Jaouen, Histoire d’un pèlerinage). Due
to these circumstances, even the authenticity of many shrines is subject to debate. This is the case,
for example, with many of the Cairene shrines ascribed to descendants of the Prophet. Some, like
as-Sayyida NafÐsa (died ca. 200 H), a fifth-generation descendant of the Prophet, are very widely
agreed to be buried in Cairo (see Bannerth, Ernst, Islamische Wallfahrtstätten Kairos, Cairo:
Österreichisches Kulturinstitut Kairo, 1973, pp. 42-45; AbÙ ÝAlam, TawfÐq, Ahl al-bayt: as-Sayyida
NafÐsa raÃiya llÁhu ÝanhÁ, 2. Ed., Cairo: DÁr al-maÝÁrif, 1998; ÝUÒfÙr, RamaÃÁn ÝAbd Rabbuh, ad-
Durar an-nafÐsa fÐ manÁqib wa-maÞÁ×ir as-Sayyida NafÐsa (raÃiya llÁhu ÝanhÁ), Hurghada, Cairo: DÁr
aÒ-Òafwa, 1996). Many other shrines are likely to date from later periods, and their authenticity has
been questioned by both Western and Egyptian scholars. The most prominent case is the shrine
century and allows us a look at their structure and significance in a contemporary urban
setting.
Only a short walk from downtown Cairo, the shrine and mosque of FÁÔima an-
NabawÐya are located at the crossing of small alleys62 in the old city district of ad-Darb
al-AÎmar, a long-established urban community proud of its local traditions but weakened
by the earthquake of 1992 after which many of its inhabitants moved to other parts of the
city. The mawlid is celebrated in the streets, alleys and small squares around the shrine,
covering the eastern parts of ad-Darb al-AÎmar district, the streets of at-TabbÁna and SÙq
as-SilÁÎ, and the quarter of al-BÁÔinÐya (also known as al-BÁÔlÐya). During the festivity,
half of ad-Darb al-AÎmar turns into a colourful festive world of its own, but beyond this
area the mawlid is as much as invisible. A few minutes’ walk away on Port Said Street, one
of the city’s busy thoroughfares, life goes on as usual.
FÁÔima an-NabawÐya, one of the many members of the family of the Prophet (ahl al-
bayt or Ál al-bayt) who are buried and venerated in Egypt, is the patron saint of ad-Darb
al-Ahmar and draws pilgrims from near and far. Although Islam does not have a canon
of saints the way Orthodox or Catholic Christianity does, the concept of sainthood is
strongly present in Muslim spirituality. In the Islamic tradition saints, ‘friends of God’
(awliyÁÞ AllÁh) as mentioned in the QurÞÁn (10:63),63 are people who enjoy a special grace
of God and a mediating position between the human and the transcendent. A saint
displays exceptional piety, can communicate with the transcendent in a way ordinary
believers cannot, and can perform acts ordinary humans cannot. Hagiographic literature
and oral tradition describe the saint as a person who displays extraordinary piety, exceeds
his or her religious duties (praying tens of times a day instead of the required five, fasting
for most of the year instead of just during RamaÃÁn, etc.), and possesses superior
knowledge of religion – both exoteric and esoteric.64 Female saints are often associated
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of as-Sayyida Zaynab, which may have originally housed Zaynab bint YaÎyÁ ibn Zayb ibn ÝAlÐ Zayn
al-ÝÀbidÐn (d. 240 H/ 854-55 A.D.) and later been reinterpreted to be the resting place of the more
famous Zaynab bint ÝAlÐ ibn AbÐ ÓÁlib, granddaughter of the Prophet and one of the most
important saints in contemporary Egypt. (Bannerth, Islamische Wallfahrtstätten, p. 29 f.; IbrÁhÐm,
MarÁqid ahl al-bayt, pp. 57-65.) Her brother al-Íusayn, whose head is believed to be buried in Cairo,
represents an especially complex case, there being six other Muslim cities (al-KarbalÁÞ, KÙfa, NaÊaf,
Medina, Damascus and Raqqa) that also claim to host his body or parts of it (Bannerth, Islamische
Wallfahrtstätten, pp. 22-34). Many Sufis are quite relaxed about saints having multiple shrines,
arguing that a shrine does not necessarily have to be identical with the site of the saint’s burial:
‘The travelling [saint] has forty shrines. There is one where he is buried, one where he taught, and
so on. And it is said about al-Íusayn that wherever he dropped a drop of blood he has a shrine.’
(Interview with Sheikh Íasan ad-DirÐnÐ, Cairo, mawlid of as-Sayyida FÁÔima an-NabawÐya, 29 May
2003.)
65Abu Kaff, Àl bayt an-nabÐ, p. 82.
66For the cult of Muslim saints, see, e.g., Chambert-Loir Guillot (eds), Le culte des saints;
Chodkiewicz, Michel, Le Sceau des saints: Prophétie et sainteté dans la doctrine d’Ibn Arabî, Paris:
Gallimard, 1986; Cornell, Vincent J., Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism,
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998; Mayeur-Jaouen, Al-Sayyid AÎmad al-BadawÐ; Idem,
Pèlerinages d'Égypte; Idem (ed.), Saints et Héros.
67Abu-Zahra, The Pure and Powerful, p. 145; Coulon,’Women, Islam, and Baraka’.
68According to prevalent Muslim interpretation there are two categories of miracles. Miracles
of the saints are called karÁmÁt, displays of God’s grace, and are not performed by the saints
themselves but rather channelled through them via Divine intervention. Miracles proper (muÝÊizÁt)
were performed by the prophets. The QurÞÁn was the last and conclusive miracle proper. Gilsenan,
Michael, Recognizing Islam: Religion and Society in the Modern Middle East,  revised ed., London:
Tauris, 2000 [19821], p 79; BadrÁn, MuÎammad AbÙ l-FaÃl, AdabÐyÁt al-karÁmÁt aÒ-ÒÙfÐya: dirÁsa fÐ
š-šakl wa-l-maÃmÙn, al-ÝAyn (United Arab Emirates): Markaz ZÁyid li-t-turÁ× wa-t-tÁrÐÌ, 2001, pp. 23-
26.
69BadrÁn, AdabÐyÁt al-karÁmÁt; for accounts in popular hagiographies see, e.g., ÝAbd al-WahhÁb,
SulaymÁn Íasan, al-Adab fÐ sÐrat ŠayÌ al-ÝArab: dars wÁfin wa-taÎlÐl šÁfin li-šaÌšÐyat walÐ AllÁh al-kabÐr
as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, ÓanÔÁ: Maktabat TÁÊ, undated, pp. 35-37; SaÝd, ÓÁhÁ ÝAbd ar-RaÞÙf, as-SÐra al-
ÝaÔira li-walÐ AllÁh aÒ-ÒÁliÎ SÐdÐ al-FarÈal: ÎayÁtuh, karÁmÁtuh, masÊiduh, iÎyÁÞ mawlidih, Cairo:
Maktabat al-Ýilm wa-l-ÐmÁn, 2001, pp. 58-62.
with motherly qualities and referred to as ‘mama’, so also in the case of FÁÔima an-
NabawÐya, who earned her honorific titles ‘mother of compassion’ (Umm al-ÍanÁn) and
‘mother of the orphans’ (Umm al-YatÁmÁ) for taking care of the orphans of the massacre
of al-KarbalÁÞ.65
The Muslim cult of saints is a vast and complex field that cannot be grasped in the
limited frame of this thesis.66 Here we must restrict our view to two key issues of
sainthood that are constitutive of mawlids: the concept of baraka, and the centrality of
sainthood to organised Islamic mysticism. The most important sign of sainthood, and
a concept central to the celebration of mawlids, is baraka, meaning blessing, charisma,
aura or power. It is a spiritual beneficient power that emanates from God, and can be
transferred to the believer through divine inspiration or mediation by the Prophet and
his family, saints and sacred sites and objects.67 Baraka is concretely expressed in miracles
(karÁmÁt), displays of God’s grace to the saints.68  Accounts of karÁmÁt constitute a main
element of the cult of saints and the most important indication of sainthood. The most
famous accounts are legends about major saints who perform spectacular supernatural
acts, such as travelling over extremely long distances in very short time, being in several
places at the same time, knowing the future, reading peoples’ thoughts, etc.69 But most
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70Sadaqa is a voluntary form of charity, in contrast to the obligatory zakÁt.
71al-AhrÁm, 21.8.1998: SaÝid ÍalwÁ, ‘“ËinÁqa” ÝalÁ ÒanÁdÐq an-nuÆÙr’, Friday supplement, p. 3.
72Most major shrines in Cairo have preferred days for ziyÁra or ÎaÃra (Sufi gathering): for
example Thursday for as-Sayyida Zaynab, Saturday for SÐdÐ ÝAlÐ Zayn al-ÝÀbidÐn, and Sunday for
as-Sayyida NafÐsa.
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miracles are much less spectacular. They are personal or second-hand accounts of healing,
success or spiritual enlightenment. These accounts appear, on the surface, to have little
of the supernatural about them: everyday occurrences that might be seen simply as a
coincidental sequence of events are interpreted as manifestations of baraka. Here, the
miracle is used as a narrative frame to interpret everyday events in a way that connects
them to higher levels of meaning. These daily little miracles are very central for mawlids,
and there is a complex economy of pious exchange at work in order to gain God’s grace.
A miracle can occur unexpectedly any time, but one can also ask for an act of grace by
the means of a vow (naÆr). A vow is typically declared at the shrine of the saint who acts
as a mediator, but only when the wish is granted is the vow fulfilled, which may consist
of distributing food or money (Òadaqa),70 a donation to the mosque, a pilgrimage, or the
like. Thanks to the income from fulfilled vows, pilgrimage mosques are a considerable
source of income to the state (most major mosques are administered by the Ministry of
Religious Endowments) and the employees of the mosque.71
The place to search for God’s blessing and grace, and the focal point for the
veneration of a saint, is his or her tomb (qabr, turba) or shrine (ÃarÐÎ, maqÁm). In ad-Darb
al-AÎmar, the shrine and adjacent mosque of FÁÔima an-NabawÐya is the site of an
ongoing stream of visitors and periodical rituals and festivities. The tomb, surrounded
by a brass railing (maqÒÙra), is located in a room attached to the mosque and covered by
a dome. It is well-visited every day but Monday is preferred over other days, and on
Monday evening the shrine is especially crowded and Sufi celebrations are held in and
outside the mosque.72 It is also on a Monday that the most important and dramatic
celebration at the shrine is opened and concluded: the annual mawlid, during which the
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73Bannerth, Islamische Wallfahrtstätten, p. 37.
74ZiyÁra is often framed as a typically female practice, and although the public found at shrines
can be  often largely female on ordinary days, this  perception needs to be somewhat revised.
Unlike ritual prayer in the mosque, which is a predominantly male practice, ziyÁra is a mixed ritual
that is performed by both men and women, usually also in a mixed space. It is not specifically a
women’s ritual.
75The BurhÁnÐya is a Sufi group of Sudanese origin that has been highly successful in
mobilising support among the urban middle classes. Its success was felt as a threat by the Sufi
establishment in the 1970s, which led to its prohibition from 1975 until 1988 when the order was
again allowed official status. Today, the BurhÁnÐya is present at many major mawlids with large
Æikrs held inside the mosque. See Luizard,’Le rôle des confréries soufies’, pp. 38-46.
76People usually travel to mawlids together with fellow members of a Sufi group, neighbours,
or family. Sites for their Ìidmas are usually rented for a small fee. Groups setting up a Ìidma in an
alley rent their sites from alley inhabitants who allow them to use the space in front of the house
and sometimes also the toilet and kitchen in the house. Ëidmas in front of the mosque and on the
main streets require permission from the police.
shrine is filled with a continuous stream of visitors and the mosque is decorated with
lights and banners.
The shrine is the focal point of the mawlid, and it is here that the festival is opened
and concluded. The old mosque, dating from the mid-19th century,73 was demolished
around 2000, and the new mosque was still under construction when I attended the
mawlid in 2003. The shrine, although also under construction, remained open to visitors,
and during the mawlid, a constant flow of people circled around it to pay their respects
to the saint. In the dusty and grey environment of the construction site the richly
decorated shrine was almost invisible, covered by a wooden structure to protect it from
the construction works, but this did not disturb the festive atmosphere.
ZiyÁra, a ritual visit to a shrine, is the central moment of the mawlid and the mawlid
is the best time for a ziyÁra. Each visitor does so in his or her own way. Some hold still
for a moment to recite the FÁtiÎa (first chapter of the QurÝÁn), others say prayers and
vows out loud, or touch and kiss the maqÒÙra and circumambulate the shrine. Some
people express their feelings vocally with recitations, loud invocations or by ululating.
Here, as in most spaces of the mawlid, there is no spatial segregation between men and
women.74 The crowd is mixed and the atmosphere is strongly spiritual, joyful and
informal.
1.2. The Sufis
A similar atmosphere prevailed on the streets and alleys of ad-Darb al-Ahmar when on
Monday, 19 May 2003 (18 RabÐÝ II), one week after mawlid an-nabÐ and two weeks before
the great night, the mawlid was opened with a small procession that ran around the
block. Inhabitants of the area and members of the BurhÁnÐya Sufi order75 carried banners,
people smiled, sang and clapped their hands, women ululated, and the atmosphere was
happy, excited, and playful.
The BurhÁnÐya was just one of the many Sufi groups that participated in the festival.
In the alleys around the mosque, Sufi pilgrims began to arrive in countless small groups,
camping in equally countless tents and apartments, some humble, others lofty, each
under the leadership of their own sheikh.76 These temporary dwellings are referred to as
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77Since the late 19th century, a partial tendency towards bureaucratisation can be observed as
the Egyptian state has attempted to bring Sufi orders under bureaucratic control. According to the
Law on Sufi Orders of 1976, Sufi orders have to be registered with the state-controlled Supreme
Council of Sufi Orders (al-MaÊlis al-aÝlÁ li-Ô-Ôuruq aÒ-ÒÙfÐya) and to fulfill a number of administrative
requirements. But the power of the Sufi Council is restricted to the dissemination of public
discourse and the affairs of the central founding ‘mother’ orders (AÎmadÐya, ŠÁÆilÐya, RifÁÝÐya
etc.). Despite bureaucratisation on higher administrative levels, the informal and personal nature
of Sufi leadership persists in practice, while the influence of the official Sufi establishment on what
actually happens in the meetings of a Sufi branch is very limited. Furthermore, there are at least
as many unregistered orders as there are registered ones. Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi; De Jong, Óuruq;
TaqrÐr al-ÎÁla ad-dÐnÐya, Vol. 1, pp. 273-286; Luizard,’Le rôle des confréries soufies’; Chih, Le soufisme
au quotidien, p. 143. For the text of the Law on Sufi Orders, see Johansen, Sufism and Islamic Reform,
pp. 257-292.
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Ìidma, literally meaning ‘service’ (from Ìidma li-llÁh, a service for the sake of God). The
term Ìidma can simply imply the act of offering food or refreshments free of charge, but
it also denotes the main physical unit of the Sufi mawlid: the site where pilgrims sleep,
food and refreshments are served, and Sufi gatherings take place. The physical form of
a Ìidma varies greatly according to the resources of its organiser: In the alleys around the
mosque there are rows of simple carpets and small tents equipped with a gas cooker and
a teapot, a water pipe and some cooking utensils. At prominent locations next to the
mosque and on main streets stand lavish tents where food is served to thousands and
famous Sufi singers perform at night. The Ìidma is the space where pilgrims spend most
of their time. In fact, their lives centre around these spaces during the mawlid: they sleep
in the Ìidma, eat there, and visit friends at other Ìidmas or receive visitors in theirs.
For Sufi orders (Ôuruq, sg. ÔarÐqa), the organised form of Islamic mysticism, the mawlid
is a key occasion to gather and represent themselves publicly. Vice versa, Islamic mawlids
would be unthinkable without the overarching ideology of Sufism and the contribution
of Sufi orders. The term ‘order’ needs to be treated with caution, however, for it suggests
a more rigid and bureaucratic organisation than is necessarily really at hand.77 Although
Sufi orders formally follow the path (ÔarÐqa) laid out by the founding sheikh, in practice
the most important relationship is that of a Sufi disciple (murÐd) to a living sheikh (or
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78Sedgwick, Mark, Saints and Sons: The Making and Remaking of the RashÐdi Ahmadi Sufi Order,
1799-2000, Leiden: Brill, 2005, pp. 1-6; Pinto, Paulo G., ‘Performing Baraka: Sainthood and Power
in Syrian Sufism’, in Stauth (ed.), On Archaeology of Sainthood, pp. 195-211.
79Mayeur-Jaouen, As-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, pp. 526-532.
80See, e.g., AbÙ l-ÝAynain, SaÝÐd, RiÎlat awliyÁÞ AllÁh fÐ MiÒr al-maÎrÙsa, Cairo: DÁr mÁyÙ l-
waÔanÐya li-n-našr, 1997, esp. p. 36. Most Sufi orders in Egypt carry a reference to these axial saints
in their titles: QÁdirÐya, RifÁÝÐya, BurhÁmÐya, AÎmadÐya, and ŠÁÆilÐya feature as elements of names
that indicate the founder of the branch and the source of his silsila, such as al-MarÁziqa al-
AÎmadÐya, al-BurhÁmÐya aš-ŠahawÐya, etc.
81For example, SÐdÐ al-MursÐ AbÙ l-ÝAbbÁs of Alexandria and SÐdÐ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm al-QinÁwÐ of
QinÁ were students of AbÙ l-Íasan aš-ŠÁÆilÐ.  al-ÍaÊÊÁÊÐ, MuÎammad ÝAbduh, SÐdÐ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm
al-QinÁÞÐ al-muftarÁ Ýalayh, 2. ed., Cairo: Maktabat ÝÁlam al-fikr, 1996 (19901); al-QÁdÐ, SaÝd, al-ÝÀrif
bi-llÁh SÐdÐ AbÙ l-ÝAbbÁs al-MursÐ, Cairo: DÁr al-ÇarÐb, 2001.
82Hoffman, Sufis, Mystics, and Saints, pp. 54 f.
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to the living memory of a sheikh who has passed away) who in turn has been guided by
a sheikh, and so on, all the way back to the great authority, the founder of the ÔarÐqa.
Rather than formal organisations, Sufi orders are dynamic communities based on
personal ties between sheikhs and disciples, spread among numerous branches that are
held together through their shared allegiance to a founding sheikh via chains of
initiation (silsila) and descent (nasab).78
The chains of initiation correspond to a hierarchy of sainthood that is central to the
hierarchy of mawlids. There is a widespread consensus among Egyptian Sufis that all Sufi
orders must show a chain of initiation based on the four ‘poles’ (aqÔÁb, singular quÔb):
ÝAbd al-QÁdir al-ÉÐlÁnÐ, AÎmad ar-RifÁÝÐ, IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ and AÎmad al-BadawÐ.79
AbÙ l-Íasan aš-ŠÁÆilÐ is commonly included in the list as an additional quÔb.80 Except for
ÝAbd al-QÁdir al-ÉÐlÁnÐ, these axial saints are also among the most venerated saints of
Egypt. Many of the other highly venerated saints of Egypt were their pupils.81 Together
with early descendants of the Prophet (especially al-Íusayn and as-Sayyida Zaynab) they
form the highest ranks of Muslim saints in Egypt, bestowed with the aura of the
Prophetic Light (an-nÙr al-muÎammadÐ)82, the most outstanding share of God’s grace, and
25At the mawlid
the most extraordinary miracles. It is for them that the greatest mawlids are celebrated,
and it is the complex networks of their Sufi orders that provide the basis for the
mobilisation that turns a mawlid into a popular pilgrimage where, in numerous parallel
celebrations, living Sufi leaders and their followers rejoice in reviving the memory of the
grand saint, creating a momentum of grandeur and unity not only despite, but indeed
through, their diversity.
1.3. The Celebrations
Diversity is not limited to Sufi groups, however, but is woven throughout the entire
spatial fabric of a mawlid festival. Turned into festive grounds during the mawlid of as-
Sayyida FÁÔima, the quarter of ad-Darb al-AÎmar hosted various celebrations and
ambiences in 2003. The first days of the mawlid were characterised by a slow buildup of
the festivity. Festive lights were hung on the mosque, while pilgrims’ tents, amusement
stands and temporary cafés increased in number day by day. In the narrow alleys around
the mosque, Sufi celebrations were held every night of the mawlid, and in cafés a few
steps away, popular singers performed. On at-TabbÁna Street some 100 metres west of the
mosque and on Aslam SilÁÎdÁr Square to the northeast, amusement areas appeared, and
children and youths of the district began to frequent them. Pilgrims began to arrive in
growing numbers. Colourfully patterned cloth tents, bright coloured lights, generators
to provide electricity for the festivity, carpets covered with people sleeping, eating and
chatting, temporary cafés, stands selling plastic toys, sweets and tinsel party hats,
shooting stands, and swing-boats painted in bright colours thoroughly changed the
appearance of the area. The streets and alleys of the quarter were transformed into a
fairground, a landscape of the extraordinary with countless attractions spread over the
squares, streets and alleys waiting to be discovered by the visitor.
When the crowds began to move the mawlid really began to look like one. The festive
atmosphere gained intensity night by night until it reached its climax on the great night,
the final and most festive moment of the celebration. Mawlids are nighttime festivities;
on the afternoon of the great night, the district lived in calm expectation. Daytime at the
mawlid was mainly a family time when women and children frequented the amusements
and the shrine, but as the evening neared, vast crowds began to push their way through
the narrow alleys, concentrating on central points of festivity: the area around the
mosque, the two main amusement areas, and the streets leading to them.
The most spectacular element of the mawlid was its sessions of Sufi Æikr (from Æikr
AllÁh: mentioning the name of God, invocating God), collective rituals of ecstatic
meditation that were held in tents in the small square in front of the mosque and the
surrounding streets. The settings and styles of Æikr vary. Sufi tradition differentiates
between silent ‘Æikr of heart’, vocal ‘Æikr of tongue’, and ‘standing Æikr’, which includes
certain bodily movements in rhythm to recitation or music, and which is the most
prominent form of Æikr at mawlids. A Æikr may either be a precisely orchestrated ritual
in which only members of a Sufi order participate, with a fixed programme and little
space for spontaneity, or it may be open to passers-by, with an atmosphere more
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83Chih, Le soufisme au quotidien, pp. 254 ff.
84Munšids are usually men, however there are numerous female Sufi singers, munšidÁt, in the
Nile Delta region. Some munšids have gained considerable fame, most prominently so Sheikh YÁsÐn
at-TuhÁmÐ (see below pp. 226-227) whose performances are surrounded by a star cult in some ways
similar to those surrounding secular pop stars. See Frishkopf, Michael, ‘Tarab (“enchantment”) in
the mystic Sufi chant of Egypt’ in Sherifa Zuhur (ed.), Colors of Enchantment: Theater, Dance, Music,
and the Visual Arts in the Middle East, Cairo: American Unversity in Cairo Press, 2001, pp. 233-269;
Waugh, Earle H., The MunshidÐn of Egypt: Their World and Their Song, Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1989; Dunleavy, Wendy, ‘Il Munshidat, The Female Sufi Singers of Egypt:
Gender and Popular Religion in Contemporary Egyptian Society’ Paper presented to the workshop
‘Gender, Myth, and Spirituality’, London, Arts and Humanities Research Board, 3 April 2004.
85Frishkopf, Michael, ‘Tarab’.
Image 7: Åikr in the Ìidma of Sheikh ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz FayÒal. Sheikh ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz, leader of  a branch
of the RifÁÝÐ order, opens the ritual with recitation of prayers (top left), after which the munšid ÉumÝa
al-BannÁ leads the Æikr (top right to bottom left) while bystanders gather in front of the tent to watch
and listen (bottom right). Mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ, DisÙq, 25 November 2004.
spontaneous and ecstatic.83 It may be based only on vocal recitation, or it may be led by
a Sufi singer (munšid)84 who is accompanied by a band consisting of percussion, nÁy,
violin, and sometimes ÝÙd or keyboards. The music of Sufi Æikr is rhythmic, emotional
and designed to create an ecstatic atmosphere. The munšid performs religious poetry in
praise of the Prophet and the saints (madÎ), a task considered to be not merely a craft but
a religiously inspired mission. There is a high level of interaction between the munšid and
his audience, expressed by the term Ôarab (meaning approximately ‘enchantment’), the
close emotional interaction between the performer and the listener and the resulting
spontaneous and improvised character of the performance.85
Participation in a Æikr has different degrees, especially in rituals that are open to all:
while some people perform the Æikr, others watch. The different means of participating
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and listening lend the Æikr its characteristic mixture of ecstatic and aesthetic experience:
it is simultaneously – but to different degrees for different participants – a religious ritual
and an artistic performance. A Æikr is usually part of, and sometimes synonymous with,
a Sufi gathering (ÎaÃra or maÊlis). Most Sufi orders hold weekly or monthly ÎaÃras in
which only members participate. In a mawlid, however, the ÎaÃra is usually held in the
Ìidma and is open to all. There the atmosphere is more festive and inclusive than that of
the closed meetings of a ÔarÐqa. The ÎaÃra may consist of a short opening ceremony, a
Æikr, and a short closing ceremony, but it also may take more elaborate forms with
speeches, prayers, and different sequences of Æikr.86
The Æikrs held in front of the mosque of as-Sayyida FÁÔima during her mawlid
represented a specific form of Sufi gathering: the public ÎaÃra, a public performance of
a munšid that is not restricted to the members of a Sufi group. Such ÎaÃras are usually
characterised by an ecstatic and spontaneous atmosphere lacking a fixed ritual
programme. The ritual in a public ÎaÃra is always led by a munšid, unlike in ÎaÃras
organised by Sufi orders where the sheikh of the order often leads and controls the
ritual.87 In front of the mosque during FÁÔima an-NabawÐya’s mawlid, one ÎaÃra was
celebrated next to another, some organised by temporary cafes, others by local Sufi
associations. Loudspeakers turned on full blast amplified the voices of several munšids
and their bands. The scenery was dominated by the bright colours of the decoration and
electric lights, and the ecstatic movement of the people performing Æikr was mixed with
the passing crowds and bystanders coming and going from the surrounding cafés.
The mawlid is high season for cafés. Around the mosque during FÁÔima an-
NabawÐya’s mawlid, temporary cafés served the pilgrims and spectators. Women were
welcomed as customers unlike at most baladÐ cafés,88 which are usually strictly male
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character. For dancing, see van Nieuwkerk, Karin, “A Trade like any Other”: Female Singers and
Dancers in Egypt, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995. For the tradition of transvestite singers
and dancers, see, e.g., McPherson, The Moulids of Egypt, pp. 84 f.
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spaces. All around the district, many cafés sponsored a munšid or a popular singer
performing šaÝbÐ style music that is very popular at weddings.89 One of the cafés, located
in a back alley, also served beer during the mawlid. In the past, and to some extent until
today, mawlids have held the reputation of being full of female dancers, alcohol and
prostitution. Until the 1990s, the mawlid of FÁÔima an-NabawÐya was associated with
open trade in drugs.90 Dancers, mostly women but also transvestites, once were a main
attraction at mawlids.91 Yet dancers’ shows have since disappeared from most mawlids,
and bars have become a rarity. Even in the only bar at the mawlid of as-Sayyida FÁÔima
there was no trace of red light district ambience. On the contrary, a relaxed atmosphere
similar to that of a wedding celebration prevailed with families and friends, music, and,
almost coincidentally, some beer.
A calmer and more intimate atmosphere prevailed in those Ìidmas where no Æikr was
being held. In a blind alley two blocks from the mosque, Sheikh Íasan ad-DirÐnÐ put up
his Ìidma consisting of a few carpets and a small tent. Neighbours, passers-by and friends
were offered tea or simple food. Later in the evening, invited guests arrived for a small
maÊlis. Food, tea and sweets were served while people chatted about a football match that
took place the same day and then turned their attention to spontaneous religious lectures
and recitation. This celebration was more sober than its neighbouring Æikr sessions, yet
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93The following is a complete list of services and commodities for sale at the mawlid of as-
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telephones and refreshments, cafés (some featuring a performing singer), fast food, tinsel party hats
and fezzes, mawlid caps (Southeast Asian style caps that depict the Dome of the Rock), posters
(with religious content as well as football and pop stars), plastic toys, walking sticks, sweet potatoes,
chickpeas, libb (various edible seeds, mainly of the cucurbit family), lupine beans, popcorn,
peanuts, music tapes (pop music and Sufi inšÁd), perfume and incense,  juice, amulets, cheap
jewellery, inflatable toys, religious literature, tapes and videos of Sheikh YÁsÐn at-TuhÁmi, prayer
the spirituality it expressed was embedded in a very informal and familiar atmosphere.
People laughed, smoked, ate, drank and interrupted the recitations and speeches with
words of praise such as ‘AllÁh!’, ‘God bless the Prophet!’ (AllÁhumma ÒallÐ Ýa-n-nabÐ!) or
‘Assistance oh Lady [FÁÔima]!’ (Madad yÁ sitt!).
A few blocks further away, Aslam SilÁÎdÁr Square was packed with carousels, swings
and shooting stands. The streets were heavily crowded with men and women, adults and
children crowding the streets while enjoying the amusements, people-watching, or simply
passing by.  Even the small space of the square hosted very different ambiences: in front
of homes and around the swing-boats young women from the district moved around in
groups, many dressed in their finest. An exclusively male public gathered a few steps away
at the shooting stands. The stands were run by young women wearing make-up and no
headscarfs and were frequented by young men who competed at their shooting skills by
hitting firecrackers with an air rifle. Next to the shooting stands, a music store played
recorded pop music, attracting youths to dance. The atmosphere was wild, loud and
rough. Occasionally young men gathered in a line (known as ‘train’) and rushed through
the crowds as noisily and as fast as they could. At other, larger mawlids, women are
usually careful to avoid such areas so as not to be severely harassed, but at the mawlid of
FÁÔima an-NabawÐya people of the quarter know each other well and there is enough
social control to keep most of the young men aware that there are certain limits they
cannot cross without getting into serious trouble.
At-TabbÁna Street, the main thoroughfare of the area, featured another amusement
area with shooting stands, swing-boats and gambling, along with cafés, small trade, and
many munšids and popular singers. In an alley northeast of the mosque, the artist ÑalÁÎ
al-MaÒrÐ  put up his sideshow featuring magic tricks, a marionette show, and a puppet
theatre play with qarÁÊÙz.92 The show was packed with children and youths who came to
enjoy the show for the modest price of 50 piastres, often several times knowing that the
qarÁÊÙz play has a different – and always truly hilarious – plot every time.
The mawlid hosted a colourful variety of small trade. Along the streets and alleys,
street vendors sold souvenirs, sweets, toys, tinsel party hats, tapes and religious
commodities. The mawlid of as-Sayyida FÁÔima an-NabawÐya is located in the middle of
Cairo near major markets and shopping areas, so its trade is limited and does not
constitute a prevalent feature of the festivity. Large mawlids in provincial cities still form
major marketplaces for commodities of all kinds, but in Cairo the trade at mawlids
concentrates on religious commodities, souvenirs, sweets, and toys.93 These goods are
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usually very cheap. Although only some of the commodities are religious in a narrow
sense, none of them is entirely profane in the context of a mawlid: they have their share
in the baraka of the  festivity and the souvenirs – snacks, sweets, and toys people bring
home from the mawlid – are believed to carry with them the baraka of the saint.
During the mawlid, the entire district of ad-Darb al-Ahmar was in a state of
celebration. For the duration of the great night, police forces closed at-TabbÁna Street to
traffic, allowing the crowds to freely roam about. Shops played tapes with Sufi inšÁd,
streets and houses were decorated with bright lights and homes were open to visitors.
Families sat on the sidewalks and enjoyed the night of festivity. Friends and relatives
living outside the quarter came back to their “hometown” to spend the evening at the
mawlid. Many inhabitants of the area celebrated the patron saint of their quarter by
offering free food and refreshments as a form of Ìidma.94 Some offered sandwiches and
others served cinnamon tea (a drink popular at mawlids – for an image see front cover),
tamarind and liquorice juice or lemonade, each according to their resources. A local
member of parliament sponsored a large tent serving full meals of rice, meat and
vegetables for anyone who wished to drop in.
Following the dawn prayer the mawlid was concluded by a morning celebration
(ÒabÁÎÐya). A procession, similar in form to the opening procession but on a larger scale,
set out from the front of the mosque and moved around the block. At every Æikr and
popular singer’s stage the procession passed, the performers joined the chant of the
crowd: ‘ÑabÁÎÐya mubÁrka yÁ sitt, bismillÁh yÁ Íusÿn!’ (blessed morning oh Lady [FÁÔima],
in the name of God, oh Íusayn), declaring her mawlid completed and anticipating the
upcoming mawlid of al-Íusayn, FÁÔima’s father. Afterwards, the mawlid slowly came to
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an end, people began to go home, and some tents were packed up, but the Æikrs at the
mosque still continued until the morning when the remains of the festival slowly
dissolved into the beginning workday.
Just as the mawlid had slowly built up, so it took some time to end. Some of the
pilgrims stayed on for one more day to celebrate the ‘residual night’ (al-layla al-yatÐma,
lit. orphan night) the following evening. Officially it was the mawlid of SÐdÐ ÝAbdallÁh
ad-DisÙqÐ,95 who is buried next to the mosque of as-Sayyida FÁÔima. It was a small, purely
Sufi celebration with an atmosphere more intimate and devotional than the bright, loud
and chaotic great night. Following the final celebrations, remaining tents and stalls were
packed up and readied to move on to the next mawlid, and the quarter returned to its
daily rhythm of life. In other parts of the city, the cycle of mawlids continued. One week
later was the mawlid of SÐdÐ al-ÝAÊamÐ in DÁr as-SalÁm, then al-Íusayn, followed by as-
Sayyida Sukayna, as-Sayyida NafÐsa, as-Sayyida Zaynab and many more. With the
beginning of RamaÃÁn, the festive season in Cairo came to an end, only to begin again
the next year.
2. The order of chaos
It is not a coincidence that in the Egyptian idiom ‘a mawlid in the absence of its master’
–  i.e. the saint – (mÙlid wi-ÒÁÎbuh ÈÁyib) implies a state of total disorder. But chaotic as
they may seem at first sight, and manifold as they are, the celebrations of a mawlid are
embedded in a festive order that allows for various expressions of festivity while limiting
them in terms of time and space. Indeed, a certain degree of chaos is tolerated as part of
the festive atmosphere, and the festivity does not have a central ritual programme. The
shrine is the symbolic and often geographic centre of the mawlid, but most of the
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celebrations take place outside it, in a decentralised manner. However, the apparent chaos
of mawlids is an organised one, as the idiom reminds us: only in the absence of a focal
point – the master of the mawlid – would the mawlid turn into total disorder. The
mawlid has its order, but it is of a flexible, ambiguous, festive kind.
To understand exactly how this festive order works is of crucial importance, not only
to map out mawlids but also to comprehend the debates surrounding them. To
understand why some Egyptians view mawlids as a threat to religion and society we must
first examine what exactly happens to the order of society and the dispositions of
believers and citizens during a mawlid. To unravel this complex order I undertake an
examination from three perspectives: the behaviour of the participants, the organisation
of public space, and the temporal structure of social boundaries.
2.1. Habitus
The most important element of a mawlid is, evidently, the people in it. The festival is
made up of a vast number of individual and collective celebrations that, together, create
the festivity as a whole in all of its different ambiences. But how to reconstruct festive
order from such a diffuse field of festive practice? Perhaps by attempting to reconstruct
the festive experiences of the participants? My solution is to postpone the intangible issue
of festive experience – it has a logic quite different from that of festive organisation, and
thus requires a different perspective – and, for now, stick to that which can be seen: the
styles and dispositions, in other words, the habitus (in the plural) of celebration. This is
all the more important because, as is shown in chapter four, the appearances and
activities of the people participating in the festivity are at the centre of much of the
criticism of mawlids.
To speak of habitus in relation to festive practice means, firstly, to indicate that there
are dispositions of the body (in a wider sense including dress, speech, movement and the
like) that are specific to the festive context and contribute to the atmosphere of festivity.
Secondly, by focussing on habitus I highlight, but – for the time being – leave open,
questions about the relation of bodily forms to attitudes, ideologies and beliefs.
The concept of habitus – learned and internalised bodily dispositions, styles and
aesthetic judgements that carry social or ethical significance – was introduced to the
social sciences by Marcel Mauss96 but is best known through the work of Pierre Bourdieu,
who defines habitus as
‘both the generative principle of objectively classifiable judgements and the system of
classification (principium divisionis) of these practices. It is in the relationship between the
two capacities which define the habitus, the capacity to produce classifiable practices and
works, and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products (taste),
that the represented social world, i.e., the space of life-styles, is constituted.’97
Habitus in Bourdieu’s use is a concept key to understanding the symbolic structure of
class society. But to understand what actually happens at mawlids, what the roots of their
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contested nature are and how discursive positions are related to festive practices,
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus may turn out to be too narrow.
A different  approach is offered by Saba Mahmood, who, in her study of the Salafi
piety movement in Egypt, takes a different direction, reinterpreting the concept of
habitus to include the habitualisation of morals and ideologies, the interlinkage of bodily
practice and moral dispositions. Habitus, according to Mahmood, involves the active
capacity of forming and transforming the self through bodily practice.
‘An inquiry into ethics from this perspective requires that one examine not simply the
values enshrined in moral codes, but the different ways in which people live these codes.
Thus, what is relevant here is not so much whether people follow moral regulations or
break them, but the relationships they establish between the various constituent elements
of the self (body, reason, volition, and so on) and a particular moral code or norm.’98
‘One result of Bourdieu’s neglect of the manner and process by which a person comes to
acquire a habitus is that we lose a sense of how specific conceptions of the self (there may
be different kinds that inhabit the space of a single culture) require different kinds of
bodily capacities. In contrast, the Aristotelian notion of habitus forces us to problematise
how specific kinds of bodily practice come to articulate different conceptions of the
ethical subject, and how bodily form does not simply express the social structure but also
endows the self with particular capacities through which the subject comes to enact the
world.’99
Mahmood’s reading of habitus is based on fieldwork conducted among women involved
in the Salafi piety movement in Egypt, a religious current that heavily emphasises the
moral discipline of the body and the self. Based on this empirical focus, she concentrates
on the way habitus forms the self. But that relationship can be thought of in two
directions: What about the use of habitus as the visible marker of beliefs and attitudes?
That perspective has gained significant currency in the anthropology of the Middle
East under the label of identity politics, meaning the expression of religious, national or
other identities through distinctive forms of dress and consumption (Muslim women’s
headscarves being the most prominent example thereof).100 While the label of ‘identity
politics’ may be somewhat misleading –  after all the politics of habitus is not confined
to the issue of identity – it stands beyond doubt that ideologies can and do become
embodied. What is less clear is what such embodiment does to the bodies and ideologies
involved.  This is pointed out by Gregory Starrett, who, in his study of the introduction
of colonial concepts of order and learning in Egypt, shows that the embodiment of
ideology in habitus does in fact involve a change of perspective for the people involved:
‘Thus, rather than conceiving of hexis primarily as wordless, unconscious, and practical
transmission of bodily habit, we might instead read “the embodiment of ideology in
habit” as a set of processes through which individuals and groups consciously ascribe
meaning to–or learn to perceive meaning in–bodily disposition, and establish, maintain, and
contest publicly its political valence.’ [my emphasis]101
Starrett’s approach implies that when specific embodied practices become associated (or
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even identified) with specific ethical dispositions, both undergo a redefinition as objects
of a discursive formation. It is precisely the contingency and dynamic nature of such
associations that makes them political. Claiming and denying their self-evidence is a form
of contestation over the values and public interest of a society and the power to define
them. The contestation of habitus can be read as the embodiment of ideologies, but it
also transforms them.
Neither Mahmood’s nor Starrett’s approach should be taken as the final word. Ethical
formation and embodiment of ideology both take place, but instead of opting for either
specific perspective, we need to realise that the relationship of the body and the self is not
only a matter of academic discussion: it is a matter of open debate in Muslim societies,102
and in fact much of the debate on mawlids can be seen as part of a wider debate on the
body and the self. Different ways to celebrate a mawlid do stand in relation to beliefs,
attitudes and ideologies, but that relation is subject to contestation, and that contestation
is in turn central to the debate on mawlids. This is why, instead of answering the question
concerning the relationship of appearances and inner states deductively, we should
enquire what interpretations of the body and the self are held by the people who celebrate
mawlids, as well as the people who criticise them. But before moving on to interpretation,
we must first give way to the perspective of the sociological observer and focus on the
actual appearances and activities of people at mawlids.
What kind of habitus (in the plural), then, are characteristic of a mawlid? What
quickly stands out is the overwhelming character of the festive atmosphere: overwhelming
in terms of quantity, with roaming crowds and a tremendous display of lights and
sounds, but also overwhelming in bodily terms: celebrating a mawlid can be
simultaneously emotional, ecstatic, pious, carnal, cheerful and joking. Expressions of
piety, joy and sexuality – to take just a few examples – are never far removed from each
other, and they are often united to the degree that they cannot be accurately described as
discrete categories. For the researcher, Egyptian or foreign, who is trained to think along
clear and universal boundaries, it can be a serious challenge to grasp what is going on, a
feeling that Michael Gilsenan vividly caught in his description of the scenery at the
shrine of as-Sayyid AÎmad al-BadawÐ:
‘People crowd into a tiny room to circumambulate the shrine, pressing themselves against
the outer brass railings, kissing it and rubbing their clothes and hands over it, and then
making a washing motion of their hands over their bodies to transfer the baraka. This is,
par excellence, the propitious time at which to do so; in the popular phrase “khud al-baraka
min al-mulid” (“take the baraka from the mulid”).
‘People do so vocally and with feeling. There is almost as much noise as at the
fireworks, and anyone who has absorbed Victorian notions of reverent behaviour as being
synonymous with whispers and quiet decorum soon has his assumptions disrespectfully
shattered. As far as the saint is concerned reverence can be demonstrated as well by
shouting as by muttered prayer. Attendants roar and push the struggling mass round the
shrine, using bamboo canes on those who cling too long to the holiness. Those who leave
must do so through those clamouring to enter. Huddled in a corner, chewing on a
sweetmeat dangerously thrown over ecstatic faces by a mosque servant, the anthropologist
has time to reflect on the wreckage of his own fixed ideas about proper expressions of
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piety.’103
The festive atmosphere of the mawlid escapes simple categorisation along the lines of
binary dissociations such as sacred and profane or public and private. The seemingly
trivial task of describing what is going on turns into a profound epistemic problem of
understanding what a mawlid does to the boundaries of the social world. In an attempt
to solve this problem, Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen argues that in the mawlid the body is the
central location of the sacred, incorporating all aspects of human life – food, smoking,
disease, healing, and sexuality – in a moment of sacred-carnal experience:
‘Le corps, dans les mouleds traditionelles, était donc omniprésent, invoqué. représenté,
revendiqué, allant jusqu’à transgresser les normes habituelles. Le corps sexué, tout
particulièrement, y était sans cesse sollicité dans un étroit rapport au sacré. L’idée d’une
dissociation entre sacré et profane, entre un sacré d’ou le corps serait exclu – ou tout au
moins bridé – et un profane où le corps aurait sa place, était absolument absente des
pratiques comme des pensées de plus grand nombre.’104
Looking at the various ambiences of the mawlid, this observation is strikingly fitting,
and yet it also calls for a closer look at the places and shapes of the body in the mawlid.
The atmosphere of the mawlid is not simply characterised by the central position of the
body at the centre of the sacred experience; the body is also the central location of the
sacred in ritual prayer (ÒalÁt). The particular relationship of the body and the sacred in
the mawlid, and the resulting particular festive ambience, is based on specific
dispositions of the body and a specific understanding of the sacred. Hence, the question
we need to ask is what habitus, concept of the sacred, spatial organisation and temporal
structure of social boundaries make it possible to celebrate the mawlid in such a way.
There is not one habitus of celebrating the mawlid, but many. The main emotional
tone of a mawlid is that of love and joy, but it is mixed with moments of grotesque
laughter, solemn commemoration, voluntary hardship, sexual tension, and sometimes
aggression. The multiple habitus of celebrating the mawlid can be seen in the cases of the
Sufi Ìidma and the crowds in the streets, to take just two examples of many.
In the Sufi Ìidma, an atmosphere of spirituality is combined with a familiar gathering
in which eating, drinking and smoking accompany ecstatic rituals, spontaneous
performances and theological discussions. Tea, coffee, plates of food, sweets and pastries
are served to the guests throughout the evening. Men, and many of the women, smoke
water pipes and cigarettes. People lead discussions and listen to preachers, lectures, and
recitation of the QurÞÁn or religious poems, expressing their appreciation loudly with
phrases like ‘May God open a way for you!’ (AllÁh yiftaÎ Ýalÿk!).
Food and eating in particular stand as an intersection of charity, pleasure, piety and
community. To offer food is to commit a pious act, and visitors in a Ìidma are
commonly offered a symbolic meal (luqma) even if they are not hungry. Eating, even
smoking in the presence of the friends of God, is to share the baraka of the sacred
occasion. The mawlid is a main occasion to buy snacks and sweets that are believed to
carry baraka, and in the early morning hours at the end of a mawlid, almost everyone
leaves the festival carrying plastic bags loaded with chickpeas and sweets. Eating is, in a
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way, archetypal to the festive habitus.105 In the mawlid, eating is not a profane act but is
rather intrinsically connected to the joy and spirituality of the special day:
‘I like the mawlid because of the love and the charity and the joy. Normally the mosque
isn’t full like this, but because of his (AbÙ l-ÝIlÁ’s) birthday everyone has to celebrate.
People give food and drink to the poor. Everybody eats on this day; our Lord makes this
food ÎalÁl (legitimate; ritually permissible). People love meat, a loaf of bread with rice and
meat. And the ladies love it very much; they go out of the house to get here and meet and
listen to the recitation of the QurÞÁn.’106
In the streets, the atmosphere is often rougher and less harmonic. Mawlids often are, and
are expected to be, very crowded, and the moving crowds provide a moment of
anonymity and an atmosphere of overwhelming festive mood that allows for expressions
of both general aggression and aggressive sexuality. The young men who rush through the
crowds, joke and laugh loudly, and dance in an exaggerated style around music stores and
Sufi Æikrs express a mixture of completely letting oneself go in a surrender to the moment
and a tense, potentially explosive performance of juvenile masculinity. At countryside
mawlids fights are common, and in the cities the crowds of the mawlid are infamous for
the muÃaqqarÐn, youths who use the anonymity of the crowds to aggressively grab women.
Most people would openly condemn such behaviour but some young men, encouraged
by the anonymity of the crowds, wholeheartedly define it as the main attraction of the
festival: ‘The mawlid is great! In the crowd there’s flesh!’107
It is, thus, less the prevalence of specific dispositions or a specific aesthetic style that
characterise the atmosphere of a mawlid than its openness to a very wide variety of styles
and dispositions. In the mawlid, piety and joy can be expressed in a multiplicity of ways
that, contrary to each other as they may be, coexist in the same event. This, together with
the crowdedness of the festival, contributes to the often extreme character of mawlids,
their atmosphere ranging (and often rapidly shifting) from ecstatic spirituality and
familiar joy to fights and aggressive sexual tension.
2.2. Boundaries
Mawlids are profoundly ambivalent events. They are full of baraka, and mark a sanctified
time and space temporarily distant from the ordinary rhythms and structures of the
surrounding mundane world.108 Yet their sanctity is not exclusive: Mawlids are also full
of trade, amusements, food, outings, joking, flirting, and trouble-making, in short,
practices that Egyptian common sense would generally consider thoroughly profane. The
Durkheimian opposition of the sacred and the profane does not hold in the mawlid. The
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festive habitus, time and space of a mawlid do not host structurally different spheres of
religion and the material world (dÐn wa-dunyÁ, to follow the idiom of contemporary
Islam instead of that of western sociology). This is all the more important since this
distinction is not an exogenous import.109 It is, however, conceived of in a less exclusive
and absolute fashion by most Egyptians. The sacredness, or perhaps more accurately,
sanctity, of things in this understanding is an inclusive power reified in the concept of
baraka. This inclusiveness and potential for expansion of the sacred makes it a quality
that can be attached to all things rather than as a transcendent sphere set apart from
profane objects.110 
The categories of the sacred and profane are constitutive for much of social and
religious life in Egypt, as is expressed, for example, in the architecture and symbolic
status of mosques, which are visibly distinguished from their mundane surroundings
both in their appearance and the way people act in them. But this opposition is not
absolute. It is subject to temporary shifts and it is exactly these shifts of dichotomies, not
their absence, that give mawlids their atmosphere of the extraordinary. Things that are
usually defined as sacred and profane do not lose their distinctive characteristics in the
mawlid. What happens, rather, is that different practices such as trade, worship, eating
etc. become connected to each other through the festive habitus, time and space. The
market remains a market, but buying commodities that carry baraka becomes a sacred act.
The mosque remains a mosque, but the moment of pilgrimage  turns it into an inclusive
space surrounded, and often filled, by people celebrating, sleeping and eating. Food still
serves to fill the stomach, but the act of eating is framed as an act of devotion. The festive
context transforms social practices and spaces, thus creating a temporary different world
that gains its power and attraction from its conscious and dramatic opposition to the
ordinary world.
The boundary of the sacred and the profane is only one of the many that are
suspended in the mawlid: the celebration of a mawlid is characterised by the temporary
and spatially limited inversion and suspension of a number of boundaries and their
replacement by a festive order of the extraordinary. Anna Madoeuf, in her study of the
great mawlids of Cairo, has pointed out the character of mawlids of being an interface,
as a space and time of inversion and transgression under the protection of the baraka of
the saint’s festivity:
‘Un monde se fonde à partir d’un autre sur lequel il se calque, qu’il emprunte et
bouleverse. Le mûlid abolit le quotidien. Il trouble l’ordinaire. Cette célébration festive
d’une commémoration religieuse est aussi une interface: entre Le Caire et la province,
entre le quartier et la ville, entre la baraka et le pélerin, entre le sacré et le profane. Des
contrastes, simultanés ou successifs, se font jour.’111
This festive order of the mawlid allows participants to relativise or temporarily suspend
the boundaries of daily life. Religion becomes fun, and entertainment and trade enjoy
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their share in the baraka of the noble celebration. Gender boundaries are eased. In old
city districts, young women go for a legitimate outing and houses are open to visitors,
and in the Sufi tents space is shared by men and women, as are most of the religious
rituals. With the inhabitants of the districts sitting in front of their houses, and the Sufi
pilgrims sleeping in tents or on carpets on the sidewalks, the distinctions between house,
alley and open street lose significance. The city is invaded by the countryside when
pilgrims from the Nile Delta and Upper Egypt storm the sidewalks. Night becomes day
as the mawlid sleeps in the daytime and festivities only begin with sunset, continuing
until the dawn prayer.112
On the imaginary level, the temporal boundaries of history collapse, giving way to a
mythological temporality characterised by the barzaÌ, the state between death and
Judgement Day, in which the believer, the grand saints, and the Prophet and his family
(ahl al-bayt) coexist and can communicate. The visible mawlid, many pilgrims believe, is
only the shadow of a hidden mawlid in the barzaÌ, attended by the saints, angels and the
Prophet himself. Thus, even the boundary between the living and the dead is far from
clear at the time of the mawlid. It is no coincidence that many mawlids take place in the
middle of graveyards where the dwellings of the dead host the celebrations of the living.
The buried saint, it is believed, is not really dead, but conscious and perceiving, and even
capable of action. From the barzaÌ, the saint continues to display miracles of grace and
act as a mediator between the believer and the transcendent. This continuous presence
of the saint is key to the baraka of the mawlid, and a primary motivation to undertake
a pilgrimage to the shrine. From the mystics point of view, there can be no mawlid
without the active participation of its master, the saint:
‘It’s not a mawlid in the absence of its master (mÙlid wi-ÒÁÎbuh ÈÁyib) like some say, no.
That is the description of the streets and squares (sÁÎa). The true mawlid of the mystical
path (ÔarÐq) is a mawlid in the presence of its master (mÙlid wi-ÒÁÎbuh ÎÁÃir).’113
Of course, this suspension of boundaries never means that everything is possible, and the
presence of the saint indicates that a mawlid is not characterised so much by a lack of
order than by the replacement of the daily order of things with an order of an
extraordinary, mystical kind. Thus no matter how overwhelming the moment of festive
freedom, some limitations are always in force. For example, women’s movement in
mawlids is generally more restricted than men’s. When in the mawlid of as-Sayyida
FÁÔima an-NabawÐya young women from the district dress up and mingle with the festive
crowd, it happens on the condition that there is enough social control to prevent sexual
harassment. In larger mawlids where the crowds are vast and no such social control is
possible, women usually stay away from crowded areas unless they are accompanied by
male friends or relatives.
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2.3. Openness, class, and power
As Mohand Akli Hadibi has argued in context of Sufi pilgrimages in Kabylia in Algeria,
the suspension of boundaries and the contingency of festivity is key to a pilgrimage site’s
ability to contain so many different, often contradicting elements.114 Open to different
practices and interpretations, the festivity remains capable of providing a moment of
common identification:
‘This mawlid is a mÁÞidat ar-RaÎmÁn115 that collects the pious and the sinner alike. So you
see very many things in the mawlid. There is safety in it, and that collects the bad, because
where else should they go? So they come and do the things they want to. The mawlid is
like a bus: in it travel the sheikh and the thief, all of society. You see the swing-boats and
the sheikh, it’s all in there.’
S.: So where does the bus go?
‘To our lord the Prophet, God willing.’116
The topic of saints and thieves is key to understanding the openness of the festivity:
everyone in the festival is a legitimate guest of the saint, even if his or her way of
celebrating may appear inappropriate in the eyes of other participants. The openness of
the festival is related to another key topic of the festive society: the suspension of class
hierarchies. Everyone is welcome and everybody is equal:
‘Here there is no difference between a doctor and an engineer and the president of the
Republic [compared to an ordinary man], all become equal when they come here. You can
meet a minister eating next to a man who doesn’t earn more than half a pound, and a
famous actress next to a poor beggar woman who doesn’t earn a shilling,117 and there is no
difference between them.’118
The habitus of the participants and the spatial organisation of the Ìidmas further
underline the suspension of class distinction. In the public imagery of modern Egypt,
mawlids are almost uniformly represented as a lower-class phenomenon. But looking at
who actually comes to a mawlid, this assumption is quickly disproved. While many of
the participants do come from a rural or urban lower-class background, mawlids are also
frequented by wealthy šarÐf families conscious of their spiritual role as descendants of
the Prophet and highly educated young professionals, along with housewives, civil
servants, small businessmen, masters of manual professions, and so on. But while the
participants of mawlids come from all social classes, they commonly enact an
unmistakably rural and lower-class habitus during the festivity. People sit on carpets and
in tents, smoking water pipes and domestic cigarettes and eating simple traditional dishes
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from shared plates. They address each other in an informal style, enriching their speech
with religious phrases, popular proverbs and jokes. While there are certain class
distinctions in how to celebrate the mawlid, in general Sufi mawlid celebrations exhibit
a very limited level of class distinction. The Ìidma is open to all, people usually eat the
same food from shared plates, and there is little visible distinction between people of
various backgrounds.119 The ambience is informal and lacks the distinctive symbols of
middle- and upper-class lifestyle. Middle- and upper-class Sufis often consciously take
over a ‘traditional’, rural habitus, most visibly marked by their style of dress. Men who
in other contexts would wear a shirt and trousers – markers of urban middle classes –
often put on a ÊallÁbÐya and a turban – markers of rural or lower-class habitus – when
they go to the mawlid.120
These moments of openness and equality stand in striking contrast to the hierarchic
society they are part of. Mawlids are organised through various informal structures of
power, notably local master-client relations and charismatic religious leadership, that are
based on the key assumption that people are not equal. In the mawlid the distinctions
of power, money and class do not cease to exist but rather they are symbolically
suspended. When a member of parliament wears a ÊallÁbÐya, sits in a humble Ìidma and
shares tea and domestic cigarettes with workers and dervishes, power is exercised in a
subtle and effective way. The people present do remain aware of his social status, and yet
by suspending the markers of his social status and not making a point of his superior
access to power and resources, he makes himself accessible, demonstrates commitment
and renews the clientele relations his power is based upon.
A successful mawlid is organised through networks of clientelism based on personal
relations of patronage: Sufi sheikhs and disciples, politicians and their constituency, and
master craftsmen and workshop owners (maÝallimÐn) and their workers and dependants.
These networks are renewed through religious legitimisation, sponsorship, charity, and
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the symbolic suspension of the very hierarchic relationships that make this festive
atmosphere possible. A mawlid is an occasion in which patrons have to prove their moral
and communal qualities by acting like ‘one of us’ while people in subaltern positions
might feel that those with money and power are not really above them after all. Although
it may seem paradoxical, the suspension of boundaries and the power of clientelistic and
charismatic networks go hand in hand in the mawlid.121
This ambiguity, and these moments of reversal between the order of the festivity and
the order of the everyday, are fundamental to the way mawlids work. The suspension of
boundaries could not take place anywhere and anytime, else were there no boundaries left
to suspend.  As I argue in the following section, mawlids exist in a tension between the
time and landscape of the extraordinary and the order of the everyday. While these two
‘worlds’ (and the festivity is in fact often described as being like a different world)
produce and sustain each other, they also limit and question each other’s validity and
power.
3. Festive space and time
The suspension of the everyday in the mawlid works through an understanding of space,
the sacred, time and social order that does not define these categories as rigid and
uniform. The extraordinary order of the mawlid is made possible through an order of the
everyday that views space as contingent, the sacred as an active source of power, time as
circular, and social norms as subject to partial temporary reversal.
3.1. Space and the sacred
Mawlids stand in close relation to the structure of villages and old urban quarters. Many
villages and quarters are named after the saints buried in them (e.g. the quarters of
as-Sayyida Zaynab, al-Íusayn and BulÁq AbÙ l-ÝIlÁ in Cairo). The shrines and the
mawlids held around them form central public spaces. Public space, however, means
something quite different here from the liberal concept of public versus private.122
Mawlids represent a way to structure the open space that was once dominant in the cities
of Egypt but has since become either exoticised as folklore or rejected as backward by the
discourses and imageries of Egyptian modernity.123 In this spatial order, spaces are
classified according to complex hierarchies of protection and openness, gender, sanctity
etc. Open spaces can have widely variant characteristics according to their position in
these hierarchies.
The mawlid, insofar it takes place in streets and squares, is set in the spatial category
of sÁÎa, the open space around the shrine, or, in a wider sense, the open space of the
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festivity. The sÁÎa – in itself an ambiguous term that in rural Sufi context has a meaning
closer to that of the zÁwiya124 – facing the shrine is an intersection, a particular form of
open, yet protected, space where an aura of sanctity allows for the licit blending of
different spheres of life. It is a contingent and ambiguous form of space that is defined
by its being open to all people and for multiple uses (market, bus stop, mawlid). The sÁÎa
can only be open to everyone – rich and poor, men and women – because it is
simultaneously protected. This protection is, in the case of mawlids, based on the
relationship of the space to a specific kind of sanctity. The sÁÎa of the mawlid, through
its connection to the sacred space of the shrine, shares some of its baraka and enjoys
some of the special protection of the sacred sphere.
Baraka, in this understanding, is the objectified, material expression of the sacred. It
is a power that emanates from God through His word (the QurÞÁn), His messengers (the
prophets), and His friends (the saints). In a way clearly inspired by Neo-Platonist
metaphysics, this spiritual power gradually mixes with matter, so that while there is a
clear hierarchy between sites, objects and persons according to their degree of sanctity
(Mecca and Medina have more baraka than any shrine, the shrine of a grand saint has
more baraka than that of a minor one, and the shrine has more baraka during the mawlid
than at other times), there is no strict boundary between the spiritual and the material.
Baraka, thus understood, is the power that makes a mawlid possible, providing
protection and legitimacy to the gathering of different people and practices. In the sÁÎa
the sacred is not protected against the profane world because it is not in need of such
protection: on the contrary, the holy shrine is a source of power and protection that
extends to the surrounding profane space, turning it into a protected realm that is
capable of containing very different spheres of life:
‘It is no accident that the holy towns one finds throughout the Middle East, for example,
are also often the sites of major regional markets and caravan route stopping points.
Religion and economy here link tightly and those who are sanctified men of peace,
perhaps descendants of the Prophet, guarantee the functioning of the social system of the
men of honor and violence. They extend a symbolic canopy of religious sanctions and
symbols over the market and impose, at least in theory, a qualitatively different order and
code upon those who come together there.
[...] The space thus formed is a world apart, even though activities within may be of
very worldly and practical nature. If, in symbolic terms, it rests on opposed principles to
that of the zone beyond its boundaries, it is also most intimately linked to that region
beyond. The making of peace at this kind of sacred site is only one of the highly
important ways in which such islands of sanctuary are connected to the wider universe.
In sacred space things become possible, even prescribed, that may be uncertain and
problematic outside. There is protection – of goods, of persons, of collective and
individual property. [...]125
The festive space of the mawlid is structured according to this concept of sanctity that
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Image 13: Parallel centres, overlapping spheres and the main streets of celebration in the mawlid of
as-Sayyida FÁÔima an-NabawÐya, Cairo, 2-3 June 2003.
is practised by most of the participants in the festival. The form of the shrines is often
clearly inspired by the holy sites in Mecca and Medina, specifically the tomb of the
Prophet in Medina, and the KaÝba in Mecca (shrines are built and decorated in a way
similar to the tomb of the Prophet, and the ritual of circumambulating the shrine
counter-clockwise is clearly an imitation of the same ritual around the KaÝba and the
Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem), but also Mt. ÝArafa outside Mecca (in a way that bears
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striking likeness to the rituals of ÎaÊÊ, climbing to Mt. Íumay×ara is a central ritual at
the mawlid of SÐdÐ AbÙ l-Íasan aš-ŠÁÆilÐ, which is celebrated simultaneously with the
ÎaÊÊ). These forms of space and movement place the shrines of saints in a hierarchy of
baraka right below the three holy sites of Islam.
A similar hierarchy of baraka is, in turn, applied in the spatial organisation of
mawlids. One can best imagine such organisation as a field of overlapping circles,
structured along the central square(s) and the mains streets.126 As shown in the case of the
mawlid of FÁÔima an-NabawÐya, a mawlid usually has numerous parallel centres
connected by main streets, while the shrine is generally the central, most crowded and
most festive spot. Sufi festivities take place around the shrine, accompanied by countless
stands of vendors. Swing-boats, popular singers and all of the other popular amusements
of mawlids sometimes concentrate in areas of their own, but this is based on pragmatic
considerations determined by the organisers and the vendors (availability of open space,
the commercial advantage of being close to competitors, etc.), not a sense of having to
be separated from the devotional celebrations. People in movement form a central
element of the festivity, moving continuously between the different areas and, via this
movement, connecting different celebrations into one festival. Crowds are concentrated
in the central square(s) and the main streets while in the side streets and alleys a different
atmosphere prevails: they host numerous Sufi Ìidmas and, especially in the mawlids of
Cairo, are characterised by a local neighbourhood celebration marked by a more intimate
atmosphere than that found on the main streets.
These different elements of festivity are partly mixed, partly separated, and yet all
centre around the shrine of the saint, a source of holiness and baraka and the focal point
and very reason behind the festivity. The festival does not have a clear programme, a clear
meaning or a clear plan, however it does have a clear centre in its festive geography (both
physical and imagined): the shrine of the saint, which radiates an aura of sacredness over
all of the festivity, encompassing everything and everyone to various degrees. While a
pilgrimage to the shrine brings more and purer baraka than drinking tea in a café next
to the mosque, even the most profane parts of the festivity are not fully separate from nor
opposed to the sacred centre, on the contrary, they become part of the sacred-profane
spectacle.127
3.2. Time and social order
On 25 October 2002, one week before the great night, the mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-
DisÙqÐ was officially opened in the city of DisÙq (Kafr aš-ŠayÌ province in the Nile
Delta). The Friday noon prayer was attended by a large crowd of people and the park
facing the mosque was filled with picnicking families. The mosque of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm is
always well-attended, but because it was the opening day of the mawlid there were even
more people present than usual on Fridays. Before the prayer, the mosque gave its usual
impression: a busy but controlled and calm pilgrimage site. 
The large mosque of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm is separated into different sections for men and
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women, each with entrances of their own. In the men’s section, some people sat around,
some performed supererogatory prayers, others passed by on their way to visit the shrine.
Slowly more people gathered in expectation of the imminent collective prayer. The shrine
is located in a separate room, a large space covered by a dome that also houses some
smaller shrines belonging to SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm’s followers. A wooden fence separates this
room into two sections – one for men and one for women. Conveniently, it also prevents
people from circumambulating the shrine, a practice which, because of its resemblance
to the rituals performed at the KaÝba, has been subject to criticism almost as much as the
mixing of men and women at the shrine.128
When the call for the Friday noon prayer sounded, believers crowded the mosque to
perform their prayer and listen to the sermon. Then, the very moment the prayer service
ended, the mawlid began. The transformation was rapid and dramatic. Immediately when
people began to leave the mosque, families began to enter it, carrying newspapers and
baskets. As soon as they were inside, they spread the newspapers on the floor, unloaded
the contents of their baskets onto the newspapers, and a picnic was ready. At the same
time, people crowded towards the shrine to pay their respects to SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm. At the
shrine, mosque employees struggled against the crowd to remove the fence that bisects
the room. As soon as the fence was gone, a vortex of human bodies – men, women, and
children – began to move around the shrine, invocating God, praising the Prophet and
greeting the saint in loud voices. Half an hour after the prayer, a Æikr of the BurhÁnÐya
order began in the main hall of the mosque. While half of the mosque had turned into
a mixed family space, the Æikr was exclusively male. Led by a munšid, the men moved their
bodies rhythmically, invocating names of God: ‘AllÁh!’, ‘Íayy!’, ‘QayyÙm!’.129 The space
was filled with the ecstatic movements of their bodies and the chant of the munšid. 
Within minutes following the Friday prayer, the character of the space and the
habitus attached to it had radically changed. The mosque and the shrine had been
transformed from a gender-segregated, exclusively spiritual space into a multi-functional
family space. The calm, almost sterile sanctity of the morning was swept away by the
emotional, crowded, ecstatic celebration of the mawlid that would prevail until the  great
night the following Thursday. After that, the fence at the shrine would be put back in
place, men and women would be confined to their respective areas once again, and the
regular everyday order of the mosque would return.
The intensity and attraction of the mawlid is essentially connected to its short,
fleeting nature. It takes place only once a year and only lasts a few days. Although there
are some people who spend most of their time going to mawlids, for the vast majority of
people, and for the pilgrimage sites themselves, the mawlid is a rare, special moment in
time that, by definition, simply cannot be a permanent state of affairs. A mawlid is
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something one waits for, something that exists as a promise sparkling through the
dullness of daily life. In visitors’ accounts, this passing, extraordinary character is often
strongly emphasised. In their narratives the mawlid emerges as a beautiful moment
beyond the boundaries of daily life, a time when all people from all classes of society
unite and where the mystic and the thief come together in the realm of the saint – a
beautiful congregation with the Sufi brethren, a moment of freedom far removed from
the restriction of the home and daily routines. During the mawlid you can ‘leave behind
your work and family and set out for a hard, long, journey’, ‘change the atmosphere’, ‘see
strange, new things’ and ‘empty your head and enjoy. The mawlid means to forget all
your worries and live in the moment.’130 The next morning, however, it is time to go to
work and behave again.
Time, or to be more precise, the temporal structure of norms and boundaries, is key
to the specific character of a mawlid – and most other festivities, for that matter. The
mawlid is a limited period of time during which different rules apply, when, for example,
circumambulating the shrine, the mixing of men and women in sacred space, and eating
in the mosque are permitted. During the mawlid, under the protection of the saint and
with the mercy of God, or, from a different point of view, in the anonymity and vastness
of the crowds, one can let loose and do what one might otherwise not do. This can
sometimes mean outright transgression of social norms – drinking, libertine sexual
contacts, harassment, fights – but more often the situation is more subtle, as ‘rules are
stretched but not broken’.131 In most cases, what is transgressed in the festive time of the
mawlid is not so much the moral norms of a society than the boundaries which mark
these. Women’s movement and gendered space make a good example. In Sufi Ìidmas and
many Sufi rituals, space is shared by men and women who are not members of the same
family132 and yet Sufis would never see this as an expression of libertine morals. On the
contrary, they argue that in the realm of the saint, on the noble occasion of his or her
birthday, people are busy with spiritual matters and are not exposed to sexual temptation,
ergo there can be nothing immoral about it:
‘This was a beautiful day, with ziyÁras, friendship, spirituality and love (maÎabba),
everyone was sitting here in a state of innocence and purity. These are beautiful, innocent
moments. The mawlid is like the ÝÐd, all people rejoin in friendship and peace, all of them
sinless (maÝÒÙm). In my Ìidma, all people, men and women, sit here in a state of pure
spiritual love (maÎabba) without any bad things to disturb it.’133
This is more than merely an apologetic strategy of argumentation. In the Sufi Ìidmas I
have attended, the atmosphere has almost never been sexually charged. At the mawlid,
most people do not do things they consider to be immoral. However, they do act in ways
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they would consider unsuitable on other occasions but which they view as legitimate
during the mawlid because of its spiritual character and/or its exceptional, fleeting festive
nature.
Time is so important to understanding mawlids because it is central to structuring
the norms and boundaries of  social order. The concept of time that makes mawlids
possible is not a universal, linear time in which all moments are equal and
interchangeable, with the same rules and logic of behaviour valid at any other given time.
Such a uniform, progressive concept of time (which does not exist in such pure form in
any society) would imply a moral and social habitus based on homogenous, universal
norms and boundaries.134 The concept of time that mawlids are based upon is contingent
and, to a significant extent, circular. It is contingent because it is based on an
understanding of social order in which norms and boundaries are bound to a temporal
context, as is pointed out by the colloquial proverb: ‘There’s an hour for your heart and
an hour for your Lord.’135 What is suitable at a certain time is out of the question at
another, and vice versa. It is circular because it implies periodic shifts of social and
metaphysical order: once a year, a mawlid is a special time in which, depending on what
one is looking for, the mythological time of the Prophet and the grand saints is mingled
with the present, the world is good and free of oppression and greed, or the worries of
the past year are forgotten and there is no tomorrow to be troubled about.136 This festive
time is never a progressive shift into another state; it implies that the order of the
everyday is neither absolute nor beyond questioning, but also that when the festivity ends
the order of daily life inevitably returns. The experience of this festive time can be, as I
argue in the following chapter, described as liminal. But due to the recurrent character
of mawlids it is not accurate to describe them as rites of passage (although they, of course,
may be so in some individual festive experiences). A mawlid does not imply a
transformation from a structure through anti-structure to a new level of structure,137 but
rather an alternative, recurrent ‘counter-structure’.138
A much criticised feature in the social study of time has been to construct the time
of the Other (the object of anthropology) through its opposition to a supposedly linear
and abstract time of the modern, Western society. According to its critics – notably
Johannes Fabian and Barbara Adam – such an approach is not only inaccurate
concerning its subject, but also problematic in the way it leaves crucial premises
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concerning the structure of time unquestioned.139 Therefore it is necessary to point out
what exactly is at stake when we talk about different models of time in the context of
mawlids. Firstly, speaking of time in this and following chapters, what is intended is
primarily the temporal structure of norms and boundaries, that is, the question as to
what extent norms and boundaries are seen to be contingent upon specific moments of
time. Secondly, the homogenous and universal time referred to in the previous paragraph
is not, although it may seem so, that of Western industrial societies.140 It is, and this
proves to be a significant element of the debates on mawlids, a specific interpretation of
time that goes along with the Egyptian modernist concepts of progress and public order.
Neither is the contingent time of mawlids in any way essentially Egyptian or pre-modern.
It is a contemporary, albeit contested, way to organise society, morality, and religious
experience. Ideal types as they are, these concepts of time are not independent entities.
The experience and social organisation of time cannot be reduced to either linear and
universal or reoccurring and contingent elements.141 Yet the distinction remains
important for this study because a specific understanding of time is expressed at mawlids
with an intensity that can be problematic for constructs of order and society that
emphasise discipline and progress.
What does this mean for the concrete case of mawlids? Let us return to the case of the
mawlid in DisÙq: The end of the Friday prayer in the mosque of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm al-DisÙqÐ
marked the beginning of a qualitatively different period of time.142 In this festive period
of time, special rules applied. Because it was the noble celebration of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm, people
could relax and express their joy, and because it was a time to relax and express joy,
people didn’t need to behave the way they would at work or during prayer. Of course, not
all aspects of temporal discipline are subject to change. Mawlid or not, murder and
robbery are not tolerated, to take just two examples. Furthermore, the moral norms and
the temporal discipline of any given society are in constant change: what was acceptable
behaviour on some occasions in the 19th century, may in the 21st century be seen as a
transgression at all times. In fact, the mawlids of the 19th century seem much wilder to
the present-day reader (see below pp. 191-192), while the basic characteristics of mawlids
– ambivalence and the suspension of boundaries – remain constant.
The festive order of mawlids (along with many other festivities) is based on a social
order that allows for a relatively high degree of ambivalence and temporal contingence
of boundaries. In this order, the mawlid is part of the circle of life and plays a legitimate
role in both sustaining and questioning the preceding and following ordinary times.
Because everything has its time, there is, among others, a time to let go and forget, even
to question some of the otherwise undisputed boundaries of life.
But what about the function of this kind of festive time? Is it perhaps a popular form
of resistance to hegemonic norms? Or is it mere ‘bread and games’ to distract people
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from their real problems and to keep the people happy and passive? Both views enjoys
significant popularity, both in Egypt and internationally, but both fail to understand the
deeply ambivalent nature of the festive time. A mawlid is at the same time profound and
joking, spiritual and commercial, conservative and subversive, and it makes little sense
to try to figure out which part comes first. The question has to be phrased differently. If
we want to understand what function, if any, mawlids have in politics and society, we
first have to ask what a mawlid means to the people who participate in it. This question
forms the subject of the following chapter devoted to the various, often contradictory
interpretations and practices of the festivity.
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Chapter Three: Festive experiences
It has become commonplace to compare mawlids with Catholic carnivals: colourful
spectacles with entertainment, music and processions in which the rules of everyday
behaviour are inverted.143 Although some researchers in the field, notably Barbara
Drieskens,144 have credibly questioned this, the analogy of carnival is compelling and to
some extent justified. Yet this analogy is also far too simplistic to be taken as a research
question. Firstly, if we were to look for comparative cases, Catholic saints-day festivals (a
custom clearly distinct from carnival)145 – for example the pilgrimages of Mexico and the
Kirchweih of southern Germany146 with their mixture of religious celebration and the
atmosphere of a fair – might show more similarities to mawlids than carnival does.
Secondly and more importantly, the question concerning the carnivalesque nature of the
mawlid is embedded in a more complex problem, namely the character of the mawlid as
a festivity as perceived and celebrated by its various participants. Hence, the question is
not whether mawlids are like carnivals (or carnivals like mawlids). Instead, we must ask
what kind of festive experiences and ideologies they are embedded in, and what kind of
relationship the different festive practices of the mawlid have to each other, daily life, and
other festivities.
I argue in this chapter that for the people involved in them, mawlids are characterised
by a temporary utopian vision of a better world. There is not one festive utopia but rather
many. These utopias are partly opposed to each other but also share a stark contrast to
daily life in a way not typical of other festivities in contemporary Egypt. Although
mawlids are strongly ambiguous and potentially subversive towards hegemonic norms,
they are not a form of open resistance or transgression. And yet they may become
perceived so from the perspective of  different understandings of festivity, piety and
social order.
1. Approaches to festivity and pilgrimage
There is an old and ongoing debate in the social and cultural sciences about how to
interpret festivity and pilgrimage. Emile Durkheim, to begin with a prominent classic,
provides a functional explanation of festivity as a means to renew and reinforce the
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values and coherence of a community.147 In the successive tradition of structural
functionalist anthropology, festive rites of reversal that appeared to question the values
of a community were generally interpreted as a way to stabilise social order through the
symbolic enactment of conflicts.148
A different approach is offered by Victor Turner,149 who argues that rituals and
pilgrimages represent a moment of anti-structure, a transition from one status to the
other whereby otherwise valid structures and hierarchies are temporarily replaced by
communitas, the egalitarian community of participants in which the authority of the
ritual leader is recognised while other forms of authority and hierarchy may be suspended
or inverted. This moment of anti-structure, or liminality, becomes a (necessarily short)
period of extraordinary unity and equality, before the passage to a new structural status
is completed.
The power of Turner’s approach is that it enables us to look beyond apparent
functional or structural continuities and analyse the dialectic and dynamic nature of
ritual and festivity. His approach was later criticised, however,  for sketching an image
that is too idealised to give justice to the complex nature of ritual. In the context of
pilgrimage, John Eade and Michael Sallnow150 argue that while pilgrimage rituals may be
a form of communitas on the ideological level, the practice of pilgrimages is characterised
by mutually contested interpretations and heavy competition, which makes them capable
of attracting people from different regions holding different ideas of what the pilgrimage
is about:
‘Pilgrimage is above all an arena for competing religious and secular discourses, [...] for
conflict between orthodoxies, sects, and confessional groups.’151
‘[W]hat confers upon a major shrine its essential, universalistic character [is] its capacity
to absorb and reflect a multiplicity of religious discourses, to be able to offer a variety of
clients what each of them desires.’152
One should be careful  not to dismiss the experience of liminality entirely on the
grounds of the power struggles that take place during a pilgrimage.153 Yet the advantage
of Eade’s and Sallnow’s criticism is that it calls attention the plural and fragmented
nature of pilgrimage – and any other major festivity. One cannot point out the one
communitas, the one ritual momentum at work in a festivity because there are always
many of them, partly in competition, partly together contributing to the shape of the
festivity.154
An approach that I consider highly fruitful to understanding this complex puzzle of
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multiple festive ideologies and practices is presented by Mikhael Bakhtin, who, in his
book Rabelais and His World155 (written in the 1930s and 40s and first published in 1965),156
argues that the mediaeval popular feast, especially the carnival, represented a moment of
utopian freedom:
‘The feast was a temporary suspension of the entire official system with all its prohibitions
and hierarchic barriers. For a short time life came out of its usual, legalized and
consecrated furrows and entered the sphere of utopian freedom. The very brevity of this
freedom increased its fantastic nature and utopian radicalism, born in the festive
atmosphere of images.’157
Even following the decline of the mediaeval carnival traditions, Bakhtin argues, this has
remained a characteristic feature of festivities:
‘The feast has no utilitarian connotation (as has daily rest and relaxation after working
hours). On the contrary, the feast means liberation from all that is utilitarian, practical.
It is a temporary transfer to the utopian world. The feast cannot be reduced to any specific
content (for instance to the historical event commemorated on that day); it transgresses
all limited objectives.’158
Festive time, according to Bakhtin, is a time in its own right, a popular utopia of freedom
and equality. Carnivalesque speech allows for ridiculing otherwise eternal truths,
representing ‘people’s unofficial truth’ and ‘the victory of laughter over fear.’159 Laughter
and festivity are, in Bakhtin’s interpretation, not a form of distraction from ‘true’ matters
and dispositions, on the contrary they appear as a powerful and truthful expression of
the human condition. Festivity, according to Bakhtin, is a utopian moment in which –
for a limited period of time – people are able to articulate and experience a better world
free of moralism, oppression, poverty and boredom.
Bakhtin’s analysis is problematic on several levels. His work is based on a narrow
selection of sources, his historical analysis is over-generalising and his concept of festivity
highly idealised.160 But these shortcomings mainly concern the validity of Bakhtin’s work
as an interpretation of Rabelais. On a more abstract level, Bakhtin remains useful for the
study of festivities, and his concept of festive utopia can be developed further to analyse
how festivities are given competing meanings.
Writing in the Soviet Union of the  1930s and 40s, Bakhtin offers a model of utopia
that is strongly influenced by the Marxist concept of utopia  as a pre-revolutionary
ideology that proclaims a better society but lacks the political programme and scientific
understanding of society required for it to be actually realised.161 A festive utopia, to argue
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with Bakhtin, shares with political utopias the vision of an ideal social order but differs
from the latter on two significant points. The first is that unlike the political utopias (in
a wider, non- Marxist sense)162 of the 19th and 20th centuries that have been either
imagined as ideal communities or located in the future, festive utopia is not imagined
but lived. The better world presented by a festivity is not a promise yet to be realised but
a recurrent experience that offers a time to question and relativise the order of the
everyday. From this follows the second point, namely that while a festive utopia can (but
does not have to) present a clear critique of the otherwise valid norms of society, it is
always ambiguous in character because of its temporary nature. Those who share a festive
utopia do not expect it to one day replace the contemporary social order for good.
Festivity stands in a dialectic relationship with the norms and structures of society: it
may serve their cohesion but may also subvert them.
Speaking of utopia instead of liminality, on the condition that we remain aware of
the specific characteristics of festive utopias, highlights the ambiguity of festivities and
their contested meanings. Utopia, in all its forms, belongs to the field of political
imagination and speaking of festivities in terms of utopia highlights their political
character, that is, their significance to contestations over the values and resources of a
society. After all, the meaning and function of festivity are not only the subject of
academic debate in which some researchers see utopian time, others liminality, and still
others renewal of the community. The people participating in a festivity themselves hold
different commonsense theories of what the festivity is about that sometimes bear
striking resemblance to the academic models. Festive experiences are accompanied by
understandings – implicit or explicit – of what the festivity means. A festivity does not
simply have functions waiting to be discovered by the social scientist. It is given functions
by the participants, and these functions are subject to explicit negotiation and change.
This is what makes Bakhtin’s concept of utopian time so interesting, provided that
we do not assume that there is just one utopia that all people live out at all festivities.
Instead, we need to ask what kind of utopian views people produce and express at
different festivities. Most festivities, not only mawlids, display a utopian spirit of some
kind: at the time of the feast, the world is good, such as at carnival time when everything
(or a lot) is allowed, and during Christmas or ÝÐd al-fiÔr when everybody loves each other
and conflicts are settled. Each festivity has its own utopian view of a temporary better
world, but these temporary better worlds show great variety, which again is related to the
occasion, social context, space and time of the festivity. To analyse these different visions
of festivity is all the more interesting with festivities that contain a high degree of variety,
competition, and even conflict – as is the case with mawlids.
Of course, as Eade’s and Sallnow’s analysis of pilgrimage reminds us, real celebrations
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can be far removed from a particular festive utopia. Christmas may be perceived as a feast
of love and solidarity, but policemen working the Christmas night shift might tell a
different story centred on outbreaks of violence as fragile families try but fail to act out
the ideal of mutual love. This discrepancy between festive ideal and practice does not
mean that the utopian view of festivity is irrelevant. On the contrary, festive practice is
continuously measured against an ideal of how a certain celebration ought to be
celebrated. When such implicit measure sticks become topics of discourse, this justifies
speaking of a festive ideology – a normative description, to some extent coherent and
rationalised, of what a festivity is  about, what it means, and how it ought to be
celebrated, combined with the will and sometimes the resources to apply these norms.
2. Many mawlids
I have argued that the success of mawlids and other pilgrimage festivities is based on their
ability to unite highly different festive practices and ideologies under an overarching
theme everyone can share in. Yet in a mawlid, finding such common ground is not easy.
For most participants, the festivity is a way to honour the memory of a grand saint and,
hence, Islam as a whole. But there are also many participants who do not share the belief
in saints, and others still who are not Muslims.
One overarching theme appears in almost all descriptions of mawlids. A mawlid,
according to almost all participants, is in one way or another a festivity characterised by
joy, to the extent that the word for joy has become a word for the festivity. The mawlid,
in popular idiom, is a faraÎ, meaning joy but also the term used for a wedding
celebration. The association between a saint’s festivity and a wedding is expressed in the
similarity of many of the mawlid’s rituals to those of nuptial celebrations: the opening
processions are known as zaffa, a term borrowed from wedding processions, and at the
festivals of female saints, a henna celebration analogous to those organised for brides
prior to weddings is held at the shrine.
The general theme of joy contains many different nuances, and allows for the
containment of highly different visions of festivity:
‘The mawlid collects all. It’s open for everybody without exception, that’s why the
mawlids also have very many ways of celebration. [...] There are those who come to look,
or to grab girls, some come to listen to the munšidÐn, others to watch a female dancer. It’s
all there. But all are in one way or another there for the saint whose celebration (faraÎ) it
is. [...] All come to celebrate (yifraÎ), and although each have a different moment of joy
(farÎa), all are in the same celebration (faraÎ).’163
What is common to all festive joy at the mawlid is its special intensity and overwhelming
and extraordinary character. FatÎÐ ÝAbd as-SamÐÝ, a poet and journalist from the Upper
Egyptian city of QinÁ, interprets the need for joy in a life full of hardship as the driving
force that turns mawlids into utopian time:
‘I think that mawlids really are a conspiracy to create joy. They are an expression of joy
and suppressed feelings in an otherwise very closed society [i.e. Upper Egypt]. People live
under hard circumstances and extreme poverty, women in the villages live in a small space
and the most they move is between two houses in the same alley. For them going to the
55Festive experiences
164Interview with FatÎÐ ÝAbd as-SamÐÝ, poet and journalist, QinÁ, 19 and 20 October 2002.
165Meaning approximately ‘may this day find you well every year’, a greeting that is used on all
annual festive occasions.
Image 14: Henna procession in the mawlid of as-
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mawlid is a rare occasion of joy and
travel. [...] The mawlid is a mirror for the
suppressed feelings (muÈlaqÁt) of the
society. [...] It is a moment of breaking the
order.  The city [of QinÁ] follows the
course of order perfectly except in the
days of the mawlid. [...] I’m especially
intrigued by the relation of the living and
the dead when the mawlid enters the
graveyard. The utmost noise amidst the
utmost silence! A whole mythical life, it’s
not by coincidence among the dead.’164
In this interpretation, joy appears as the
emotional tone of a temporary
liberation from the bonds and hardship
of daily life. But it is not determined
what bonds are broken, nor what kind
of joy prevails during the time of the
mawlid. United in the same great
moment of joy, participants have very
d i f f e r e n t  e x p e r i e n c e s  a n d
interpretations of the festivity.
On a closer look, it turns out that a
mawlid is not really one festivity at all
but rather a festival in a most profound
sense of the word: a time and an area
for countless different celebrations,
some of which overlap while others never meet. In this temporary city of celebration,
each visitor makes his or her own mawlid, depending on where one goes and what one
does. The choices are many: read the FÁtiÎa at the shrine, take a ride on a swing-boat or
the Ferris wheel, participate in a Æikr and reach a state of trance, sit in the Ìidma with Sufi
brethen and friends, hang around on the streets, make or fulfill a vow, play dice or
roulette, listen to a munšid, eat for free, go to a café or restaurant, have a good look at
members of the opposite sex, study the biography of the saint, obtain baraka, sit in front
of one’s house and watch the changing scenery, go target-shooting and choose a stand run
by a pretty girl, donate food or drinks, beg, give alms, feel united with God, sleep, cook,
get high, earn money by selling cheap commodities, make fun of people, watch the side-
show, walk in or watch a procession, praise the Prophet, rush through the crowds, pick
a fight, buy snacks and souvenirs, recite the QurÞÁn and religious poetry, kiss the shrine
and break into tears, laugh, ululate, distribute money and presents, listen to a popular
singer, shake hands and greet: ‘kull sana w-inta Ôayyib!’165
One can choose to participate in any of these moments of festivity, but few choose
all. In fact, the pluralistic character of the mawlid makes an attempt to see it all a
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169Interview with Sayyid, teacher, formerly leftist poet and now active Sufi, QufÔ (QinÁ
province), 21 October 2002.
practically impossible task, and most mawlid-goers never even try. It sometimes happened
during my fieldwork that people whom I had interviewed about their relationship to the
festivity in turn asked me to show them around. Young men from DisÙq who went to the
mawlid of their hometown every year turned to me to inquire about what Sufi pilgrims
actually do at the mawlid. At the same mawlid a Sufi pilgrim who had come to celebrate
SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ for 15 years asked me to take him to the amusement area because
he had never been there. The researcher is, by definition, expected to go everywhere, but
most people have their own particular interests and regular places to frequent.166 Every
visitor thus makes his or her own imaginary map of the festivity, each one showing the
way to a different mawlid.
So what are these different mawlids like? If, as I have suggested, festivities often have
a utopian nature, then what kind of festive utopias do people experience at mawlids? And
in what relation do these stand to each other, other festivities, and daily life? In the
following, I take a closer look at three different understandings of the mawlid and the
utopian worlds it represents. These are, of course, heavy generalisations. In individual
festive experience, different interpretations of the festivity come together in an
unpredictable way. But these three ways to celebrate and to describe the mawlid are
central, recurring interpretations of its festive utopia, allowing an approximate if not
fully accurate overview of the festive interpretations and practices that make up the
mawlid.
2.1. The Sufi mawlid
For Sufi pilgrims, the mawlid, framed as joy (faraÎ), is first and foremost an expression
of love: love of God, love of the Prophet and ahl al-bayt, and mutual love of pilgrims,
brethren and sisters.167
‘I used to be opposed to mawlids completely until I was convinced to change my mind
by the living example of my sheikh. People come to a mawlid for different reasons like
following the example of the pious or having fun, but the essence, the absolute
foundation of the mawlid is love, indiscriminate love including everyone, near and far.
What can bring people all the way from Indonesia or the Philippines to visit the Arab
imam while some of the neighbours stay away, if not love? I know people who cry heavy
tears in the face of severe economic hardship just to go to the mawlid. Visiting the mawlid
is a QurÞÁnic duty: “Say: I do not ask of you a wage for this, except love for the
kinsfolk”.168 Those are the children (i.e. descendants) of the Prophet, his bond of
kinship.’169
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170Sg. šarÐf, šarÐfa. Like many Sufi leaders, al-ÍÁÊÊa SihÁm, speaking in this account, draws a
large part of her authority from her lineage as a descendant of the Prophet.
171Interview with al-ÍÁÊÊa SihÁm al-ËalÐfa, charismatic leader of a Sufi group in Alexandria,
mawlid of as-Sayyida NafÐsa, Cairo, 21 August 2002.
172Unlike in many other pilgrimages, (See Coleman/Eade, ‘Introduction: Reframing Pilgrimage’;
Coleman/Elsner, Pilgrimage, pp. 205 f.) travel itself is not essential to Islamic pilgrimages (Pagès-El
Karoui,’Le mouled de Sayyid al-Badawî’, p. 253).  It may be so in some cases, though, as in the case
of the mawlid of SÐdÐ AbÙ l-Íasan aš-ŠÁÆilÐ, located in the eastern desert far from any other
settlements and requiring a long journey that becomes a part of the festive experience in the
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173Interview with ËamÐs, graduate of al-Azhar, and his friends, Sufi pilgrims to the mawlid of
as-SulÔan al-FarÈal, AbÙ TÐÊ, 18 July.
174People often undertake the pilgrimage to a shrine in search of healing, but I have also
encountered people who did not expect to be healed and yet consciously defied the advice of
doctors to stay home. On the theme of voluntary hardship, see also Reader, ‘Conclusions’, pp. 224-
226.
‘For us as ašrÁf (descendants of the Prophet)170 the mawlid is like a birthday, of my great-
grandmother as-Sayyida NafÐsa. Other people view the shrines of ahl al-bayt differently,
they see baraka and giving (ÝaÔÁÞ). And indeed, miracles really happen there, with the
power of God, at the mawlid of as-Sayyida NafÐsa, through vows. Of course everyone has
his own way to celebrate the mawlid. The mawlid is at the same time baraka and closeness
to God (qurbÁ); it is at the same time pious charity (nafÎa) and remembering. But all the
Sufis gather on one issue: love of the Prophet and God.’171
The Sufi experience of a mawlid is characterised by leaving home and everyday life
behind and entering a realm of love, baraka and spirituality for a limited period of time.
For Sufis, the mawlid is a pilgrimage, although the pilgrims may only travel very short
distances to reach their goal. More essential than the physical movement is movement
in the sense of transformation:172 the moment of leaving home and the successive time
spent dwelling at the mawlid. There, in tents and rented apartments, on carpets and at
the shrine, Sufi pilgrims live out the unique time of the mawlid.
Dwelling at the mawlid is associated with great physical fatigue: uncomfortable travel,
spartan living conditions and, most crucially, lack of sleep. Most Sufi pilgrims tend to
see this fatigue as a privilege rather than a problem. Attending the mawlid of as-SulÔÁn
al-FarÈal in AbÙ TÐÊ (near AsyÙÔ) in July 2003, I was invited by the fresh Azhar graduate
ËamÐs and his sheikh ÝAlÐ AbÙ NabbÙt to stay in their Ìidma located in a secondary
school classroom. ËamÐs and his friends who ran the Ìidma appeared exhausted but
happy and told me that they had hardly slept or eaten in the past three days: ‘All we need
are cigarettes and the grace of our Lord’. When I worried that they may be wearing
themselves out too much, they countered that that was the least thing concerning them:
‘The people here don’t think about things being trouble, because God will reward them
for the effort of the Ìidma. One doesn’t want it to be easy.’173 In fact, they appeared rather
proud of holding out. Voluntarily going through hardship in the mawlid is seen as an
expression of the love the festivity is founded upon. In Cairo, many Sufis who could
easily take the bus home prefer to stay in a tent for the duration of the festivity. Some
people go to the extreme and attend the mawlid even if they are seriously ill.174
Despite the physical discomfort of pilgrimage, many pilgrims stress how they feel
intensively alive at the mawlid. Through its stark contrast to daily life and its temporary
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176See Drieskens, Living with Jinns, pp. 225-227.
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character, the time spent at the mawlid appears as more real, more intense and more
profound than that of other days. So also to LaylÁ, a young woman from ZaqÁzÐq who
travelled with her parents and a Sufi group of some ten people to the mawlid of as-Sayyid
Ahmad al-BadawÐ in ÓanÔÁ. For most of the mawlid she spent cooking tea and food for
their small Ìidma on the sidewalk near the mosque, and yet the plenty of work she was
busy with did not prevent her from being in an excellent mood.
S.: ‘It looks like you run the whole mawlid.’
‘Yes, I like it a lot. It’s much better than being at home – there I don’t have work and stay
at home and feel tired/ill (taÝbÁna). Here it’s different. I stay awake all the time – you saw
me yesterday night: I was awake until late at night and up again early.
S.: ‘Do you go to mawlids a lot?’
‘Only here in ÓanÔÁ. I always come with the same people, but there are some new ones
every year. I was once on my own in Cairo at the mawlid of as-Sayyida Zaynab but I felt
left alone (literally orphan, yatÐma) and lonely in the crowd. Here it’s much better, also
much better than at home, I get a change of atmosphere (aÈayyar il-Êaww).
S.: ‘Do you stay here in the Ìidma or do you move around in the mawlid?’
‘Why would I go out into the streets? The youths there have bad manners, they would just
harass me. And all the people I want, I can see them here.’175
‘Getting a change of atmosphere’ (taÈyÐr al-Êaww), that is, moving to a different
environment and taking time off from daily routines and worries,176 is a central motif of
almost all festive accounts. But nowhere else is the utopian moment as explicit as among
the pilgrims. For them, mawlids are often almost like a second life. Usually people go to
certain mawlids every year, finding there old friends and familiar places.177 Their life at
mawlids develops into something of an alternative lifestyle based on rules and
conventions different from those of daily life. For many the Ìidma becomes a second, or
even first, home. So also Sheikh Íasan ad-DirÐnÐ who, after touring the mawlids of Egypt
with his Ìidma for several months every year, has to adjust to middle-class lifestyle again
when the mawlid season ends.
‘You know when my tour is over, I feel addicted and upset and sad, and when I change my
clothes [from ÊallÁbÐya and turban to shirt and trousers] and move around in Heliopolis
and al-MuhandisÐn and al-Haram178 I feel like a stranger; here [in the mawlid] I feel in my
own element. A friend of mine caught the point well when he said: You can’t take a fish
out of water.’179
Most Sufi pilgrims only attend one or just a few mawlids every year, but there is also a
much smaller but very visible group of pilgrims who, like Sheikh Íasan, travel from one
mawlid to the next throughout the different festive seasons,180 to the degree that they may
live more than half of the year at various mawlids around the country. It is these people
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183Interview with Umm NÙrÁ, mawlid of SÐdnÁ al-Íusayn, Cairo , 22 June 2003.
who are commonly described as dervishes or mawÁldÐya:181 nearly full-time mystics who
devote all their free time to Sufi practice or even give up regular work and live completely
‘for God’. The fact that some people actually live as dervishes bestows the festive
experience with the quality of an alternative life; not only are there times when people
can free themselves from some of the bonds of the society, but some people actually live
their entire life that way.182
Most full-time dervishes live on the margins of society without steady income or even
housing. Although many people who are sympathetic to Sufism express admiration or
respect for them, they would hardly want to change places with them. Many of the people
who work in the Ìidmas and travel from one mawlid to another are driven to this lifestyle
by utter poverty. The Ìidma is often the last refuge for homeless youths, single mothers,
the mentally ill, and others with no other place to go. Their life at the mawlid is mostly
hard work for which they receive food and shelter, plus some occasional tips. But
working at a Ìidma is never merely a way to survive hardship for them – they always
frame it in religious terms: they take pride in doing it for the sake of God. What they
demand in exchange is respect and recognition for the service they offer, as exemplified
by the account of Umm NÙrÁ, the single mother of a young girl. She spotted me once
during the mawlid of SÐdnÁ al-Íusayn and asked me whether I had recently seen Sheikh
N. at whose Ìidma I would often sit and where she used to cook.
‘I left his Ìidma; I got angry at him. I felt disrespected and badly treated, doing the Ìidma
and cooking the food for the sake of God, not asking for thanks. But Sheikh N., he was
always very demanding and unfriendly and had no respect. I did my work from the
morning till late at night, and he would just be commanding around and hurrying me.
I wouldn’t take it. I can cook well, do it properly, and with patience; that’s the way you
have to do it. Sheikh N. didn’t treat me well; he doesn’t listen to people, he only
commands around. [...] With so many of the sheikhs you can’t know what they are up to...
This sheikh MuÎammad (at whose Ìidma the discussion took place) is good, but with
others you can’t know. [...]’
S. ‘So are you now working in another Ìidma?’
‘No, I don’t work in a Ìidma now. I’m staying with an old sick woman nearby here and
cooking for her and taking care of her. After the mawlid I’ll go to BÙlÁq AbÙ l-ÝIlÁ where
I live and find some work with my brother. I hope to get some work to get enough money
to put my daughter NÙrÁ in school. This is actually the first year that I have worked in
a Ìidma at a mawlid. [...] I do hope the best for Sheikh N. although I had a quarrel with
him. But I’m really upset because later, when I went to say hello to him, he just shouted
at me. I won’t take that. Say, if you meet him, tell him greetings from Umm NÙrÁ. Just tell
him that and see how he reacts.’183
For most people, however, staying in the Ìidma is a matter of voluntary choice. What
attracts them to the life at mawlids is the experience of living in a better world ruled by
the altruistic principles of love, equality and spirituality. In the Ìidma, everybody appears
equal and everything is free of charge. At the shrine and in the Æikr, one has a share in
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higher spheres of meaning. Oppression and greed, banality and profanity are absent from
the world of the mawlid – at least that is what the festive ideology claims.184
In a way that strikingly resembles Victor Turner’s concept of communitas, the Sufi
gathering of the mawlid is framed and experienced as an altruistic community in which
material interests are absent.
‘People only think about materialistic things these days: work, marriage etc., but here, this
is a different moment because people are not interested in material things but in love
(maÎabba). The people here don’t take, they give, which is difficult for the lower self (nafs),
which is greedy. But the people of God are distinguished by love and giving. Who gives,
God loves him, and he can live with all people, and he won’t get sick from bad food. The
people with love are few, but they can go through life and are treated well by people. They
may not work at all – they don’t need to. Did any of the prophets work?’185
This vision of an altruistic spiritual world is also strongly reminiscent of Bakhtin’s
concept of festive utopia: the temporary, better world stands in tension with the order
of daily life. When AÎmad al-FarmÁwÐ praised the love that prevails in the mawlid, he was
also quite openly criticising what he sees as the driving forces of contemporary Egyptian
society: selfishness and materialism. But through the specific characteristics of festive
utopia, this view is not turned into a general programme of action. AÎmad al-FarmÁwÐ
himself is a civil servant and would not quit working, and he would hardly agree with the
idea that everybody should give up earning profit and concentrate on giving. The festive
utopia is temporarily real in the festive communitas, but remains ‘utopian’ (in the Marxist
sense), that is, unrealistic if taken as an alternative model of society.
This seeming limitation is actually a great source of power for the festive utopia:
impossible on a large scale, it is still possible to live out for one night. This temporary
and extraordinary nature of festive utopia provides it with enormous emotional intensity,
which is often described by participants as a cathartic experience of inner renewal.
‘The mawlid is about two things: it is an expression of love for the ahl al-bayt, and it is rest
and recreation for the mind (rÁÎa nafsÐya). You arrive troubled and return happy.’186
‘The mawlid has a lot of good things, the most important of which are getting to know
people (taÝÁruf), friendship, sincere devotion and mutual love. And when you do ziyÁra
[to the grave] there’s baraka. The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said ‘The
grave is a garden of paradise’.187 And your mind is relaxed (inta mustarÐÎ nafsÐyan) because
it’s a pure place and has baraka. [...] That is the joy (farÎa) of the mawlid: everyone is busy
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188Interview with Sheikh ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz FayÒal, sheikh of a branch of the RifÁÝÐya order in Kafr
az-ZayyÁt, mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, ÓanÔÁ, 16 October 2002.
189The term murÐd denotes a person committed to the mystic path, who has taken an oath from
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spirituality. Chih, Le soufisme au quotidien, p. 350.
190Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi, pp. 47-64.
191Wa-ÊaÝalnÁkum šuÝÙban wa-qabÁÞila li-taÝÁrafÙ (49:13), translated freely after Arberry (transl.),
The Koran Interpreted. Interview with Sheikh ÝAÔÐya ÞAbdallÁh al-ËÁlidÐ from the province of al-
BuÎayra, mawlid of as-Sayyida NafÐsa, Cairo, 22 August 2002.
in his head, and when he comes [to the mawlid] he is relieved of his worries, thinks about
God and relaxes, and returns satisfied.’188
As this second account by Sheikh ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz indicates, the festive ideology of the Sufi
mawlid is not restricted to the experience of spiritual love. Learning, community
building and the reinforcement of spiritual authority are other central elements of the
Sufi mawlid. For Sufi groups, mawlids are the most important occasion available to
mobilise their murÐdÐn and muÎibbÐn,189 bring together members who otherwise live far
from each other, display the identity of the order to the public, and, last but not least,
demonstrate and exercise the unity of the order and the power of the sheikh.190 In Sufi
accounts of what mawlids are about, this is framed in the terms of taÝÁruf (getting to
know each other) and iqtidÁÞ (following the moral example of the saint).
‘The purpose of the mawlid is the congregation of the muÎibbÐn in a way to save time and
effort, for learning and self-improvement through the example of other muÎibbÐn in the
mawlid, and the search for esoteric truth (ÎaqÐqa). The most important purpose of the
mawlid is getting to know each other (taÝÁruf), based on the verse of the QurÞÁn “We have
made you peoples and tribes, that you may know one another.”’191
The relationship of love and learning may be tense at times. What some pilgrims see as
an expression of love is perceived by others as improper behaviour that misses the real
point of the mawlid. These different experiences and interpretations coexist, and even
unite in individual festive practice. People who can be tolerant to the degree of being
antinomian at one moment, can turn very orthodox at another. The festive utopia and
ideology of the Sufi mawlid is characterised by a strong ambivalence between equality and
unrestrained love on the one hand, and authority and discipline on the other. As I show
in more detail in chapters six and eight, this tension has gained increasing relevance to
the course of debates on and attempts to reform mawlids.
Tension is not only found between different forms of Sufi celebration, but also within
the wider spectrum of different festive ambiences. Although some Sufis completely refuse
any elements of mawlids that are not in line with a spiritual Sufi celebration, most view
the popular celebrations, amusements and trade as a marginal yet legitimate part of the
festivity. On a pragmatic level, popular amusements and trade are either viewed as a
natural and largely unproblematic byproduct of any great festivity, or – accompanied by
a somewhat more critical judgement of amusements and trade –  as a way to mobilise
masses:
‘The appearance (ÛÁhir) of the mawlid is amusements. And [some] people are opposed to
amusements, [saying]: “How come are they together with matters of religion and moral
values, and these values are not applied at all in the mawlid, when the people come who
work as magicians, and who run amusements, and who do stuff like that, and some youths
come as if that would be the purpose of it.” And when I asked that question [of someone],
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193Interview with Íusayn ÝAbd al-MunÝim from al-MinyÁ, Sufi pilgrim to the mawlid of as-
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he told me that those amusements may be the thing that collects the people. Everyone
comes. There is one who comes for the swings, there is one who comes to do illicit things,
and we open the places to tell knowledge. So we come to fish among these people, you see.
How do you get the people to come here? Because there are amusements. But we say to the
people [who criticise that]: no, maybe some of them come to us so that we can show them
the correct way. So the essence (Êawhar) is here, then, the essence is not that the folks sit
and walk around and do Æikr, no. All that stuff is to make the people come, and
afterwards we will teach them the correct way to God.’192
The reference to the ‘appearance’ (ÛÁhir) versus ‘essence’ (Êawhar) of the mawlid in this
account indicates that pragmatic considerations are accompanied by a more profound
view of festivity that is fundamental to the inclusive and ambivalent nature of the Sufi
mawlid, namely the distinction between the exoteric (ÛÁhir) and esoteric (bÁÔin) festivity.
This goes in line with the basic teaching of Sufism that religion is not restricted to the
exoteric teachings concerning rituals and law (šarÐÝa), but has a deeper level of esoteric
spiritual truth (ÎaqÐqa). At least officially, most Sufis hold that ÎaqÐqa does not contradict
šarÐÝa, and that fulfilling one’s legal and ritual obligations is a precondition of moving
further on the mystic path. In practice, more antinomian tendencies are present, and
many people state that a person who lacks formal religious training and even may not
fulfill ritual obligations can nevertheless enjoy a special grace of God and hold deep
knowledge of the bÁÔin. The bÁÔin is hidden except for the initiated, thus it is impossible
to conclude inner states from appearances. This quality of esoteric knowledge is essential
for the Sufi interpretation of the mawlid. The real mawlid is, in this view, invisible to the
eyes of, say, the Salafi scholar or the Western anthropologist.
‘Knowledge (Ýilm) is limited. God grants knowledge according to the capability of the
human. The appearance (ÛÁhir) that you see has its good and bad sides. When people stand
up in the visible (ÛÁhir) ÎaÃra it’s only the beginning of the invisible (bÁÔin) ÎaÃra. [...] It’s
like the ocean: who stands above it does not see more than its surface, only who dives into
it can see its depths.’193
In this esoteric view of the festivity, appearances may or may not be expressions of
hidden spiritual states. There is no one given way to celebrate the mawlid. But all festive
expressions (or most of them) are motivated by one all-encompassing deeper meaning:
the love of God, the Prophet and his family. This view of hidden meanings and various
expressions allows the legitimisation or at least the toleration of the mawlid as a whole,
and is key to the openness of the festival to different practices and interpretations.
2.2. The community mawlid
For many villages, towns and urban quarters, the local mawlid forms an important
community celebration. Once a year, the local community comes together in a
celebration that in many significant ways differs from that of the Sufi festivity.
For the quarter of ad-Darb al-AÎmar in Cairo, the mawlid of as-Sayyida FÁÔima an-
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194Interview with MaÎmÙd, a young lawyer serving cinnamon tea to passersby in the mawlid
of as-Sayyida FÁÔima an-NabawÐya, Cairo, 2 June 2003. For an image, see the front cover of this
thesis.
195Interview with a group of men sitting in chairs in front of a house during the mawlid of as-
Sayyida FÁÔima an-NabawÐya, Cairo, 3 June 2003.
196Interview with a family sitting in front of their house, mawlid of as-Sayyida FÁÔima an-
NabawÐya, Cairo, 2 June 2003.
197Interview with Zaynhum, interior painter who participated in the procession of as-Sayyida
NafÐsa, Cairo, 13 August 2003.
NabawÐya (see chapter two) is the greatest event of the entire year. People who used to live
in the quarter in the past but have since moved elsewhere return ‘home’ to celebrate the
mawlid, inhabitants and local notables put up small Ìidmas to serve tamarind and
liquorice juice, cinnamon tea and snacks, and the sidewalks and alleys are packed with
families who spend the evening receiving visitors and enjoying the night of festivity. This
particular form of festivity also represents a temporary better world, but in a very
different way than it does to the pilgrims. No move from home to pilgrimage, no second
life here: the local community mawlid takes place right at home, and celebrating home
in the German sense of Heimat is at the core of its festive ideology:
‘These are old customs of the Egyptians who celebrate the family of the Apostle of God.
It’s a good commemoration, and all people contribute to it according to their ability. [...]
We provide a Ìidma here by serving cinnamon tea to the people. We do it for God. For
us, it’s a moment of joy (bahÊa); we are all happy and glad. People who had moved away
from here come back during this time. It’s beautiful, a good day, people all gather
together.’194
‘Many of us live elsewhere in Cairo, but for the mawlid of as-Sayyida FÁÔima we all come
here. You can consider this the National Day of ad-Darb al-AÎmar! And it’s a celebration
in memory of ahl al-bayt. It’s an ancient celebration; it goes back to the days of the
Fatimids. We gather here every year, it’s a heritage that goes from father to son, you see.
Now we are drinking tea here, and then we will move on to an other place to greet the
people there.’195
‘Tonight is the great night. The whole family comes to celebrate like this as you see, with
the kids, and all bring what they can to serve as a Ìidma for the sake of God, and to
celebrate FÁÔima an-NabawÐya. People bring whatever they can. That’s a very fundamental
project in Islam.’196
In these accounts the joy of the religious celebration (in memory of the local patron saint
in particular and ahl al-bayt in general) is closely intertwined with the imagination and
renewal of community. The local shrine is a great source of local pride and identity, and
by celebrating their patron saint, inhabitants of a district actually celebrate themselves
as an ideal community ruled by hospitality, solidarity, and joy. This is most clearly
articulated in festive projects that require a high degree of cooperation, most notably the
processions:
‘The procession costs a lot of money and effort. There is a trusted guy who, accompanied
by others, collects money from the people. The big maÝallimÐn (masters of crafts and small
industries) contribute by donating money. The craftsmen contribute by assistance in their
field of expertise: the electrician in installing the lights, the carpenter in building the carts,
etc. It’s a big common effort and an expression of a lot of solidarity.’197
In this account describing the celebrations of as-Sayyida NafÐsa in the district of al-ËalÐfa
in Cairo, the procession appears on the one hand as a display of the wealth and power
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198The district of al-ËalÐfa where the said procession of as-Sayyida NafÐsa takes place is an old
city district suffering from a bad reputation. The district is not much poorer than many ‘middle-
class’ districts elsewhere in Cairo, but – like most popular districts –  it suffers from poor
infrastructure and a marginal position in the administrative and symbolic hierarchy of Cairo.
199This performance, similar to the Æikr of the Turkish Mevlevi order, is shown to tourist and
upper class audiences as ‘Sufi dance’. In contemporary Egyptian Sufi context it is used exclusively
as an artistic performance in processions and does not form a part of Æikr.
200In the past these were processions organised by local guilds. With the decline of the guild
system they have developed towards neighbourhood processions, but informal networks of
craftsmen and professionals still play a central role in them, and some carts are often made by
representatives of a certain profession. Baer, Gabriel, Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt,
Chicago etc.: The University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 216 f.; see also ÝÀmir, ÝAbd as-SalÁm ÝAbd
al-ÍalÐm, ÓawÁÞif al-Îiraf fÐ MiÒr 1805-1914, Cairo: al-HayÞa al-miÒrÐya al-ÝÁmma li-l-kitÁb, 1993.
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of the ‘big maÝallimÐn’ and a demonstration of their commitment to their local
community, and on the other hand as an expression of the collective pride of a
marginalised and disadvantaged198 district joined in celebration of  their patron saint. In
any case, be it with the families on the sidewalk, the big maÝallimÐn, or the young men
who build the procession, the basic tone is similar: the ideology of the community
mawlid looks very much like a Durkheimian renewal of the collective: living out an ideal
self-image of the quarter, populated by warm-hearted, hospitable and glad people. But the
image is, once again, more complex upon a closer look. After all, it is exactly this kind
of community celebration that also contains some of the most frenzy and, perhaps,
carnivalesque moments one can observe in a mawlid, and the most important occasion
for these is the festive procession.
Festive processions  consist of two parts: a Sufi procession made up of people bearing
flags and banners, playing tambourine, performing the tannÙra spinning dance199 and
chanting religious verses; and a procession of local craftsmen.200 The craftsmen’s
processions may consist of a colourful display of religious, professional and political
symbols, but also of grotesque political parodies and sexual travesties. A source of great
local pride, the procession of the mawlid of as-Sayyida NafÐsa  is lead by a Sufi sheikh and
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flag bearers, followed by a truck carrying a large balloon, then carts and cars representing
the KaÝba, the tomb of as-Sayyida Nafisa, a mosque, the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem,
a ship, a fountain, a rocket, a laser show, and finally followed by a Sufi singer and a truck
loaded with tamarind and liquorice juice and candies that are distributed to the
bystanders. The procession passes through streets packed with families who have come
to see the event. The atmosphere is one of joy, and the young men in the procession
dance, joke and chant religious verses. Other processions take on more grotesque forms:
at the mawlid of as-Sayyida SakÐna, the carts display a barber shop parody, a transvestite
wedding, a fat young man surrounded by doctors and giving birth to a little dog, prison
guards and a prisoner, and a boxing ring. The mawlid an-nabÐ procession in one Nile
Delta village used to be led by a mock president of the republic (a local café owner with
a striking likeness to former president Anwar as-SÁdÁt), dressed in military uniform and
surrounded by mock republican guards. A megaphone in hand, he would promise the
villagers telephone lines, clean drinking water and a new brothel. Since 2003 he has not
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201When I conducted my fieldwork, many of these processions had been suppressed by the state,
and others had declined due to lack of resources or commitment by local sponsors. Yet at some
mawlids they still flourished, most notably at the mawlids of as-Sayyida SakÐna and as-Sayyida
NafÐsa in Cairo. These mawlids take place in the district of al-ËalÐfa three weeks apart. The same
people are involved in building both processions, but each procession has a distinct flavour. In
2005, security officers refused to give permission to the procession of as-Sayyida NafÐsa, citing the
risk of demonstrations and the proximity of presidential elections. See Cairo Magazine, 10-
16.3.2005, Jennifer Peterson: ‘On the Margins: Facing Religious and Official Disapproval, Moulids
Barely Survive’, pp. 14-19.
202The village in question was an important mobilisation base for the Wafd Party in the 1920s.
Currently it has a very  active branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Even a left-wing group is active
in the village, which is rare in rural areas.
203The transvestite shows of contemporary mawlids are mainly appreciated as humorous jesting,
and although they contain sexual gestures they do not have an erotic character as they might have
had in the 19th century. They appear to be mostly young men’s proof of courage, amateur events
put on by a group of men, with one dressed as a woman and others escorting “her,” or posing as
exaggerated female dancers. There used to be tents offering transvestite dancing on a commercial
basis, but the few remaining were banned in the 1990s.
204Accounts of people who saw or participated in the processions of as-Sayyida SakÐna and as-
Sayyida NafÐsa in July and August 2003.
been allowed to appear in the procession after he crossed a red line by directly criticising
local authorities in his ‘address to the nation’.201
These processions form the part of mawlids that makes it the most compelling to
draw a parallel to Catholic carnival: they are colourful, fun, and full of grotesque
humour. While mawlids cannot be parallelled with carnival in general terms, the specific
case of mawlid processions does share a crucial moment of ambivalence with carnival.
These processions at once represent subversive mockery of authorities (president of the
republic in a village with a long tradition of political activism,202 and prison guards and
prisoners in a district where recently many people had been imprisoned for drug trade),
grotesque expressions of sexuality (transvestite wedding203 and giving birth to dogs), and
proud religio-political representations of symbols of collective identity (the shrine, the
Dome of the Rock and the KaÝba in the procession of as-Sayyida NafÐsa), while it is not
at all clear which tone is prevalent in the community celebration.
This ambiguity between the mockery of dominant norms and proud self-
representations of an ideal community is especially puzzling because there is strikingly
little discourse on the procession among the people who participate in it and watch it.
Unlike Sufis and pilgrims who often have elaborate stories and explanations as to what
the mawlid means, the people who put together the procession and those who watch it
seldom have more to say about it than that it’s great. People would largely agree that a
good procession is ‘really great’, ‘joy’, ‘pleasure’, ‘a special unique thing of our district’,
or that ‘it was very beautiful this year: even the policemen were dancing’, but, in the end,
‘I can’t really tell how it is, you have to see it yourself.’204 The procession as a performance
is a very explicit form of expression, but the procession as an experience works so much
on physical and visual levels that people (including the anthropologist) have difficulties
putting it into words.
Lacking explicit verbal discourse, one may nevertheless assume that this dramatic
ambiguity between communal identity and total openness and demonstration of power
and ridicule of authorities, has to do with the way the suspension of boundaries and
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205Interview with Sayyid, butcher, Cairo, 5 August 2003.
206KarÐm, a teenager working in a Ìidma during the mawlid of SÐdnÁ al-Íusayn, Cairo, 23 June
2003.
207Interview with MaÎmÙd, Sufi pilgrim to the mawlid of as-SulÔÁn al-FarÈal, AbÙ TÐÊ, 18 July
2003. 
informal structures of power are intertwined during the mawlid. Clientelistic structures
of power allow, and perhaps even attract, utopian reversal of hierarchies. Without the
money of the ‘big maÝallimÐn’ there would be no procession, and by paying they are able
to demonstrate their commitment to the local community. But the procession does not
represent them; it stands for the common effort and collective solidarity of the district,
masters and workers alike. In a way, the masters become subordinates during the festivity
while for one evening, young workers and craftsmen rule the district and women and
families own the streets, creating the moment of ideal community that is key to the
neighbourhood mawlid.
As a pilgrimage, the mawlid brings together locals and pilgrims, and changes the face
of urban quarters. For the people of the neighbourhoods this is a source of joy and pride,
but also of astonishment and discomfort. Particularly in old city districts where the
tradition of mawlids has a high standing, locals have a lot of respect for the devotion of
dervishes but most of them would not like to live or act like them. The inhabitants of the
area where a mawlid takes place are proud of the festivity and the fact that people travel
from all over the country to visit their quarter, and yet for many, the Sufis remain a
fascinating but rather strange variety of people. Sayyid, a butcher from al-ËalÐfa active
in organising the procession of as-Sayyida NafÐsa, displayed this attitude in his
comparison of the local festive procession and Sufi festivities:
‘In the procession there is spirituality; it’s not like those who move their heads around
(imitates Sufi Æikr). Dance, that’s what that is. The mawlid of ar-RifÁÝÐ that will take place
after tomorrow is different [from our celebration], because it’s all people from Upper
Egypt, strange people who do weird things with snakes and spikes.’205
This tension is laid in the way mawlids are organised and celebrated: they are open to all,
which significantly contributes to the festive atmosphere, but can be also experienced as
a source of discomfort not only to the inhabitants of the district  but also for Sufi
pilgrims who sometimes feel exposed to the curious and ridiculing glance of bystanders:
‘You should avoid those people (referring to young men from the district I had spoken
with earlier the same evening). I know those guys and they are no good. They are the
people who look at girls and who come to the Æikr and imitate us and are sarcastic about
it and make fun of us.’206
Many Sufis complain in similar manner about all those ignorant troublemakers  who
lack both the consciousness and the love required to behave according to the true nature
of the festivity, but instead just go and make fun of everything, spoil the reputation of
the Sufis, and cause mischief. This is why some Sufis say that the so-called al-layla al-
yatÐma (the night after the great night, when most of the people have already left but
many of the pilgrims stay on and some Æikrs are organised) is the best part of a mawlid,
‘because it’s only for us’.207
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2.3. The fun mawlid
The Sufi and neighbourhood celebrations of mawlids are always firmly anchored in the
veneration of a saint who provides the occasion to celebrate and legitimises the festive
joy. But with a number of other participants, this is not the case. For many people, a
mawlid is primarily about ‘relaxation’ (tarfÐh Ýan an-nafs), ‘having/making fun’ (tahrÐÊ)
and ‘pastime’ (lahw), and they may or may not agree with the religious basis of the
festivity. This is not to say that the spiritual and entertaining aspects of the mawlid are
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they mostly go hand in hand. What I argue in the
following is that entertainment is as constitutive of the mawlid as pilgrimage and
community celebration are, and that, for some people, it is the sole attraction that draws
them to a mawlid.
Pilgrimage itself, no matter how spiritual, can be a very entertaining experience.
‘Changing the atmosphere’, a central element of pilgrimage, may involve a great deal of
fun and merriment. So for example with the men of the ŠiÎÁta family from the village
of NÁhyÁ near Cairo who travel to the mawlid of as-Sayyid Ahmad al-BadawÐ every year.
They leave their wives and children behind and for a few days thoroughly enjoy being
away from their family responsibilities. Most of the day the men – there are
approximately ten of them – sit in the hall of an inexpensive hotel where they have rented
rooms, smoking, chatting, and listening to tapes they have brought with them: QurÞÁn
recitation, Sufi inšÁd, and pop music. In the evening, their celebration follows a standard
programme: ziyÁra at as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ’s shrine, going to the cinema, walking around
the festive grounds, shooting at firecrackers (and preferably choosing a shooting gallery
run by a pretty girl), eating sugarcane,208 joking, drinking tea and smoking water pipes at
their favourite temporary café in the fields, and watching their favourite munšids perform.
In many ways, their visit to ÓanÔÁ is a holiday framed as pilgrimage, with excitement,
shopping, a good time, and no wives or children around to stress them.
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and often political texts (his breakthrough was the song ‘I hate Israel’)  combined with the beat of
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210Interview with a student of medicine at al-Azhar, mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ, DisÙq,
31 October 2002.
For many others, most notably young men (and fewer women) who roam the streets
of the mawlid during the great night, the mawlid is primarily, or even exclusively, about
fun. These people are often hardly interested in the religious side of the festivity, and
many among them express strong disagreement with Sufi beliefs and rituals. Their
celebration is especially wild and rough, significantly contributing to the chaotic and
loud atmosphere of the great night.
At the mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ I once joined a group of university students
and fresh graduates from the city and nearby villages to celebrate the great night. At the
beginning of the evening we gathered in a café and, around 8 p.m., set out to move
through the mawlid. We kept together, moving in a group, and wherever there were
enough people we held onto each other’s shoulders to form a ‘train’ and rushed through
the crowds as fast as we could, making a lot of noise along the way. Past the mosque and
the Sufi Ìidmas we moved straight ahead to the amusement area located to the east of the
mosque. When my fellow celebrators said ‘mawlid’, what they meant was the amusement
area. Sometimes they stopped to watch Sufi performances, but did not join the Æikr,
rather staying on the margins and dancing the way people dance at weddings, shaking
their hips and clapping their hands, and then laughing at themselves and at the Sufis
who, of course, took the situation much more seriously. Mostly they walked past the Sufi
Ìidmas (which, in this mawlid, are mostly in the side streets) and concentrated on the
amusements on the main streets: electric cars, target-shooting (after, as usual, spending
some time to look for a stand run by a sufficiently good-looking girl) and the like. As
they passed a music store playing the  songs of ŠaÝbÁn ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm,209 they
spontaneously began to dance to the tune of the music. Along the wide Nile promenade
they walked in a row, singing and shouting loudly, then stopped to buy sugarcane and
sat down to enjoy the refreshment. One of the young men, a student of medicine at al-
Azhar in Cairo, had come back to his hometown to celebrate the mawlid. But his view
of the festivity was actually very critical:
‘The mawlid is a bidÝa, and there are many things that happen here, like gambling and
female dancers, that are ÎarÁm.’
S: But aside from the things that are ÎarÁm, what about the rest?
‘Without forbidden things it’s OK, having fun in itself is fine!’210
Fun, the key frame of festivity for these young men, has different dimensions in their
accounts. On one level, it stands for absolute freedom and intensely living in the
moment, beyond the control of parents, teachers, bosses or any other authorities. For
ËalÐl, a fresh university graduate from a village near DisÙq, this is what makes him come
to the mawlid every year. Now that he has become a teacher – a person embodying
authority himself – he only goes to the mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm for a day or two and
nostalgically recalls his student years:
‘We would travel from Kafr aš-ŠayÌ [where we studied] to DisÙq and stay the whole week
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at the mawlid. That was a very, very beautiful time. Now I will have to go to work the next
day, but in those days we had time and the right group of people to celebrate and relax.
[...] The point of the mawlid is that you can empty your head and enjoy. The mawlid is
about forgetting all your problems and living in the moment’.211
While letting go and living in the moment, these participants nevertheless maintain an
observant and often sarcastic attitude towards the festivity of which they are a part. To
go to the mawlid is to ‘see strange, new things’, that is, to be a spectator to a colourful
and fantastic world:
‘We go to see the mawlid every night. The most interesting thing about it are the Sufis, the
dervishes who put up tents and do Æikr. They live in a way that we don’t. You know, all
the youths are busy with material things: work, marriage and so on. But those people
don’t perceive anything of the world, they do their spiritual thing. They don’t worry
where to eat, where to live; they live for religion and spiritual things.’212
While these university students expressed their fascination with the Sufi utopian life at
the mawlid, many other spectators have a more critical attitude. A group of young men,
also university students, whom I encountered in ÓanÔÁ displayed this attitude in a
striking way. I met them at a Æikr, where they were standing at the margin of the ritual,
dancing, laughing and imitating the participants. But as soon as I asked them what they
thought about it, they became serious and started criticising the festivity and the rituals,
arguing that they were ‘wrong’ and ‘ÎarÁm’, a way to ‘fool the peasants’. In the same tone
they went on to point out that asking for the intercession of the ahl al-bayt and kissing
the maqÒÙra of a saint’s tomb  is ‘wrong’.
S: Is there anything you do like about the mawlid, then?
‘Oh yes, it’s a lot of fun. We hang around, play in the amusements, meet people. You see,
we don’t like those things (i.e. ecstatic Æikr) but we like to watch them.’213
The discourse of these young men (as they usually are: women are fewer in this group,
and with growing age people generally either stop going to mawlids or turn towards the
spiritual and communal aspects of the festivities) on mawlids is strikingly contradictory:
They love the festivity, but at the same time find much of the people and rituals
ridiculous and wrong. In this festive utopia, two rather different motifs intertwine: On
the one hand, the experience of ‘living in the moment’ free of the restrictions, boredom
and moralism of daily life, and on the other hand a sarcastic  commentary on the very
event the people find themselves in, making fun of it and thus distinguishing themselves
from it (an issue to which I return in chapter five). What holds these motifs together is
the topic of having fun and the framing of the mawlid as an aesthetic experience, a
cavalcade of beautiful, striking, exotic or shocking things that provide a spectacle for the
senses that would be impossible in the grey dullness of ordinary days.
‘It’s nice like this only once a year. The rest of the year the place is a ruin –  just one day
it’s passion; it’s something we look forward to with desire. In the noise you can’t think,
you just go with it and forget all your worries and sorrows. There are people who come
to the mawlid for knowledge. You can also come to the mawlid to learn, but not me.’
S: So you come just for the fun?
‘Yes, that’s it. We sit here in this place, most importantly to listen to [the munšida] ÍÁgga
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RaÎmÁn ibn ÝAwf, QalyÙb, 14 July 2003.
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WafÁÞ who will sing here. Do you want to smoke some grass?’214
Of all festive experiences I have encountered in the mawlid, this is the most
contradictory. In a way it displays a vision of a world where everything (or a lot) is
allowed: there are no authorities, no moral limits, no disciplinary restraints of daily life
at home, school, university, work. But unlike the Sufi utopia of an altruistic world and
the neighbourhood utopia of perfect community, this view of festivity is much less
framed as a criticism of the social order, in fact, it often has an openly  escapist tone.
More than that, through its sarcastic attitude it has something of an anti-utopian
tendency: it celebrates the extraordinary time when everything is possible but at the same
time states that it is merely illusion, nonsense or error.
3. The mawlid as festivity
The various ways to perceive and judge mawlids are already present in their fragmentary
character as festivals comprising very different forms of festivity. The various festive
experiences of a mawlid express different, often competing and contested utopian views
of a better world. The Sufi mawlid utopia consists of all-encompassing love and equality
between all, the suspension of economic imperatives and their temporary replacement
with a world based on altruistic motives, the experience of inner renewal and
purification, and the marked difference between pilgrimage and life at home. The utopia
of the community celebration is based on the reunion of a perfect community during the
night of the celebration and the simultaneous demonstration and inversion of local
power structures. The sarcastic young men’s mawlid utopia celebrates freedom from
parental and other forms of control, the euphoria of forgetting daily life, ‘living in the
moment’, ‘making one’s head empty’, ‘spending time’, and a contrast between normality
and the fascinating, exotic and also ridiculous other world of the festivity.
72 Chapter three
215Reader, ‘Conclusions’, pp. 241-244.
216Eade / Sallnow (eds), Contesting the Sacred.
These accounts are far from exhaustive. I have focussed on three specific festive
experiences because they are very common and because they particularly well demonstrate
how celebrating a mawlid is a highly fragmented experience  subject to reflection and
contestation among participants. This has been at the cost of other significant
differences: the mawlid is not the same thing for merchants and customers, young and
old, men and women, villagers and city-dwellers, or Muslims and Christians. All three
festive experiences sketched above include a good deal of shopping and commerce, but
what from the visitors’ point of view is a special festive occasion is a season of hard work
for the merchants. For young people, fun and excitement are often more central to their
mawlid experience, but with age people tend to turn to more spiritual matters. For men,
the crowds of the mawlid are a chance to dive into the anonymity of the masses and
become part of its dynamics, but for women the crowd is a dangerous place that one
should avoid in favour of the tent, the mosque, or the private home. For villagers, a big
mawlid in the city is a special event, a holiday one must plan and undertake, but for city-
dwellers the mawlid comes to them and they may take part in it spontaneously if they
like. For Muslims, the veneration of saints is connected to the spirituality of Islamic
mysticism, an ideology that unites believers across the country and around the world but
also distinguishes them from Salafi reformists. For Christians, celebrating the festival of
a Christian saint is to express the communal identity of a religious minority that shares
a feeling of suffering from discrimination.
All experiences and interpretations of celebrating the mawlid show inner
contradictions and tensions with other experiences and interpretations. The Sufi mawlid
revolves around the tension between learning and ecstatic love, and often displays a
problematic relationship with popular amusements and trade. The neighbourhood
mawlid is at times conservative, at times subversive and grotesque, and displays a mixture
of admiration of and uneasiness with the Sufi festivity. The fun mawlid celebrates the
exotic and extraordinary while at the same time criticising and ridiculing it. What
emerges as the central tone of the various festive utopias is not so much their specific
materialisation of a better world. What seems to unite them is, paradoxically, their strong
ambivalence. In many ways parallel to what Ian Reader,215 John Eade, and Michael
Sallnow216 have argued about pilgrimage in general, a mawlid provides an overarching
occasion for festive joy that can embrace a high degree of contradiction.
3.1. Mawlid and ÝÐd
But this is of course valid to a vast number of other types of festivities as well. What is
it, then, that distinguishes mawlids from other festivals in the eyes of their participants?
The most common comparison people make is between the mawlid and the ÝÐd. The term
ÝÐd literally means feast or festivity – such as birthday (ÝÐd al-mÐlÁd) or national day (al-ÝÐd
al-qawmÐ) – but it is primarily used to specifically designate the two canonic Islamic
festivities ÝÐd al-fiÔr (feast of breaking the fast at the end of RamaÃÁn) and ÝÐd al-aÃÎÁ (feast
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218A public park nearby that features playground equipment and fairground rides.
219Interview with KarÐm, 12 years old, visiting his grandparents’ house in the graveyard near the
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of sacrifice at the end of the ÎaÊÊ).217 These two festivities have their own specific features
but they share a very similar festive atmosphere and are in popular usage lumped together
under the name ÝÐd.
The duration of the two ÝÐds is characterised by familial  reunion as people travel to
visit their relatives and celebrate in the circle of family. Maintaining neighbourhood
relationships is also very important, and an essential ritual of every ÝÐd is to visit and greet
friends and neighbours. Unlike mawlids, the ÝÐd is mainly a daytime celebration.
Followed by a special ÝÐd prayer at sunrise, three days of celebrations begin, characterised
by shared meals, visits to friends, outings to and picnics at parks and Nile promenades,
visits to graveyards where families may picnic for an entire day, television programmes
consisting of special ÝÐd features and Hollywood films, and popular amusements similar
to those found in mawlids: shooting stands, carousels, swings, sideshows and the like.
The festive ideology of the two ÝÐds shares significant similarities to as well as
differences with mawlids. Joy is the prevailing tone of all these festivities, hospitality and
charity are given high emphasis, and they are accompanied by a great deal of amusements,
food and merchandise.
‘On the day of the mawlid, when you come here it’s a big outing (fusÎa) and there’s lots
of playing. Same thing in the ÝÐd. All go walking around, and it’s crowded like today. Like
in FusÔÁÔ Gardens,218 for example.’219
From the perspective of twelve-year-old KarÐm, the mawlid, the ÝÐd and the amusement
park are essentially the same thing with the same festive atmosphere of playing, walking
about and being beyond the control of parents, teachers and other persons of authority.
From a different perspective, a journalist writing in the English-language al-Ahram Weekly
compares the atmosphere in her grandmother’s house in ÓanÔÁ during the ÝÐd, with guests
coming and going all day, to that of the mawlid. A festive time of hospitality and coming
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together with friends is characteristic to the ÝÐd and mawlid alike.220
Parallels notwithstanding, the differences are evident and manifold. ÝÏd al-fiÔr and ÝÐd
al-aÃÎÁ are national events and almost everybody celebrates them, but they usually do so
within a circle of family. A mawlid is a special event for those who either live nearby or
have a special relation to the saint, but at the same time it is a street festivity open to
everyone. The ÝÐd is a festivity for all Muslims (and the media follow the celebrations
around the world) but the actual event of celebration takes place largely in a familiar
setting. The mawlid, on the other hand, is a celebration of the extraordinary that is open
to all, and the atmosphere is often significantly rougher than that of the ÝÐd. Groups of
rambunctious young men also make going out difficult and intimidating for women
during the ÝÐd, but nowhere is the roughly masculine atmosphere as outspoken as in the
crowded main streets at a large mawlid. This characteristic difference was pointed out to
me by a man who was working at a Ferris wheel and touring mawlids, ÝÐd celebrations and
amusement parks:
S.: Does the work differ on different occasions?
‘Yes, in the ÝÐds it’s people coming for a walk around, while in the mawlid it’s pilgrims
(zuwwÁr). In the ÝÐd people come with their families; they are relaxed and take it easy. In
the mawlids people come for ziyÁra of the sheikh, and to buy sweets and toys, and to play,
and there is more stupidity (habal)’
S.: Stupidity?
‘Yes, stupidity, idiots (literally ‘animals’, bahÁyim). It’s more crowded and you see the
people trying to push the line [to the Ferris wheel] and get in although there is no place.
I think in Europe, where you’re from, people are more disciplined and civilised. At the
mawlid in particular it’s crowded and chaotic, and there are fights. Sometimes people
might come to the mawlid because they have had a quarrel and want to pick fight with
each other. But in the ÝÐd people are relaxed, visit friends, and sit with their family.’221
The days of the ÝÐd are at least as multi-faceted as the nights of the mawlid, yet both kinds
of festivities display quite distinctive features. The festive ideology of the ÝÐds lays great
value on maintaining and restoring solidarity and communal values. The time of ÝÐd al-
fiÔr and ÝÐd al-aÃÎÁ alike is family-based and constructive, oriented to consolidating and
reinforcing ties of kinship, neighbourhood and friendship. The mawlid offers an
outspokenly different atmosphere where night replaces day, the living celebrate with the
dead, pilgrims’ tents replace homes and daily life seems very far away. In contrast, the
festive utopia of the ÝÐd does not represent such an exotic alternative reality. It is more
like a utopian perfection of an ordinary day, together with one’s family, friends and
neighbours, and on the level of imagination with all Muslims, but unlike on most other
days, in perfect joy and harmony. Contrary to the ÝÐd – or weddings, or the National Day,
etc. – the mawlid is not a festivity of harmony. It is, and this is what distinguishes it from
other festivities of contemporary Egypt, a festivity of cheerful chaos open to everyone and
everything, and its festive atmosphere stands in explicit and dramatic opposition to the
boundaries of the normal world.
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3.2. A spectacle without footlights
The space and time of the mawlid, embracing various fields of society, is ambiguous by
definition and open to all kinds of people and interpretations. The mawlid is an
overwhelming and fascinating spectacle for both the pilgrim and the researcher, yet it
lacks the typical elements of a spectacle: an orchestrated programme, the distinction of
performers and audience, and a top-down line of communication. With a phrase taken
freely after Bakhtin,222 the mawlid is a spectacle without footlights. As such, it does not
have a clear hierarchy of authority that might reinforce a specific interpretation of what
the festivity is about or how it ought to be celebrated. Interpreting and celebrating the
mawlid remains in the hands of its participants, who may do it in ways that differ from
those propagated by official authorities, and even defy them.
This presents an occasion to return to the question of whether mawlids can be
interpreted as a form of popular resistance against dominant norms and structures of
power or whether they are a form of ‘opium for the people’, keeping the masses passive
by providing them distraction from their real problems, or, less polemically, whether
mawlids are subversive or conservative in regard to the power relations of the everyday.
Both views enjoy some popularity not only in the debates on mawlids in Egypt but also
in international academic and political debates on the meaning of festivity in general.
Both interpretations fail to grasp the way mawlids are based on a concept of time and
social order in which the temporary suspension of boundaries has no clear functionality.
It can serve both to maintain power relations and to subvert them.  But the problem is
not yet solved. Firstly, these two interpretations (or actually four, depending on the
normative value given to dominant boundaries: ‘resistance’ can be also read as the
transgression of social order, and ‘opium for the people’ can be seen as upholding social
order) are an important part of the debates on mawlids and their cultural and political
implications need to be grasped in order to understand the importance of this question.
I return to this issue in the following chapter. Secondly, if mawlids do indeed subvert
hegemonic norms (which is not to be confused with resistance), how do they do it?
James Scott, in his book Domination and the Arts of Resistance,223 introduces the
concept of ‘hidden transcripts’, that is, the discourses and practices that are not included
in the public communication between people in different positions of power. Hidden
transcripts, according to Scott, are not necessarily more true or truthful than public ones,
but they, and the moments when they can be publicly declared, offer an insight into the
struggles and shifting lines of class and power.224 Scott argues that one of the moments
in which the hidden transcripts of subordinate classes can become public are festivities
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that ‘are socially defined in some important ways as being out of ordinary’,225 Catholic
pre-lenten carnival being only one example thereof. Critical of the safety-valve theory of
festivity, Scott argues that although carnival is often framed by symbolic subordination
to the proper order of things and domesticated through its use for public representation,
it remains a potent site of resistance and revolt. ‘It would be just as plausible to view
carnival as an ambiguous political victory wrested from elites by subordinate groups.’226
Elites have never felt very certain about the functioning of the safety-valve, and public
festivals of reversal have constituted an ambiguous moment of disorder and potential for
revolt.227
Are mawlids occasions for the public proclamation of hidden transcripts? ÝIÒÁm
FawzÐ, in his study on patterns of religiosity in Egypt, suggests that this is the case.
According to FawzÐ, popular patterns of religiosity including carnivalesque festive culture
are characterised by pragmatic, ironic and materialistic tendencies that  subvert and even
ridicule hegemonic religious discourses. For ÝIÒÁm FawzÐ, popular festivities such as
mawlids represent one of the moments in which a development from below, despite the
hegemonic relationships of power, is possible.228
A look at the various celebrations of the mawlid indicates that to some extent, this
might actually be the case. The symbolic suspension of class and power relationships is
one possible proof: it is a way to reinforce these relationships, but also to demonstrate
their contingency. Some festive processions contain very open moments of criticism and
mockery of the secular authorities, such as the mock president of the republic and his
mock republican guard. Finally, the accounts of miracles (karÁmÁt) that are told at
mawlids often contain passages in which the saint, with God’s help, successfully defies
and derides the police, the state, or people who are opposed to Sufism.229
But before we rush to declare mawlids celebrations of subversion, and thus tacitly
vehicles of counter-hegemony, a pause of healthy caution is required. Subversion has
become a very popular term in some fields of literary and social research that have been
inspired by the work of Bakhtin, to the degree that Greil Marcus has been attributed with
commenting that ‘a lot of the people in cultural studies these days kind of remind me of
the FBI in the fifties: They find subversion everywhere.’230 And we need to be aware that
Scott’s concept of hidden and public transcripts is based on understandings of self,
power, and publicness that may be too simplified and dualistic to explain what actually
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is going on at a mawlid.231
Firstly, the distinction between the hidden and public may not be very helpful in
understanding the festive time of mawlids. The utopian visions of society expressed at
mawlids are not ‘hidden’ for the rest of the year. Mawlids are public, but they have a very
different status than some other sites of public debate and action, and it is these
relationships of hegemony and exclusion between different public actions and actors that
should draw our attention if we want to understand the potential of mawlids for
controversy. Rather than focussing on the dichotomy of ‘hidden’ vs. ‘public’, we have to
problematise the construction of the public and ask whether and under what conditions
mawlids may be included in or excluded from the field of hegemonic definitions of
social order and the common good.
Secondly, while mawlids may be counter-hegemonic towards, for example, middle-
class constructions of urban space and civility, they can, at the same time, be sites of
power and mobilisation for Sufi groups and local politicians. And although mawlids do
contain moments of irony, mockery and subversion, this is not their main emotive tone.
Even where mockery and subversion can be found, it is not shared by all participants and
neither does it have the same targets. KarÁmÁt stories and festive processions may ridicule
Salafis and secular authorities but they do not question religion and recognised religious
authorities. Students may ridicule the Sufis but they do so in order to demonstrate their
own intellectual hegemony rather than to challenge another.
Finally, when we speak of subversion, we need to ask from whose perspective
something becomes subversive, or even transgressing. After all, in the eyes of most
participants, the mawlid is not a transgression of boundaries because the boundaries to
transgress are not valid during the festivity. But what is an honest expression of piety or
joy in the eyes of a participant might appear as mockery to an outside observer.
Hence, hidden transcripts do not take us very far in understanding the potential of
mawlids for controversy. The problem must be approached from a different angle,
starting with the observation that while most of the festive atmosphere of the mawlid is
not subversive in the eyes of the people involved, it may become so if described within
a discourse that shares different commonplaces about piety, festivity and the order of
society. The trick of subversion is, hence, that mawlids might not be subversive at all
from their participants’ perspective, but they can become so when they enter the
hegemonic discourses and imageries of contemporary Egypt. To understand why and how
they do so is the task of the following chapter.
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Chapter Four: Criticism of mawlids
1. Modernism and reformism
Many Egyptians do in fact consider mawlids subversive, but they definitely do not view
this subversion in a positive light. For them, mawlids are an ensemble of erroneous,
backward, profane and ridiculous beliefs that threaten the order of religion, society and
the nation.
The criticism of mawlids varies in degree. Some see mawlids as altogether wrong and
detestable. Many are sympathetic to the basic idea of venerating and celebrating a saint
but do not agree with the actual form of celebration. Others disagree with the religious
foundations of mawlids but enjoy their festive atmosphere. Critics also highlight a
diversity of issues. While some see mawlids primarily as an issue of religion and ritual,
others emphasise their social and political role. At first glance, the manifold criticisms
of mawlids may appear unrelated. They are, however, interconnected and can only be
properly understood as elements of a discourse, not a coherent, rationalised ideology, but
rather a field of interrelated statements that differ in their emphasis and intensity and
yet share significant commonsense assumptions.
In all their variety, critical views of mawlids share such a number of commonplaces
that it is not possible to diacritically split them along the lines of, say, Islamist and
secularist modernist discourses. In the eyes of their critics, mawlids are simultaneously
backward and un-Islamic. The criticism of mawlids is an expression (and, as I argue in the
next chapter, a distinctive marker) of an Islamic reformist and nationalist modernist
common sense of what function festivities ought to have, how piety ought to expressed,
how society should be organised, and how these issues should be embodied in and
acquired through habitus and a visible matrix of spatial order. People who criticise
mawlids perceive them as opposed to the aesthetic and habitual criteria that together are
constitutive of the disposition of the modern/pious subject and, hence, the order of a
progressive and authentic nation. The key issues at stake are thus, I argue in the
following, the constitution of the self, its relation to embodied practices, and the
significance of these to the order of religion and the nation-state.
Yet before moving on to analyse the critical discourse on mawlids it is necessary to
substantiate my decision to lump their critics under the label of modernism and
reformism. What do radical Salafis and Islamists have to do with modernity? What do
secularist intellectuals have to do with Islamic reform? First of all, these different political
and religious currents share a genealogy, as I illustrate in the next chapter. But more
importantly and immediately, they do not necessarily appear as separate currents or
discourses in relation to mawlids, but rather participate in a common hegemonic
discourse.232 This discourse should not be mistaken for an ideological doctrine – it is far
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too diverse to be one. It should rather be seen as a diffuse common sense marked by
shared implicit or explicit assumptions and distinctive markers of habitus that is  capable
of defining the terms of debate on a wide range of issues. For example, while different
actors and authors in the public sphere do not agree on exactly what role religion should
have in the national identity and legal system of Egypt, they generally have little
difficulty in agreeing on what religion is or enforcing their understanding of religion
against other interpretations.
For this reason I have preferred to use the term SalafÐya – rather than Islamism – to
denote a legalistic, scriptural and anti-mystical interpretation of Islam. While ‘Islamism’
highlights the aim of a part of the political spectrum to organise state and society
according to an authoritarian reading of Islamic Law, ‘SalafÐya’ emphasises the
importance of ritual and moral (self-)discipline to the project of Islamic reform. The
Salafi movement is in fact distinguishable from the various Islamist movements in Egypt.
While Islamist groups generally follow a Salafi interpretation of Islam, not all Salafis
hold to Islamist political ideologies.233
The SalafÐya is the most radical current within the wider discourse of Islamic reform.
Few Egyptians are committed to the rigid pious discipline of being a Salafi – distinctive
dress, exact observance of ritual obligations, and a rigid and comprehensive moral
discipline – but the Salafi reformist understanding of Islam as a rational system of ritual
and morality has much wider currency. It is this interpretation of Islam that I refer to
with the term reformism, including but not confined to Salafi and Islamist movements.234
Reformism, in turn, is closely connected to the overarching discourse of modernity.
Modernism (in a wider sense denoting the project of modernity and modernisation, thus
not restricted to the modernist movement in arts, letters and architecture) in 20th and
21st-century Egypt is an ideology, strongly propagated by the state but generally shared
by opposition and non-state actors who declare rationalisation, enlightenment,
independence and development as the key qualities that the nation needs in order to
flourish (Egyptian modernism is intrinsically connected to nationalism). Unlike in some
other contexts, in Egypt the project of modernity does not imply a break with
conservative values. The Egyptian modernist, as depicted by school textbooks and the
self-image of many a modernist intellectual is progressive yet committed to religion,
communal morals and national heritage.235 It is this attempt to unite progress and
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authenticity that makes modernism a twin of reformism in contemporary Egypt. And it
is this linkage of authentic religion and national progress that is key to understanding
the modernist and reformist criticism of mawlids.
Rather than further dwelling on theoretical discussions of reformist and modernist
discourses, let us look at a contemporary example of a critical account that is
representative of the modernist and reformist criticism of mawlids. It contains almost
all the standard topics found in the critical view of mawlids, which makes it a good
starting point for analysis while also serving as a reminder that even if the criticism
directed at mawlids can, for analytical purposes, be described as a field of separate
arguments, in practice these arguments are woven together. This account does not
originate from a renowned intellectual but from ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm, a school teacher whom
I interviewed at the mawlid of as-Sayyida NafÐsa where, by coincidence, he was taking a
short cut to a bus stop.
S.: What do you, personally, think about the mawlid?
‘It is absolutely un-Islamic. These people are not really religious. [...] The mawlid is a bidÝa.
In the Æikr, men and women mix and everything. The Æikr sessions are undesirable, in
general the veneration of the sheikhs is opposed to the idea of monotheism (tawÎÐd). The
Æikr sessions [of the kind held at mawlids] are not proper for the religious, rational,
civilised human.  On the contrary, they will provoke the anger of the Prophet.’
S.: Can you imagine how a legitimate (šarÝÐ) mawlid festivity would look?
‘A legitimate mawlid festivity really doesn’t exist at all. There is no reason to celebrate
someone who has already passed away in order to gain something from him. The only
legitimate mawlid festivity is the mawlid of the Prophet, God’s blessing be upon him.
Unfortunately, the Sufi orders and much of the Egyptian people, up to 40 or 50 percent,
celebrate it in an un-Islamic way. A correct way of celebrating the Prophet’s birthday
would consist of reciting verses of the QurÞÁn. We should follow his example, revive his
tradition. What is more right, that I recite the QurÞÁn or that I dance like that (points at
Sufis participating in Æikr in a nearby Ìidma)? That is all just pastime and foolery (lahwun
wa-Ýaba×)!’236
S.: Can’t pastime and religion coexist?
‘No, because God didn’t give us two hearts so that I could have pastime (lahw) in one and
invocation of God (Æikr) in the other. Either it’s pastime and foolery, or it’s invocation
and sunna.
‘These things go back to the Fatimids who established a Shiite state and set out to lead the
Muslims astray. They are the origin of these practices, they and these districts of Fatimid
Cairo.237 You must come to ÝAyn Šams, Heliopolis and al-MaÔarÐyya. There are no shrines
in the mosques there and no mawlids. [...]’
S.:What about the religious feasts, like ÝÐd al-fiÔr, when people in the countryside go on the
second or third day of the feast to the banks of the Nile for picnics and walks, isn’t that
an acceptable kind of pastime?
‘It’s reprehensible (makrÙh). The pastime on the Nile promenades doesn’t belong to the
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correct ÝÐd, which should consist, as mandated by the Prophet, of prayer, visiting friends
and relatives, and helping the orphans. Here in the mawlid the people are rich! They don’t
need all that food [offered in the Ìidmas]. One should give to the orphans who really need
it. The people should follow the sunna. Look at these people! (Pointing again at Sufis in
an ecstatic state of Æikr) Are these Muslims? Islam is a religion of dignity, work and
worship, not a religion of laziness, neglect and begging. These charities here are of no
value. One must work, that is what our religion teaches.’238
ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm’s account exhibits a characteristic feature of most criticism directed at
mawlids. He lists a wide range of issues that, in his view, makes celebrating the mawlid
a grave error and does not treat them as separate issues but rather as different aspects of
one great error. To sum up his account, mawlids are opposed to Islam for a number of
somehow interrelated reasons: They are an illegitimate innovation in Islam (bidÝa), men
and women mix, the veneration of sheikhs is opposed to monotheism, the behaviour of
Sufis in the Æikr circles is not religious or civilised, it is a tradition of Shiite origin, there
are shrines in the mosques, and the people are lazy and do not work. All this is
incompatible with the habitus of ‘the religious, rational, civilised human.’ There can be
no ambivalence in these matters. These themes provide us with a rough outline of the
main lines of argumentation used in expressing criticism of mawlids: Religious
authenticity, morality, civilised habitus, and progress and rationality.
2. Un-Islamic...
2.1. BidÝa
Historically, mawlids are an innovation within Islam, and from the beginning, this has
provided critics with a strong argumentative weapon based on a ÎadÐ× of the Prophet
MuÎammad prohibiting innovations (bidaÝ, sg. bidÝa):
‘Every novelty is an innovation (bidÝa), and every innovation is an error, and every error
leads to hell.’239
On this basis, it is very commonly argued that mawlids are un-Islamic simply because
they did not exist in the age of the Prophet: Mawlids are, the argument goes, a Fatimid
(that is, Shiite) innovation, or perhaps a trace of a Pharaonic cult, but in any case, ‘there
is no such thing called mawlid in Islam’.240
Most Islamic schools of law distinguish between different categories of bidaÝ, ranging
from forbidden (muÎarrama), reprehensible (makrÙha), indifferent (mubÁÎa),
recommended (mandÙba) and obligatory (wÁÊiba).241 Muslim scholarly tradition
determines that a practice is illegitimate bidÝa not simply when it is not sanctioned by the
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ÌaÔaÞ al-ibtidÁÝ, Cairo: Maktabat al-Ýilm, 1998, p. 14.
244For the 20th century debate on the broadcasting of the QurÞÁn, see Larkin, Brian, Uncertain
Consequences: The Social and Religious Life of Media in Northern Nigeria, PhD Thesis, New York
University, 1998.
245The middle of the Islamic month of ŠaÝbÁn is currently interpreted to commemorate the
changing of the qibla from Jerusalem to the KaÝba. Al-isrÁÞ wa-l-miÝrÁÊ is celebrated on the occasion
of the Prophet MuÎammad’s nighttime travel to al-AqÒÁ mosque and ascension to heaven
mentioned in the QurÞÁn (18:1). Cf. Rispler-Chaim, ‘The 20th Century Treatment of an Old BidÝa’;
‘MiÝrÁdj’ in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed.,Leiden: Brill, vol. 7, pp. 97-105; Sells, Michael,
‘Ascension’, in Encyclopaedia of the QurÞÁn, Jane Dammen McAuliffe (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 2001, vol.
1, pp. 176-181.
246While Salafi scholars would not agree, in popular discourse this is tacitly recognised:
S.: What exactly is bidÝa?
‘It’s what is new in Islam. I mean, if you study Islamic history, there weren’t mawlids or stuff like
that. But in the Fatimid age and such was when there were these things, and the lanterns [which
are used in RamaÃÁn to decorate the streets] and all that, I mean, also beautiful things, but the
mawlids, they aren’t good.’ Interview with ÉamÁl, mawlid of SÐdÐ MuÎammad Maslama, Cairo,
9 August 2002.
QurÞÁn and the Sunna, but when it is also seen to compromise the purity of sacred
practices, the validity of the canonic texts and rituals, or the identity of Islam against
other religions.242 Hence, there are no objective criteria on what constitutes an illegitimate
innovation: the religious assessment of a practice depends upon social and ideological
factors external to the religious scripture.
However, this is not how bidÝa is conceived of by those who regularly use this term
in contemporary Egypt: most notably so Salafi activists and authors who have a strong
influence on the religious debates over mawlids. They argue that while secular issues are
subject to improvement and development, in the field of religion innovations are
categorically forbidden: ‘There are no [classes of] good and bad bidaÝ. The good
innovations are those in worldly affairs, the bad ones are those in religion.’243
The issue is far from simple, however. While it is widely agreed that the prohibition
of innovation only applies to religion, not all innovations in religion are actually
considered bidaÝ. There are numerous other religious innovations that do not originate
in the age of the Prophet but which at the present time are not considered to be bidaÝ:
professional religious hierarchies such as those represented by al-Azhar, printing and
broadcasting the QurÞÁn, which caused significant controversy when first introduced but
has since been considered unproblematic,244 and the festivities of the Middle of ŠaÝbÁn
and al-isrÁÞ wa-l-miÝrÁÊ,245 neither of which were celebrated in the age of the Prophet and
yet, while not unanimously recognised, are not a cause of controversy in modern Egypt.
If mawlids are a bidÝa, they are not so simply by their being an innovation, but rather
because they, in the view of critics, compromise the rituals and spirit of Islam.246 The
basic argument in this direction is that mawlids are opposed to monotheism, the most
83Criticism of mawlids
247Širk in the QurÞÁn refers to the Meccans who believed that God has companions (šurakÁÞ,
sg. šarÐk), and to the Christian belief in the Trinity. (Mir, Mustansir, ‘Polytheism and Atheism’, in
Encyclopaedia of the QurÝÁn, Vol. 4, pp. 158-162) Inspired by the work of Ibn TaymÐya, the WahhÁbÐ
movement that emerged in NaÊd in the 18th century made wide use of the accusation of širk and
used it as a ground for takfÐr, the declaration of Muslims who did not follow WahhÁbÐ doctrine
as infidels. This interpretation has been taken over by the 20th century Salafi movement, however
to different degrees. Peskes, Esther, MuÎammad b. ÝAbdalwahhÁb (1703-92) im Widerstreit:
Untersuchungen zur Rekonstruktion der FrÎugeschichte der WahhÁbÐya, Beirut and Stuttgart: Steiner,
1993, pp. 15-32.
248‘Do not take tombs as mosques’ (LÁ tattaÌiÆÙ l-qubÙra masÁÊid). Muslim, ÑaÎÐÎ: KitÁb al-
masÁÊid, ÎadÐ× 23; ‘Undertaking the pilgrimage is only allowed to three mosques: the mosque of
Mecca, the al-AqÒÁ mosque, and my own mosque [in Medina]’ (LÁ tušadd ar-riÎÁl illÁ ilÁ ×alÁ×ati
masÁÊid: al-MasÊid al-ÍarÁm, al-MasÊid al-AqÒÁ, wa-masÊidÐ anÁ). Muslim, ÑaÎÐÎ: KitÁb al-ÎaÊÊ, ÎadÐ×
511.
249Duhayna, ÝAbd al-KarÐm, al-AÃriÎa wa-širk al-iÝtiqÁd, Cairo: DÁr an-nÙr al-muÎammadÐ, 1993,
pp. 5 f.; al-Éamal, IbrÁhÐm, BidaÝ wa-munkarÁt yaÊib an tazÙl: laysa min al-islÁm, Cairo: al-Maktaba
at-tawfÐqÐya, undated, pp. 41 f.; IbrÁhÐm, MaÊdÐ as-Sayyid, BidaÝ wa-ÌurÁfÁt an-nisÁÞ, Cairo: Maktabat
al-QurÞÁn, 1992, p. 54; al-MunaÊÊid, MuÎammad ÑÁliÎ, MuÎarramÁt istahÁn bihÁ n-nÁs yaÊib al-ÎaÆar
minhÁ, Cairo: Maktabat al-Ýilm, 1993, with several reprints, pp. 12 f.; aÔ-ÓahÔÁwÐ, ÝAlÐ ÝAbd al-ÝÀl,
BidaÝ al-maqÁbir, Cairo: Maktabat aÒ-ÒafÁ, 2001; ÝU×mÁn, FatÎÐ AmÐn (ed.), FatÁwÁ hÁmma: taÎrÐm
iqÁmat al-aÃriÎa wa-tazyÐnihÁ wa-waÃÝ al-qanÁdÐl ÝalayhÁ wa-n-naÆr li-sÁkinÐhÁ, Cairo: ÉamÁÝat anÒÁr
as-sunna al-muÎammadÐya, undated [ca. 2000]; ZahrÁn, ÓalÝat, IÎÆar! aqwÁl wa-afÝÁl wa-ÝtiqÁdÁt
ÌÁÔiÞa, Alexandria: DÁr al-ÝaqÐda li-t-turÁ×, 1995, pp. 86-88.
250Salafis with whom I have discussed this issue argue that the Prophet’s mosque in Medina is
a different case because the Prophet’s grave and the mosque were originally separate and have
become attached only through successive enlargements of the mosque. The problem is that this is
exactly how the mosques at many prominent Sufi shrines have also been built. See, e.g., on the
development of the mosque of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ in ÓanÔÁ: Mayeur-Jaouen, Histoire d’un pèlerinage,
p.p. 126-128, 133.
251Only the ÍanbalÐ maÆhab prohibits it categorically. Others permit it, however upon strict
conditions, most importantly that the grave should not be located so that worshippers face it when
praying. See, e.g., Ibn ÝU×mÁn, Muwaffiq ad-DÐn (d. 1218), Muršid az-zuwwÁr ilÁ qubÙr al-abrÁr al-
central pillar of Islamic faith. In this view, invocations at a shrine, asking a saint for
assistance, believing that saints have a mediating position between men and God,
slaughtering (a religious ritual in Islam) on the occasion of a mawlid, making vows to a
saint, kissing and touching a shrine, and circling around it counter-clockwise (as around
the KaÝba and the Dome of the Rock), are all seen as opposed to the direct, unmediated
relationship between the believer and God, and thus an expression of polytheism, širk.247
Pilgrims to shrines see it differently, of course: they express their love to the saints but
do not worship them, worship (ÝibÁda) being restricted to God only. Salafi critics,
however, use a significantly wider definition of worship that includes all expressions of
devotion, including love, fear and obedience.
This argument is further supported by two references to hadÐ×, one prohibiting
Muslims from taking graves as sites of worship, the other (referred to by one of the men
in the service taxi quoted on p. 1) restricting pilgrimage to the three holy sites of Islam.248
On this basis, Salafis argue, it is prohibited to construct shrines at all, to pray in mosques
attached to them, or to travel to a shrine to celebrate a mawlid there.249 Yet neither
reference they base their argument on is unproblematic: the mosque of Medina is built
around the shrine of the Prophet Muhammad,250 and three of the four Sunnite schools
of law conditionally allow prayer in mosques attached to tombs.251 The ÌadÐ× on
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Cairo: ad-DÁr al-miÒrÐya al-lubnÁnÐya, 1995, p. 64.
252This was actually the subject of a debate I attended among members of AnÒÁr as-sunna al-
muÎammadÐya, a Salafi organisation closely oriented to the Saudi Arabian WahhÁbÐ movement.
One of the persons present argued that Sufism as a philosophical and ethical discipline as
represented, for example, by Íasan al-BaÒrÐ, is a good thing, and that the main problem with
mawlids is not the fact that saints are celebrated, but the way it is done. Others objected, arguing
that Sufism is completely bÁÔil (invalid in a legal or ritual sense) and that because the construction
of shrines is ÎarÁm, the actual form of the celebration makes no difference.
253IÆÁ saÞalta fa-sÞal illÁh wa-iÆÁ istaÝanta fa-staÝin bi-llÁh. TirmiÆÐ, ÉÁmiÝ aÒ-ÒaÎÐÎ: KitÁb Òifat al-
qiyÁma, bÁb 59, ÎadÐ× 2516.
254Wa-iÆÁ saÞalaka ÝibÁdÐ ÝannÐ fa-innÐ qarÐbun uÊÐbu daÝwat ad-dÁÝi iÆÁ daÝÁni: 2:186, transl. freely
after Arberry (transl.) , The Koran Interpreted.
pilgrimage speaks of travelling to mosques, not to shrines. Other interpretations of these
textual references are thus possible, and have been favoured over the centuries; the Salafi
reading of the texts has gained its present hegemony only in the 20th century. Mawlids
are neither unequivocally forbidden nor sanctioned in the scripture. There must be
something more than these textual references, then, to make it plausible and compelling
to interpret mawlids as bidÝa.
Some Egyptians, mostly those belonging to the group of active Salafis who adopt a
strictly pious discipline and habitus, do argue that the mere fact that a shrine has been
built makes anything that happens around it ÎarÁm. But even in the context of the Salafi
movement most people always bring in other arguments to condemn mawlids.252
Furthermore, the active Salafis represent a clear minority that also condemns various
other things that are widely accepted in Egyptian society, most notably music, images and
tobacco. This poses the important question of why people who do not care that some
sheikhs consider music ÎarÁm believe the same sheikhs when they condemn mawlids. The
question is in fact twofold: What non-scriptural factors make mawlids a bidÝa in the eyes
of many Egyptians? And why do they care?
The imam of Egypt’s largest Salafi organisation, Dr. MuÌtÁr al-MahdÐ, provides us
with some clues:
‘If we remember the friends of God on the ground of their piety and follow their example,
this is allowed. But to construct shrines for them, and mawlids, with forbidden things
(munkarÁt) such as the mixing of sexes, seating of women [among men], Æikr lacking true
devotion, or folkloric movements, it’s without any bond to Islam.  [...] There is not one
proof from the QurÞÁn or the Sunna to allow us these noisy mawlids with their [bodily]
movements that are claimed by the Sufi profiteers who have nothing to do with [real]
Sufism. True Sufism is obedience to God and withdrawal from worldly pleasures. This is
the correct understanding. But these phenomena/appearances (maÛÁhir), and the way
people invocate graves, searching for mediation and appealing the dead for assistance [are
incorrect]. In Islam appealing for assistance is only directed to God. The Prophet, God’s
blessings and peace be upon him, says: “If you ask, ask from God, and if you appeal for
assistance, appeal God for assistance.”253 And our sublime Lord says [in the QurÞÁn]: “And
when My servants ask thee about Me – I am near to answer the call of the caller, when he
calls to me”254 There is no mediation (wasÁÔa) in Islam between man and God. The believer
asks from God directly. [The founder of al-ÉamÝÐya aš-ŠarÝÐya] Sheikh as-SubkÐ attacked
those who gain profit from mawlids and they started to criticise him, saying that he had
left the good tradition. But the truth is that these mawlids didn’t appear in the Islamic
world until in the days of the Fatimids. They were Shiites and Egyptian society refused the
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Shiite maÆhab, so with these movements and mawlids for the saints, they distracted and
appeased the people from their oppressive rule, so that people wouldn’t oppose their
politics.’255
‘As for those who claim to invocate God; the positive sides have no impact in that
atmosphere. The conduct of the people sitting on the street is not approved by religion,
especially concerning cleanliness, wasting time, and hysterical, folkloric movements. [...]
We have rules and responsibilities to fulfill in religion and in society. On the day of
resurrection God will ask us about them and make us responsible for them: what we did
with our life, our property, how we spent them to profit us in this world and the
hereafter. But to stay up all night in the mawlid, that alone is a crime against the interest
of religion and society.’256
Now if even the current leader of the largest Salafi organisation in Egypt thinks that there
is nothing wrong with commemorating saints per se, but that the problem is the way it
is done, in the ‘noisy’ way of celebration, the invocation of graves and the ‘wasting of
time’ that go against the interest of religion and society alike, then it is worth taking a
closer look at what exactly is so problematic about the ‘appearances’ or ‘phenomena’
(maÛÁhir) of festivity.
Besides the issue of širk, the key issues Dr. MuÌtÁr mentions are the mixing of men
and women, the bodily movement of Sufi rituals, the exploitation of the festivities by
Shiite rulers, and neglecting one’s responsibilities in religion and society by celebrating
all night. These are factors that contribute to the definition of mawlids as bidÝa, but at
the same time they stand as independent issues of morality, bodily disposition, festive
time, progress and rationality.
2.2. Women and men
People who criticise mawlids and the veneration of saints as bidÝa almost always include
the issue of the ‘phenomena’ or ‘appearances’ (maÛÁhir, sg. maÛhar) of festivity in their
argumentation. Furthermore, many people who are sympathetic to sainthood and
shrines, and may regularly visit them, remain firmly opposed to mawlids. Mawlids are
almost never only about the construction of shrines, and for a large number of people
the saints’ shrines are in fact the least problematic part of mawlids. What troubles people
much more, and significantly boosts the claim that mawlids are a bidÝa, is what they see
as immoral and improper behaviour facilitated by the festive atmosphere.
In the hegemonic religious discourses of 20th century Egypt among the religious
establishment and the Islamist movements alike, the issue of religion is intimately
connected to the issue of morality.257 And so also is the condemnation of mawlids as
bidÝa attached to the argument that mawlids are wrong because they are full of, even
primarily an occasion for, debauchery: prostitution, female dancers, alcohol, drugs and
gambling. Meanwhile, the reality of mawlids has fallen far behind this scandalous image
– with few exceptions, alcohol and prostitution are absent from mawlids, and dance
shows have become rare as well – (see below p. 196) and yet the topic of munkarÁt
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(immoral acts prohibited by religion) has remained central to criticism of them:
‘The results that follow from the celebration of mawlids are that uncontrolled behaviour
(ašwÁÞÐyÁt) is encouraged, debauchery flourishes, and theft is incited, not to forget female
dancers who also take part in mawlids.  And all this is considered to be searching for
closeness to the saint. And we must add to the calculation the vices (like adultery) that
take place at mawlids. And God protect, furthermore there are always dealers of drugs and
liqueur in this night (staying up all night is required) as it is called.’258
This image of wild debauchery in the name of religion (used in a newspaper article as part
of a furious attack on mawlids of a kind that is quite common in the Egyptian press) is
so far removed from the contemporary practice of mawlids that it is likely the author is
basing her account mainly on indirect sources. This is perhaps telling of the power of the
moralistic argument. The imagery of munkarÁt is a powerful – and exciting –
argumentative tool used to depict mawlids as a dangerous medium of moral corruption.
But even without actual debauchery taking place, the fact that space and rituals are
shared by men and women is enough to provoke the outrage of the religious press.259
Relations between men and women have long been a sensitive issue in most Muslim
societies (as elsewhere), conceived of as a potential source of chaos and decadence on the
one hand, and a marker of morality and religiosity on the other. While most Sufi groups
have been relatively tolerant of the participation of women, for the Salafi and Islamist
movements of the 20th century gender segregation – in practice typically meaning the
seclusion of women – has been a key issue. While it is not surprising that the religious
press and Salafi and Islamist activists stress this issue, it is striking to note that people
who spend much of their time in the mixed spaces of, say, universities, shops and offices
without finding that problematic, and who may in fact enjoy the atmosphere of romance
and flirtation that prevails on the Nile promenades, also object to the presence of women
at mawlids.
It is true that the atmosphere in the streets during mawlids is often sexually charged.
Mawlids serve as an important occasion for young men and women in the countryside
and small cities to meet.260 A more aggressive sexual tension rules the main streets on the
great night of mawlids in large cities when groups of young men roam the crowds, often
grabbing and harassing women. However, the main criticism is not directed against the
crowds in the streets but rather at the presence of women in the mosque, at the shrine
and in Sufi Ìidmas, and their participation in rituals where the atmosphere is, in fact, not
sexually charged.
There must be more to the issue of mixing, then. In the moralistic atmosphere of
present-day Egypt anything indicating loose morals is a powerful basis for
argumentation, and mingling of the sexes has become an argumentative front for a more
complex issue: namely the kind of presence women have, which in turn is related to the
sacredness of the occasion and its class habitus.
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Image 21:
The ÎaÃra of 
al-ÍÁÊÊa SihÁm 
(third from the right,
wearing sunglasses) 
at the mawlid 
of al-MursÐ 
AbÙ l-ÝAbbÁs,
Alexandria,
24 July 2003.
To understand the problems posed by women’s presence it is illustrative to look at
two Sufi gatherings organised by two women, HudÁ and al-ÍÁÊÊÁ SihÁm, who represent
two models of female participation at mawlids. Both organise Ìidmas at mawlids that
share a familiar and informal atmosphere but which differ in terms of their rituals and
class habitus. SihÁm, holder of a university degree and emanating matriarchal charisma,
organises small, intimate meetings that are mostly frequented by her circle of followers.
The programme consists of spontaneous speeches and performances, and sometimes a
Æikr without loudspeakers. SihÁm does not participate in the Æikrs herself; she always
keeps a certain distance, restricting herself to the role of a motherly spiritual leader, and
never forgetting to stress her well-educated background. HudÁ, on the other hand,
organises an ecstatic gathering with plenty of bystanders spontaneously joining in and
famous munšids performing, loudspeakers magnifying the sound of the Æikr. HudÁ
radiates the habitus of a maÝallima:261 she smokes, participates in the Æikr and talks with
the guests of her ÎaÃra in a familiar and informal manner. Both women are problematic
in the critical view of mawlids, but HudÁ much more so than SihÁm. They both represent
female leadership in the field of religion, a very sensitive issue that has led to the
imprisonment of two other women.262 But what HudÁ also does is act contrary to the
88 Chapter Four
263Najmabadi, Afsaneh, ‘Veiled Discourse – Unveiled Bodies’,  Feminist Studies 19 (1993), 3, pp.
487-518; Abu-Lughod, ‘Feminist Longings and Postcolonial Conditions’; Moors, ’Representing
Family Law Debates’.
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Image 22:
The ÎaÃra of HudÁ
(not pictured),
mawlid of SÐdÐ
AÎmad ar-RifÁÝÐ,
Cairo, 7 August 2003.
publicly propagated roles of women. She meets neither the modest and shy habitus
required from the religious woman, nor the professional middle-class style of those
women who have successfully made careers in Egypt over the past few decades. SihÁm, for
her part, is carefully balancing between these two parallel, partly interdependent and
partly contradictory trends that define the role of women in public space.
During the 20th century, the role of women in society underwent complex changes
that cannot be depicted as a straightforward path of emancipation. While there are
increasingly more women in professional and public life, the bodies of women have also
been subject to a strong moral discipline. This discipline is not confined to the field of
religion. As Afsaneh Najmabadi (writing about Iran) and others have argued, the entire
move of women to the public in the 20th century has been connected to forms of
disciplining, be it religious or secular.263 Women who do not fit into these standards are
increasingly excluded from a legitimate public presence. Following this logic of inclusion
and exclusion, women with access to education and the ability to display a modest
middle-class habitus are more likely to be accepted in public space, while the public
presence of women who have little formal education, wear lower-class dress, smoke in
public and sit with men on sacred occasions is perceived as immoral and un-Islamic.264
But why is mixing (iÌtilÁÔ) such a problem at mawlids while it is not so, for example,
at universities and workplaces? To understand this we have to take a closer look at what
the issue of mixing is really about: the gender and habitus boundaries that define the
religious, civic and moral order of modern Egypt, and their relationship to the
boundaries that define the sacred and the profane. This issue is not restricted to the
presence of women; it is related to the habitus and atmosphere of the entire festivity.
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267The ad appeared in al-AhrÁm on Friday 4 or 11 June 1999, but I have not been able to trace
the exact date.
268aš-ŠabÁb, July 1999: ÑabÁÎ ÍamÁmÙ, ‘aš-ŠabÁb fÐ mawlid SÐdÐ š-ŠaÝrÁwÐ!’, pp. 8-9; ÀÌir SÁÝÁ,
16.6.1999: ÍuÒÁm ÝAbd Rabbuh, ‘WuzarÁÞ wa-ÝulamÁÞ .. wa-zuwwÁr min as-SaÝÙdÐyya wa-l-Kuwayt
wa-AndÙnÐsiyÁ fi ÃarÐÎ aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ’, pp. 36-37; MaÞmÙn ÇarÐb, ‘Li-awwal marra: mawlid SÐdÐ aš-
ŠaÝrÁwÐ’, pp. 38-40; al-AÎrÁr, 9.7.1999: ÑalÁÎ QabaÃÁyÁ, ‘al-Mawlid’, p. 12.
269The first is published by the public sector al-GumhÙrÐya publishing house, the latter by the
ruling National Democratic Party. Both represent a politically loyal but strongly moralist reading
of Islam.
270ÝAqÐdatÐ, 22.6.1999: BasyÙnÐ al-ÍilwÁnÐ, ‘Man yunqiÆ sumÝat aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ min hÁÆÁ l-Ýaba×?’,
p. 6; MÙsÁ ÍÁl and IslÁm AbÙ l-ÝAÔÔÁ, ‘Mawlid aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ .. taÎawwal ilÁ malÎan li-d-darÁwÐš
mihraÊÁn li-l-ÎummuÒ wa-l-ÎalwÁ wa-luÝab al-aÔfÁl!!’, pp. 10-11; ÝAqÐdatÐ, 12.6.2001: MÙsÁ ÍÁl /
MuÒÔafÁ YÁsÐn: ‘Mawlid aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ bayn al-qubÙl wa-r-rafÃ’ ÝAqÐdatÐ, 3.7.2001: ‘TilÁwat al-QurÞÁn
wa-malÁhin fi mawlid aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ!! DaqÁdÙs tataÎadda× Ýan al-ÊÁmÙsa al-latÐ aÌaÆahÁ ÒÁÎibuhÁ li-
ziyÁrat al-maqÁm’, p. 13; ÝAqÐdatÐ, 25.6.2002: MÙsÁ ÍÁl: ‘TanÁfas al-qurrÁÞ wa-l-munšidÙn.. wa-l-bÁÝa
al-ÊÁÞilÙn afsadÙ l-iÎtifÁl’, p. 8; al-LiwÁÞ al-islÁmÐ, 24.6.1999: ÝAbd al-MuÝÔÐ ÝUmrÁn, ‘Mawlid .. sÐdnÁ
aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ!’, pp. 4-5; al-LiwÁÝ al-IslÁmÐ, 6.7.2000: ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz ÝAbd al-ÍalÐm, ‘Li-awwal marra:
Mawlid aš-šayÌ aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ: mÙlid w-ÒÁÎbuh ÈÁyib: ÎummuÒ wa-ÔarÁÔÐr wa-tilÁwat al-QurÞÁn wa-Æikr
AllÁh!’, pp. 3-5. See also al-MaydÁn, 15.6.1999: MuÎammad TaÈyÁn, ‘RaÈm istinkÁr ÝulamÁÞ al-Azhar:
ibn aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ yuqÐm “mawlidan” li-mawlÁnÁ’, p. 10; al-MuÒawwar, 27.6.2003.
2.3. Chickpeas
When Egypt’s most influential television preacher Sheikh MuÎammad MutawallÐ aš-
ŠaÝrÁwÐ died on 17 June 1998, a veritable cult soon developed around his person.265 The
conservative sheikh had been subject to some controversy in his lifetime but after his
death the press was full of praise for ‘the Imam of the modern age’,266 and posters and
wall calendars with his picture soon swept the homes and shops of the nation. One year
later, a scandal followed as ŠaÝrÁwÐ’s son al-ÍÁÊÊ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm posted an ad in a leading
newspaper announcing that the mawlid in honour of the late sheikh would be celebrated
on the anniversary of his death.267 The event gained widespread publicity, and several
magazines and newspapers wrote about it both before and after. Some of them took a
neutral stand on the issue,268 but the two weekly religious papers ÝAqÐdatÐ and al-LiwÁÞ al-
IslÁmÐ269 launched a furious campaign against the mawlid that continued, in somewhat
more moderate tones, in the following years while the mawlid, a considerable success,
grew and flourished.270
What makes this debate interesting is the fact that al-ÍÁÊÊ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ
was very concerned with keeping the mawlid free of controversial elements. The tomb,
covered by a large ornamented dome, does not stand near a mosque, and at the entrance
an announcement appeals visitors to direct their prayers to God only and observe good
manners at the shrine. Dancing, alcohol and gambling have been successfully banned
from the mawlid. To add further respectability, a large official celebration with lectures,
QurÝÁn recitation and poetry readings dominates the centre of the festivity.
Yet the critics were not impressed. They argued that the sheikh himself had been
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271ŠaÝrÁwÐ ran several Ìidmas at major pilgrimage sites, one at the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-
BadawÐ in ÓanÔÁ, one in an apartment next to the mosque of al-Íusayn, and one in a building
constructed specifically for the purpose across from the mosque of as-Sayyida NafÐsa (for ÓanÔÁ,
see Mayeur-Jaouen, Histoire d’un pèlerinage, p. 229). The two posthumous collections of fatwÁs by
as-ŠaÝrÁwÐ contain no opinions on mawlids, except of a fatwÁ in favour of mawlid an-nabÐ  (aš-
ŠaÝrÁwÐ, MuÎammad MutawallÐ, al-FatÁwÁ: kull mÁ yuhimm al-muslim fÐ ÎayÁtih yawmih wa-Èadih,
as-Sayyid al-ÉamÐl (ed.), Cairo: al-Maktaba at-tawfÐqÐya, 1999, pp. 600 f.). In an interview made a
few years before his death, aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ expressed a view cautiously in favour of mawlids:
‘We do not talk about “the mawlids” [per se], what concerns us is what happens in them. As
long as there is no immorality and transgression it’s OK. As long as it’s all about Æikr and blessing
the Prophet, it’s OK. Some Arab countries do not recognise that; they have even been saying that
the mawlids that we celebrate have no base [in religion]. I said to them: We do not take it as an
issue of judging the idea of the mawlid, but what happens at the mawlid. If there happens nothing
but obedience to God, then give me the proof of forbidding obedience to God.’ (AbÙ l-ÝAynayn,
SaÝÐd, aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ yabÙÎ bi-asrÁrihÐ maÝa s-Sayyida Zaynab wa-l-Íusayn: AnÁ min silÁlat .. ahl al-bayt,
6th ed., Cairo: MaÔÁbiÝ AÌbÁr al-yawm, 1997, p. 179; see also Idem, RiÎlat awliyÁÞ AllÁh, pp. 188-190.)
272ÝAqÐdatÐ, 22.6.1999, pp. 10-11.
273al-LiwÁÝ al-IslÁmÐ, 6.7.2000, p. 3.
274ÝAqÐdatÐ, 22.6.1999, p. 6.
275ÝAqÐdatÐ, 3.7.2001, p. 13.
276See, e.g,. aÔ-ÓahÔÁwÐ, ÝAlÐ ÝAbd al-ÝÀl, BidaÝ al-maqÁbir, Cairo: Maktabat aÒ-ÒafÁ, 2001, p. 16.
In this case the owner of the water buffalo was a woman, making it even worse.
opposed to mawlids (which was not quite accurate: ŠaÝrÁwÐ actually sponsored Ìidmas at
various mawlids but rarely publicly discussed the issue, well understanding its potential
for controversy),271 and that to honour the ‘Imam of the modern age’ with a mawlid was
mockery and travesty of the most outrageous kind. This second argument deserves a
closer look: what was presented as particularly offensive in the headlines and
commentaries was the turning of a legitimate pious celebration into a popular festival
with all of its entertainment and commerce:
‘The mawlid of aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ turned into an amusement ground of dervishes and a festival
of chickpeas, sweets and children's play!’272
‘Mawlid without its master (i.e., total chaos): chickpeas and party hats, recitation of
QurÞÁn and invocation of God!’273
According to these critics, al-ShaÝrÁwÐ’s memory should indeed be celebrated, only not
in such a shameful, un-Islamic way:
‘Sheikh aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ left his name in the record of the nation’s greatest ÝulamÁÞ who earned
their glory through their struggle, excellence and sincerity in their call for God and their
defence of the rights of the Muslims [...] It is not reasonable and not acceptable that one
of the sheikh’s sons comes to destroy all this by associating the name of his father with
the shameful amusement and superstitions which are witnessed in the mawlids.’274
The debate was not restricted to the press: it also divided the people of DaqÁdÙs, aš-
ŠaÝrÁwÐ’s native village and site of the mawlid. As part of this local debate, a story
circulated that a man had gone to the shrine of aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ with his water buffalo and
circled around it to make the animal fertile. ÝAqÐdatÐ used the story for another critical
headline on the mawlid,275 but it is possible that this event never actually took place:
ziyÁra with a water buffalo (and never with any other animal) is a recurring topic in the
criticism of the cult of saints, and has been told on many different occasions to ridicule
the rituals of ziyÁra.276
The mawlid adds up to the destruction of all that aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ stood for, we are told,
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277In the expression ‘leaving the mawlid without chickpeas’ (ÔiliÝ mi-l-mÙlid bi-lÁ ÎummuÒ),
meaning ‘failing to catch an opportunity’.
278The issue of celebration in graveyards illustrates the perception of things being out of place
especially well. Like in the following passage from a contemporary Salafi tractate, joy in the place
of fear is seen as an expression of lack of faith and respect: 
‘Among their bidaÝ is that they turn [the graves] into a festival (mawsim), a feast (ÝÐd), a lodge,  a
playground for children and a marketplace on weekly holidays (Friday) and on seasonal festivities
like ÔalÝat RaÊab and the feasts. You will even find at the shrines of the people of the house of the
Prophet (Ñ), (if it is true that they are buried there), that the people have called [these shrines] a
Îaram (sanctuary) and have fixed for each saint a night in which their ÎaÃra is held. Add to that
the make-up [or generally making themselves attractive] of the women and the noise and the širk
by asking the dead for what only God is capable of, and the mixing of men and women, and
forbidden private encounters, [all this] in the places of admonition, fear and shiver of the horror
of the death. One of the pious said: “if you should see someone eating or laughing in the
graveyard, then know that his heart is extinguished and he is far from the mercy of God because
he was being frivolous in the place of fear.”’aÔ-ÓahÔÁwÐ, BidaÝ al-maqÁbir, pp. 18-20.
because of the presence of amusements, children playing, sweets, party hats, chickpeas
and a water buffalo. These things all have one feature in common: None of them is, per
se, opposed to either Islam or morality, but in the context of the mawlid they transgress
and subvert the norms that ŠaÝrÁwÐ, in the view of the critics, stands for. Let us take the
example of roasted chickpeas for closer examination. They are inexpensive, tasty, healthy
and ÎalÁl according to Islamic Law. But as a commodity, they acquire additional
connotations. Part of the flourishing trade in sweets, snacks, amulets, toys and souvenirs
at mawlids, chickpeas are archetypal to mawlid imagery, so much so as to enter the
Egyptian colloquial idiom.277 Chickpeas, in this context, are much more than just a
snack: they symbolise the concept of baraka and the suspension of boundaries at
mawlids.
The issue of chickpeas is, just like the issue of mixing, part of a wider argument
stating that the behaviour of people and the general festive atmosphere at mawlids is
improper, un-Islamic and uncivilised. This topic is key to the entire debate. The issues
of bidÝa, immorality, and – as we shall see in the following section – backwardness, are
all openly or tacitly related to this central issue of habitus and festive time.
To understand why this is so, we must move step by step, first sketching the argument
in more detail and then trying to understand what discursive commonplaces the
argumentation is built upon and showing how mawlids (don’t) fit into them. The main
critical arguments concerning the festive atmosphere are the following:
–Mawlids mix profane behaviour with a sacred occasion, thus banalising and
desacralising it. This includes the mixing of men and women, having fun and shopping
on a religious occasion, eating and sleeping in a mosque or in front of it, and celebrating
in a graveyard.278 Having fun and shopping are entirely acceptable, but should not
happen under the pretext of religion.
–The embodied practices of saint veneration are opposed to the condoned expressions
of piety. The fact that people at shrines are loud and their movements impulsive, that
many of them are women and some of them wear dirty or eccentric dress, and that they
touch and kiss the shrine, is contrary to the way devotion at shrines should be expressed
(if at all), namely through calm and quiet meditation, study, and recitation of the FÁtiÎa.
– The movement of Sufis in Æikr is not a proper way of invocating God: it is mere
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279Interview with leading activists of the Muslim Brotherhood in a village in Kafr aš-ŠayÌ
province, 21 February 2002.
280This procession is, in fact, full of humour and irony. It is led by a mock president,
surrounded by mock republican guards (see pp. 64-65) and followed by a travesty of a bride and
groom, carts representing the professions of the village, and members of the Sufi orders wearing
imitated Arabian dress.
hysteric dance that may have therapeutic effects but contradicts the habitus of Islamic
piety, which should be that of concentrated, restrained and conscious worship, as ideally
exemplified by ritual prayer (ÒalÁt).
–The use of music, especially that of musical instruments in Sufi Æikr, is prohibited either
because music is completely ÎarÁm or because it is otherwise acceptable but should not
be used in mosques and on religious occasions.
These arguments leave us with a number of questions: Why does piety have to be quiet
and constrained? What is the problem with music? Why is the sacred in need of
protection? Why is having fun opposed to religion? To begin with the problematic nature
of fun, it is useful to look at how critics of mawlids view other festivities. Most Egyptian
Muslims do not express a general dislike for amusements and entertainment. So also
three local activists of the Muslim Brotherhood in a village in the Nile Delta whom I
interviewed about local festive traditions.279 They were strictly opposed to the mawlid of
the local saint and to the festive procession held on the occasion of mawlid an-nabÐ. What
they found especially objectionable was ‘the spirit of joking’ and the ‘sarcastic attitude’
expressed in these festivities.280 In their view, the birthdays of the Prophet and saints
should be celebrated through education, preaching and contemplation. Beyond this, they
considered the very idea of special festive time suspect: Instead of celebrating once a year,
a Muslim should live every day according to the example of the Prophet and the saints
(provided that they really are worthy of being venerated as saints).  Yet their suspicion of
the festive time of mawlid appears strange when compared to their enthusiastic
descriptions of the festive atmosphere of the two religious feasts. During the ÝÐd,
according to these activists, one should concentrate on the joy of the special day and
forget all sorrows in order to bring the community together and settle all conflicts that
might have arisen among the people during the year.
We have different contrasting notions of festivity here. One is the harmonic,
integrative and family-oriented time of the canonical religious feasts. The second is the
extraordinary time of mawlids made up of overlapping and contradictory festive practices
and utopian visions that all share a stark contrast to the order of daily life. This does not
mean that the festive time of the ÝÐd is uncontested. When these activists wished to
completely replace the atmosphere of mawlids with a stern, educational and moralistic
commemoration they in fact offered a third model of festivity, one much more restrictive
than that of the ÝÐd. This model is commonly presented in reformist discourses as the true
form of festivity to which also ÝÐd and RamaÃÁn celebrations are expected to comply.
Festivity, in this view, has to serve (thus no festive time in its own right) the moral and
religious improvement of the nation and the umma, the pan-Islamic community. The
Muslim Brothers I interviewed could be so enthusiastic about the ÝÐd because they
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281Like in many other locations, the Muslim Brothers in that village organise an ÝÐd morning
prayer in the open, carefully and successfully designed to balance between the moments of festive
joy and political demonstration.
282ÝAqÐdatÐ, 1.10.2002: MuÒÔafÁ YÁsÐn / HÁla as-Sayyid, ‘al-MunÁsabÁt ad-dÐnÐya: hal aÒbaÎat li-l-
iÎtifÁl faqaÔ.. am wasÐla li-taÈyÐr al-wÁqiÝ al-marÐr li-l-umma?’, p. 12; al-LiwÁÞ al-islÁmÐ, 5.12.2002:
ZakarÐyÁ aš-ŠinnÁwÐ / Amal al-ÝAdl, ‘Yawm al-fiÔr.. yawm al-ÊÁÞiza al-kubrÁ’, p. 7; al-AÌbÁr, 5.12.2002:
‘RÙšitta nabawÐya li-l-iÎtifÁl bi-l-ÝÐd’, p. 4.This is not the only tone of the public discourse on ÝÐd:
the moment of joy in harmony with the family and the umma, seen in no contradiction with the
various popular celebrations, features widely in the press coverage on ÝÐd, including religious
discourse. See, e.g., al-AÌbÁr, 6.12.2002: AÎmad ŠaÝbÁn, ‘al-ÝÏd yuwaÌÌid al-mašÁÝir wa-l-qulÙb’, p.
5; MuÌammad ÝAbd as-SamÐÝ ŠabbÁna, ‘ SulÙkÐyat al-Muslim fÐ l-ÝÐd’, p. 5. It is worth noting that
the critical discourse on the way ÝÐd is celebrated does not question the basic element of joy and
holiday but states that it should not be mistaken for the true meaning of ÝÐd, quite unlike in the
critical discourse on mawlids, and also on mawlid an-nabÐ, in which the moment of joy, most
notably the consumption of sweets, is often categorically rejected. For mawlid an-nabÐ, see, e.g., al-
ÝArabÐ: 13.5.2003: ÝAbdu ZakÐ, ‘ÝUlamÁÞ al-islÁm: al-iÎtifÁl bi-mawlid ar-rasÙl (Ñ) yakÙn bi-stirÊÁÝ
sÐratih al-ÝaÔira wa-l-iqtidÁÞ bihÁ: al-ÎalwÐyÁt bidÝa fÁÔimÐya wa-lÁ asÁs dÐnÐ lahÁ’, p. 10.
283KunÁfa is a pastry especially associated with the month of RamaÃÁn. Riddles (fawÁzÐr) are
a central part of RamaÃÁn television programming in Egypt. See Armbrust, Walter, ‘The Riddle
of Ramadan: Media, Consumer Culture, and the “Christmasization” of a Muslim Holiday,’ in
Donna Bowen / Evelyn Early (eds), Everyday Life in the Middle East, revised ed., Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2002, pp. 335-348.
284It is not clear whether he refers to the mawlid, to RamaÃÁn, or both.
285Man from QinÁ, in a discussion two days after the local mawlid and some two weeks before
the beginning of RamaÃÁn, QinÁ, 22 October 2002.
perceived and employed it as a functional part of religious and political mobilisation.281
But the ÝÐd is an ambivalent festivity, too, and many people complain about the
hedonistic and materialistic character of the celebrations that concentrate on eating and
entertainment instead of spiritual and communal values.282 And some of the people who
are opposed to the festive atmosphere of mawlids in fact do extend their criticism to
festive culture at large:
‘Mawlids are far removed from religion. It’s the fault of the people who come from
outside QÐnÁ and spoil (yisÐÞÙ) the mawlid. The proper intention would be to learn about
the life and work of SÐdÐ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm. What’s the role of chickpeas and sweets in Islam?
Their place is not here. It’s the same with RamaÃÁn, with TV riddles and kunÁfa283 and all
that nonsense. It284 should be celebrated differently, because Islam is a lot more sublime
(arqÁ) than that. But only few do it the proper way.’285
The problem of the festive culture criticised here by an urban middle-class citizen  is that
things are out of place. In his view, sweets, chickpeas and TV riddles banalise the spirit
of religion. The ambiguity of festive culture, the fact that a mawlid, or RamaÃÁn, or ÝÐd,
can mean hedonistic fun one moment and pious commemoration another, or even both
at the very same time for one and the same person, is a violation of boundaries that
appear to be fundamental to the discourse in which he is participating. We encounter the
same anger over the crossing of boundaries, be it with the presence of women, the
behaviour of the people at the shrine or in Æikr, the music, sweets and chickpeas, or the
festive atmosphere at large. At the mawlid, these accounts indicate, things are badly out
of place: graveyards should not be a place to celebrate, the invocation of God should not
be expressed by dancing, women should not sit with men, and, most importantly, the
commemoration of saints should not be an occasion for eating snacks and having fun.
The most important, but by no means only, boundary of importance in this debate
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is that marking the sacred and the profane. Following the concept of baraka, the sacred
in the mawlid is a powerful force of its own, a source of protection, and hence not in
need of protection itself. Yet this concept is clearly not shared by those who criticise the
festive atmosphere of mawlids. In his study of religious commodities in Cairo, Gregory
Starrett286 has argued that there are two competing definitions of the sacred strongly
related to issues of class habitus. While the baraka model remains influential, it is
contested by a rationalist view that emphasises the interpretation and understanding of
the meaning of religious commodities (most importantly the QurÞÁn, be it in the form
of a printed book, calligraphy, or tape-recorded recitation). While people holding to the
latter view agree that the QurÞÁn does hold baraka, they emphasise the importance of
understanding its text and acting according to its commandments and spirit. Following
this logic, celebrating the sacred should be based on the habitualisation of its meaning.
Commemorating a saint should, then, mean studying his or her pious example and
learning to live according to it.
The consequence of defining the sacred through its intellectual interpretation is that
removing it from the context of interpretation can desacralise it. The sacred, in the
reformist rationalist understanding, implies a pious and moral discipline and cannot
serve to legitimise profane practises. The sacred in this interpretation is fragile and in
constant need of cultivation and protection.287 In the mawlid, in contrast, no such
discipline or protection is available: on the contrary the sacred expands to protect the
entire festivity in all of its aspects. It is exactly this expansion of the sacred to include
eating, sleeping and trade that, in the reformist point of view, leads to its inflation and
banalisation. Fun in the name of religion is wrong, in this view, because it breaks the
boundaries set for religious ritual and space, because it does not express the constrained
and serious habitus and the disciplining of the everyday that are taken to be necessary
constituents of religiosity. In the words of an Islamist author, it makes it appear ‘as if
Islam were a religion of amusement and pastime’.288
Chickpeas, fun, music and ecstatic bodily movement in the name of religion and in
a sacred location are all seen as breaking the boundaries that, in the view of critics, are
there to define the proper and separate places of snacks and saints. Hence the debate on
mawlids is never simply about shrines in mosques or dancers and alcohol. The mawlid
of Sheikh aš-ŠaÝrÁwÐ doesn’t host any of that, and it has still inspired major debate. It is
the very order of celebration and pilgrimage that is problematic and is in fact the core
of the problem. If it weren’t for the impulsive and emotional habitus of ziyÁra, only few
Egyptians would consider it širk. If it weren’t for the kind of presence women have in a
sacred space, only few Egyptians would object to their participation. And if it weren’t for
the ambivalent festive time of mawlids, only few Egyptians would object to the fact that
people have fun at them. If mawlids were only about the love of ahl al-bayt, or if they were
purely secular festivals the way the spring festival Šamm an-nasÐm is, only the most radical
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289Starrett, ‘The Hexis of Interpretation’.
290Discussion with an Egyptian academic in Cairo on 23 January 2003, referring to the verse
‘Recite/read in the name of your Lord who created’ (iqraÞ bismi rabbika l-laÆÐ Ìalaq, 96:1),
considered to be the first verse of the QurÞÁn to be revealed to MuÎammad. See Gade, Anna M.,
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291So primarily from the point of view of the reformist critics. In practice, ecstasy in Æikr is
reached by conscious and learned movements and breathing techniques, and a certain level of
control is present in the ritual context. Åikr may  contain moments of partial or full loss of self-
control, but these are restricted to the occasion of the ÎaÃra and follow a loose ritual programme
in which moments of intense emotion and ecstasy are followed by moments of calm and rest.
When participants in a Æikr lose consciousness or the ability to coordinate their movements, which
sometimes happens, others are quick to see that they are taken to recover.
Salafis would bother to oppose them.
But why should Islam not be associated with amusement and pastime? Why are these
boundaries so important? As one can observe at mawlids, millions of Egyptians do not
have a problem with them. They are perfectly able to be pious and/or have fun at the
mawlid without feeling that there might be something wrong with it. The issue of
boundaries is related to different understandings of religion and society that have been
in a process of redefinition and contestation in Egypt since the 19th century, and for
which specific definitions of piety and the self are constitutive.
Piety has always been a contested issue in Muslim societies, but became more so in the
20th century when the reformist discourse gained a hegemonic position in the public
debates on religion, stating that the proper and only way of expressing religiosity is that
of conscious, disciplined and rational obedience and contemplation. This leads to an
empirical contradiction when people express piety by, say, kissing a shrine or dancing in
a Æikr. In the view of critics, these movements are opposed to two of the fundamental
principles of Islamic ritual: rationality and discipline.289 Piety, the personal disposition
of the sacred, is seen as a highly conscious and controlled state of the mind and body that
is under constant threat of distraction and banalisation. From this perspective,
constrained disciplined intellectualism is the very cornerstone of the Revelation and
inherently opposed to uncontrolled, ambivalent emotion: ‘God opened the Revelation
with the word “Read!”, He did not say: “Dance!”’290
One could argue that He did not say ‘Do not dance’, either, but this objection does
not apply in the reformist discourse. Ecstatic bodily movement to the tune of music is,
it is implied, the opposite of reading. The problem with dancing, in this view, is that it
taints the Word of God and distracts from its rational interpretation by giving in to
animal instincts of the body and the lower soul (nafs). The problem is not just the
centrality of bodily movement in Æikr, for the same applies to ritual prayer (ÒalÁt). By
taking the contrastive case of ÒalÁt, in which the body is disciplined through an exact
specified series of movements and phrases and the dominance of the spirit (rÙÎ) over the
lower soul (nafs) (any profanity or interruption makes the prayer invalid), we can see its
clear opposition to Æikr, which is an ambivalent and weakly controlled expression of an
emotional, ecstatic state of soul and body (infiÝÁl) and not controlled by reason or fixed
ritual as required by the reformist understanding of piety. This opposition between
conscious discipline and (seemingly) uncontrolled291 ecstatic states also explains the
power of the story of ziyÁra with a water buffalo (see above p. 90). The animal body is the
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ultimate symbol of an undisciplined and irrational habitus, and the water buffalo of all
domestic animals the most intimately associated with profane and dirty agricultural work
and bare of any religious connotation of sacrifice which, say, a camel or lamb might have.
The logic of dancing vs. reading also applies to music, the subject of an old and long
lasting debate among Muslims. Critics see the use of melodic instrumental music as
compromising the spirit to a lower level of animalistic instincts. This is more than just
an issue of the profane connotations of musical instruments that are also used at
weddings and nightclubs. The problematic nature of music is related to the Muslim
tradition of rhetoric and aesthetics whereby hearing, understood  to be an ethical
capacity, has a central position. Listening to the QurÞÁn is an act of devotion, and the
voice of the recitation is believed to have beneficial power. Following the same logic,
listening to profane music is to open one’s heart to profanities and illicit thoughts.
Music is seen to have an innate power that it exerts on the listener, hence the strong
ambivalence in Islamic tradition between the elaborate use of sound in religious rituals
and strong reservations towards secular songs.292
The interesting thing about music at mawlids is that while most people in Egypt do
not think that music is altogether ÎarÁm, they may still object to the use of music in Sufi
Æikr. What they see as problematic is not music itself but its presence in a sacred context:
‘Mawlids are a bidÝa that Muslims have invented; they didn’t exist in the time of the
prophets. What you should do is visit [the shrine], recite the FÁtiÎa and go, not play
music and dance like that (imitates Æikr).’
S.: Why is that bidÝa?
‘It’s bidÝa because of music and amusement in the mosque. In the mosque one should pray
and express respect. There is nothing wrong with music but its place is not in the mosque.
The problem is in the context, and the way the celebration is expressed.’293
To accept music in a profane context but to exclude it on a religious occasion is
emblematic of the way modernist and reformist critics conceive the boundaries that mark
religion and religious habitus. The rationalist concept of piety and the sacred are
embedded in a theory of the self that is key to the reformist reading of Islam and, as we
shall see, the modernist reading of society.
2.4. Bodies and selves
To understand the relationship of boundaries and the self we have to briefly return
to the beginning of this chapter and listen closely to what ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm has to tell us,
for he has two important points to offer:
S.: Can’t amusement and religion coexist?
‘No, because God didn’t give us two hearts so that I could have amusement (lahw) in one
and invocation of God (Æikr) in the other. Either it’s amusement and pastime, or it’s
invocation and sunna.
[...]
Look at these people! (Pointing again to Sufis in an ecstatic state of Æikr) Are these
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Muslims?’294
In other words: the human mind can only contain one emotional state at a time, and
because Sufis dance ecstatically in a Æikr it is questionable whether they deserve to be
called Muslims. This first statement about humans not having two hearts implies a
philosophy of the self based on a rigid differentiation between states of mind,
hierarchically ordered and mutually exclusive, the lower always stronger than the higher.
According to this theory, a devoted state of mind is invalidated through the presence of
the least trace of amusement, sexual desire, or anything else:
‘Ordinary life can be half-and-half but religion has to be 100% otherwise it’s
compromised. There is no half-and-half in religion.’
S.: But isn’t 50 or 70% religion better than 0%?
‘No, 50% adds up to the same as 0%, it has to be 100%.’295
This is a philosophy of the mind that completely denies the possibility of ambivalence
in the field of piety. It radically differs from the concept of the self that is central to the
festive habitus of mawlids and affirms the complex nature of the mind consisting of two
competing forces: the lower soul (nafs), locus of the animal and sexual instincts, and the
spirit (rÙÎ) aspiring towards God.296 While the goal of the Sufi is to overcome the nafs and
to completely follow the rÙÎ, it is acknowledged that only few ever progress so far on the
mystic path as to actually reach this goal. The lower soul is always present, an ambiguous
force that can be destructive but which can also be employed in the first steps of the
mystic path through the concept of love. While the concept of the self based on a
competitive coexistence of nafs and rÙÎ provides plenty of room for ambivalence, the
concept of the self presented by ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm implies the mutual exclusion of the two.
The self, in this understanding, must be a disciplined and purified one. But unlike
the Sufi self trying to gradually overcome the nafs entirely, the disciplined self needs only
to be genuinely purified in the context of religion. Going to a football match is
considered a different set of (also legitimate) parameters altogether. While radical Salafis
tend to be highly sceptical about anything with the slightest potential to taint the
disciplined religious self,297 this view implies a highly ascetic lifestyle and is not very
widespread. Young middle-class Egyptians who adapt elements of Salafi religiosity and
view mawlids critically do not typically give up amusements and fun (although they may
at least try to give up munkarÁt such as alcohol and marihuana). Instead they draw clear
lines between religious and profane fields of life. Religion, in this understanding, may
and should enter daily life in the form of moral discipline, but its original, sacred context
of interpretation has to remain pure and distinct. For this reason, the modernist pious
self requires clear and steady boundaries to mark the different fields of life and the states
of mind associated with them. Relativising the boundaries implies relativising discipline
of the self.
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301While most Sufis do pray regularly, and none of them would ever question that it is a
Muslim’s obligation to pray, it does stand out that a number of active, devoted Sufis do not
regularly observe this ritual obligation. This is once again related to the Sufi theory of ÛÁhir and
bÁÔin: Persons sufficiently far along the mystic path may not need to pray. Although nobody would
actually claim to have reached such an advantaged stage him or herself, this discourse does allow
the relativisation of the absolute status of ritual prayer as a marker of piety.
This is where ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm’s second statement, concerning the appearance and inner
state of Sufis doing Æikr, enters the picture. Discipline of the self and the attempt to keep
it untainted, is, in practice, a process of habitualising virtues. Following Saba Mahmood’s
argumentation concerning the Salafi piety movement in Egypt (see above p. 33), habitus
in this ethical sense means acquiring states of mind through a discipline of the body.298
This understanding is different from the Sufi concept of ÛÁhir and bÁÔin that provides an
explanation of and  legitimation for the complex and contradictory character of the
mawlid. In the Sufi view also a virtuous state of the self is acquired through pious acts,
strongly expressed in the concept of sulÙk, which literally means manners or conduct but
in mystical context denotes the progress made on the mystic path, and the practices,
exercises and meditations that are necessary for it.299 But while sulÙk is necessary to reach
a mystical state, it remains largely invisible, making it impossible to conclude inner states
(bÁÔin) from appearances (ÛÁhir). A person displaying no signs of the exoteric education
and pious behaviour of an ÝÁlim (religious scholar) may nevertheless be a true ÝÁrif bi-llÁh,
a mystic with immediate knowledge of God.
The difference lies, thus, not in the habitualisation of virtues but in their subsequent
expression in habitus. The reformist concept of habitus states that because inner states
are learned through bodily discipline, outer appearances do in fact allow conclusions to
inner states. This is a notion most strongly present among the Salafi movement, but
Mahmood shows that people who do not share the Salafi emphasis on the habitualisation
of virtues and rather highlight the importance of pious itention (nÐya), may nevertheless
maintain that a pious status, once acquired, will be embodied in habitus.300 This view
implies that while a virtuous habitus cannot be taken as a proof of virtue, the lack of
virtuous habitus can be taken as a proof of vice. Different though they are, these two
readings of piety and habitus share the conviction that it is possible to judge inner states
(especially vices) from appearances, or even that the two are identical. Thus the fact that
some Sufis do not pray allowed one of the men in the service taxi (see chapter one) to
claim that they do not truly believe in God.301 And the fact that the Sufis move in a way
that is contrary to ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm’s concept of religious habitus allows him to doubt
whether they, in the depths of their selves, are Muslims at all.
Following this logic, mawlids are directly opposed to the reformist and modernist
discipline of the self because their habitus is taken to express and, possibly, produce a
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state of the self that is counter to and a threat to the discipline of piety. But this issue
would not trouble so many people if it weren’t for the crucial role given to the discipline
of the self in the modernist view of society. The state of mind of citizens is not a private
matter, and neither is it a secret between the believer and God. It is, rather, taken to be
key to the development of the nation. This issue leads us to a fourth and final line of
critical argumentation that circles around the issue of backwardness.
3. ...And backward
The way mawlids are celebrated is highly problematic not only for the discourse of the
religious self but also for that of modern society. What makes mawlids such a grave issue
for the people whose voices we have heard above is that in their view these festivities are
harmful to society, the nation, and religion as a whole. This is a line of argumentation
that extends far beyond the issue of religion and piety, connected as it is to the issues of
rationality, order, progress, and the image of Egypt as a developed nation. These
discourses are interconnected and interdependent. Certainly there are Salafis who focus
only on the issue of the religious self, just as there are secularists who only worry about
the order of modern society. But the mainstream critical perception of mawlids is based
on the important commonplace that progressive modernity and authentic religion are
interdependent, even identical. In the eyes of these critics, mawlids are opposed to the
order of modern society for the same reason that makes them opposed to the religious
self: they break boundaries that are taken to be a universal and necessary condition for
piety and modernity:
‘Mawlids have nothing to do with Islam: they have been attached to Islam but do not
belong to it. And the mentality of the people is an expression of backwardness and it has
a negative effect on society. [...] There are things that might be irrational for society, and
bad for religion separately, but mawlids certainly are both.’302
‘What is this? I mean what is this?! It’s a state of mind, yeah, but what’s the meaning? [...]
These are all backward people (mutaÌallifÐn), there is not one intellectual (mu×aqqaf)
among them, nor anyone with education (mutaÝallim), nor anyone on a high level! [...] I
don’t believe in this. This is against the šarÐÝa, this is against religion, and against reason,
and against logic!’303
‘The word Sufism has become associated with the image of mawlids, with all their negative
aspects such as laziness and idleness, begging and dervishdom, colourful turbans, flags
and processions, which all are negative issues that have led us to our present state. [...]
Presenting the people with  this false and obscure image of Sufism is intended,304 in order
to keep them in their present state, while the West is taking takes vast leaps towards
knowledge and progress.’305
What stands out in these critical views is how religious authenticity, social progress, and
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an educated and disciplined habitus are taken to be identical. Idleness, an attitude, is
treated as belonging to the same class of things as flags, a material element of festivity.
Such equations are characteristic to this line of critical argumentation which, to sum up,
goes as follows:
–Mawlids are based on ignorance and superstitions. They are a way to exploit simple
people and keep them distracted from their true problems.
–Mawlids represent a form of disorder that subverts the order of religion and modern
society.
–Mawlids are irrational and therefore opposed to both religion  and modernity.
–Mawlids are an expression and cause of backwardness.
At first glance, these arguments seem somewhat incoherent. How exactly do flags hold
back the development of the nation? How can mawlids be both a distraction and
subversion? But people who make such arguments present them as logical and
convincing, and often view them as self-evident. Hence there must be some, even if weak,
underlying logic to them, and it is this underlying logic that I attempt to reconstruct in
the following pages.
3.1. Opium for the people306
In January 1998, the leftist weekly al-AhÁlÐ published an article sharply criticising the
mawlid of as-Sayyida Zaynab:
‘At the mawlid of as-Sayyida: rituals, crimes and superstitions. The oppressed flee to the
Mother of the Weak (Umm al-ÝAwÁÊiz) and madmen (maÊÁÆÐb) corrupt the intellects of
the future generations.’307
In the article, the mawlid is described as a site of swindle, exploitation and irrationality:
Poor farmers undertake the pilgrimage in the hope of healing, spending their little money
on nuÆÙr. Clever swindlers squat on state property claiming visions and establish mawlids
to exploit the poor who believe their absurd claims. Children listen to sheikhs telling
miracle stories that in reality are nothing but superstitions that corrupt the minds of the
youth. Ignorant parents bring their daughters to be circumcised.308 The author concludes
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that mawlids are based on a kind of religiosity that makes these festivities carriers of
dangerous traditions while preventing their abolition. The mawlid is, in other words, a
medium of false consciousness. This is a view by no means restricted to the leftist secular
circles that produce and read al-AhÁlÐ. Let us recall the Salafi Dr. MuÌtÁr al-MahdÐ
arguing that mawlids were invented by the Fatimids who ‘distracted and appeased the
people from their oppressive rule, so that people wouldn’t oppose their politics.’309
Distraction is a key concept in this argument: mawlids keep people busy with
anything except actually solving their problems. This argument is developed further by
MuÎammad, a school inspector who sees mawlids as an instrument of domination
consciously employed by colonial rule:
‘When the French arrived in ÓanÔÁ they were very happy about what they saw. The people
didn’t care about liberating themselves. The mawlid kept them occupied in place of
colonialism. The French found this an excellent way to distract the people from reality
in service of colonialism. The mawlid is escapism from reality, a bit like weddings or
football matches are today. The origin of the great mawlids is in colonialism: give people
something to keep them from thinking. When Napoleon saw the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-
BadawÐ he hoped all Egypt would be like that. The educated and the intellectuals only go
to the mawlid for a day or so, I may go to the mawlid, but for me it’s not more than fun,
like when a tourist goes to the pyramids. It has no scientific interest. Many intellectuals
refuse mawlids because they are not real popular folklore but a colonialist idea. There is
no objection to a day of amusement, but that is not [authentic] folklore. The idea of
mawlids is a colonialist idea. It’s an instrument of domination. For example, you can rule
someone with what he loves, like sex and money, and keep him backward and passive, or
keep people wearing party hats, playing, dancing, and believing in baraka. In my
childhood people held a strong belief in the miracles of [the local saint] SÐdÐ al-MuršidÐ,
but such beliefs are against scientific thought. And they serve colonialism. The sheikh
moves to the centre of the people’s thinking, and the colonialist to the margin.’310
Muhammad’s account expresses a mixture of appreciation for festivities – notably
mawlids, weddings, and football311 – combined with a suspicion of festive time: although
people certainly need and deserve some fun, it is ultimately a destructive and distracting
factor in society. The belief in the assistance of saints makes people helpless and passive,
unable to take their destiny into their own hands, and the festive atmosphere of mawlids
distracts people from their true problems. Instead of working, people trust in the power
of saints and let themselves go in the trance of Sufi Æikr and the unproductive idleness
of the Ìidmas. Instead of changing oppressive reality they escape into the superstitions
and colourful illusions of the festival.
Mawlids, in this view, are nothing more than opium for the people, a medium of
escapism and submission as opposed to the activist, progressive self: They have been
created by the Shiite Fatimid rulers to lead Muslims astray, exploited by Mamluk Sultans
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to keep the people under their yoke,312 they have opened the door to colonialist
occupation and exploitation of Egypt,313 and they serve to sustain an authoritarian
regime.314
A look at the history of Egypt, however, may significantly relativise this picture of
passive fatalism. ÓanÔÁ was, in fact, the site of a major uprising against the French
occupation in 1798, and protecting the shrine of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ appears to have
played a strong mobilising role in the events. Afterwards, Napoleon prohibited the
mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ fearing that it might lead to further uprisings. British
colonial authorities prohibited the mawlid for similar reasons in 1915, following the
declaration of Egypt as a British protectorate.315
But the task of this study is not to judge the historical accuracy of the arguments that
are presented in the debates. What I am interested in are the discursive commonplaces
they share. In this respect, such argumentation would appear fairly sound, if it were not
frequently accompanied by another argument pointing in the opposite direction.
3.2. Chaos
Noisy and crowded as they are, mawlids appear as the ultimate symbol of chaos, the
opposite of any reasonable form of order. So for example in an article that appeared in
the semi-official newspaper al-AhrÁm, criticising the state of Ramses Square, which faces
the main railway station and, at the time the article was written, housed an important bus
station:
‘Only the swings and amusements were missing from Ramses Square to convince all of us
that what is going on here is nothing more than a popular mawlid that has moved with
all its customs, appearances and practices from the margins of the Egyptian countryside
and entered the heart of Cairo, directly in the middle of the crowd of two million
passengers who arrive daily to BÁb al-ÍadÐd Square. [...] If you head to the right along the
wall in the direction of as-SabtÐya Street you will find the heart and centre of the mawlid
103Criticism of mawlids
316al-AhrÁm, 20.7.1999: ‘BaÝd an iÌtalaÔ al-ÎÁbil bi-n-nÁbil: FawÃÁ fÐ MaydÁn RamsÐs’.
317See Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, pp. 92-94.
318State security officer questioning me during the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, ÓanÔÁ, 15
October 2002.
319Interview with a woman running a fish restaurant, mawlid of SÐdÐ al-MursÐ AbÙ l-ÝAbbÁs,
Alexandria, 24 July 2003.
where the scenes overlap. To the right, juice vendors struggle for space with cigarette and
food vendors. On the pavement on the opposite side of the street, vendors of lottery
tickets and shoe-shiners stand in a row, and between them minibuses that have lost their
way drive among hundreds of people, all melting away into the scene of incredible chaos
on the background of a panorama of hassle and a cacophony of voices: horns of the cars
and calls of the minibus drivers, passing over the excitement of the gangsters who demand
protection money for every spot of pavement and cart [...]’316
In this account, the image of the mawlid stands for deep countryside, disorder,
unorganised street trade, organised crime, hassle and trouble: the opposite of how a
public square in the capital ought to look: beautiful, clean, quiet, ordered, under control
of the law, and with trade restricted to shops. Associating mawlids with chaos is a
normative statement with far-reaching implications. The image of a modern city is taken
to be a visible matrix of order that is necessary for modern society to function.317
Following this logic, describing mawlids as chaotic implies that uncontrolled expressions
of emotion and cheerful chaos are, through their opposition to discipline and order,
opposed to the order of society at large.
This feeling of mawlid chaos threatening the order of the modern city is pointedly
expressed in the way middle-class urban citizens view the pilgrims who stay in tents and
on carpets on the street. They find it very difficult to understand why these people
voluntarily leave their homes to stay in a tent or even on the street for up to a week.
While some people simply find it a bit strange, or may actually be proud that their
hometown is so important to these people, others strongly condemn such behaviour:
‘Why do you come to do research at the mawlid?’
S: ‘I study mawlids as a part of Egyptian culture...’
‘It’s not culture, it’s backwardness. Would you come with a tent and all your kids and
everything like that? It’s backwardness to leave one’s home and stay in a tent.’318
‘What do you think about these beliefs?’ (pointing at Sufi Ìidma tents on the other side
of the street)
S: Well, what do you think?
‘I find they are wrong (ÈalaÔ). Islam didn’t tell us to do that.’
S: What exactly is wrong about it?
‘That the people sit in tents on the streets like that.’
S: But the Prophet and the Arabs also lived in tents.
‘Yes, but that was because in that time they had no other means of housing. Now people
can stay in houses, but instead they sleep in the streets and tents. And also rich people
who could afford better.’
S: But what’s wrong with that?
‘The sanitary conditions, and there are women sleeping in the streets. (discusses the
problem of sanitary conditions in more detail) I guess you Christians don’t have things
like that.’
S: Actually we do, like the mawlid of St. George in DaqahlÐya, and in Europe, too.
‘Yes? (surprised) Anyway, I think that’s wrong: I do ziyÁra to the shrine, that’s alright, but
not like this.’319
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It is, of course, not the tents themselves that are problematic. What troubles these middle-
class urbanites is what they stand for: the redefinition of urban space at the mawlid, the
fact that the urban middle classes lose their hegemony over public space to villagers and
dervishes who do not respect the standards of hygiene and modesty that these urban
citizens are committed to. Sleeping in a tent in the middle of the city threatens the image
and order of the modern city that, as the story of Ramses Square very well shows, is taken
to be identical with modern society. It is worth noting that although large mawlids are
mostly urban affairs, the author of the AhrÁm article makes the assumption of mawlids
being essentially rural, the village and the mawlid both standing as symbols of
backwardness, filth and chaos.320
But sleeping in a tent is not only perceived as backward, unhygienic and uncivilised.
The criteria of being a good, clean, well-educated modern citizen and a good Muslim are
so much one that sleeping in the street and leaving one’s work and family is considered
to be against religion as well:
‘It’s wrong that people leave their home, family, work, women and children and go to the
mawlid to do Æikr and sleep on the street. According to a ÎadÐ× of the Prophet, blessings
be upon him, there are only three legitimate reasons for travel: ÎaÊÊ, work, and ÊihÁd.’321
I tried to ask the student who expressed this opinion whether this also applies to wealthy
people who go for a holiday on the Mediterranean coast, but he did not see my point.
People who criticise the pilgrims’ behaviour do not place it parallel to the holidays of the
upper classes who leave behind their home and work in order to spend time and be
unproductive on the beach.
There is a sound logic to this: going to the beach is well within the boundaries of
public space and class distinctions as they are defined by the hegemonic classes of society.
The pilgrims subvert these boundaries. Not only do they express a form of ecstatic
religiosity that contradicts the ideal of rationalist, constrained piety that has been
cultivated by reformist and modernist movements, but they are also representatives of a
civic order that undermines the ideal of the modern citizen who, in the dominant
imagery, is expected to live in a modern city characterised by functional differentiation,
clear boundaries, and a temporal, spatial and bodily discipline imposed by moral
education and public planning.322 For such an understanding of social order the
temporary suspension of boundaries at mawlids, as expressed, for example, by pilgrims
camping in the streets, becomes a serious and real threat to the discipline of the self and
the visible order of society that are needed to raise and maintain a nation that is – with
varying emphases – modern, civilised, and religious.
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Often people who count themselves as the opposition are highly dependent on the state, notably
through public sector jobs. At the same time, people who carry out government policies may at the
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3.3. Progress, rationality and the habitus of the modern Muslim
These two lines of argumentation – false consciousness and chaos –  do not quite seem
to fit together. First we are told that mawlids are wrong because they maintain oppressive
hierarchies, and then we hear that mawlids are wrong because of their anti-hegemonic
tendency concerning the shape and use of urban space. Mawlids appear as both a reason
for the persistence of poverty and oppression, and a form of subversion and chaos
threatening the order of society. It seems that the people who celebrate mawlids just can’t
get it right for critics of the festivities. If their celebration maintains conservative values,
it is backward and un-Islamic. If it subverts them, it is also backward and un-Islamic. This
is not a true dilemma, though: these two arguments only contradict each other on the
surface. The trouble with mawlids is not their maintaining or subverting order but the
way they do it.
To untangle this complex of arguments let us, one final time, return to ÝAbd ar-
RaÎÐm’s account. When he says that the behaviour of people at mawlids is incompatible
with the habitus of ‘the religious, rational, civilised human’ he, in fact, offers us a simple
and easy formula for a modernist and reformist reading of Islam: Islam = worship of God
+ a constrained bodily disposition + a rational (as opposed to ecstatic) state of mind +
an ethic of dignity and work. This formula leaves no space for ambivalence: everything
has its place in a given order, and what breaks the boundaries of this order is not only
un-Islamic, but also uncivilised and irrational. One can thus use exactly the same quasi-
logical formula to produce modernity in its twentieth century Egyptian reading: to be
modern is to embody a constrained disposition expressing a rational state of mind, an
ethic of work and the worship of God. (There are some secularists who might argue that
the worship of God is not a necessary component of modernity, but in Egypt such views
are mainly confined to academic leftist circles.) What makes this formula of
Islam/modernity highly interesting is that following this logic, mawlids are not opposed
to Islam and modernity because they are a bidÝa and backward. On the contrary, mawlids
only become unauthentic and irrational after they become opposed to the habitus and
discipline of a modern Muslim.
Before proceeding with this key point, however, a few clarifying words about the
relationship of religion and the secular nation-state in Egypt are necessary. This
relationship cannot be sufficiently grasped by the opposition of Islamism and secularism.
The discourse of nationalism and development that is presented by actors with varying
positions toward the state323 and shared by most of the political spectrum is usually
neither Islamist nor secularist, while it is Islamic and secular in varying (and at times
contradictory) combinations. While the term ‘secularism’ has become identified with a
point of view that denies a public role for religion – and thus an often pejorative term
to which only few Egyptians subscribe – Egypt as a state and Egyptian modernity in its
hegemonic readings are secular, however in a different sense. Being secular in this context
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does not mean the exclusion of religion from the public but rather giving religion a
specific meaning and functionality.324 While the exact place and weight of religion in the
definition of the nation-state is a subject of controversy, there is wide consensus that
religion has a place in it. The key point here is that religion is conceived of within the
frame of the nation-state and that the nation-state is defined, in varying degrees, through
its religion(s).325 The nation must stand on the foundation of  the ethical principles laid
down by religion, and religion must be capable of being put in the service of the nation’s
development. Thus framed, religion becomes a functional part of the secular nationalist
project, which, as we shall see in the following, has significant consequences for the way
‘true’ religion is defined.
Walter Armbrust argues that this attempt to unite progress and authenticity is a
characteristic feature of the modernist project in Egypt:
‘The Egyptian modernist, as portrayed by the state and many intellectuals, is a
conservative radical. [...] Egyptian modernism allows for Europe as a cultural catalyst, but
insists on continuity between present and past: No rejection of tradition, and therefore
none of the uncomfortable dislocation of European Modernism.’326
In this image, there is no liberal-secularist distinction between the fields of reason and
faith, nor is there any apparent break between tradition and modernity such as that
which has been characteristic of the liberal modernist project elsewhere. This is a fragile
union, however, and further below I illustrate that the relationship between reason and
faith and the union of authenticity and progress are by no means unproblematic. To
understand how this construction of modernity works, we need to take a closer look at
two of its constituents, rationality and progress,327 and ask why exactly mawlids, in the
view of Egyptian modernists and reformists, are opposed to them.
Rationality became a key issue in Egypt in the late 19th century and has remained so
since. It extends to all spheres of life: not only the state of mind of modern citizens and
the organisation of society, but also their religion is expected to be rational. Today it is
a repeated claim in both intellectual and popular discourses that Islam is a rational
religion, based on the call to think and  understand (let us recall the point of the
Revelation being opened with ‘Read!’ – see above p. 95), and fully in accordance with
reason and science. Simultaneously, the issue of emotional inspiration is viewed with
great scepticism. In this tone, MuÎammad al-ÇazÁlÐ (1917-1996), an intellectual close to
the Muslim Brotherhood but whose influence by far exceeds Islamist circles, describes
how an influential sheikh told him about hearing a mystic in India play the flute so
beautifully that it brought him to tears. Al-ÇazÁlÐ is sceptical: was the mystic a Muslim,
a Christian or even a Hindu? What was his message? For whose sake was the sheikh
actually moved to tears?
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runs along with a heart-moving voice. Passionate spiritual love leads to deceitful illusion
just like passionate sexual love leads to a forbidden mistress. It is necessary to respect the
voice of reason first and last, this is what we have learned from our mighty book (i.e. the
QurÞÁn).’328
This story shows how strongly moments of uncontrolled, spontaneous emotion and
inspiration are felt to be a threat to the religious truth which, in this view, can only be
found through rational interpretation of the scripture. It reminds us of the criticism of
Æikr and music, and the fragile nature of the sacred in its intellectualised reading:
ambivalence and emotional inspiration threaten the carefully constructed image of
religion as rational interpretation of the Divine truth because they do not allow the
world to be defined along clear, rationalised boundaries.
To understand why this should be a threat to reason, we must realise that reason in
the sense used by al-ÇazÁlÐ is actually a rather dogmatic construct. Rationality in this
context does not mean that all values of society are subject to rational critique, nor does
it mean the rational choice of strategies to reach a known goal. Rationalism, in its
contemporary Egyptian sense, is a habitus and mode of thinking based on the
presentation of society and its values in the form of a coherent system of laws, regularities
and deductive values. Critical debate of the axioms behind this system, most importantly
the primacy of the nation, the prospect of progress, and the fundamental truth of
religion, could destabilise the claim that these political and religious beliefs are entirely
rational. Consequently, such debate is largely taboo. Both a mystical view stressing the
moment of inspiration and a liberal secularist model of different fields of reason and
faith could undermine the apparent rationality of the nation and its creed, which is why
they are both problematic for the public definition of religion and modernity  in Egypt.
Much of the suggestive power of ‘reason’ is due to its promise of progress. Progress,
the idea of a linear development of society towards a better future, is central to every
modernist project.329 Unlike in earlier times when a slow decline was taken to be the
natural state of a world waiting for judgement day,330 Egyptians since the late 19th century
have been expecting their society to constantly improve, and have expressed their
discontent whenever they have felt that it does not. Because religion, in mainstream
modernist discourse, serves a function in the path of the nation’s progress, it is judged
according to its ability to serve this task.331 The reform of religion, inspired by an
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idealised past, is conflated with the development of society, inspired by a progressive
utopia. The same happens to their opposites, false innovations and backwardness that
become connected to each other through labels like ‘ignorance’ and ‘superstition’.332
This synthesis of religion and modernity, authenticity and progress is a fragile
construction and specific understandings of religion and modernity are necessary to
uphold it. Modernity in its hegemonic Egyptian reading leaves no space for the relativity
and disorientation of postmodernism. There must be a grand narrative. The Egyptian
modernist narrative at the turn of the millennium, in rough outline, is one of
nationalism, progressive development in harmony with authentic heritage, and religious
and moral superiority, while the different parts of this narrative may be emphasised to
different degrees.333 In this narrative, everything is expected to have a purpose, to follow
the same principles, to be part of the same system of the nation. Religion must be capable
of being made part of this narrative of development: it has to be representable as a system
of deductive values, an objectified codex of principles. Just as there is no space for the
post-modern in Egyptian modernity, there is no space for the ambivalence of ecstatic
states and utopian festivities in the hegemonic reading of religion.
To keep this discourse of modern society and religion from disintegrating, it has to
be based on a perception of society itself based on universal boundaries that define the
place and time of different fields of life and allow their treatment as discrete elements of
a functional system. Such perception is, of course, never fully coherent, nor is it ever even
nearly realised in practice. It is, nonetheless, powerful through the promise of progress
it delivers and through its dissemination via state administration, school education, and
public media. It is this common sense of how society is and should be structured that
makes mawlids appear transgressing and reactionary in the same instance.
The perception of society as a rationalised system, and the emphasis on sober,
constrained and rational habitus of the religious self are two sides of a coin. Both are
based on the assumption of universal boundaries. To understand the far-reaching
consequences of this assumption let us make a short excursion to Mikhail Bakhtin’s
interpretation of the European enlightenment: Bakhtin argues that enlightenment went
hand in hand with the refusal of the ambivalence and laughter that had characterised the
renaissance:
‘In the new official culture there prevails a tendency toward the stability and completion
of being, toward one single meaning, one tone of seriousness. The ambivalence of the
grotesque can no longer be admitted.’334
The world of enlightenment, in Bakhtin’s reading, is a coherent system that can only be
understood by sober, rational meditation. The 17th-century enlightened critic has no taste
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for the grotesque because he ‘is used to conceive being as something finished, stable,
completed, clear, and firm. He draws a dividing line between all bodies and objects.’
According to Bakhtin, this tradition continued until his time, and the ambivalent
laughter of Rabelais remained incomprehensible to a 20th-century historian in whose
perception ‘truth can speak only in solemn tones. Neither does he perceive
ambivalence.’335
Drawing sharp dividing lines between objects and bodies implies a shift in the
relationship to ambivalence that is expressed in the mawlid by the emotions of love and
joy, ecstatic bodies, multiple meanings of festivity, contingent use of  festive space, and
utopian festive time. In a world consisting of discrete elements, truth must speak in
solemn tones, bodies have to be disciplined, everything has to have a clear meaning, space
must be organised according to an abstract matrix of order, and time is uniform and
does not allow for temporary utopias. What makes a mawlid so scandalous for a devout
modernist is the collision of highly different understandings of space, time, the body and
the self: contingent space versus spatial differentiation, temporary utopia versus linear
progress, and ambiguity versus universal boundaries. What appears as an aura of sanctity
over a festivity uniting all of human life in the overlapping circles of a mawlid becomes,
in the modernist world view, a collection of profane, backward and ridiculous practices
that taint the purity of the sacred sphere, undermine the order of the modern city, and
divert the consciousness of the people.
Of course it would be mistaken to draw a direct parallel between European
enlightenment and Egyptian modernity. Firstly, the world views, actors, and  general
historical contexts of 17th-century Europe and 20th-century Egypt were different in so
many significant ways that a direct comparison would be absurd. Secondly and more
specifically, the enlightened perception of the world was, relatively seen, a static one in
which Utopia was imagined as a place rather than a time. The secular view of history as
progress, as dynamic improvement of human society, did emerge with the
enlightenment,336 but only in the modernist discourses of the 19th and 20th centuries did
progress and the prospect of future gain the central position they now have in the
developmentalist projects of modernity around the world. In such a view of history and
time, which is shared by Egyptian modernism, utopia is located in the future, and the
festive time of the mawlid appears as a form of retrogression. Backwardness is thus not
only an issue of backward practices that may be hosted by the festival. The very concept
of qualitatively different festive time, of inverting the order of the everyday world once
a year, is opposed to the way progress is expected to take place. What appears as a
temporary utopia of a better world to the participants becomes an escapist regress, a form
of false consciousness standing in the way of linear progress in the eyes of the modernist
critics.
In this sense, mawlids in fact are opposed to the order of modernity and religion in
their hegemonic interpretations, and vice versa: festive utopia is not progressive, and
ambivalent festive joy does not follow the habitus of deductive rationalism. For the
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project of modernity, celebrating the utopia of a different world (instead of celebrating
that of a perfect world like in the ÝÐd) once a year is always wrong. From the point of view
of a progressive grand narrative, a time beyond the ordinary, without a clear function or
purpose, is simultaneously subversion and false consciousness.
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Chapter Five: Mawlids as an Other of modern Egypt
1. What will the foreigners think?
Mawlids are controversial not only because they transgress boundaries; they are also
problematic because they do so in public. Mawlids are among the few occasions in which
subaltern classes can demonstrate their vision of religion and society that may
substantially differ from the view mediated in the public sphere. The logic commonly
held by those who criticise mawlids of identifying habitus and visible order with inner
states implies that the public image of mawlids has tremendous importance. And the
image of Egypt in the eyes of foreigners (that is, Western foreigners) is indeed a great
concern to those who view these festivities in a negative light. In their view, mawlids
present a false image of Egypt as a nation and Islam as a religion, and this false image can
be employed to defame both Egypt and Islam. For this reason some people whom I
interviewed were highly suspicious of my research project, fearing that it may be part of
an Orientalist plot to depict Islam as a backward, irrational and ridiculous religion. This
sentiment is strongly expressed in the book of an Islamist author on Islamic festivities:
‘When the enemy who always waits for us to meet with disaster sees the people who wave
their bodies at mawlids under the pretext of Æikr, he watches them with a wide open
mouth. Drowning in laughter he searches from the depth of his mind for a way to
describe what he sees. Thus have we become an object of ridicule in the eyes of our
enemies. And at the same time we have insulted our Islam and dressed it in clothes that
are not in its favour nor part of it.’337
The author goes on to express his distress about the copious amounts of sweets consumed
on all major religious holidays,  but what mainly concerns us here is his image of the
enemy laughing at the sight of a mawlid. The image of religion being tainted by
profanities and innovations is here mixed with a sense of being under attack and the
feeling of humiliation at seeing one’s religion represented by sweets and Sufi Æikr.
This sense of being exposed to the foreign glance and an outsider’s representation is
based on key historical experience. Since the 19th century, mawlids have been a popular
topic of colonial, Orientalist and tourists’ representations of Egyptian culture, a fact that
has often troubled Egyptian elites who would have preferred to present a very different
image of Egypt. At the same time, Egyptians have measured their society through
continuous comparison with Europe and, increasingly, the United States, be it as an ideal
image of progress,  an enemy and competitor to match, or an Occidentalist negative
mirror image representing vice and decadence as opposed to Egyptian/Arab/Islamic
virtue and civilisation. The intellectual and political elites of Egypt have continuously
defined themselves in actual or imagined confrontation with Western dominance and
representations.
The debate on mawlids is part of this definition. In this chapter I argue that it has
developed into its present form through a confrontation with Orientalist representations
of Egypt  and European concepts of progress and piety prior to and during the colonial
period. This encounter has significantly shaped the current hegemonic discourses of
religion, nationalism and modernity, and has produced a specific way of defining their
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boundaries in which mawlids and other communal religious traditions play an
important role.
2. Genealogy of the debate
2.1. The tractates against innovations
Mawlids have been the subject of controversy from the very beginning. The earliest
known reference to the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ mentions that it was prohibited
(for only one year, as it turned out) in 1448 ‘because of the presence of sinful women’.338
This was not an isolated event: The emergence of mawlid an-nabÐ, mawlids in honour of
Muslim saints, and the spread of organised mysticism and ecstatic rituals was
accompanied from the start by major controversy in the Muslim Middle East. Mawlids
have remained part of this historical controversy ever since.
Between the 12th and 15th centuries, a genre of fiqh specialised in the discussion of
bidaÝ emerged. This genre, which first appeared among MÁlikÐ scholars in Andalusia but
soon spread throughout the Islamic world, became part of a debate that developed in
particular between the supporters and opponents of Sufi rituals. The most prominent
representative of this genre, although not its creator, was AÎmad ibn TaymÐya (d.
728/1328), a highly controversial figure even in his lifetime.339 Part of a current within
Islamic scholarship devoted to the purification of ritual and morality, he followed the
footsteps of earlier scholars such as aÔ-ÓurÔušÐ (d. 520/1126), Ibn al-ÉawzÐ (d. 529/1200),
AbÙ ŠÁma (d. 665/1268) at-TurkumÁnÐ (14th century) and Ibn al-ÍÁÊÊ al-ÝAbdarÐ (d.
737/1336).340 The topics and arguments developed in kutub al-bidaÝ (the tractates against
innovations) belong to a repertoire that became standard in the critique of ritual, and
which gained new dynamics following the revival of Ibn TaymÐya’s writings upon the rise
of Islamic reform movements beginning in the 18th century.
While issues that today form part of the debate on mawlids are prominent in the
kutub al-bidaÝ mawlids do not appear as a discrete topic in them. The kutub al-bidaÝ
discuss, among other things, the veneration of saints, Sufi Æikr, instrumental music and,
starting in the 13th century, the celebration of mawlid an-nabÐ. A related topic of
controversy was the older and never solved debate on samÁÝ, that is, the use of music for
Æikr.341 The absence of mawlids in these tractates has two reasons: The first is that mawlids
either did not yet exist or had not yet developed into a discrete custom by the 13th and
14th centuries when the bidÝa debate emerged. When mawlids emerged as a clearly
113Mawlids as an Other of modern Egypt
342In the early phase of their development, mawlids of Sufi sheikhs were often celebrated on the
date of the Prophet’s birthday (most notably so the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ), and living Sufi
sheikhs hosted annual or monthly celebrations also known as mawlids at their zÁwiya. Any other
occasion with a banquet and public invitation might also have been called a mawlid, as could an
occasion where mawlid poetry in praise of the Prophet was performed. Winter, Society and Religion,
pp. 179-180, 183; Mayeur-Jaouen, Histoire d’un pèlerinage, pp. 118-126.
343Fierro, ‘The Treatises Against Innovations’; Shoshan, Popular Culture, p. 17.
344See, e.g., al-ÝAbdarÐ, Ibn al-ÍÁÊÊ, al-MadÌal, Cairo: al-MaÔbaÝa al-ÝÁmira, 1320/1903, vol. 1, pp.
122-126, 142-175vol. 2, pp. 10-13, 151-157; at-TurkumÁnÐ al-ÍanafÐ, IdrÐs b. BaydakÐn b. ÝAbdallÁh,
KitÁb al-LumaÝ fÐ l-ÍawÁdi× wa-l-bidaÝ: Eine Streitschrift gegen unstatthafte Erneuerungen, Subhi Labib
(ed.), Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1986, pp. 76-96, 203-229, 293-302.
345al-ÝAÛma (al-Azmeh), Ibn TaymÐya, pp. 481-491.
346The concept bidÝa Îasana follows the legal qualifications developed in MÁlikÐ and ŠÁfiÝÐ fiqh.
See above p. 81 and Fierro, ‘The Treatises Against Innovations’, p. 206.
347as-SuyÙÔÐ, ÉalÁl ad-DÐn, Íusn al-MaqÒid fÐ Ýamal al-mawlid, Beirut: MuÞassasat al-balÁÈ, 1987;
Kaptein, N.J.G., MuÎammad’s Birthday Festival: Early History in the Central Muslim Lands and
Development in the Muslim West until the 10th/16th Century, Leiden: Brill, 1993, pp. 48-67.
distinguishable custom in the 15th or 16th century,342 the genre of kutub al-bidaÝ had
already developed its fixed standard topics and arguments, and mawlids were bulked
together with shrine visitation, mawlid an-nabÐ, and other seasonal celebrations.343 The
second reason for the absence of mawlids as a discrete issue even in later debates on bidaÝ
is that for the discourse of Islamic jurisprudence, individual practices such as kissing
shrines, lighting candles, or moving to the tune of music are easier to grasp than complex
festivities that contain numerous practices with different ritual and legal statuses.
In their treatment of public festivals, grave visitation, music, morality and the habitus
of piety, the bidaÝ tractates already contained basic elements of the contemporary
criticism of mawlids and are referred to for that purpose until today. They are
characterised by an uncompromising demand for ritual purity and moral discipline, a
clear and strong rejection of any syncretistic forms of piety, and a staunch opposition to
overwhelming joy and laughter, extravagant culinary culture, liberal spending, and
anything that has a taste of hedonism attached to it. In their insistence on clear and solid
boundaries and a constrained and stern habitus (for example in their general criticism
of popular festive traditions and the participation of women in public festivals, as well
as their strict rejection of celebrations at graveyards and of food and music at religious
occasions)344 they clearly present a formative body of discourse whose aesthetic standards
of piety and patterns of argumentation have significantly shaped the discursive common
sense of Islamic reformism.
Yet this view did not remain uncontested. Ibn TaymÐya faced massive opposition
from his contemporaries,345 and the views he and other authors of kutub al-bidaÝ
represented remained marginal for centuries to come. At the end of the 15th century, the
influential ÝÁlim ÉalÁl ad-DÐn as-SuyÙÔÐ argued that mawlid an-nabÐ was in fact a
praiseworthy innovation (bidÝa Îasana),346 and that there is nothing wrong with giving a
banquet, expressing joy, or samÁÝ, on the condition that the celebration  is free of
munkarÁt.347
I return to this argumentation in chapter six on the defence of mawlids. For the
moment it is sufficient to point out that the controversy did not diminish the success
of mawlids. Critical views remained marginal, an intellectual counter-hegemonic
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discourse unable to mobilise wide political or popular support. In the period extending
from the 14th century all the way to late 19th century, Sufism was central to Islamic piety
in Egypt, to the degree that it is out of the question to describe Sufi practice during that
period as popular Islam and its opponents as orthodox.  The ruling classes were closely
attached to Sufism. Sufism maintained close, though occasionally tense, contact with the
tradition of scholarship embodied by al-Azhar, and until the 19th century most scholars
of Islamic law were also affiliated to Sufi orders.348 A combination of Sufism and maÆhab-
based scholarship was the orthodox Islam of the time.349
Prior to the 20th century mawlids held a central place in religious, political and
economic life.350 They were celebrations not only for ‘the people’ but also for the ruling
classes and religious dignitaries.351 For MurtaÃÁ az-ZabÐdÐ, one of the most influential
scholars of 18th-century Egypt, the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ was an important
occasion to build and maintain his extensive scholarly network.352 As late as the early 20th
century, sessions of the cabinet were delayed to allow ministers to attend the mawlid of
as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ.353
The critical discourse on ecstatic rituals and festive culture never entirely disappeared,
however, as is shown by ÝAbd ar-RaÎmÁn al-ÉabartÐ (1753 - ca. 1825), a pupil of MurtaÃÁ
az-ZabÐdÐ and author of a chronicle famous for its account of the French occupation of
Egypt. While al-ÉabartÐ himself attended mawlids and did not question the position of
saints, his description of the mawlid of al-Íusayn expresses indignation about the
habitus of the dervishes:
‘They would talk in ungrammatical phrases, believing them to be invocations, and repeat
petitions. [...] Each gathered around him his likes, base people all. Then he would spend
his night awake and greet the dawn dizzy and idle, believing that he had spent the night
in devotion, invocation, and piety.’354
When and how did this counter-hegemonic discourse turn into the ideological hegemony
it represents today? And is it really the same discourse? With the modernisation policies
of MuÎammad ÝAlÐ (ruled 1805-1848) and his successors, European concepts of society
and progress were imported into Egypt, further amplified by the British colonial rule that
began in 1882, formally ended in 1922, and continued de facto until 1952.355 During this
period, the modernist, nationalist, Salafi and Islamist movements emerged and the
115Mawlids as an Other of modern Egypt
356de Jong, Frederick, ‘Opposition to Sufism in Twentieth-Century Egypt (1900-1970)’, in de
Jong/Radtke (eds), Islamic Mysticism Contested, pp. 310-323.
357ÝAbduh, MuÎammad, ‘IbÔÁl al-bidaÝ min niÛÁrat al-awqÁf al-ÝumÙmÐya’, in MuÎammad RašÐd
RiÃÁ (ed.), TÁrÐÌ al-ustÁÆ al-imÁm aš-šayÌ MuÎammad ÝAbduh, 2nd ed., Cairo: MaÔbaÝat al-ManÁr,
1344 H (1924-25 A.D.), Vol. 2, pp. 133-136, here p. 135. First published in al-WaqÁÞÐÝ al-MiÒrÐya, 4 ÅÙ
l-ÍiÊÊa 1297 (7.11.1880).
358Ibid, p. 136.
discourse of Islam and modernity as known today developed and gained a hegemonic
position in the public sphere, the educational system, the institutions of the state, and
the habitus of the middle classes. At first restricted to the intellectual elites, it has
increasingly gained ground in the wider segments of society following the spread of state
schooling and, since the 1970s, SalafÐya-inspired Islamist movements.
2.2. The invention of society and the causes of its retrogression
Sometime around 1880, a new kind of criticism of ecstatic rituals emerged.356 It takes
a closer look, however, to understand what made it new. Let us, for example, take an
article by MuÎammad ÝAbduh in the newspaper al-Wa×ÁÞiq al-MiÒrÐya about the
prohibition issued by the administration of public awqÁf (religious endowments) on the
ÎaÃra of the SaÝdÐya order:
‘When they stand up for Æikr they lower the ugly voices of their many percussions with
their disturbing noise, and begin to supplicate meaningless expressions. And as the wine
of illusions grows stronger in their minds they become crazy as lunatics, and some of
them take off their clothes and take pieces of burning charcoal from the fire, put them in
their mouths and touch their bodies with them as a demonstration of the grace/miracle
(karÁma). And God forbid that all these violent movements and all this strange confusion
be a miracle. It is their custom to show up with this kind of practice in the mosque of
SÐdnÁ al-Íusayn during his mawlid. Then people gather around them and the spectators
crowd and confuse the minds of the visitors. [...] There is not one Sunna [of the Prophet]
that would permit this kind of forbidden things (munkarÁt) carried out by the ignorant
in the mighty houses of God. On the contrary, the pure šarÐÝa prohibits associating the
invocation of God with instruments of amusements generally and without exception,
especially since no reasonable person doubts that their intention in beating percussions
and basing the Æikr on melodies is just amusement and delight that are prohibited by the
Law.’357
This is an aesthetic argument very similar to those proliferated both in the mediaeval
kutub al-bidaÝ as well as in the public debates of the early 21st century, describing the
scenery as ‘disturbing’ and ‘ugly’ and phrasing the opposition of true religion versus false
innovations as an opposition of wholesome pious habitus versus noisy amusement and
dirty chaos. On the surface, this argumentation stays well in the tradition of the debates
on bidaÝ and samÁÝ, rejecting the use of musical instruments, the ecstatic behaviour of the
Sufis, and the transgression of the boundaries that mark piety and amusement and the
sacred and the profane.
But the argument is made in a new context and has a very different significance than
that made by MuÎammad ÝAbduh’s predecessors. It is conceived of as part of a wide-scale
project of religious reform that ‘will reach out from Cairo to the villages of the
countryside’358 to remove all errors and bidaÝ until a true, Islamic state of affairs based on
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the QurÞÁn and the Sunna is reached.359 MuÎammad ÝAbduh was part of a movement
among Egypt’s political and intellectual elites searching for a way to modernise the
nation and lift it from its perceived state of backwardness and ignorance. His
argumentation is part of this emerging ideology of reform, progress and nationalism.
Why did these ideals crop up in the late 19th century? Reform movements aiming to
purify ritual and beliefs already existed in the Muslim world in the previous century,
most notably so Sufi reform movements in India360 and the WahhÁbÐya in NaÊd.361 But
they had not had much impact on Egypt until it became clear in the late 19th century
that Egypt lacked the technological, military and social capabilities of the European
powers, and the elites of the country began to ask why this was so. It is only in this era
that the key concepts of society, nation and progress emerged: Egyptian politicians and
intellectuals began to speak of Egypt as a nation (umma in the contemporary idiom)362
and a society suffering from a state of backwardness but striving to be equal to the
European powers.363 It is in this context that mawlids became a problem not only for the
individual believer, but society at large.
An influential piece of this discourse on backwardness was a book published in 1902
under the title The Present State of Egyptians, or the Cause of Their Retrogression, written by
MuÎammad ÝUmar, a civil servant employed by the Egyptian Post Office.364 The book
makes explicit reference to Edmond Demolins’ À quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-
117Mawlids as an Other of modern Egypt
365Demolins, Edmond, À quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons, 5th ed., Paris: Maison Didot,
1897.
366Demolins, Edmond (Edm½n Dÿm½lÁn), Sirr taqaddum al-inÊilÐz as-saksÙnÐyÐn, Transl. AÎmad
FatÎÐ ZaÈlÙl, Cairo: MaÔbaÝat al-ÉÁmmÁlÐya, 1329 [1911]. The translator’s introduction is dated 1899,
but it is not clear whether this is a second edition or whether the translation remained
unpublished in the meantime. AÎmad FatÎÐ ZaÈlÙl (1863 - 1914) was brother of SaÝd ZaÈlÙl who was
to become the leader of the nationalist movement and belonged to the same intellectual circle as
MuÎammad ÝAbduh and  QÁsim AmÐn. He translated several influential works of social theory
from French into Arabic, including works by Demolins and Le Bon, Bentham’s Les principes de
législation and Rousseau’s Le contrat social. Ahmed, Jamal Mohammed, The Intellectual Origins of
Egyptian Nationalism, London etc.: Oxford University Press, 1960, pp. 44-46; Goldschmidt, Arthur
Jr., Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2000,
pp. 233-234.
367Sivan, Emmanuel, ‘The Clash Within Islam’, Survival 45 (2003), 1, pp. 25-44, here p. 35. A
Turkish translation of the book found an interested readership among the Young Turk movement:
Demolins, Edmond, Anglosaksonlarin Esbâb-¤ fâÞiqiyeti nedir?, Transl. A. FuÞâd and A. Nâci,
Istanbul: 1330 [1912].
368ÝUmar, ÍÁÃir al-MiÒrÐyÐn, p. 257.
Saxons,365 which had been recently translated into Arabic by AÎmad FatÎÐ ZaÈlÙl366 and
was well received in nationalist and reformist circles: RašÐd RiÃÁ, pupil of MuÎammad
ÝAbduh and father of the Salafi movement in Egypt wrote a praising review of the Arabic
translation, arguing that Egyptians had a lot to learn from the British.367 Demolins (1852-
1907), a French social scientist, saw the roots of British advantage as compared to the
French in the racial superiority of the Anglo-Saxons and in a system of education that
transmitted not only knowledge but also practical virtues, producing intellectuals with
a pioneering spirit – in other words, teaching virtues through habitualisation. It was the
latter issue that greatly impressed Egyptian nationalists, among them the author of The
Present State of Egyptians who in his book set out to reveal the factors that prevented
Egyptian society from developing. MuÎammad ÝUmar’s approach is worth attention: not
only does he make the opposition of progress and backwardness a leading theme of the
book, he also presents Egyptian society as a system in which all parts are interdependent.
Critical of the regional, ethnic and confessional classifications of Egyptian society
dominant at that time, the author structures the book according to economic position:
the rich, the middle classes, and the poor. The poor are problematised as a source of
ignorance and moral decay, and their education and the reform of their life
circumstances and customs appears as a necessary step for the development of the nation.
Among the many causes of retrogression presented in The Present State of Egyptians,
mawlids appear as a destructive influence on the morals of the poor and, consequently,
an obstacle to improving the moral and religious quality of the nation at large:
‘These kinds of illusions that are so deeply rooted in the minds [of the poor] generally
damage the morals and move them away from the foundation of correct belief, the
example of virtue and the perfection of civilised manners (kamÁl al-adab). These great
state-sponsored mawlids are gatherings for different kinds of people with diverse shapes
and with manifold intentions, most of which are harmful to the morals and manners [...]
through a mixture of illusions with good faith and naive morals and characters. We ask
God to send someone to renew the religion of the commoners and cultivate their minds
and change their simple-mindedness and delusions into good creeds that will reform their
morals and manners. If only that were realised it would be a mighty success and splendid
accomplishment.’368
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The concept of civilised manners, as I have translated adab here, is central to this critical
account. While in the older Islamic tradition adab was the habitus of an educated
individual versed in arts, letters and fine social conduct (and thus by definition restricted
to upper classes), it here shows striking similarity to the European concept of civilisation.
Adab had thus become the collective quality of a society embodying an advanced state of
social, moral and cultural development. Another, closely related, key feature of this
account is its elitist perception of simple-minded and naive commoners in need of
cultivation and enlightenment (a perception that has since been shared by most Egyptian
modernists). The elitism of intellectuals and scholars is, of course, not new. But while
mediaeval Islamic scholars like AbÙ ÍÁmid al-ÇazÁlÐ and Ibn Rušd were concerned with
protecting the commoners from the potential dangers of engaging themselves with
complex esoteric knowledge,369 in the modernist and reformist discourse elites and
commoners are perceived as parts of an interdependent system: the nation. The early 20th
century nationalists of the like of MuÎammad ÝUmar shared with their classical
predecessors a strong elitist distinction from the masses but embedded it in a nationalist
view of being one with the same commoners whom they wanted to distinguish themselves
from. What could be a better role, then, than that of the avant-garde, a distinguished but
progressive elite committed to civilising the commoners and lifting them from their
perceived state of ignorance?370
The modernist image of mawlids subverting the pillars that support the nation as a
whole – religion, reason, morality, and civilised behaviour – was developed further in the
following decades, and mawlids and the cult of saints developed into a standard topic in
modernist and reformist discourses on bidaÝ and backwardness. The criticism grew more
radical as Islamic reformism developed from small intellectual circles into the wider
religious movement of the SalafÐya371 by the 1920s and gained a political dimension with
the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement holding to an outspokenly
modernist, nationalist and moralist agenda and committed to a reformist/Salafi
interpretation of Islam. In the first decade of the 20th century, critics of mawlids still
expressed their hope that mawlids would be successfully turned into a positive part of the
nationalist project, for example by developing them into modern trade fairs.372 But it
soon became clear how difficult it is to employ popular festivals for utilitarian purposes,
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and a more general rejection of mawlids and the veneration of saints gained ground in
the public debates.
In this period, the critique of Sufism and popular religious culture moved from
attacks on specific practices towards a general rejection of ecstatic and mystical piety. In
1927, a series of articles in the weekly as-SiyÁsa al-UsbÙÝÐya reinterpreted the hagiography
of as-Sayyid AÎmad al-BadawÐ and declared that he had in reality been a Shiite spy,373 a
claim that, although historically highly questionable,374 has remained an important topos
until today.375 In 1929, another article in as-SiyÁsa al-UsbÙÝÐya criticised the government
for issuing permissions to celebrate mawlids and demanded their abolition and
replacement with QurÞÁn recitation at shrines.
‘The government knows perfectly well that mawlids are nothing but superstitions, bidaÝ
and dangerous customs that must be abolished. [...] They are a suicide of virtue, and they
are in reality worse than that, but we lack the expression to describe it exhaustively.
Because mawlids, especially in the cities, and what goes on in them, are nothing but
various expressions of  religious, moral and social vices and truthful expressions of the
moral deficiency latent in the minds of a large group of people (šaÝb). And those mawlids
incite them and assist them in increasing it (i.e. the moral deficiency). [...] Thus why not
abolish these dangerous customs that let loose the bonds from all people civilised or on
the way to civilisation, and that are the source of moral and religious corruption, and
which furthermore are a cause for the contempt of the foreigners for us and an incentive
to make us doubt religion and the authority of those who stand to it.’376
Here the modernist/reformist critical image of mawlids is articulated in its full spectrum:
The festivity is taken to be a truthful image of moral deficiency, that is, the embodiment
of a disposition of the mind. As such, it is a threat to Islam, the morals of the people, and
the boundaries that structure civilised, that is, modern, society. Mawlids are a public
problem that should draw the attention of the state. And last but not least, they are an
open door to foreign domination. The article underlines the last point with the story of
two Americans who wanted to visit a mawlid with their wives. The visit became a disaster
as the women were severely harassed by the crowds:
‘Then the pinching turned against them. They bore it for some time until they fled the
crowd saying “Savages, savages!” And [one must know that] the word savages is the
political expression for people who, according to the international law of the Western
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nations, may be colonised and subjected under absolute rule.’377
This experience of being represented as savages or, more commonly, Orientals and hence
legitimate subjects of colonisation is key to understanding the development of this
critical view. The problem for the Egyptian nationalist of the late 19th and early 20th
century was not just that parts of society were backward and uncivilised. The problem was
that they were being seen and represented as such by Europeans and that this was used
as a justification for colonial rule.
The encounter with European hegemony (which began long before colonial rule) was
formative for the Egyptian modernist criticism of mawlids. Egyptian intellectual and
political elites starting in the early 19th century became aware of the enormous
technological and military advancement of European powers, and this awareness led to
the modernisation policies of MuÎammad ÝAlÐ and his successors. These policies led to
the creation of a centralised state apparatus with a growing number of tasks, a new
understanding of public order378 and the emergence of the afandÐya, a civil service-based
Egyptian Muslim middle class379 that gained a central role in the nationalist movement.380
At the same time, the growing European presence and British occupation in 1882 led to
the emergence of a split between ‘modern’ or ‘civilised’ European culture and public
order, and a ‘backward’ Oriental society. This division was key to the colonialist world
view, the Orient serving as a negative mirror image used to construct Western self-image
and an ideological rationalisation of colonialism.381 It came to be strongly felt in Egypt
with the dissemination of a Victorian understanding of education and public order, the
development of a strong class divide between Egyptians and mostly European minorities,
and the increasing exoticisation of local culture, most visibly marked by the construction
of new European-style districts inhabited by foreigners and the new upper and middle
classes.382
Part of the Orientalist and colonial world view and self-justification was the
representation of Islam and the Orient as sensual and irrational. Part of this imagery,
mawlids and ecstatic Sufi rituals came to appear as a form of recreation characteristic of
the idle Oriental at best, and ‘morbid and unwholesome deviations’383 and religious
fanaticism at worst: 
‘[The young Egyptian’s] recreation is the periodical moulid, or fair, or a quiet lazy evening
outside the restaurant, sipping coffee and smoking the inevitable cigarette, enjoying a
gossip with his neighbour. The warmth of the climate and his habits permit of no further
121Mawlids as an Other of modern Egypt
384Cunningham, Alfred, To-Day in Egypt: Its Administration, People and Politics, London: Hurst
& Blackett, 1912, p. 213.
385Rudolph, crown prince of Austria, describing a Sufi Æikr. Cit. by Starrett,’The hexis of
interpretation’, p. 957.
386Starrett,’The hexis of interpretation’, p. 955.
387Ibid., p. 958.
388Anderson, Imagined Communities; Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, pp. 119-127.
exertion.’384
‘Looking on makes one dizzy, and European blood runs cold at such sights. This height
of fanaticism is appalling. Without moving an iota, in the same attitude these people turn
with incredible rapidity. Their features are convulsed, their eyes turn out; the thin hands,
and pallid cheeks set in their short beards, cut in Turkish fashion, betray all the painful
signs of nerves disordered by depraved religious feelings.’385
It was not only Æikr and mawlids but also Islamic rituals and traditions of learning in
general that became part of the Orientalist/colonial image of the irrationality and
backwardness of Islam and Muslims. European observers interpreted key rituals such as
wuÃÙÞ (ritual washing) and ÒalÁt (ritual prayer) as mere form without any deeper meaning
and depicted the education of QurÞÁn schools (kuttÁb) where pupils would sit on the
ground around a sheikh moving rhythmically while memorising the QurÞÁn as the very
opposite of any real education, ‘sensual, primitive, and antirational’.386
Gregory Starrett argues that this perception was based on the 19th-century European,
and particularly the British Victorian self-image of rational, internalised piety that was
expected to be expressed in a quiet and constrained habitus. In the context of
colonialism, the Muslim body became a site of inscribing European hegemony. The
bodily movement of dervishes in a Æikr, worshippers performing wuÃÙÞ and praying five
times a day, and pupils in a kuttÁb came to be represented as expressions of meaningless
and blind ritual standing in direct opposition to philosophical, pious, moral disposition
and, consequently, true civilisation.387 Thus while the Victorian observers doubted
whether ritual practice could lead to virtues, they certainly did believe in embodiment:
They saw lack of true internal piety, and to prove this perception wrong was a key
concern of Egyptian modernists.
If the irrational character of the Orient was a key issue in colonialist discourse, so did
rationalism and rationalisation become the key to progress and respect in the eyes of the
Egyptian elites. To stand equal to the challenge of colonialism, the nation (in itself a
recent innovation)388 had to display the same kind of virtues as  Europe did (or was seen
to display in the perception of Egyptians): rationalism, discipline, constraint, progress,
and cultivation, while holding to core values that could make Egyptians not only equal
but, at least in terms of morality and religion, superior to Europeans.
This became the central commonplace of all nationalist, modernist and reformist
movements that emerged in this period, and it has remained so until the present day.
Despite their substantial differences in other issues, the reformists and nationalist
intellectuals and activists of the early 20th century not only shared significant common
experiences and expectations but also moved in the same circles. The conflict line
relevant for this study, namely that between reformists and Sufis, between the supporters
and opponents of mawlids, ran across the political spectrum. It was not an issue of
whether Egypt should be a religious or secular nation, an independent republic or a pro-
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British monarchy, but a conflict between different sites of power: one dominated by Sufi
orders, a large part of the religious establishment, and local networks of guilds and
merchants, affirming the role of communal traditions that their power, in part, depended
on, and another dominated by the Islamic reform movement, the new middle classes and
sections of society in close contact with the colonial system, in the process of not only
establishing different forms of public order and piety but also of conceiving the structure
of society anew.
2.3. Selection and exclusion
The modernist and reformist common sense of piety and modernity is not a simple
takeover of European concepts; nor is it a simple continuity of Islamic traditions. Rather,
it is an innovative and selective synthesis of the two. Egyptian modernism and Islamic
reformism aimed to defend Islam and Egyptian culture by reshaping them into a form
that could withstand confrontation with European hegemony. In confrontation with
colonial rule, European and  Islamic traditions were reshaped, reinterpreted and moulded
together to create a new discursive formation.389 But what was selected, and what
excluded? And what were the criteria for inclusion and exclusion?
One of the most explicit and influential expressions of this synthesis and the
subsequent exclusion of mawlids from the realm of true culture is MuÎammad FahmÐ
ÝAbd al-LaÔÐf’s book as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ and the Dervish State in Egypt,390 first published
in 1948 and reprinted in 1979 and 1998. A mixture between an ethnography and a polemic
pamphlet, as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ is a study about and against the cult that developed around
as-Sayyid AÎmad al-BadawÐ and its effects on society.
ÝAbd al-LaÔÐf contributed to the development of Egyptian folklore studies and wrote
an influential study on Sufi music (which is the only part of mawlids and Sufi rituals
that won words of appreciation from him).391 His analysis is strongly influenced by social
theories globally current in the first half of the 20th century, when concepts such as race
and national character played a key role in the debate on why some nations grew
powerful while others did not. While racial theories had little appeal for Egyptians, the
concept of national character found a very positive response. ÝAbd al-LaÔÐf makes explicit
reference to Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931), a French social psychologist whose most
influential work Psychologie des foules had been translated into Arabic in 1909 by the same
AÎmad FatÎÐ ZaÈlÙl who had also translated À quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons.392
Le Bon’s most important contribution to the intellectual debates of his time was his
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Image 23: Cover illustration of the second and
third edition of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ. MuÎammad
BaÈdÁdÐ.
development of the concept of the crowd.
The crowd, according to Le Bon, is
characterised by its irrational, impulsive
and extreme behaviour based on the
collective subconscious, which is also
expressed in its religiosity and political
actions.393 Le Bon, like Demolins a
supporter of the Anglo-Saxon educational
system, believed that a civilised and
powerful nation needed an elite with
education and character to provide it with
rational self-control to discipline the power
of the subconscious.394
In as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, ÝAbd al-LaÔÐf
presents the image of a world dominated
by the ridiculous and irrational beliefs and
rituals of dervishes who control the minds
of the common people and a large part of
the intellectuals and scholars of the nation.
He depicts the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-
BadawÐ as a site of crazy rituals, chaos and
immorality, all ruled by dark irrationality
not only incompatible with true (that is,
Salafi)395 Islam and the disposition of the modern, progressive citizen, but also ‘an
obstacle in the way of every reform and every awakening (nuhÙÃ)’.396 He conceives the
mawlid as the expression of a religious consciousness of the ‘people’ (šaÝb) or the ‘masses’
(ÊamÁhÐr) who, very much like Le Bon’s crowd, are led by their subconscious emotions
that are inaccessible to reasonable argumentation.397 The effects of this religious mass
consciousness are disastrous:
‘There is no doubt that this sentiment had the worst effect on the Egyptian society and
the gravest contribution to damaging the authentic Islamic belief. For it filled the spirits
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with submission and capitulation, it caused them to completely sink into their trust in
God, to leave everything to fate and destiny, to let things take their course, and to put
their trust in all matters in those dervishes and sheikhs. It led them to believe that [the
Sufis] were able to repel the worst misfortune and to bring about the dearest fortune. Thus
the worker doesn’t work and the trader doesn’t care for his business. The farmer doesn’t
tend to his field, the sick man does not worry about his illness and the oppressed doesn’t
try to overcome his oppression. They all believe that their needs will be satisfied by the
miracles of the saints, and that nothing can harm them except by force of predestination,
so that there is no need to make any effort or exert oneself.’398
This depiction of the cult of saints and anything that has to do with it as false
consciousness bears witness to the developing conflict between the ambivalent self at the
mawlid and the disciplined, fragmented modern self advocated by the reformist and
modernist movements. Furthermore, it turns mawlids from merely a site of deviance into
a subsystem within society, a cultural configuration representing the opposite of modern
society and true Islam. This criticism of ritual and festive order produces the analytical
lines necessary to define disciplined reason and uncontrolled subconsciousness, orthodox
Islam and popular beliefs, progress and backwardness, nationalism and colonial
domination. The festive culture of mawlids is objectified as a system of its own: a parallel
false religion,  both a threat to true religion and a marker of its boundaries.
‘The mawlids that we see today are not a matter of religion: they are popular (šaÝbÐ)
festivities whose appearances/phenomena (maÛÁhir) and rituals have become mixed with
the emotions of the people (aš-šaÝb) since ancient times and become rooted in the
subconscious, as psychologists call it. And these phenomena, deep-rooted beliefs as they
are, have the sanctity of religious rituals in their minds.’399
The late 19th and early 20th centuries were a key period for the discursive construction
of new objects: religion as an ideological and rationalised system, nation as an organic
whole of interdependent classes, rationality as a habitus and a visible matrix of order.
This process of objectification, of presenting the social world as a rationalised ideological
system, has been key to the project of modernity in general. The problem, however, is that
social reality does not have objective boundaries to facilitate the separation of objects
from each other: there is no a priori way to tell when Æikr is a key element of Islam and
when it is a popular custom, or to define whether people’s devotion to saints is an
expression of love or worship. Objects such as religion, nation and rationality have to be
constructed from a mass of contingent and weakly structured data. Chaïm Perelman,400
in his theory of argumentative rhetoric, shows that key concepts of philosophical theories
are all constructed through the argumentative operation of dissociation. It is an
operation that always creates two objects: a thing, and its opposite whose identity with
the former is denied.
ÝAbd al-LaÔÐf thus demonstrates the trick to Egyptian modernity: there is an
opposition between reason and faith after all, but the dividing line is drawn straight
through the field of faith and devotion. The Egyptian modernist distinguishes between
true rationalist religion and false popular beliefs guided by uncontrollable emotions and
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exploited by charlatans. The same logic is applied to tradition: Egyptian modernity can
only stand on the firm foundation of authentic heritage (turÁ×) on the condition that the
actual historically transmitted culture of Egyptians is separated into true heritage on the
one hand and false, backward customs and traditions on the other.
This selection and exclusion to dissociate ‘true’ from ‘false’ tradition favoured
elements that could harmonise with each other. In late 19th- and early 20th-century
Egypt, the hegemonic forms of European modernity were the moralist and pietist
discourse of Victorian Britain, mainly represented by the colonial system, and French
social theories that gained currency in nationalist intellectual circles. Late 19th-century
French social scientists of the like of Demolins and Le Bon offered systemic and top-
down explanations for the development of nations and advocated what they saw as the
Anglo-Saxon model of education based on the habitualisation of a rational, active state
of mind. They offered a response to Victorian pietism, showing that external practices
like ÒalÁt and wuÃÙÞ might, through the habitualisation of virtuous practice, lead to
virtuous inner states after all. They provided a way to reinterpret the Islamic tradition of
adab and learning through bodily practice in a way that would conform with the
Victorian view of the embodiment of virtue (and, consequently, civilisation) in quiet and
constrained behaviour. Additionally, they provided the nationalists of the new afandÐya
middle class with a powerful ideology of progressive elitism.
On the other side of the bargain, the Islamic tradition of ritual reform with its
scholarly social base, its rationalist tendency and strong fear of uncontrolled emotion,
and its identification of piety with constrained bodily disposition and strict morality,
was the most suited to stand equal to the European challenge. Hence it developed from
the counter-hegemonic discourse of a small scholarly elite into a metaphysical foundation
and perceived true heritage upon which a unity of authenticity and progress could be
claimed. Other European definitions of modernity remained marginal to the emerging
discourse of modernity and Islamic reform, and other definitions of Islam were
increasingly marginalised and constructed as the expression and cause of the weakness
that had so long kept ‘true’ culture from developing and flourishing.
WuÃÙÞ was reinterpreted to teach and express cleanliness and ÒalÁt to teach and express
order. What appeared frivolous to the Victorian observer was turned into a ‘central sign
of civilization’.401 What is interesting about these cases is not so much the redefinition
of the rituals themselves but the fact that  religion  came to be defined through its
rationality and functionality.402 In a similar manner, the kuttÁb education was replaced
by state schools with a very different kind of discipline and habitus, and a dramatically
new concept of education. While the kuttÁb’s primary purpose was to teach the QurÞÁn,
the modern school was conceived of as instrumental to the national project.403 Finally,
one part of the response was to admit that some of the practices singled out by the
Orientalist representations were indeed terribly irrational and backward and were thus
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denied having anything to do with the true shape of Islam and Egyptian culture.
This is what happened to mawlids: Reformist and modernist discourses excluded
them from the realm of orthodox Islam and progressive modernity, and thus from the
true substance of the nation, not because there was something inherently un-Islamic or
irrational about them, but because their particular form of festive time, their order, and
their habitus did not fit the newly constructed habitus of the authentic yet enlightened
Muslim, nor did they comply with the new rationality of the progressive nation.
3. Dissociations and Distinctions
Recognising that the un-Islamic and backward character of mawlids claimed by the
reformists and modernists is in reality an ideological construct resulting from a
historically contingent political configuration has significant consequences for our
analysis of the criticism of mawlids. In this light, the debate on mawlids appears as a
marker of the modern self and society, a perception parallel to the Orientalist perception
of Egypt. Mawlids, grouped in the debates on Sufi orders, the cult of saints and popular
religious culture in general, serve as a negative mirror image to define modern Egypt and
orthodox Islam.
Modernity in the Middle East (as anywhere else) has been a highly complex project,
as is reflected by the research of an increasing number of scholars working in the field,
notably Lila Abu-Lughod, Walter Armbrust, Timothy Mitchell, Afsaneh Nadjmabadi and
Gregory Starrett.404 They argue (and I follow their argumentation) that modernity in the
20th-century Middle East has not been a straightforward process of rationalisation and
emancipation. Instead, the new concepts and practices of education, rationalisation and
progress brought with them new practices of discipline,405 accompanied by the exclusion
of many practices  from the legitimate realm of modern society because they appeared as
incompatible with the discipline of the religious, rational, civilised human.
Constructs of this type are a characteristic feature of the modernist and reformist
project. To be civilized is to embody the intellectual and constrained habitus of the
authentic Muslim, and to implement the discipline and order of the rational citizen. But
reality always falls short of such ideals. The fear of the countryside disrupting the order
of the modern city, of ambivalent festivities tainting the purity of religion and the
religious self, or of belief in saints and the experience of temporary utopia blocking the
nation’s development, all indicate how fragile these constructs are. The ideal order of the
modern city is restricted to a few privileged districts of the capital and the coastal resorts.
The ambivalence of everyday life makes it very hard to uphold the boundaries of the
purified self. The nation’s development has turned into a disappointment time after time.
In the face of such troubling reality, exclusions produced by the means of dissociation
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are necessary for the discourse and image of modernity and orthodox Islam to persist.
These exclusions work in ways very similar to those of the colonial city analysed by
Timothy Mitchell:
‘The identity of the modern city is created by what it keeps out. Its modernity is
something contingent upon the exclusion of its own opposite. In order to determine itself
as the place of order, reason, propriety, cleanliness, civilisation and power, it must
represent outside itself what is irrational, disordered, dirty, libidinous, barbarian and
cowed. The city requires the “outside” in order to present itself, in order to constitute its
singular, uncorrupted identity.406
Oppositions of this kind are not restricted to the colonial period as Delphine Pagès-El
Karoui has shown in her study of the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ. Today, urban
citizens of ÓanÔÁ define modern urban lifestyle partly through their criticism of pilgrims’
behaviour and use of public space.407 
This construction of colonial and post-colonial modernity through the exclusion and
distancing of ‘native’, ‘rural’ or ‘backward’ culture is not only a spatial one. It is
accompanied by what Johannes Fabian describes as the ‘denial of coevalness,’408 the
construction and distancing of the Other by setting it in a time different from ‘ours’.
Classifications such as ‘backward’ or ‘primitive’ that regularly occur in the criticism of
mawlids, but also the more ambiguous terms ‘traditional’, ‘ancient’, ‘popular’ and
‘folkloric’ all imply that whatever is described by these terms is a trace of the past and
belongs to a different time, a reality that may be interesting to the historian or the
anthropologist but which must not enter the progressive time of modern society.
With the end of the colonial period, the distinction between colonial and Oriental
lost much of its power, and yet its logic has persisted in the Nasserist ideology of
progressive nationalism and in the present-day construction of a globalised Egypt that
continues to work, in part, through the exoticisation and exclusion of ‘popular’
culture.409 In chapter seven on the mawlid as cultural icon I return to the strategies of
exoticisation that allow the representation of popular culture as authentic on the
condition that it remains marginal to the hegemonic project of modernity. Here I
concentrate on how the dissociations employed in the criticism of mawlids serve to
construct modernity, orthodox Islam, and middle-class status through the construction,
criticism and exclusion of their opposite.
3.1. ‘Consciousness’
In the foregoing analysis of the criticism of mawlids, a number of key dissociations
have emerged: progress vs. backwardness, consciousness vs. ignorance, rationality vs.
uncontrolled emotion, solemn truth vs. mockery, knowledge vs. superstition,
monotheism vs. širk, Sunna vs. bidÝa, religion vs. charlatanism, religion vs. popular
beliefs, universal boundaries vs. ambivalence, order vs. chaos, middle vs. low classes, city
vs. countryside, modern city vs. popular districts. Such binary dissociations are essential
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for the construction of the true, good and proper image of society: Orthodox Islam is,
in part, defined through the construction of bidÝa, modernity through backwardness,
knowledge through superstition, urban public sector middle-class habitus through the
vulgarity of the lower classes and ‘popular’ middle classes.
The most common and powerful statement of exclusion concerning mawlids is one
that bars them from religion. People who display an intellectual middle-class habitus have
very often found it necessary to remind me that mawlids ‘have nothing to do with
religion’(mÁ l-hÁš ayy ÝilÁqa bi-d-dÐn). Yet the very frequence, vehemence and categorical
nature of this statement indicates that mawlids do in fact have a relation to religion.
People never make such a statement about things that really have nothing to do with
religion such as, say, football, because there is no need to do so. Denying that mawlids
have any relation whatsoever to religion is a discursive act of demarcating true religion
by dissociating it from the vast field of religious devotion to which mawlids belong much
more so than football.410
This and other similar dissociations serve to imagine and demarcate modernity,
religion and civilisation in their hegemonic reading. For one thing, they allow the
embedment of the oppositions of reason vs. faith and tradition vs. modernity into the
Egyptian modernist discourse without shaking the fragile union of authenticity and
progress. The dissociation of religious devotion into Religion and its Other – which may
be popular beliefs, charlatanism, or širk, depending on what exactly one means by
religion in a given context – allows the Egyptian modernist to include criticism of
religion – but only of false religion – into the modernist project. Hence the curious split
in the theories of religion that Talal Asad has observed in Western anthropology of Islam
but which is equally present in Muslim normative discourse on religion: while ‘true’
religion –  that is, disciplined pious habitus presented as a part of a rationalised system
and associated with high and middle classes – is described in quite Weberian terms as an
acquired state of ethical consciousness, ‘false’ religion –  that is, parts of religious
devotion that fail to fulfill these criteria – is discussed in strikingly Marxist terms as
escapism, false consciousness and opium for the people.411
Secondly and most importantly, to state that mawlids have nothing to do with
religion is to participate in a hegemonic definition of religion. To say that Sufis and
pilgrims at the mawlid have false consciousness is, following the logic of dissociation, to
claim true consciousness for oneself. This is why the issue of liking or disliking mawlids
is not considered an issue of legitimate difference of opinion: to go to mawlids is taken
to be an expression of ignorance, of bare and simple lack of consciousness. In this critical
view, if educated people do go to mawlids, they are assumed to do so only for material
profit or as distanced spectators. The issue of criticising mawlids is represented as a very
straightforward case of linear progress from ignorance to consciousness (waÝy):
‘The mawlid gets smaller year by year, in the past 20 years at least by 50%. There has been
ignorance, and people come to get baraka with their wife and daughter and son and sit
around in a small place, that’s all far from Islam. When the people gain more
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consciousness they understand it’s ÎarÁm.
U.M.: Does it have to do with the spread of the WahhÁbÐya?
‘No, it has nothing to do with the WahhÁbÐya. It’s about growth of consciousness; the
people [begin to] understand. And so a small daughter tells her father: no I won’t go to
the mawlid, it’s ÎarÁm.’412
What is striking about this account – and the many of its kind – is its bluntness in
contrasting consciousness with ignorance. This is characteristic of the entire construction
of middle-class modernism. We must remember that while participation in mawlids is
not dependent on class, criticising them is very closely connected with displaying (or
trying to display) an intellectual middle-class disposition. People of all social classes
participate in mawlids, but opposition to them is a disposition associated with the
distinction of urban professional middle classes whose status is based on higher
education, modernist habitus and, often but not necessarily, public sector careers (heirs
to the afandÐya). But while many middle-class citizens are critical of mawlids, not all are,
as is demonstrated by the many middle-class citizens who, temporarily dressed in
ÊallÁbÐya and turban, participate in ecstatic rituals at mawlids. Class distinctions, we must
note, are not deterministic. Firstly, there are different ways to express a middle-class
status, and not all of them require a critical view of popular traditions. Secondly, habitus
can also be a strategic means of social ascent, meaning that progressive elitism is often
an expression of wanting to be included in the middle classes rather than of already being
middle class (students being perhaps the most important case in point). Finally, people
express different opinions and styles at different times, which implies that a specific kind
of class habitus is often a changing role rather than a fixed identity.
However, many people critical of mawlids with whom I discussed this issue insisted
that there are absolutely no educated middle classes at mawlids except as distanced
spectators. This selective perception is necessary to uphold their particular construction
of middle-class identity. Recognising that a person going to a mawlid may very well have
a sophisticated consciousness, even – as often is the case – profound knowledge of the
Scripture, would compromise the carefully constructed distinction of those middle-class
intellectuals who define their superiority towards the lower classes through
‘consciousness’, that is, the combination of Salafi religious discourse and progressive
elitism.
‘Consciousness’ is, not by coincidence, the term of distinction for the three (mutually
overlapping) categories in Egyptian society in which criticism of mawlids has highest
currency: the public sector-based urban middle classes, the Salafi and Islamist movements,
and the intellectuals. People who identify themselves with one or more of these categories
often share the modernist/reformist grand narrative of nationalism, authenticity and
progress. They use the higher education they have received to distinguish themselves from
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the lower classes and from ‘popular’ middle classes whose status is based on income, such
as workshop owners, cash crop farmers, butchers, etc. They claim and to a significant
degree command intellectual hegemony but (with the significant exception of people
employed in the military and security apparatuses) their political and economic power
is limited.  This is why the criticism of mawlids is so specific to the middle classes and
does not have the same currency in upper-class context. For most Egyptians from the
urban upper and upper middle classes mawlids are totally exotic and do not constitute
any considerable threat to their class status and view of society. Consequently, while
members of the upper classes often share the modernist/reformist critical perception of
mawlids, they rarely make an issue out of it.
These groups have played a key role in the development and dissemination of
modernist and reformist discourse and share a strong sense of representing an elite
responsible for the development of society. This sense is most strongly represented by the
intellectuals (mu×aqqafÙn), a somewhat ambiguous category defined by high educational
capital and possibly but not necessarily intellectual production: not only authors and
professors but also students, teachers and lawyers count as intellectuals. Progressive
elitism, even in the face of the deteriorating quality of overcrowded state schools and
universities, is central to being an intellectual in Egypt. The intellectual’s task is to
disseminate consciousness to ‘the simple people’ (al-busaÔÁÞ), a strongly patronising term
that implies that they not only lack formal education but also reflection and thus need
to be guided by the intellectuals.
3.2. Nostalgia, rejection and fascination
Yet many of Egypt’s intellectuals were once themselves ‘simple people’. Influential
intellectuals and political activists of the early and mid-20th century like ÓÁhÁ Íusayn,
Íasan al-BannÁ, Sayyid QuÔb413 and many others came from a rural or small town milieu
where Sufism was the hegemonic form of piety. For them, critique of rural religious
culture was a way to demarcate personal advancement in society and a way to create a
modern self-image through a break with communal traditions.
This distinction has often been a painful one. The same people who have shaped their
habitus, religiosity, dress and understanding of society in a way that only has a place for
mawlids as a negative mirror image of modern society have very often experienced some
of the most exciting moments of their childhood and youth at mawlids. A key feature of
many of their critical accounts of mawlids is that their criticism is mixed with feelings
of nostalgia and aesthetic fascination.
One of the best expressions of such mixed feelings is ÝAbd al-ÍakÐm QÁsim’s
(1935-1990) novel The Seven Days of Man,414 the story of young ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz’s development
as he grows up in a devoted Sufi family in a village, goes to school in ÓanÔÁ, and
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increasingly loses faith in his society and its values. The narrative evolves around the
mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, recurring year after year in a different form. The young
boy ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz adores his father and his friends who are preparing to travel to the
Sayyid’s mawlid and hopes to travel with them one day, but the teenager ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz,
now going to school in ÓanÔÁ, grows disillusioned  by the oppressive reality he perceives
behind the kind and friendly surfaces of the people. The mawlid he once so longed to see
now betrays its promise of love and spiritual community and appears to him a tragic self-
deception of tired and impoverished people. Seven Days of Man is soft in its tone,
dominated by a feeling of loss and alienation. It is the story (that carries many
autobiographic traits)415 of a young intellectual’s break with what he perceives as an
oppressive and stalled society, yet it is full of nostalgia for the communal spirit lost for
him.
The fact that a great number of people have mixed feelings about mawlids and
experience ‘an inner conflict’416 over them makes it necessary to draw a much more
complex image of the debates than I have done so far. Egyptian society is not simply
divided into those who wholeheartedly love mawlids and those who sternly oppose them.
It should not be a surprise that the ambivalence characteristic to mawlids evokes
ambiguous responses. The most striking case of this ambiguity is provided by the young
men, often students (whom we encountered in chapter three) who combine a wild, rough
atmosphere of celebration with a sarcastic distancing, often even a fundamental critique
of the entire event. These people do not come from the old middle classes, and they are
not Salafi activists or urban intellectuals. They are typically young men from the
countryside or small towns who have some degree of higher education. Often they come
from a milieu where Sufism has played an important role, and many of them come from
devoted Sufi families. They tend to be ambiguous in their views, loving the mawlid but
turning very critical when asked about it by a foreign researcher. While they generally do
follow the lines of the reformist and modernist criticism, they do not make a connection
between the cult of saints and the festive atmosphere. It is very typical for these young
people to argue that mawlids are completely ÎarÁm and an expression of a backward
mentality but in the next sentence to state that ‘as a festival they are great.’417 They often
hold to a strictly Salafi view of worship and devotion while conveniently ignoring the
strict moralism and purity so central to the Salafiya. They represent a form of criticising
mawlids that reflects the popularisation of Salafi Islam and the expansion and
impoverishment of the middle classes since the 1970s.
During most of the 20th century, the urban middle classes, Salafis and intellectuals
were small but hegemonic groups. They dominated public debates, the educational system
and a growing part of the religious establishment, but also the arts, modern cities, and
the public image of the nation. Yet their power to actually disseminate their views of
culture, society and piety among wider segments of the population remained limited
largely because these views were connected to means of distinction that were not
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distributed with the same generosity of nationalist ideology. Since the 1970s, economic
and religious changes have significantly altered the situation. The expansion of state
higher education and the spread of Salafi Islam following the Islamic revival have made
two key markers of middle-class distinction available to ever wider segments of society.
But while the expansion of state education has made a university degree, a central marker
of middle-class status, more easily available, its value has dramatically deteriorated. The
public sector-based middle classes that emerged in the late 19th centuries have lost much
of their economic status to the point that they are now only marginally better off than
the lower classes418 and often way behind new middle classes based on ’popular’
professions. Yet young Egyptians continue to aim to enrol in state universities and public
sector jobs because they, especially in the countryside, remain attached to high social
status. This has led to the development of a rapidly growing lower middle class whose
only effective means of distinction are educational capital and reformist religiosity or,
following the popular idiom, ‘consciousness’.
For the young men who wholeheartedly celebrate mawlids and at the same time
criticise them, this criticism is a way to establish class-based hegemony in a world where
they have few other means of distinctions available. They come from a rural or lower-class
milieu, have no financial means to emancipate themselves from it, and have to watch how
people whom they consider their inferior make money they can never hope to make.
Criticising women doing ziyÁra and ridiculing Sufis doing Æikr is one of the ways they
have to show that they are superior to their social background very much in the sense of
the progressive elitism exhibited by the modernist intellectuals.419
The very bluntness and fury of these people calling mawlids a bidÝa is a sign of how
fragile the distinction actually is. The youths who claim to possess consciousness often
have less textual knowledge than many of the Sufis whom these youths claim to be
ignorant and backward. Their ‘consciousness’ is transmitted by an official religious
discourse and a school system that provide them with only a heavily simplified and
dogmatic view of religion and society and do not support critical independent reasoning.
3.3. Hegemonic publics
Where lies the power of this ‘consciousness’, then? Its appeal and credibility is only
understandable if we view it in the wider context of social change and a shift of
hegemony over the public definition of piety, civility and festivity. Lower Egyptian cities
and villages420 are currently undergoing far-reaching transformations that can be observed
in changing patterns of economy, religiosity, dress, social distinction, etc. Rural local
identities, networks and forms of publicness that have been closely related to a
communal piety based on Sufism are giving way to a regional, increasingly individualistic
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orientation and to forms and standards of publicness that are closer to those defined in
modernist and reformist discourse. This transformation is accompanied by the
redistribution of markers of middle-class status and a heavily simplified Salafi religiosity
that are gaining an increasingly hegemonic position in rural and urban lower-class
contexts.
I have often associated public debates and the public sphere with the concept of
hegemony. For one thing, this is a fairly straightforward empirical statement. The critical
discourse on mawlids has a hegemonic position in public debates, in other words: it sets
the standards in the debates on mawlids as an issue concerning religion and society, that
is, as a matter of public interest.421 Most importantly, however, it implies a perspective
on public debates that highlights the issues of inclusion and exclusion and relations of
power.
Following the writings of Jürgen Habermas,422 the concept of public sphere, a strongly
spatialised translation of German Öffentlichkeit, has become highly appreciated in the
social sciences. Although originally developed with reference to the emergence and
decline of a bourgeois public sphere in 18th- and 19th-century Europe, the concept has
also become increasingly popular in the anthropology of contemporary Muslim societies.
Dale Eickelman and Armando Salvatore, two of the most prominent proponents of this
line of research, have subjected Habermas’ originally highly normative concept to a
number of modifications to make it  applicable to religious discourses in authoritarian
societies like Egypt. They describe public sphere as
‘the site where contests take place over definition of the “common good”, and also of the
virtues, obligations and rights that members of society require for the common good to
be realized.’423
Two key features are shared by the public spheres of Habermas and of Eickelman and
Salvatore. The first is that the public sphere is conceived of as more or less a singular,
open field of debate of issues that concern the common interest. The second is that the
moment of inclusion and the potential of empowerment through participation in public
debates are highlighted. The public sphere in Muslim societies has, Eickelman and
Salvatore argue, become accessible to a growing number of people who are increasingly
able to question the traditional bases of religious authority.424 
It cannot be denied that access to public debates has become easier for middle-class
citizens with sufficient education and material resources, and that participation in public
debates can have an empowering effect on the people involved, on the condition that
their voices are actually heard.425 However, the focus on the middle classes and the
perception of the public sphere as a singular space that can be entered at will has often
allowed researchers to conveniently overlook the exclusions that are an elementary part
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of belonging to ‘the public’. For one thing, participation in public debates is bound to
certain requirements – education, habitus, access to the media – and thus not available
to everyone.426 Furthermore and most importantly, the public sphere is never only a locus
of contesting hegemony: It is also a medium for the establishment and dissemination of
it. A site of empowerment, it is simultaneously an instrument of power.427 This means
that the exclusive character of public debates is not only a pragmatic issue of having or
not having the means to participate. It is, as Harold Mah has pointed out, based on the
way the ‘the public’ and ‘the common good’ are established in opposition to particular
interests. To be a part of ‘the public’ is to have the power to define one’s particular views
and interests as the normal, normative point of view, and to exclude other views and
interests as particular or misguided.
‘Analysis of the public sphere should begin [...] with a recognition that its location is
strictly in the political imaginary. The public sphere is a fiction, which, because it can
appear real, exerts real political force. The enabling condition of a successfully staged
public sphere is the ability of certain groups to make their social group or particularity
invisible so that they can they can then appear as abstract individuals and hence universal
[...], while other groups are consigned to public performances that always undo themselves
because those performances end up proclaiming their own identity, their social
particularity.’428
Mah further argues that the public sphere (or, to be precise, that particular sphere of
debate whose participants have gained the power to distinguish their actions and
discourses as ‘public’) has a tendency, in the perception of the people involved, to
transform from a field into a personified entity, ‘the public’.429 This personified or
objectified subject of hegemonic truth may not be necessarily called the public. It can be
also phrased as the common interest, the nation, or rationality, to name just a few
examples. And we may add religion to this list, although it differs in character from the
concept of the public, being conceived of as a transcendent truth exterior and superior
to the collective will of the believers. Religion does, however, follow the same logic of
objectified hegemonic truth that is inherent to the imaginaries of the nation and the
public. To claim orthodoxy as opposed to deviations and innovations is a discursive act
very similar to claiming to speak in the name of ‘the public’ as opposed to particular
factions.
We can observe this in the way state education and popularised Salafi religiosity are
employed by students and young graduates to establish a hegemonic position in relation
to their rural and small town milieu and to progressively exclude and  block other forms
of publicness. When young men go to a mawlid and imitate Sufi Æikr in exaggerated and
obscene ways, what they try to do is establish hegemony. For them, the prospect of being
part of the modernist and reformist imaginary of the nation, the religion, and rational
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modernity is a promise of empowerment. And in order to lay claim to inclusion in this
imaginary, they not only need to embody its aesthetics of piety, civility and festivity but
also have to demonstrate that other groups that lay claim to being the legitimate
representatives of religion and the nation are in fact backward, ignorant, or swindlers.
Under these conditions, the prospect of empowerment (and we must remember that
material resources lacking, it often remains a prospect) for young Egyptians with middle-
class aspirations is most easily available through the critique, exclusion and ridiculing of
the communal traditions they themselves have often grown up with. To claim
‘consciousness’ is to put oneself in a position of authority, to grant oneself the right to
speak in the name of religion, nation, and public interest. In turn, to present people with
differing views or interests as ‘ignorant’ or ‘backward’ is to deny their competing claims.
In retrospect, it is clear that, at least in urban upper- and middle-class contexts, the
reformist and modernist faction has turned victorious in  the struggle over the power to
define the values of society. With the spread of mass education (we should remember that
teachers, underpaid progressive elitists, are among the strongest representatives of
modernist common sense) and Salafi/Islamist discourse on religion and morality (for
example, the market on religious books is almost completely dominated by them), the
hegemony of the modernist/reformist discourse on festivity, piety and modernity has
reached wider parts of society yet without ever losing its exclusive character. Its further
dissemination can, however, lead to an inversion of the situation. If middle-class habitus
and Salafi religiosity become common on all levels of society, they will lose their
exclusive character, which, in turn, will deprive them of their power of distinction and
promise of empowerment.
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Chapter Six: The defence of mawlids
1. Defending the ideal, criticising the practice
The critical discourse on mawlids is contested by several counter-arguments that come
from various sources: people who participate in mawlids and defend their own festive
practice, members of the religious establishment who are sympathetic to Sufism and the
veneration of saints, and leftist and nationalist intellectuals who see mawlids as an
expression of tolerance and national unity. Common to their arguments is that in most
cases they work within the terms set by the criticism of mawlids, not questioning its
premises but rather trying to prove that mawlids actually more or less fit them, or can be
made to fit them. This recognition of and attempt to be included in modernist and
reformist hegemony is a key feature of the apologetic discourses expressed in public
debates. This is not necessarily the case, however, in informal discussions in which the
standards set by the critical discourse may actually be subverted or openly questioned.
The debate on mawlids is by no means one between ‘popular’ Sufis and ‘orthodox’
scholars. As far as mawlids are concerned, there is in fact no such thing as a unified
orthodoxy. While some scholars and imams take a position close to that of the Salafi
doctrine, some remain close to Sufism, and many others cannot be clearly associated with
either current. Fundamental criticism of Sufism is not acceptable in al-Azhar, and books
condemning Sufism at large are sometimes censored by the Islamic Research Academy
(MaÊmaÝ al-buÎÙ× al-islÁmÐya) of al-Azhar.430 Rituals and customs related to Sufism remain
a subject of controversy. Individual scholars are free to express their views and do so
frequently, whereas al-Azhar, the Ministry of Religious Endowments and the FatwÁ
Office of the Ministry of Justice remain remarkably silent on such controversial issues
as mawlids. There are very few official fatwÁs on mawlids,431 and MaÊallat al-Azhar and
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other official publications of al-Azhar do not discuss the subject at all ‘because it is a
subject of disagreement’.432
Since the beginning of the debate on mawlids, the critical view has been challenged
by an apologetic discourse that has claimed that mawlids are fully in accordance with
religion and morality, and that any possible deviations do not belong to the proper
meaning of the mawlid. At the end of the 15th century, ÉalÁl ad-DÐn as-SuyÙÔÐ wrote an
influential fatwÁ to legitimise mawlid an-nabÐ celebrations on the condition that they
remain within the limits of the šarÐÝa, and the author of the most important collection
of Sufi hagiographies until today, ÝAbd al-WahhÁb aš-ŠaÝrÁnÐ (d. 973/1565) defended the
mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ against critics but at the same time drew a dividing line
between proper and deviant celebrations.433
Today, a defence of mawlids accompanied by the explicit exclusion of any deviating
activities is a standard topos in the apologetic discourse, so for example in a
contemporary hagiography of as-Sayyida NafÐsa which, like many of its kind, devotes a
passage to discuss the mawlid.
‘[...] Celebrating the mawlid of a saint [is legitimate, provided it takes place] in a way that
is free of anything forbidden that would damage the good commemoration. [The
celebration] must contribute to the good, as is the desired purpose of the recitation of the
noble QurÞÁn, preaching (waÝÛ), guidance, the dissemination of Islamic culture, and
correct Æikr. Commercial activity and social movement that accompany it do not limit
the validity of the magnanimous principles of the šarÐÝa. Hence, the celebration of the
memory [of a saint] does not contradict any provision of the šarÐÝa, and is to be seen as
thanks for the grace of God (niÝma). For the rule is that not everything that did not exist
in the earliest period [of Islam] is forbidden (ÎarÁm), for otherwise there would be nothing
permissible (ÎalÁl) left in our life. We should not fail to emphasise that celebrating the
mawlid of the saints and the pious is not a form of worship (ÝibÁda) but a praiseworthy
custom that contributes to the good. And acts are based on intentions (al-aÝmÁl bi-n-nÐyÁt),
thus whatever forbidden (marfÙÃ) things there are in these festivities, their abolishment
should be through reform, not prohibition [of the festivals].’434
This quote contains two key arguments of the apologetic discourse on mawlids. The first
argument states that although mawlids were not celebrated in the age of the Prophet, they
are not a forbidden bidÝa, firstly because they are not opposed to the spirit of Islam, and
secondly because they are a custom, not a form of worship:
‘We have a ÎadÐ× in the Sunna of the Prophet, he said, blessings be upon him: “Who
establishes a good custom in Islam, upon him is its reward and the reward of those who
follow it after him, without anything being reduced from their reward. And who
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kitÁb aÒ-ÒÙfÐ, 1991; IbrÁhÐm, MuÎammad ZakÐ, al-MašrÙÝ wa-l-mamnÙÝ fÐ qaÃÁyÁ: al-qubÁb, al-maÎÁrÐb,
al-masÁÊid wa-l-qubÙr, sadd ar-riÎÁl, al-mawÁlid, ziyÁrat al-qubÙr, masÊid ar-rasÙl, at-tabarruk bi-Ò-ÒaliÎÐn
.. wa-baÝÃ mÁ yataÝallaq bi-kull ÆÁlika, Cairo: MaÔbÙÝÁt wa-rasÁÞil al-ÝašÐra al-muÎammadÐya, 1996;
SaÝd, ÓÁhÁ ÝAbd ar-RaÞÙf / SaÝd Íasan MuÎammad ÝAlÐ, as-Sayyida NafÐsa: nafÐsat al-Ýilm wa-
karÐmat ad-dÁrÐn, Cairo: Maktabat aÒ-ÒafÁ, 2000; pp. 82 f.; al-LiwÁÞ al-IslÁmÐ, 12.7.2001: MuÎammad
aš-ŠandawÐlÐ, ‘al-ÝUlamÁÞ fÐ s-sÁÎa ar-riÃwÁnÐya bi-l-UqÒur: al-iÎtifÁl bi-mawÁlid al-awliyÁÞ mašrÙÝ
wa-tanqiyatuhÁ min al-bidaÝ wÁÊib’, p. 15.
establishes a bad custom, upon him is its sin/burden (wizr).”435 [...] And there is the ÎadÐ×
that says that ‘every innovation is an error and every error leads to hell’, but the Prophet
nevertheless also said: “Who establishes a good custom, upon him is its reward”, so the
meaning of the ÎadÐ× is that there will be novelties like the computer and internet and
television and radio: these are of course all contemporary inventions [...] which can be
either profitable or destructive for society. [...] What is intended with “novelties”436 in the
ÎadÐ× are novelties in Islamic Law, which are known to damage religion. Like for example,
we cannot change a legal rule (qÁÝida fiqhÐya). But what is subject to change, by the way of
analogy (qiyÁs) or reasoning (istinbÁÔ) is custom.’437
Defining mawlids as a custom is a powerful argument because it inverts the critical
argument claiming that mawlids are merely a custom and have nothing to do with proper
religion. By asserting that mawlids belong to the realm of custom, however pious, the
apologetics can effectively avoid the entire discussion of bidÝa because then mawlids are
not an innovation in religion. The same logic of stating that the scriptural references
used by critics do not apply to mawlids is also employed for the defence of pilgrimage.
The hadÐ× restricting pilgrimage to the three mosques in Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem
speaks only of travelling to mosques. Hence, argue  the Sufi apologetics, it does not apply
to visiting the burial sites of the pious. This argumentation is further used to legitimise
the cult of saints, interpreted as a way to honour and commemorate some of the grandest
heroes of Islam. As such, it is not a form of worship, and hence it cannot be širk.
The second key argument of the apologetic discourse states that mawlids have a
positive social and religious function, promoting religiosity, charity, and the local
economy. Any deviating, immoral or improper practices do not belong to the celebration
of the mawlid and must be removed by means of reform.438 This is a direct counter-
argument to the claim that mawlids are opposed to the order, morals and consciousness
of modern/Islamic society. But it also implies a radical redefinition of the festivity. What
is strikingly absent in this defence of mawlids is any attempt to legitimise mawlids as they
are. The differentiation of a mawlid into separate – positive or negative – aspects allows
the Sufi and scholarly apologetics to defend mawlids in principle while being at the same
time highly critical of the festive practice.
‘On any great occasion not all people who celebrate are committed to the law and good
manners (ÁdÁb). We cannot take the action of individuals [as a reason to be]  against the
occasion and the person in whose memory it is held. It is not enough that you research
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439Interview with Sheikh AÎmad ÝAbd al-HÁdÐ al-QaÒabÐ, sheikh of the ÓarÐqa al-ËalwatÐya al-
QaÒabÐya and member of the Supreme Council of Sufi Orders, mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ,
ÓanÔÁ, 15 October 2002.
440Unlike Ôabla, the mizmÁr – an instrument similar to the mediaeval European shawm, the
predecessor of the modern oboe – is nowadays hardly ever used in Sufi Æikr. It belongs to the
standard repertoire of critical discourse on music, however, and therefore keeps cropping up.
441Interview with a member of al-ÍÁmidÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya, mawlid of SÐdÐ al-MursÐ AbÙ l-ÝAbbÁs,
Alexandria, 24 July 2003; Ñaqr, ÝAÔÐya, FatwÁ on the celebration of mawlid an-nabÐ.
442I had assumed that ‘the tradition of Islamic scholarship, in its traditional as well as its
modern form, especially seems to lack the idiom to express issues of festive joy and temporary
utopia.’ Schielke, Samuli, ‘Habitus of the Authentic, Order of the Rational: Contesting Saints
Festivals in Contemporary Egypt’, Critique. Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 12 (Fall 2003), Nr.
2, pp. 155-172, here p. 166, note 37.
443ÓalaÝ al-badru ÝalaynÁ min ×anayÁt al-WadÁÝ / waÊaba aš-šukru ÝalaynÁ mÁ daÝÁ li-llÁhi dÁÝ /
ayyhuhÁ l-mabÝÙ×u fÐnÁ ÊiÞta bi-Ìayr il-muÔÁÞ / ÊiÞta šarrafta l-ÌalÐqa marÎaban yÁ Ìayra dÁÝ. See Ibn
Ka×Ðr (Ibn KathÐr), ImÁm AbÙ l-FidÁÞ IsmÁÝÐl, The Life of the Prophet MuÎammad: A Translation of
Al-SÐra al-NabawÐya, ed. MuÒÔafÁ ÝAbd al-WÁÎid, transl. Trevor Le Gassick, Reading: Garnet
Publishing, 1998, Vol 2, pp. 177-178.
the festivities which, in fact, are diverse. You also need to study the persons who are being
celebrated. They are the source of morality, conduct (sulÙk) and spirituality. This can lead
to an understanding that is completely opposed to the understanding of the people who
celebrate the mawlid.’439
The ‘true’ mawlid evoked in this account of a reformist Sufi sheikh is an occasion for
following the pious example of the saint, proliferating religious knowledge, reciting the
QurÞÁn, gathering people together, and providing charity to the needy. These are all
elements that are present in the festive practice and ideology of Sufi pilgrims. But it is
striking how many other things are excluded from the realm of the true mawlid:
amusements – not only those that are considered illegal or immoral but also swing-boats
and bumper cars –, music in Sufi Æikr, usually referred to as ‘the use of Ôablas and
mizmÁrs’,440 the mixing of men and women, emotional votive rituals at the shrine, and
any kind of ‘muddle’ (harÊala) or ‘chaos and confusion’ (haraÊ wa-maraÊ).441 Finally, love
and joy – key elements of the Sufi mawlid – rarely feature in the apologetic discourse.
Mawlids are represented primarily as an occasion of learning, obeying God and
strengthening social bonds.
This apologetic discourse is strongly embedded in a suspicion of music, ambivalence,
and festive joy. In its view of morality, festive order, and the habitus of piety, this defence
of mawlids in fact looks very similar to much of the criticism of mawlids. This is not, as
I argued in an earlier article, because the vocabulary and logic of Islamic scholarship
would prevent other strategies of argumentation.442 In fact, a defence of festive joy, even
ambivalence, is very well possible within the framework of Islamic scholarly discourse:
‘The origin of this custom is the celebration of the people of Medina upon the arrival of
the Apostle of God from Mecca. They came out as one man (ÝalÁ qalb raÊul wÁÎid), men
and women, young and old, singing:
“The full moon has risen over us, from the passes of al-WadÁÝ
We owe thanks, for what a supplicant has prayed to God
Oh messenger among us, you brought the best commandment
You came to honour the creatures, welcome, oh best supplicant”443
[...] And did the Prophet say “Sit down sir, calm down madam, stop this nonsense”? No
he didn’t. He let them do so because he saw the extent of their affection for their prophet
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445Interview with Dr. MunÊid as-Sayyid ÝAbd al-ÇanÐ ŠÁdÐ, Cairo, 7 June 2003. For the
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446Even the Azhari scholar Dr. MunÊid cited above spoke at first in much stricter tones about
the festivity and only after he saw that I was not intent on criticising mawlids for their festive
atmosphere he moved to legitimise festive joy, music and the well-mannered mixing of men and
women on the condition that the commands of religion are not transgressed.
447See Chih, Le soufime au Quotidien, pp. 141-153; Johansen, Sufism and Islamic Reform, pp. 21-31,
70-74, 91; Sedgwick, Saints and Sons, pp. 195-219.
448Baljon, ’Shah Waliullah and the Dargah’; Sedgwick, Saints and Sons, pp. 27-49.
449See Weismann, Taste of Modernity, Hudson,’Reading al-ShaÝrÁnÐ’.
450De Jong, Óuruq, pp. 96-101; 194-200.
and guest.’
[...]
‘There is one major positive side [to mawlids] because of which the state, especially in
Egypt, does not hate mawlids, and that is that it relieves and lightens the minds of the
people. Because if the people take the word “saint” or “mawlid” as a reason for recreation,
then this is not a reason for concern as long as it is about recreation of the mind and no
trouble occurs, and the state does not prohibit it. And this is based on the saying of the
Prophet, peace and blessing be upon him, to AbÙ Hurayra: “Oh AbÙ Hurayra, recreate the
hearts from time to time, for the hearts rust like iron rusts, and they are polished by the
invocation (Æikr) of God, Lord of the worlds.”444 And thence comes the proverb that says:
“An hour for your heart and an hour for your Lord”. The hour that is for your heart
mustn’t oppose or transgress religion.’445
This form of argumentation is possible and present but not common in the scholarly and
Sufi defence of mawlids because it does not fit the strategy chosen by most Sufi-minded
Azhari scholars,446 the Sufi establishment, and certain Sufi orders to confront modernist
and reformist critics with their own standards of argumentation. These various actors
share in a discourse I call reformist Sufism, based on a partial redefinition of Sufi rituals
while holding to mystical spirituality and charismatic organisation. Reformist Sufis
defend mawlids, shrines, Sufi Æikr, etc., but at the same time radically redefine them and
criticise their contemporary forms.447
Reformist Sufism predates the Salafi reformist movement448 and has been its breeding
ground to a significant extent.449 In the case of Egypt, however, we can observe that the
rise of reformist Sufi discourse has been related to the rise of the new modernist and
reformist understandings of piety and society. The key moment in the emergence of
reformist Sufism in Egypt may have been the circular issued in 1881 – a year that was
marked by substantial debate on Sufi rituals – by Sheikh ÝAbd al-BÁqÐ al-BakrÐ, the freshly
inaugurated head of the Sufi orders. In response to growing public criticism and
Khedivial pressure, the circular called for a strict reform of Sufi rituals and tight
administrative control of the orders.450 The circular was followed by a Khedivial decree
in 1895, amended in 1903,  and laws on Sufi Orders issued in 1905 and, more recently, in
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1975.451 These regulations and laws  created a bureaucratic framework to increase state
control of Sufi orders and laid guidelines on proper rituals that have remained
influential until the present. The tone of the circular from 1881 can be heard in all of
them: discipline Sufi rituals and festivities, ban their colourful, ambivalent,
uncontrollable, spontaneous elements, and make them comply with the new ideas of
religion and society gaining currency at the time.
The circular, would it ever have been fully applied, would have effectively meant the
end of popular mawlid festivals. It prohibited, among other things, the use of drums in
public, religious assemblies in public thoroughfares, the establishment of new mawlids,
all processions and ceremonies that had been established within the past 10 years, cafés
near places of worship, and any vocal performance (most notably singing) at mawlids
except prayers for the Prophet and God. The circular further ordered that all mawlids,
ceremonies and processions must follow these rules, and that madmen (maÊÁÆÐb) ‘must
be arrested by the police and sent either to a hospital or a lunatic asylum’.452
The far-reaching demands of this manifesto have been partly implied at the most (see
chapter eight), but they marked the beginning of a reformist turn in the Sufi
establishment. The emphasis on learning and disciplined contemplation, often
accompanied by a harsh criticism of ambivalent festive and ritual practice, has since
become the leading tone of official, state-controlled Sufism as represented by the Supreme
Council of Sufi Orders.453 In the wake of this shift, several reformist Sufi orders emerged
in the early 20th century. Among them were al-ÍÁmidÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya, al-ÝAzmÐya and al-
ÉÁzÙlÐya al-ÍusaynÐya whose attempts of ritual reform I  discuss in chapter eight. These
groups share a high emphasis on constrained, disciplined rituals, a nationalist ideology
of activism and progress, and a centralised organisation454 – all key issues to the discourse
of modernity and Islamic reform, and hence markers of inclusion in the modernist and
reformist public sphere. It would be misguided, however, to describe them as ‘neo-
Sufism’,455 a term that suggests that Sufi reform implies a departure from Sufi tradition,
just as it would not be accurate to describe the reformist interpretation of Islam as ‘neo-
Islam’. Reformist Sufi orders represent a discourse of reform and purification within the
Sufi milieu. On the level of individual trajectories and the dissemination of Sufi
discourse there are no clear lines of demarcation between reformist and ecstatic Sufism.
When reformist Sufis speak in favour of mawlids, they defend their collective identity
and base for mobilisation. Although love and joy often remain central to the festive
experience of reformist Sufis, they are not part of the apologetic discourse because they
do not serve the search for recognition in public debates, a key concern of reformist Sufis
who attempt to prove that Sufism is actually very orthodox and modern by redefining
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Sufi rituals – which, in the critical discourse, are taken to reflect the mystic’s state of
mind – to embody the reformist and modernist habitus. If Sufism is to be accepted as the
inner truth of Islam, and if truth has to speak in solemn tones to a disciplined audience,
then a ‘true’ Sufi mawlid must be based on the habitualisation of morals and piety and
the dissemination of religious doctrine. It has to be a stern and formal affair. To make
them acceptable for the discourses on piety and festivity, mawlids are re-defined from
ambivalent festivals that express a stark contrast to daily life into constructive
celebrations that have one clear meaning and where boundaries are enforced, not
suspended.
The apologetic discourse on mawlids powerfully demonstrates the hegemonic power
of reformist and modernist common sense. To publicly oppose it one has to accept its
logic and fulfill its habitual criteria of inclusion and exclusion. It is a different question,
however, to ask to what extent this apologetic discourse is taken seriously by its
proponents and to what extent it is a public rationalisation for  festive behaviour that is
quite different in practice.456 As we see in chapter eight, reformist Sufi groups and state
actors do translate this discourse into a festive practice that can significantly change the
order and atmosphere of mawlids. But individual experiences tend to be more complex
than public discourses, and the same Sufi sheikhs who, in their role as members of the
Supreme Council of Sufi Orders define mawlids as an occasion for learning may, in their
role as fathers, take their children to the amusements area and have a good time there.
And there is another, parallel discourse in defence of mawlids that does highlight love
and festive utopia and, to a certain degree, questions the foundations of the critical
discourses. Although it is rarely expressed in public debates in the press, religious
literature, fatwÁs etc., it is strongly present in informal discussions I have had with people
who participate in mawlids.
2. Defence of festive joy and subversion of orthodoxy
2.1. Good intentions
In 1882, ÝAlÐ MubÁrak Pasha (1823-1893), a prominent intellectual and politician of his
time –  best known as the author of al-ËiÔaÔ at-TawfiqÐya, a voluminous chronicle and
geography of contemporary Egypt, he was also one of the first Arab Egyptians to become
a minister in the Khedivial cabinet457 – responded to a criticism that had gained currency
in his time:
‘[The Englishman said:]458 I have seen some sheikhs speak about these mawlids,
condemning them because of the violations of the šarÐÝa that happen in them, and wishing
their abolition for this reason. And I have seen some people say that even if there was no
other harm in them, alone the fact that the people at [mawlids] suspend their work and
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usual affairs is reason enough [to call for their abolition], so how do you view that,
professor?
The sheikh said: Whoever looks at the thing from one of its many sides and does not
explore the whole of its circumstances and all of its specific features may judge it with
condemnation or with praise based on that particular side. And if he would look at other
sides he would change his judgement, and the same applies to those you mentioned who
speak about the mawlid of as-Sayyid [al-BadawÐ] [...] Even if some of the people who gather
in the mawlid of as-Sayyid undeniably do cause some affairs that violate the noble šarÐÝa,
[...] a thing may not be judged in itself based on one of its aspects, especially if its aspects
are many. For you know that all times, all countries, and all generations are never free of
some affairs that violate the Law and nature. But peoples, places and times are not judged
in their entirety on the grounds of those among them who cause [violations of the Law].
And neither are the violations of the Law that happen specific to the mawlid of as-Sayyid,
for they take place everywhere, as we have said. And the mawlid is not restricted to them,
for it has countless and undeniable good deeds, invocations, prayers, and charities. So why
close our eyes to the good and focus on the bad?
In this mawlid there are merits and profits that are not hidden from anybody, like the
profit of the railways and those who offer animals and boats for rent for transport to and
from the mawlid, and the profit of people who provide tents and carpets (farrÁšÐn), cooks
and other craftsmen and of the people who rent apartments and sell goods, and the
extensive trade in [the mawlid]. For we see that many of the merchants from ÓanÔÁ and
from all cities of Egypt are dependent on this mawlid for the payment of their debts and
the running of their affairs, and look forward to this occasion for its abundance in selling
and buying, and taking and giving. And the seller profits through the price of the goods
he sells, and the buyer through the goods he buys. [...] And who goes to this mawlid with
no intention of trade or the like, will not fail to bring profit to others. And as for his
suspending his work and being idle for a few short days, it causes no damage to him or
others. For if he does not work also when there is no mawlid, then he is idle himself and
the mawlid doesn’t make him any idler. And if he is busy with work and business, labour
and toil when there is no mawlid, then the mawlid offers him an outing and a change of
atmosphere, health and recreation that make him return afterwards to his work with new
vigour, fresh desire, dedicated ambition, and unweary mind. Hence he compensates for
what was left undone during the days of the mawlid. For  human minds, if work and
labour persist upon them, are overcome by fatigue, weariness and boredom. For this
reason they need recreation from time to time to regain their vigour.’459
ÝAlÐ MubÁrak’s view, expressed by the literary character of a sheikh in dialogue with an
Englishman, is remarkable in its recognition and acceptance of ambivalence: there are
many sides to a mawlid, and one’s judgement depends on what one looks at: even if there
are some violations of the Law (šarÐÝa), in general the mawlid is a positive occasion for
devotion, trade and recreation. This argument is based on a sense of piety, festivity and
society very different from that of the 20th- and 21st-century critics, and very similar to
that shared by a large proportion of the people who participate in mawlids: there are
times to work and times to celebrate and there is nothing wrong with devotion, trade and
recreation coming together in the realm of the saint. The presence of some immoral
practices is, if not accepted, then at least tacitly tolerated.
Today, this line of argumentation is not common in public debates but can be often
heard from people who participate in mawlids, mainly Sufis and people sympathetic to
Sufism. Not needing to stand in public debate against reformist critics, they take a
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significantly different approach to defending mawlids based on three central premises
not shared by the apologetic discourse of reformist Sufism:
– Mawlids are an expression of love.
– The festive atmosphere of mawlids is unproblematic as long as basic moral norms are
observed.
– Mawlids cannot be judged by their appearance.
According to the first premise, mawlids are a fully legitimate expression of  joy for and
love of the family of the Prophet. To be opposed to mawlids is to lack the love that makes
one celebrate the mawlid:
‘There are people who are deprived of this gift (ÝaÔÁÞ). He (i.e. someone opposed to
mawlids) lives as a Muslim but doesn’t know how to love. Love is not my property. The
hearts are between the fingers of the Merciful who turns them around as He wills. [...]
There is Law (šarÝ) and there is Truth (ÎaqÐqa), but he is far from it, can’t believe in the
Truth.[...] In his state he can say what he wants. His job are the lines in the book, and our
job is what is between the lines. [...] It’s a job of the heart. My heart is relaxed, his heart
is sick. He has the illness, and I have the cure. We follow the Law, apply all it tells us, but
also follow the conduct/path (sulÙk) of Truth, thus we have more than he. We can’t fix
him unless God goes with him. [...] He says to everything “why?” or “explain”. What can
I explain to him? It has to be experienced.’460
This account implies that celebrating or not celebrating mawlids is a matter beyond
rational discussion: the critics are only concerned with the šarÐÝa, the exoteric (ÛÁhir) side
of religion, and cannot be made to understand its inner (bÁÔin) meaning unless God
opens their hearts to it. Love is given by God and cannot be taught, hence there is no use
in argumentation.
This mystical view is accompanied by more pragmatic responses trying to show that
in fact there is nothing wrong with most of the things the critics pinpoint. So for
example in the account of MuÌtÁr, engineer and a graduate of al-Azhar whom I met at
the mawlid of as-Sayyida NafÐsa. When I told him about my encounter with the teacher
ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm (see above pp. 80-81) that had taken place earlier the same evening, he
asked me to recount the points of criticism ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm had made so that he could
reply to them. I mentioned the themes of dancing in the Æikr, the mixing of sexes, not
working, and the veneration of saints. This is his reply:
‘Did you in your life ever dance in a disco? What is the disco based on? Music, isn’t it? [...]
When you dance disco it brings you relaxation. [...] It’s the same way [with Æikr]: When
I go and do Æikr like this and say “AllÁh! AllÁh!” it means that my spirit becomes clean,
good and pure, plus that the physical movement also discharges the tension that is in me.’
[...]
‘When he (ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm) speaks of mixing of men and women, he means, how come we
as Muslims allow that one of us goes out with a woman, or a woman goes out with a man
in the street. But that’s a normal thing, of course she goes out. We have a whole lot of
respect. You know, if someone would grab a girl, he would find the community of those
who believe that there is no deity but God (ummat lÁ ilÁha illÁ llÁh) come down and beat
him. [...] We have a clearly defined religion, you see. Religion clearly defines that it’s
forbidden (ÎarÁm). What is it that is forbidden? Mixing? Or adultery? Adultery and
mixing are not the same thing. You must understand what mixing means. It doesn’t mean
that I can go and grab a woman in the corner and do adultery with her, no! It means that
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oh Sayyida Zaynab”, [the ruling is that] actions are judged by intentions of the people who commit
them, and who says so is responsible for his intention in doing so, and it is the exalted and
sublime God who judges him, based on the saying of the Apostle of God, God’s blessing and peace
be upon him: “Actions are based on intentions” (innamÁ l-aÝmÁl bi-n-nÐyÁt. BuÌÁrÐ, ÑaÎÐÎ: kitÁb badÞ
al-waÎy, bÁb 1.).’ FatwÁ of the MuftÐ of the Republic NaÒr FarÐd WÁÒil, nr. 752 of the year 2001.
463Interview with MuÌtÁr, engineer and a graduate of al-Azhar, mawlid of as-Sayyida NafÐsa,
Cairo, 22 August 2002.
there can be ladies in the mawlid, ladies doing Æikr. What’s the problem with that? There
isn’t.’
[...]
‘When you see all the people standing around here, eating and drinking and buying and
selling, it doesn’t mean that we are not working. If I want to go to celebrate your birthday,
I take a holiday or go after work and come to visit you and celebrate you, what’s the
problem? It’s not like the people here would be neglecting their work. I for example got
my work done and then came here to see the people I love and do ziyÁra [to as-Sayyida
NafÐsa]. [...] And as for the people who eat at the Ìidmas, some come from work and are
tired and hungry, and some others are sick or old and can’t work. [...] I bring what I can
from my pocket to assist them.’
[...]
‘There is one who goes to visit as-Sayyida NafÐsa and speaks out a prayer (duÝÁÞ) and recites
the FÁtiÎa and kisses the maqÒÙra and says “Oh Lord, and Prophet and as-Sayyida NafÐsa,
I want a water buffalo,461 I want a car, I want to become rich, I want to become a doctor”.
And there is another one who’s educated, who comes to read her the FÁtiÎa and says that
there are people who are close to our Lord and he wants to follow their example. Like for
example if you’d say “I’d like to be like Dr. MuÌtÁr”, is there anything wrong with that?
And there is the first one who doesn’t know to read or write and says ‘Oh Lord give me
wealth with the baraka of as-Sayyida NafÐsa’, but his intention (nÐya) is pure and correct,
only he doesn’t know how to express it.462 He is in error though, doesn’t understand, he’s
not able to express it correctly, but the purpose is that he prays to our Lord and recites the
FÁtiÎa.’463
MuÌtÁr wholeheartedly approves of the festive atmosphere of mawlids. This is the second
commonplace of this discourse: As long as basic moral and religious commandments are
observed, the relativisation of boundaries is not a problem. Music is a medium that can
serve both profane and religious purposes. As long as there is no adultery, mixing is not
a problem. If people work most of the time, why not spend a night in celebration
sometimes?
But MuÌtÁr does not accept everything that happens in the mawlid. His discussion
of ziyÁra shows that he takes the accusation of širk (polytheism) seriously and adopts a
reformist interpretation of the true meaning of ziyÁra: following the pious example of
the saint and reading her the FÁtiÎa. But even when he criticises the behaviour of the
pilgrims who do ziyÁra for baraka he refuses to judge their intentions. This is the third
central premise of this discourse in defence of mawlids: actions, or the ÛÁhir, do not allow
conclusions to intentions, or the bÁÔin. Celebrating a mawlid is based on the intention
of love, and ‘everyone expresses his love in his own way. That is why the mawlid has
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464Interview with al-ÍÁÊÊ ÝÀdil, Sufi pilgrim to the mawlid of as-Sayyida Zaynab, Cairo, 28
September 2002.
465Most miracles do actually ‘happen’: they are experiences of success that may or may not be
interpreted as divine intervention: getting healed from a serious illness, finding a lost wallet,
winning a difficult lawsuit, having a problem unexpectedly solved. See above p. 21.
466Sheikh ÝAbdallÁh MuÎammad ÝAbd al-BÁqÐ al-ÍabÐbÐ in a sermon to his followers at the
mawlid of SÐdÐ al-ÍabÐbÐ, Cairo, 15 August 2002.
467Middle-aged man working for a television production unit to broadcast the Friday prayer
from the mosque of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, ÓanÔÁ, 18 October 2002.
468aš-ŠaÝrÁnÐ, aÔ-ÓabaqÁt al-kubrÁ, pp. 262-264.
469Interview with Ašraf, a follower of al-ÍÁÊÊa SihÁm, mawlid of as-Sayyida FÁÔima an-
NabawÐya, Cairo, 1 June 2003.
many appearances.’464
MuÌtÁr’s careful defence of ziyÁra also shows how central the issue is for critics and
adherents alike: The belief in miracles (karÁmÁt) of healing and success through the
baraka of saints is a key motif both in the pilgrimage to mawlids and their reformist
depiction as širk. For this reason, pilgrims are very keen to point out that their veneration
of the saints has nothing to do with širk. In their view they seek closeness to God by the
way of His friends but do not worship them. The miracles that happen465 are not acts of
the saint but of God: ‘Going to a saint is like going to a doctor: It’s not the doctor but
God who heals me. But the doctor is the intermediary cause (sabab).’466 In this discourse
miracles play a double role acting simultaneously as a subject of defence and as proof:
‘There are many poor people here, but in spite of their poverty they come here to spend
for charity. That’s proof that it’s a spiritual thing, because it’s for God. They have faith
(ÝaqÐda). And when they come to as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ they get healed from illnesses here.
That is of course through the power of God, not through His servant.’467
This man working in a television crew sees the mawlid as a highly spiritual event for the
same reason that provoked the outrage of a journalist in the leftist al-AhÁlÐ (see above p.
100). The fact that poor people spend their little money on the mawlid here appears no
longer as an expression of ignorance, but of true devotion. Most importantly however,
this account brings miracles into the centre of focus, as a subject of defence and as a form
of proof in one instance. Miracles, we are told, are true and legitimate because they are
the work of God, not His servants. And if the Almighty heals the sick and helps the
oppressed in the presence of the saints, then this should sufficiently prove that
pilgrimage to the friends of God is fully legitimate.
The use of miracles as a form of proof includes not only the success of those close to
the friends of God, but also the punishment of those opposed to them. This is a very
established topic; it was used in the 16th century by aš-ŠaÝrÁnÐ who reports at length how
as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ severely punished people who criticised his mawlid.468 But it is not
only the critics of Sufism who are threatened by miraculous punishment. This topic also
includes troublemakers who try to introduce munkarÁt to the mawlid, and works as a
powerful incentive to persuade people to undertake the pilgrimage.
‘I have two colleagues at work, one is a long-bearded Salafi and the other is a Muslim
Brotherhood activist. I always have arguments with them, but as a Sufi I’m relaxed because
I know that I have the support of ahl al-bayt behind me. And really, once after they had
made some very nasty comments, they got into serious trouble with the boss the very same
day.’469
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470Interview with ÝAbd an-NabÐ, a Sufi pilgrim from IdfÙ to the mawlid of SÐdÐ AbÙ l-Íasan
aš-ŠÁÆilÐ, Íumay×ara, 17 January 2005.
471Interview with ÍamdÐ, vegetable vendor from K½m Omb½, AswÁn, 20 January 2005.
472It does sometimes appear in the press and religious booklets in a non-polemic form that
reproduces an ideal image of a beautiful festival full of spirituality and joy, however without open
reference to the criticism of mawlids. See, e.g., al-ÉumhÙrÐya, 6.12.1996: Sayyid IskandarÁnÐ (text)
/ Ašraf ŠaÝbÁn (photographs), ‘al-Layla al-kabÐra li-s-sitt aÔ-ÔÁhira: milyÙnÁ “murÐd” aÎÁÔÙ as-sayyida
Zaynab’, p. 13; Ñawt al-Umma, 18.7.2001: AÎmad AbÙ l-Íasan, ‘Madad yÁ Íusayn madad’, p. 20;
SirÁÊ, an-NabawÐ Éabr, ManÁqib al-imÁmayn al-Íasan wa-l-Íusayn, Cairo: al-Maktaba at-tawfÐqÐya,
undated [ca. 1997], pp. 73 f.
473Schimmel, Annemarie, Mystische Dimensionen des Islam: Die Geschichte des Sufismus, Köln:
Diederichs, 1985, pp. 130-132.
474Interview with Dr. IbrÁhÐm ÝAbd al-ÍÁfiÛ, folklorist, High Institute of Folklore, Academy
of Arts, Cairo, 26 July 2003.
‘SÐdÐ AbÙ l-Íasan only allows those to his mawlid who have his approval. Those with a
sincere intention find the travel easy, while others are prevented from coming here. A few
years ago there was a guy who wanted to bring a truckload of beer to the mawlid. He had
an accident and his truck exploded.’470
‘I should have gone to the mawlid of SÐdÐ AbÙ l-Íasan. I wanted to but I had no time, and
I had a really bad day yesterday, with a lot of trouble. SÐdÐ AbÙ l-Íasan punished me
because I missed his mawlid.’471
With its acceptance of ambivalence and its reference to miracles, the defence of festive joy
can be quite successful in informal discussions. But it has less chance of success in the
public debates dominated by reformist and modernist discourse because it subverts some
of its central assumptions.472 Yet it is not a subversive strategy: love, joy and invisible
esoteric truth are not represented as an alternative to exoteric religion and modern civic
order. In the eyes of the people who express these views, many of them middle-class
professionals devoted to Sufism, they are fully compatible: there is a time to work and
a time to celebrate, a time for exoteric religious obligations and a time for esoteric love,
a time for rational arguments and a time for miracles. This view does become subversive,
however, in the context of the reformist and modernist construction of piety and civility
because it does not recognise the dissociations that define the latter.
2.2. The antinomian mawlid
Sometimes the defence of festive joy can be openly subversive. Such an antinomian view
that intentionally subverts or inverts exoteric religious norms (and not just the
boundaries that mark them) is not common in everyday religious discourse, however.
People may neglect or manipulate religious norms in their daily life, but they seldom
question their actual validity. In Sufi context, however, there is a historical tradition of
antinomian readings of religion. Take, for example, the mediaeval MalÁmatÐya, mystics
who, in the belief that true piety can never be motivated by reward or public acceptance,
consciously broke with exoteric norms.473 Today, some Sufis hold that mystics sufficiently
advanced on the mystic path may not need to fulfill their exoteric obligations. Sufi
poetry makes frequent use of antinomian themes such as erotic love, wine, and the
religious vocabulary of Christianity.474 They are used as symbolic representations of
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475Explicitly stated, for example, in the verse often sung by munšidÐn: ‘The drinker of wine wakes
up from his intoxication / while the drinker of love remains intoxicated his entire life.’
476Interview with the younger of two men in a Sufi Ìidma in the mawlid of as-SÁda aš-ŠahÁwÐya,
ŠuhÁ, 19 September 2002.
477Interview with the brother of late Sheikh ÉÁbir al-MadanÐ, mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ,
ÓanÔÁ, 16 October 2002. Sheikh ÉÁbir was also known as al-ÍarÁmÐ, ‘the Thief’ – a strongly
antinomian choice of a title. Because of his charismatic personality and success in converting
several people to Islam he was called ‘the thief of hearts’, but the connotation of ÎarÁm is evident
and apparently intended. HudÁ, whose ÎaÃra is described above on pp 101-103, is daughter-in-spirit
of Sheikh ÉÁbir.
mystic experience,475 but the ambiguity of these themes is obvious and intended.
The persistence of antinomian motifs in the Sufi tradition allows the interpretation
of mawlids as an occasion in which sinners can be drawn to God. In this interpretation,
participation in the mawlid despite its controversial character and the presence of
immoral practices gains a very different quality:
‘I’ll tell you another, very strange story. One of the ÝulamÁÞ comes and says to the [Sufi]
sheikh: “What’s this? Our lord sheikh, why do you put on the mawlid? That mawlid
collects the garbage of society.” The sheikh replied: “Why would I want the good ones?
What would I do with them? I want the bad ones.” The ÝÁlim asked: “Why?” The sheikh
told him: “Just like that.” The ÝÁlim stood up and said: “Alright, your excellency, what am
I supposed to make out of this? You confuse me (or: you’re making fun of me).” The
sheikh said: “I don’t want the good ones, I want the really bad ones. I’ll give you a little
example. Let’s assume that you have a gangster in your street. What will happen? I’ll take
him from you for a week, and relieve you of him. I take him with me for a week and put
myself into trouble and turn him into one like me. What do you think, should I leave him
to you? In your street?” The ÝÁlim said to him: “Then I couldn’t stay in my house. Alright,
I agree with what you are doing, our lord Sheikh.”’476
In this account, moving in the same milieu with ‘the garbage of society’ is not a cause of
blame but a sign of the pious commitment of a true Muslim willing to spread religion
to those gone astray. This is shown as more than just a pragmatic compromise. Seeking
the company of the sinful is seen as proof of spirituality, courage and devotion that the
exoteric scholars in their comfortably pious environment cannot boast of. A consequence
of this view is that in doing so, one may break against the exoteric norms of the šarÐÝa,
and that the observance of these norms is not the starting point but the final goal of the
process of winning over the sinner:
‘Where else can I find the deviant (munÎarif) who drinks and gambles than here in the
mawlid. I hunt here, take him step by step until he reaches purity. You can’t go to
someone in a bar and take him straight to the mosque to pray. If I tried to win over the
munÎarif once and one hundred percent he would just run away. There can be no
obedience before love, so we first make him love, and bit by bit he will become pure. We
represent Truth (ÎaqÐqa) together with Law (šarÐÝa). The Law prohibits that I seek the
company of the munÎarif. But I go to him to make him like me.’477
This line of argumentation can evidently also serve as a rationalisation that defines as
pious a type of lifestyle that may otherwise be seen as deviant. This is a point of criticism
made by other Sufis who argue that by opening the door to drug addicts and petty
criminals, these Sufis end up being dominated by them.
‘When I first came to this mosque I found a community split in competing groups and
a scene dominated by criminals. There are youths who trade in drugs, and although
they’ve been officially let in with the claim of leading them to good, it’s them leading the
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478Interview with al-ÍÁÊÊa SihÁm, Alexandria, 25 October 2002.
479al-HarÁwÐ, UsÁma, Min awrÁd aÔ-ÔarÐq: al-ÎÁÊÊ ÝAlÐ aš-ŠarÐf, QinÁ, 2000.
480IbrÁhÐm, al-MašrÙÝ wa-l-mamnÙÝ, pp. 15-18.
481AbÙ l-ÝAzÁÞim, as-Sayyid ÝIzz ad-DÐn MÁÃÐ, IslÁm aÒ-ÒÙfÐya huwa  l-Îall lÁ islÁm al-ÌawÁriÊ, DÁr
al-kitÁb aÒ-ÒÙfÐ, 1993. The ËÁriÊÐya emerged in the first century after HiÊra as the first sectarian
splinter group within Islam. The ËÁriÊites were opposed to dynastic succession of the Caliphate
and believed that any act of sin equals outright infidelity. Levi Della Vida, G., ‘KhÁridjites’ in
Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., Leiden: Brill, vol. 4, pp. 1074-1077.
482Peskes, Esther, ‘Die Wahhabiya als innerislamisches Feindbild: Zum Hintergrund
anti-wahhabitischer Publikationen in der zeitgenössischen Türkei’, Die Welt des Islams 40 (2000),
3, pp. 344-274; Knysh, Alexander, ‘A Clear and Present Danger: “Wahhabism” as a Rhetorical Foil’,
Die Welt des Islams 44 (2004), 1, pp. 3-26.
people to bad.’478
2.3. ‘SunnÐs’
Open to ambivalence as it may be, the discourse in defence of festive joy nevertheless
needs dissociations and markers of exclusion of its own. Because this line of
argumentation states an unproblematic unity of mysticism and orthodox Islam,
ambivalent festivities and modern civic order, it has to explain why so many Egyptians
claim the opposite. The solution to this problem is to depict the critics of mawlids and
the opponents of Sufi rituals in general as extremists. In this view, Sufis represent the
moderate middle ground of Islam threatened by extremist and terrorist movements that,
based on a superficial understanding of religion, act against the true spirit of Islam.
The construction of extremists as the enemies of Sufism is a dissociation common to
all discourses in defence of mawlids ranging from strictly reformist to strongly
antinomian. The extremist Other appears with different titles that are always designed to
point out that they are not true followers of the pious first generation of Muslims (as-
salaf aÒ-ÒÁliÎ): suflÐyÙn (‘the lowlyists’ – a word play from salafÐyÙn),479 mutamaslifa
(‘Salaficists’),480 and ËÁriÊites, the oldest inner-Islamic Other.481 But the most common
labels used for this Other of Sufism are WahhÁbÐs and SunnÐs. Both labels are worth
attention. WahhÁbÐs, proponents of a reformist movement that emerged in NaÊd in the
18th century, call themselves muwaÎÎidÙn (monotheists), implying that others are not.
The movement was labelled WahhÁbÐya (after its founder MuÎammad ibn ÝAbd al-
WahhÁb) by its opponents to depict it as a sectarian movement.482 The label ‘SunnÐs’
(sunnÐyÐn or sunnÐya) is common in colloquial usage in which it is used as an inversion
of the reformist self-image and does not refer to the distinction of Sunna and ŠÐÝa. The
Salafi movement defines itself continuously through its heavy emphasis on following the
Sunna of the Prophet and describes itself as true Sunnite Islam as opposed to the ŠÐÝa and
other sects. In this context, the term SunnÐ has come to denote a person holding to a
strongly Salafi doctrine and/or radical Islamist ideology, observing a distinctive dress
(men with long beards and white, short-hemmed ÊallÁbÐyas, women in full veils covering
the face and hands) and distinguishing him- or herself from society on the ground of his
or her following the Sunna.
The character of the WahhÁbÐ or the SunnÐ represents everything opposed to
moderate Sufi Islam: He (the typical SunnÐ is depicted as a man with four wives whom
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483In popular usage the term mutaÌallif is a common insult, meaning both ‘backward’ and
‘retarded’.
484Simple waterpipe that is often used to smoke hashish.
485To say that someone has no religion is a serious insult in Egypt.
486AwrÁd (sg. wird) are litanies consisting of selected verses of the QurÞÁn and prayers. Reciting
them, e.g. after the ritual prayer or as part of Æikr, forms an important part of daily Sufi practice.
487Interview with two men in a Sufi Ìidma in the mawlid of as-SÁda aš-ŠahÁwÐya, ŠuhÁ, 19
September 2002.
he keeps in seclusion) is a political extremist whose morality and religiosity are mere
form without content:
Younger man: ‘They are mentally retarded/backward (mutaÌallifÐn ÝaqlÐyan)483. I mean, they
tell you that in the mawlids there is vice and I don’t know what. I love the saint. I go to
the saint and read the FÁtiÎa for him, that’s all. But there are other youths, for example
someone who sits and smokes ÊÙza,484 and there is someone who goes out with a girl. I
don’t care about that stuff, I go to the saint. And their backwardness/retardedness also
[becomes clear] in every ritual prayer (ÒalÁt). When we pray, what do we say? “Oh God
bless our lord MuÎammad and the family of our lord MuÎammad.” Who are the family
of our lord MuÎammad? They are the saints, al-Íasan and al-Íusayn, as-Sayyida Zaynab
[...] Thus I bless them in every prayer. So when I go to visit the shrine of one of them and
recite the FÁtiÎa and take their baraka, what is ÎarÁm about that? They tell you that it’s
ÎarÁm. [...] If he sees us sitting here like this he says: those are polytheists (mušrikÐn bi-llÁh),
those don’t have any idea of religion, those I don’t know what. And also in their houses
you find them very extremist. I mean, they allow for themselves to greet any woman on
the street, but he won’t allow you to greet his wife. Now how come you allow yourself to
greet the women outside but forbid it from your friend in your house? [...] Those SunnÐs,
in their homes, in a family of 10 or 15 there might be just one SunnÐ, if you go in you find
that one guy with a beard, and all the family far from him.’
Older man: their name is not SunnÐs but sÙÞ nÐya (of bad intention) (laughs).
Younger man: ‘When they go out they might go after a pretty girl, although he makes
himself out to be very fanatic and religious [...] He makes an appearance (huwa ÝÁmil ÛÁhir)
but inside it’s a different story. [...] When I go to al-Íusayn, what’s wrong with it,
compared to if I sit in a cafeteria and smoke. What is better? Visiting al-Íusayn or sitting
in a café and drinking and taking drugs? So why don’t you fight the people who sit in
cafes? Or those who go after women or steal or kill? So they suffer from
backwardness/retardedness. But he will take his tour and get back again.’
S.: ‘Come back to truth, you mean?’
Younger man: ‘They will come back again, after they see that all the world got closed in
front of them, from God’s anger. Because they fight ahl al-bayt. That is their fanaticism,
but they are people with no principles and no religion.485 But we all go under the flag of
“there is no deity but God”; there is no difference in that. We sit and recite awrÁd486 and
hymns, but we do all this under “there is no deity but God”. We all are Muslims, we all
know our Islam, why should we fight each other?’487
This depiction of the SunnÐ as characterised by fake morality and bad intentions
expresses a very different understanding of the relation of habitus and inner states than
that shared by the critics of mawlids. Not only is habitus not a key to the state of the self;
the heavy emphasis on appearance is taken to be suspect, a sign of a lack of true faith. In
this view, doing pious deeds may help one become a pious person, and a good Muslim
may eventually express a pious habitus, but adopting a pious habitus alone will never
make one a good Muslim. On the contrary, it is seen to prevent the process of acquiring
piety, as is argued by RÐhÁm, the daughter of a charismatic Sufi leader:
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488Interview with RÐhÁm, daughter of al-ÍÁÊÊa SihÁm, Alexandria, 24 February 2005.
Image 24: The stereotypical SunnÐ extremist with
his beard, ÊallÁbÐya, machine gun and secluded
wife. Cover illustration of ÝAzzÁm, May, AnÁ
NÁdiya zawÊat amÐr al-ÊamÁÝa al-islÁmÐya,
Cairo: AÌbÁr al-Yawm (KitÁb al-Yawm; March
1999), 1999. Illustration MuÒÔafÁ Íusayn.
‘I didn’t begin to wear a headscarf until last year. Not because I was opposed to it: I know
that it is a religious obligation. But I did not want to do it for the sake of show. A lot of
people do things just to show off and forget that what really matters is what is inside
you.’488
The construction of WahhÁbÐs or SunnÐs as
an extremist Other serves the same purpose
as the construction of mawlids and related
customs in the critical discourse as a
backward and un-Islamic Other. It
establishes a dramatic dissociation to
construct and protect one’s own collective
identity against the contingence of everyday
life. Just like people who go to mawlids are
not only ignorant peasants or ruthless
charlatans, people who criticise mawlids are
not only long-bearded extremists. The
criticism of mawlids is disseminated in
circles much wider than the supporters of
the Salafi and Islamist movements, and these
circles have been able to increasingly
marginalise Sufism and rituals related to
Sufism in the public sphere. But to
acknowledge this would undermine the Sufi
self-image as the moderate mainstream of
Islam and Egyptian society.
3. Alternative development, national unity, and hybrid discourses
The reformist and modernist critics of mawlids contend their subversive and
transgressing character. Sufi apologetics respond that mawlids, properly understood,
neither constitute a subversion nor a transgression of religion and the social order. But
there is another, highly different argument in defence of mawlids claiming that it is
exactly the ambivalence and even the subversive character of mawlids that makes them
a positive factor in society.
Most often expressed by modernist intellectuals, this argument is all the more
interesting because it is formulated largely in the same ideological setting as the critical
view, with one significant difference. This argumentation can show the relativisation of
religious boundaries in a positive light because it is attached to a leftist (and often
Marxist) secularist vision of society in which, unlike in the mainstream secular modernist
view that sees religion as a functional part of society, religion is seen as a potential
problem for the modernist project.
A radical formulation of the view of mawlids as positive subversion is offered by
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ÝIÒÁm FawzÐ, author of two articles on popular religiosity published in the 1990s.489 Like
in the critical discourse, here also mawlids appear as the expression of a wider field of
religious culture distinct from official religion. According to ÝIÒÁm FawzÐ, mawlids are
embedded in a popular discourse on religion characterised by a pragmatic and subversive
approach to norms and boundaries, an ironical attitude towards religious dignitaries, and
an ambivalent relationship with the sacred, manoeuvring between devotion and
manipulation.
This interpretation is in many ways similar to the critical discourse on mawlids. The
difference lies in its normative assessment. Arguing from a Marxist perspective, IÒÁm
FawzÐ shares with mainstream Egyptian modernists the search for progress and a
progressive state of mind, but he does not accept the assumption that progress has to be
based on authentic religion and morality. While the mainstream of modernists
intellectuals, notably also many Marxists among them,490 see mawlids as a medium of
false consciousness, IÒÁm FawzÐ interprets them as a possibility to contest and subvert the
false consciousness disseminated by the religious establishment and the Islamist
movements. In this view, mawlids are rehabilitated from a cause and expression of
backwardness to a possible source of alternative development, a site where ideological
hegemonies of the state and Islamist movements can be contested.
ÝIÒÁm FawzÐ’s view of popular religiosity is embedded in a Marxist critique of religion
and remains marginal in the public debates. But other, less radical formulations of this
discourse are strongly present in the debates. Mawlids are often represented as an
authentic national tradition expressing the tolerance central to ‘true’ Egyptian culture.
I dwell on the reasons and consequences of representing mawlids as national heritage in
the following chapter; for the moment it is sufficient to note that even people who think
that mawlids are a bidÝa and part of a backward traditional society may at the same time
view them as parts of authentic Egyptian culture. This does not mean a full rehabilitation
of mawlids but it does imply that in certain contexts they can be viewed as a positive
factor in society.
The most important positive role offered to mawlids is to be a site of tolerance in the
face of radical Islamist movements and confessional tensions. Mawlids have become one
of the sites where the image of peaceful and tolerant ‘true’ Egyptian society is projected.
This representation shares the same Other with the Sufi apologetic discourse: the long-
bearded extremist with no love and no tolerance. This image of extremists versus tolerant
ordinary Egyptians received a significant boost in the 1980s and 90s, which were
characterised by heavy and often violent confrontation between Islamists and their
opponents. It appears to have lost some of its power with the recent trend towards de-
radicalisation and integration of Islamist ideology in everyday piety and morality.
The view of mawlids as an expression of tolerance is essentially a secularist one based
on the assumption that some relativising of religious norms and boundaries is necessary
for a modern society to function. But unlike ÝIÒÁm’s interpretation of mawlids as positive
subversion, it is part of the mainstream nationalist and modernist discourse. Just like
Salafi religiosity is not restricted to active Salafis, secularism in Egypt is not restricted to
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492Such candy figures are a common part of festive traditions in Egypt, especially of mawlid an-
nabÐ.
493ÍannÁ, al-AÝmida as-sabÝa, p. 50-51.
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left-wing secularists. The hegemonic nationalist discourse on religion and society is not
a coherent rationalised system; it speaks in different tones ranging from very Islamist to
openly secularist in different contexts and at different times. It tends to go especially
secular when the relationship of the Muslim majority with the Christian minority is
discussed. In this context, mainstream nationalist discourse defines Egypt as a harmonic
multi-confessional nation where religion is a private matter, as expressed by the slogan
‘Religion is for God and the motherland is for all’.
Reality is less harmonious, however, and the past decades have witnessed several waves
of confessional tension that have often resulted in violence. For this reason, ‘national
unity’ – an euphemism for the lack of it – has become a key issue in public debates.
Whenever confessional tensions arise, voices appear in the public sphere searching for
proof of the harmonious coexistence of Christians and Muslims. The most prominent
example of this quest is The Seven Pillars of Egyptian Identity by the urban planning expert
MÐlÁd ÍannÁ.491 This book (which has gone through several reprints and has been
published in English translation by the Egyptian General Book Organisation) depicts
Egyptian national identity as a composite of historical and geographical layers reaching
from Pharaonic times through the Roman and Christian periods to the Islamic era and
from the Mediterranean across the Arab world to Africa. According to MÐlÁd ÍannÁ
these ‘layers of civilisation’ form a tolerant and harmonic whole in which also popular
piety and festive culture have a role to play.
‘All Egyptians have been accustomed to respect of the other and to abstainment from
anything that may hurt the feelings of those with whom he shares the house. [...] For the
field of shared [beliefs and values] in both religions is great [...], and both religions call
to virtue, deeds, purity and virtuous conduct, compassion with the weak and defence of
the truth, and to “love your next like yourself”. [...]  And until our present day we find
that the Copts celebrate the HiÊra New Year, and when I was a child I insisted on buying
the “candy horse” like my sister NarÊis insisted on buying the “doll of mawlid an-nabÐ”.492
A friend of mine, a historian, told me that the custom of making a candy horse for the
festival of mawlid an-nabÐ was taken from the horse of St. George of the Copts. And since
the Copts have their mawlids and the Muslims have other mawlids, why shouldn’t all
children celebrate all mawlids. And this is in fact what happens all over the Egyptian
countryside. And when there was a fire in the mawlid of the Virgin near al-MuÎarraq
monastery in the district of al-QÙÒÐya in AsyÙÔ province, it turned out that the injured
were an equal mixture of Copts and Muslims’493
In even more enthusiastic tone, an article in the leftist al-AhÁlÐ describes the mawlid of
St. George as an incorporation of national unity:
‘Thousands of Egyptians – Muslims and Copts – undertake the pilgrimage to the mawlid
of St. George (MÁr ÉirÊis) in the last week of August every year. There, in the village of
MÐt DamsÐs in [the province of] ad-DaqahlÐya, true national unity is embodied, as the
village with its Muslim majority hosts one of the biggest Coptic mawlids.’494
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al-adab, 3.1.1999, FatÎÐ ÝAbd as-SamÐÝ, ‘Sirrak .. yÁ MÁr Girgis .. sirrak’.
495See, e.g., ÝAbd al-LaÔÐf, as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, p. 138.
496I do not intend to imply that syncretism is a cause of confessional conflicts, and yet
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dynamic relationship with its own moments of conflict and domination. Werbner/ Basu: ‘The
Embodiment of Charisma’, p. 20.
497al-AhÁlÐ, 16.4.1997; 28.1.1998; 15.9.1999.
498In colloquial Arabic the English loan word business is strongly associated with corruption,
grey economy and shady deals.
499al-MiÒrÐ al-Yawm, 24.11.2004, ‘MawÁlid al-muÎÁfaÛÁt: bÐznis w-fawÃÁ wa-nÎirÁfÁt’, p.4.
The fact that Muslims and Christians often attend each other’s mawlids, share a common
festive culture, and sometimes venerate each other’s saints is elevated to an expression of
their national unity as Egyptians. The syncretisms that appear as serious transgressions
for reformist discourses (both Muslim and Christian) on piety and festivity495 are
presented as moments of mutual love and respect that effectively prevent confessional
conflicts. This is a very idealised image, however. It stands in striking contrast to the
trend among both Muslims and Christians to erase syncretisms and draw clear dividing
lines between the two religions in all fields of society. It also conveniently avoids the
question of why most communal violence takes place in Upper Egypt, the region where
syncretistic forms of piety are more prevalent than anywhere else in Egypt.496
This image has an inner tension. Mawlids are represented as expressions of national
unity usually when Muslims attend Christian mawlids but much less so the other way
around. The same media that praise Christian mawlids may condemn Islamic ones.
Between 1997 and 1999, the leftist al-AhÁlÐ published a highly critical article on the
mawlid of as-Sayyida Zaynab and two articles full of praise for the mawlid of St.
George.497 In 2004, the commercial daily al-MiÒrÐ al-Yawm published a full-page feature
on mawlids in Egypt that was largely critical of Muslim mawlids but very positive about
Christian mawlids:
‘The phenomenon of mawlids in Egypt represents a popular and religious carnival with
a strongly specific character. On the one hand, they are ‘business’498 and centres to attract
tourism, and one of the purest and most spontaneous expressions of the unity of the
Egyptian people – Muslims and Christians. On the other hand they are seasons for chaos,
deviations, taking advantage of the minds of the simple people, occupation of the streets,
traffic troubles, and making noise.’499
This ambiguity is partly due to the different status of Islam and Christianity in public
debates. For a Muslim journalist, the issue of whether a Christian mawlid is a correct or
wrong expression of piety does not arise the way it does when a Muslim saint is being
celebrated. But ambiguity in the judgement of mawlids is also common to the entire
debate. For many among the intellectual elite, mawlids may have some sympathetic
moments of tolerance and some beautiful folklore, but they are definitely not the stuff
a modern reading of religion, civil space, or citizenship should be made of. Students
from provincial cities may define mawlids as an error and a bidÝa, but the mawlid of their
hometown remains one of the best days of the year for them. As ÝAlÐ MubÁrak correctly
observed in 1882, one’s judgement of mawlids depends on what one looks at. Mawlids are
highly complex festivities and it should not surprise us that they inspire complex and
contradictory interpretations.
155The defence of mawlids
500In the following quotation, they appear as one speaker because it was not possible to
reconstruct from the notes with certainty who is speaking in each passage. They at no point
disagreed with each other. Incoherence in the account is thus not caused by there being two
speakers, but by both speakers continuously revising their view.
501It is not clear whether this refers to people or practices.
50210:62.
Especially when we move away from the public media to informal conversations, the
views people express about mawlids are not only differentiated (such as liking music and
amusements but disagreeing with the cult of saints, or liking the spirituality but disliking
the noise and the crowds) but often also  ambiguous and contradictory, combining
elements of different discourses in unpredictable ways. Add to this that people are likely
to express different views in different situations. The result are discourses with multiple
layers and inner contradictions. A good example is the account of two middle-aged men
who observed the mawlid of as-Sayyida Zaynab from their local café. They were highly
suspicious of my intentions, which gave their talk an additional layer as they decided to
act as representatives of Egypt, determined to provide me with ‘correct information’ so
that I would not rely on ‘some of the ignorant people around here’:500
‘The QurÞÁn should be the source of your research. Those buried in the shrines are ahl al-
bayt, the saints and the pious who reached a high degree of piety and ascetism. The shrine
is a source of method (nahÊ), you take the method of the person buried in the shrine.
Some ignorant people say that they take baraka. The purpose of the mawlid is celebration
and benefit (niÝm) according to the manners and customs of the people of Egypt: mizmÁr
and religious hymns, and the service of food. There are true and false customs. The true
are ritual prayer (ÒalÁt) and following the method of the saints. The false are those501 on
the streets and sidewalks, and inappropriate begging. But what is desirable, are things like
[the distribution of] food, also in RamaÃÁn in the mÁÞidat ar-RaÎmÁn. It’s for God! We
must stick to the correct way. Our way must be strict and clear (gÁmid). There should be
no disorder and fighting factions. [...] 
From the rosary you’ll recognise the dervish. He is a divinely inspired madman
(maÊÆÙb); he was drawn to God and has left the world behind, he doesn’t need anything;
he is an ascetic in this world. [...] 
We are here in this café all the time.  We are just spectators, we distinguish ourselves
through critique. We are isolated from this atmosphere because it is not the method we
should take from the prophet, and it is a reason for the decline of our country into a
third world state.  This is not the absolute true way worship should be. It should be calm,
without disturbance in prayer. The people (šaÝb) are taken from the state of religiosity to
a state of bidÝa. The submersion in bidaÝ leads to laziness and negligence. Worship
becomes a service of food. [...] We sit here, drink tea, read QurÞÁn, look at the things, but
we know what the outcome of this will eventually be. [...] 
[The proper way is] to go to the people with the method of as-Sayyida, and the
Prophet, and the QurÞÁn. Every shrine is a declaration of monotheism. We criticise those
who understand the noble QurÞÁn wrongly, like those who kiss the shrine. It is forbidden
because the shrine does not speak (i.e. the person buried in it is not a living being capable
of reasoning and communication). The iron doesn’t speak.  The verse in the QurÞÁn says:
“Verily upon the friends of God rests no fear, nor do they grieve.”502 What is forbidden
is worship [of the shrine], and not the shrine itself. Actions are based on intentions.
Kissing the maqÁm out of love after not seeing it for a long time is acceptable by the
natural disposition of the heart (maqbÙl bi-fiÔrit il-qalb), if my intention is love. But if the
shrine is taken as an object of a search for baraka or prayers are directed to it – which is
only for God – then it’s not allowed. 
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[...] The celebration is about reviving the memory of ahl al-bayt. I revive it with the
recitation of the QurÞÁn, with prayer, attempting to follow the example of ahl al-bayt, and
if I have the available means, I distribute sweets and meat to the people, because there are
lots of poor people everywhere. The most important things in the mawlid are the worship
of God and the method of ahl al-bayt. The [opening] celebration in the mosque begins
with QurÞÁn and supplications  (ibtihÁlÁt), and the performance of the obligatory prayer.
That is the correct mawlid. The party hats and swing-boats and children – [it’s] like
Christmas in your place – are a good thing, they don’t do any harm. People come from
the provinces, they also want to celebrate, buy sweets, enjoy themselves, [these are all] good
customs and traditions. [...] If your research is to be successful, it has to be one hundred
percent what I said. The mawlid releases the people from their sufferings and worries.
Playing and smoking waterpipes doesn’t damage worship.’503
Everything is everything in this popular interpretation of reformist discourse. The
dervishes are true devoted mystics and ignorant people, serving food is a religious duty
and a distraction from worship, kissing the shrine of the saint is ÎarÁm and acceptable,
the only correct way to celebrate a mawlid is to follow the example of the saint and it is
a legitimate occasion for joy, amusements and recreation. Elements of almost all lines of
argumentation that I have analysed above can be found in this account. BidaÝ and
backwardness, a stern and rational habitus of festivity and piety, the reformist
reinterpretation of the festivity, the affirmation of festive joy, and the national culture
of Egypt all feature here. And in the middle of all this, ‘our way must be strict and clear’.
One would be mistaken to try to find a hidden clue in this account. It is
contradictory because everyday discourse is always contradictory to some degree, the
more so when it is produced ad hoc in a discussion in which the speakers continuously
revise their judgement of what the foreign researcher is up to and what he wants to hear.
This account stands as a reminder that the discourses represented in this study in practice
are often much less coherent than they appear in a work of discourse analysis. People mix
different arguments and topics and make strategic use of them depending on their
judgement of the situation. Much more than rationalised ideologies, the discourses
analysed here must be understood as modes of action that are subject to manipulation
and capable of containing a high degree of contradiction.
Recognising this, we face new problems. First, and this is the subject of the following
chapter, if the discourse on mawlids tends to be ambiguous and contradictory, how does
this ambiguity relate to the criticism and exclusion of mawlids? Second, and this is the
subject of the final chapter of this thesis, if discourses are to be understood as modes of
action, then there can be no analysis of the debates on mawlids without an analysis of
how these debates enter festive practice.
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Chapter Seven: The mawlid as cultural icon
MuÎammad FahmÐ ÝAbd al-LaÔÐf, author of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ (see chapter five) and a
staunch critic of mawlids, was also an admirer of Sufi music and a founding figure of
Egyptian folklore studies. A furious attack on the cult of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, his book
is also a rich ethnographic study that contains some moments of honest fascination.
Such ambiguity is not unusual. As seen in the preceding chapters, festive experiences and
accounts of mawlids are often ambivalent and contradictory, combining and shifting
between fascination, criticism, nostalgia and irony. This tension is even stronger among
those who have no first-hand experience of mawlids. For them, mawlids are often at once
an exotic, fascinating piece of traditional culture and a dangerous no-go zone. These
moments of ambivalence are usually not translated into a revision of the criticism of
mawlids, however. On the contrary, they are rationalised by redefining mawlids and
representing them in a new context and with new meanings in a way that does not
challenge and in fact often enforces the logic of criticism and exclusion.
An issue of debate, mawlids are simultaneously the subject of a rich body of
historical, anthropological and folkloric research, artistic production, colourful photo
essays and press features, and government propaganda. These practices of representation
often show mawlids in a positive light and yet do not counter the criticism of mawlids.
On the contrary, the exclusion of mawlids from the field of modernity and orthodox
Islam contributes to a redefinition of the festivals that makes it possible to rationalise the
ambivalence towards mawlids shared by many of their critics, balancing between refusal,
irony, fascination and nostalgia. Stating that ‘mawlids have nothing to do with religion’
is not only a way to exclude them from the field of religion: in the following I argue that
it is also a way to include them in the field of popular heritage and art.
In the preceding chapters I primarily analysed the construction of modern and
Islamic culture, social order and subjectivity as mobilised against mawlids. Thus far, the
product of modernist inclusions and exclusions might be described as an invented
tradition much in the way suggested by Hobsbawm and Ranger.504 The image becomes
more complex, however, when we realise that the dissociation of custom into true and
false tradition implies a redefinition of both as new objects in society. Not only ‘true’
tradition is invented: its margins and its Other also are. A striking feature of such
invention through exclusion is that it makes it possible to analytically split its product
into different elements, some of which can be viewed in a positive light. A case in point
is ÝAbd al-LaÔÐf’s redefinition of mawlids as popular religion. It not only allowed him to
exclude the cult of saints from the field of religion proper, but also enabled him to study
and appreciate Sufi music as folkloric art despite his disagreement with Sufi spirituality.
In this chapter I argue that within the modernist and reformist imagery of society and
nation there are two common ways to represent mawlids in a potentially legitimate role.
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One, parallel to the modernist exclusion of mawlids, is to define them as popular religion
and folklore. The other, parallel to the reformist Sufi defence of mawlids, is to represent
them as spectacles of religious education and state propaganda. Through these practices
of redefinition and representation, mawlids can be partially (but never fully) included in
the field of national heritage without challenging the dissociations that produce and
uphold the imagery of modern Egyptian culture. The products of these public
representations develop a dynamic of their own, increasingly separate from the original
and resulting in an growing gap between actual festive practice and the public imagery
of festivity. The further we move from festive practice into academic research, artistic
production, public media, and the social imagination of the upper and upper middle
classes with no firsthand experience of mawlids, the stronger the split between the mawlid
as social practice and the mawlid as cultural icon.
1. The construction of popular heritage
Historical and social sciences in Egypt, as elsewhere, are often marked by a normative
approach. The study of society, culture and history is a functional part of the nationalist
project. Its task is to search for elements of national identity, potentials for development,
and causes of underdevelopment.505 The academic study of mawlids, their history, and
their present form and place in society, is thus also a highly political enterprise. For this
reason, academic representations are torn between two objectives: the construction of
Egyptian national history and heritage, and a sociology of development that
problematises communal customs and cultural values as obstacles on the way to progress.
On the one hand, the construction of national heritage (turÁ×) is a necessary part of the
nationalist and modernist project.506 On the other, the same elements that may be a part
of national heritage may also be problematised as causes of underdevelopment.507
In chapter five I argued that part of the modernist distinction produced through the
criticism of mawlids is the exclusion of a large part of popular culture from the field of
legitimate heritage. Why then is it now possible to state that through this very distinction
mawlids are represented as heritage after all? This seeming contradiction is due to the
differentiation between a high cultural, religious and intellectual heritage, and a lesser
popular heritage, much in style of the distinction between ‘great’ and ‘small’ tradition
that was once current in Western anthropology.508 While the first is accredited with full
validity as part of the nation’s moral and civilisational core, the latter remains
subordinate to the high heritage and confined to the role as a mere constituent of
national identity.509 This layered character of the concept of heritage makes it possible to
represent mawlids as a part of popular heritage while maintaining their exclusion from
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the grand heritage of religion and civilisation.
This differentiation is, evidently, a modernist construct. What is popular heritage
today may have been a largely unquestioned part of religious and communal life 150 years
ago. To show how this distinction is constructed and what consequences it brings to the
position of mawlids in the nationalist and modernist imagery is the task of the following
pages.
1.1 Writing the history of mawlids
The historiography of mawlids has been primarily one of a search for origins.510 A field
of discourse originally produced in Western and Egyptian academic publications, the
issue of origins has become a recurring topic in the press and in everyday discussions.
The historical origin of mawlids is usually traced back to the Pharaonic era and/or to the
Fatimid dynasty that ruled over Egypt from 969 to 1171 A.D. Less commonly pronounced
although historically better documented is a view relating the emergence of mawlids to
the spread of Sufi orders in the Muslim world.
The concern for origins has two reasons. Firstly, it is based on an implicit assumption
that popular culture is static in nature: once established, it remains essentially the  same
throughout centuries.511 Secondly, the issue of origin plays an important role in the
debate on the legitimacy of mawlids and the place given to them in the public image of
Egyptian culture. Any theory of the origin of mawlids implies a normative judgement of
their relationship to Islam and national heritage.
In the following I look at the historical debate from two angles. On the one hand, I
discuss the historical evidence they are based on while, on the other, I analyse how these
different theories carry implicit or explicit judgements of mawlids and their place in
Islamic piety and Egyptian culture.
1.1.1. Pharaohs
The theory of a Pharaonic origin of mawlids was developed in the late 19th century
by European authors who attempted to trace Muslim practice back to pre-Islamic
traditions, a common approach in Oriental studies of the time.512 It was quickly taken
over by Egyptian authors,513 and gained currency in the early 20th century as the
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Pharaonic past was constructed as a constitutive element of Egyptian nationalism.514
Today this theory can be found in academic studies, press features and informal
discussions alike. The theory says, in short, that mawlids are a trace of Pharaonic
festivities that were celebrated at the temples of local gods. As Christianity began to
spread throughout Egypt in the first and second centuries A.D., the sanctuaries and
festivities were taken over and dedicated to Christian saints and martyrs. With the Arab
conquest of Egypt and the successive Islamisation of Egypt, the tradition of shrines,
saints and their festivals was again reinterpreted in Islamic terms.515
The most prominent case in which both foreign and Egyptian observers tend to
establish a link to a Pharaonic cult is the mawlid of SÐdÐ AbÙ l-ÍaÊÊÁÊ al-UqÒurÐ (d.
642/1244), which is celebrated next to the Luxor temple and concluded by a procession
that includes scale models of boats.516 Both the location of the shrine and the inclusion
of boats are commonly interpreted to be a direct continuation of the ancient cult of
Amun in which a procession with boats also played a key role. The boats are interpreted
as a trace of the Pharaonic past, an immediate piece of ancient Egyptian culture that has
been superficially Islamised but remains essentially a procession of Amun. This
interpretation is not restricted to Luxor. There is a widespread tendency to see mawlids
in general as a trace of Pharaonic past, which has led to some highly innovative theories
considering saintly figures who are seen as Christianised or Islamised Pharaonic deities.517
From a historical point of view, such theories are problematic on two levels. Firstly,
they lack hard evidence. Although it is reasonable to assume that a process of renaming
and reinterpreting gods/saints and holy sites has taken place to some extent, there is not
one single case of positive evidence of a Pharaonic pilgrimage turning Christian and,
later, Islamic. On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence for major ruptures in the
history of sacred sites: the Coptic cult of martyrs and saints, for example, emerged in a
violent confrontation with the old Egyptian and Roman religions.518 And since the 7th
century, the tradition of Coptic pilgrimages has developed parallel to the Muslim
tradition, making it very difficult to determine the origin of syncretistic elements. Some
Muslim shrines do share a location with ancient temples, most notably so the mosque
of SÐdÐ AbÙ l-ÍaÊÊÁÊ al-UqÒurÐ that stands on top of the Luxor Temple, or, to be more
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precise, on top of a church that was built into the temple in the 7th century A.D.519 This
case is an example of undebatable continuity in location, but it does not prove
continuity of practice or meaning. Concerning practice, there is a gap, centuries long, in
the religious use of the site: the church was built in the 7th century, long after the temple
had fallen out of use. More importantly, the act of replacing a temple by a church, and
a church by a mosque is a demonstration of discontinuity much more than it is an
expression of continuity. It means to occupy a place that is recognised to be sacred and
to change its meaning by physically (demolishing) or symbolically (building a mosque
over a temple and a church) defeating the earlier tradition. The sanctity of the holy place
may be continuous, but such continuity does not extend to the meaning of the site or the
rituals performed there. And as Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen has argued in her study of the
Muslim saints of Egypt, the boats are not much in the way of evidence either. In a
country where the river Nile was the most feasible route of travel before the construction
of the railway, the boat is a potent symbol of gratitude for good fortune and safe arrival.
Boats can be found at festive processions all over Egypt and need not have any
connection to the ancient cult of Amun.520
Furthermore, the search for ‘traces’ contributes very little to the understanding of the
significance of these practices to the people involved. SÐdÐ AbÙ l-ÍaÊÊÁÊ is not ‘really’
Amun. For the people who put on the festival, he is a Muslim friend of God. Even if the
boats of today could be traced back to the boats of Amun, and if the saints were heirs of
ancient  god-kings, this still would contribute little to an understanding of what mawlids
are about.521
If one is to look seriously for pre-Islamic continuities in mawlids, then one should
look not at the festive sites and rituals but at the much more diffuse field of festive
culture. While a continuity in the sense of concrete ‘traces’ surviving to the present
should be judged with utmost scepticism, there is credible evidence for a tradition of
festive culture characterised by a dramatic reversal of the everyday and/or an ambivalent
combination of piety and amusements documented in the critical commentaries of some
contemporaries, for example by archimandrite ŠenÙda of Atripe who in the 5th century
A.D. expressed his indignation with the pilgrims’ behaviour in and around the church.
‘To go to the shrine of a martyr, to pray, to read, to sing psalms, to be sanctified, to
partake of the Eucharist in the fear of Christ is well and good... But to talk, to eat and to
drink, to frolic, or rather, shall I say to fornicate, and to commit murder as a result of
drinking and lewdness and brawls, with complete stupidity, that is lawlessness. While
some are indoors, singing psalms, reading, taking communion, others outside fill the
place with the din of trumpets and pipes... Ye have we made the house of God a place to
sell honey in, and bracelets. Ye have we made the shrines into prowling grounds for your
cattle, race tracks for your donkeys and your horses [...] There are many who go to the
shrines for the purpose of polluting the temple of God and making the members of
Christ harlot members, instead of keeping them holy and free from all defilement,
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whether it be a man or a woman... Do not make visits to the shrines of the martyrs the
occasion of destroying your flesh in the tombs round about them, or in the buildings near
by, or in the corners inside them...’522
Some six hundred years later, a document from the Cairo Geniza, paraphrased by
Goitein, describes the restrictive measures taken, probably in the early 11th century, by
the rabbis of the Jewish community to discipline the annual pilgrimage to DammÙh,
expressed in a tone of some striking likeness to admonitions of behaviour exhibited or
perceived to take place at present-day mawlids.
‘1. All should attend solely for devotion. No merrymaking would be tolerated.
2. Marionette shows and similar entertainments are not permitted.
3. No beer should be brewed there.
4. No visitor should be accompanied by [a Gentile] (this and other additions and gaps are
by Goitein) or an apostate.
5. No woman should be admitted except when accompanied by [a father, a husband,] a
brother, or a grown-up son, unless she is a very old woman.
6. The synagogue building should be respected and revered like any other synagogue.
7. Boys, or a grown-up man together with a boy, should not [...], in order to expose
themselves to suspicion and make for themselves for a bad name.
8. Both men and women should take utmost care not to desecrate the Sabbath in any way.
9. Playing chess and [...] is forbidden.
10. Likewise games like ‘watermelon and clay’, and [...].
11. Making noise by hitting something with a bang or clasping hands is disapproved.
12. No instrumental music.
13. No dancing.
14. On Sabbath water should be drawn from the well only when needed for drinking.
15. Men should not mix with women, nor come near them [...], nor are they permitted to
look at them.
16. In the synagogue women should pray in the gallery upstairs and men in the hall
downstairs, as is established by ancient custom, sunna.’523
It is not clear whether this Jewish pilgrimage was a predecessor or successor of the
Muslim cult of saints: Goitein assumes that this celebration was influenced by the
Fatimid mawlid an-nabÐ celebrations, but this a problematic assumption because the
Fatimid mawlid was largely a state celebration at that time. (see below pp. 164-165) What
is certain, however, is that there were local pilgrimages in the Fatimid period and before
it, and that they were characterised by a mixture of devotion and amusements. Whether
this festive atmosphere was actually transferred from earlier pilgrimages to Islamic
mawlids remains speculative, however. Such atmosphere is characteristic of pilgrimages
in various locations around the globe,524 and may have been reinvented several times in
the course of history.
A third example is nawrÙz, a festivity that is better documented and especially
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interesting in terms of continuity because it declined in Egypt around the same time
mawlids emerged. Held in early September when the Nile flood reached its peak (and thus
possibly a predecessor of the later wafÁÞ an-NÐl), nawrÙz was a wild carnivalesque
celebration displaying, among other spectacles, transvestites, a masquerade, and a false
king.525 It appears to have emerged in Egypt shortly before or after the Islamic conquest
and flourished throughout the middle ages until its decline and disappearance in the 15th
century.526 The carnivalesque celebrations and the reversal of the everyday in the
mediaeval nawrÙz clearly reminds us of the craftsmen’s processions in today’s mawlids,
but compared to the frantic and even violent celebrations of nawrÙz, mawlids display
(and always displayed) a different atmosphere in which a great deal of merriment and
some degree of inversion of the everyday is legitimised and simultaneously limited by the
sacred occasion and location of the festivity.
The available historical evidence suggests that the union of spiritual and carnivalesque
elements typical to mawlids may well be a continuity of earlier festive traditions. But it
would be a fallacy to conclude that mawlids themselves are a continuation of earlier
festivities. Continuity in festive practice must be understood as a constant dynamic
transformation that, from a historical point of view, makes it impossible to single out
specific ‘traces’. Like all culture, festive culture erases and rewrites pre-existing customs,
leaving the historian with vague moments of likeness at best.
Nevertheless, the search for traces and continuities of ancient Egypt at mawlids
remains a highly popular enterprise because it is a powerful way to give a specific
meaning to the festivities. For one thing, the very idea of something being preserved by
successive generations over thousands of years has great aesthetic and emotional appeal.
Secondly, it goes hand in hand with the temporal distancing of mawlids and many other
communal traditions that is central to their modernist exclusion (see above p. 127).
Finally, in this interpretation, mawlids appear as an expression of an unchanging
Egyptian identity: ‘Mawlids are not a religious but a national custom. The national
element is the core of the mawlid, while the religious element is subject to change.’527 This
interpretation allows the rehabilitation of mawlids as some of the most authentic
Egyptian culture while maintaining their position as an Other of modern society:
Because they are traced to the ancient past they are truly Egyptian and a part of national
heritage, but only as long as they are confined to the role of a trace separated from the
field of legitimate modern Islamic culture.
1.1.2. Fatimids
The same logic applies to a second theory on the origins of mawlids, stating that mawlids
were invented by the Fatimid dynasty. The Fatimids, of North African origin, belonged
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to the IsmÁÝÐlÐ branch of Shiite Islam and had a missionary drive great enough to
challenge the Sunnite Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad and establish a caliphate of their
own, first in North Africa and then in Egypt.528 Their ambitions of world domination
were never realised, but the dynasty did rule Egypt for 200 years, long enough to leave a
lasting mark on the country’s culture and religion. According to the theory, the Fatimid
rulers were determined to legitimise their rule in religious terms and to proselytise their
interpretation of Islam, and one of the instruments that served this goal were public
festivities. Following the cult of the family of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt) that is central to
Shiite Islam, the Fatimids constructed shrines (one of which still stands529) and
introduced celebrations to honour the Prophet, his family, and the ruling caliph. These
mawlids were celebrated with a banquet, recitation of the QurÞÁn, an appearance of the
caliph, and the distribution of food to the commoners.530 When ÑalÁÎ ad-DÐn al-AyÙbÐ
conquered Egypt in 1171, he erased the Fatimid dynasty, demolished their palaces, and
banned their doctrine from the institutions of religious learning. On a popular level,
however, the Fatimids left a lasting legacy in form of a widespread cult of ahl al-bayt and
festive traditions, most importantly the birthday of the Prophet and mawlids of the
saints.531
There is little doubt that the tradition of mawlids to some extent does date back to
the Fatimid era. The strongest case in point is the mawlid of al-Íusayn, the third Imam
and great martyr of Shiite Islam. His mawlid was among those celebrated by the Fatimid
court, and after the transport of al-Íusayn’s skull from ÝAsqalÁn to Cairo in 1156, his
shrine quickly developed into a major pilgrimage site.532 And certainly the love of ahl al-
bayt that is so central to Egyptian Sufi Islam does have a recognisably Shiite flavour. But
again caution is required, since the love of ahl al-bayt is a topos common to Sufi
spirituality all over the world.533 It is not clear to what extent it really is a local Fatimid
continuity and to what extent it has been transmitted through the trans-local tradition
of Sufism. After all, most mawlids were not established during the Fatimid era but much
later. Even the mawlid of the Prophet may have been discontinued for some time before
it was re-introduced in the 13th century as a Sunnite practice in Mecca, Irbil, and only
later in Egypt.534 Most importantly, however, the mawlids of the Fatimid era differed
significantly from  mawlids as we know them today. They were primarily celebrations of
the court, made by and for the ruling class. Commoners participated, if at all, as
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spectators and recipients of food distributed for the occasion.535
The Fatimids are exemplary of the complex nature of contemporary Egyptian
nationalist readings of history. Historiography in Egypt (and elsewhere) is often
anachronistic, projecting contemporary issues into history, searching for moments of
success and causes of failure, defining heroes and villains. Due to the unavoidably
contradictory nature of such anachronistic historiography, Fatimids, like Mamluks after
them, have come to play the role of both heroes and villains: heroes that turned Egypt
into one of the most important Islamic dynasties of the time, founded the city of Cairo
and the university of al-Azhar, and introduced many contemporary Egyptian Islamic
customs such as RamaÃÁn lanterns, mawlid an-nabÐ festivities, and the veneration of ahl
al-bayt, and villains that proselytised an IsmÁÝÐlÐ sectarian version of Islam, held the
ordinary Christian and Sunnite Muslim Egyptians under their yoke, and left behind a
range of bidaÝ that continue to influence the simple peoples’ minds until today. This
imagery has become a firm part of common knowledge that, due to its ambiguity, can
serve both as part of a critical argument – as was done by ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm in his critical
view of mawlids (pp. 80-81) – as well as a way to associate mawlids with the grand
religious and civilisational heritage of Egypt – as was done by the men who described the
mawlid of FÁÔima an-NabawÐya as the ‘national day of ad-Darb al-AÎmar’ (p. 63).
1.1.3. Sufis
If there is a precise moment of beginning at all for such a diverse and dynamic
custom as mawlids, then historical evidence supports locating it in the period between
the 14th and 16th centuries. Islamic mawlids similar to those we know today – popular
festivals at a saint’s shrine combining elements of pilgrimage and fair – are only
documented from the 15th century on. Their rise went hand in hand with that of
organised Islamic mysticism starting in the 13th century, which gave sainthood a new
quality as the burial sites of founders of orders became sites of celebration and
pilgrimage. These festivals were not Islamised Christian pilgrimages but developed
parallel with the mawlid an-nabÐ celebrations from which they borrowed their name and
many of their festive elements.536
The disadvantage of this theory, from the point of view of the modernist
representations of mawlids, is that it’s pan-Islamic and not specifically Egyptian. The
assumption implicit in stating that mawlids are a ‘national custom’ of Pharaonic and/or
Fatimid origin is that mawlids are a specifically Egyptian tradition not observed
elsewhere in the Muslim world. Interestingly, the same assumption of locality is made
about Muslim pilgrimages in other parts of the world as well, notably in the case of Ýurs
celebrations in the Indian subcontinent that are commonly claimed to be heavily
influenced by Hinduism.537 In the Ýurs, pilgrims gather at the shrine of a Muslim saint in
166 Chapter Seven
538Troll (ed.), Muslim Shrines in India; de Tassy, Garcin, Muslim Festivals in India and Other
Essays, ed. and transl. M. Waseem, Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995; Saheb, S.A.A., ‘A “Festival of
Flags”: Hindu-Muslim devotion and the sacralising of localism at the shrine of Nagor-e-Sharif in
Tamil Nadu’, in Werbner/Basu (eds), Embodying Charisma, pp. 55-76; interview with ÕanÁÞullÁh,
a  Pakistani PhD student at al- Azhar and a devout Sufi and regular visitor of mawlids, Cairo, 13
August 2003.
539See ‘ZiyÁra’ in Encyclopaedia of Islam.
540For the very same reason, it is very well present in the Sufi apologetic discourse on mawlids.
See, e.g., AbÙ l-ÝAzÁÝim, al-IÎtifÁl bi-mawÁlid, p. 4; Idem, IslÁm aÒ-ÒÙfÐya huwa l-Îall, p. 157.
a celebration combining vows, miracles, Sufi Æikr, trade and popular amusements.538
There is enough similarity between Ýurs and the Egyptian mawlid to question the
exclusively local origin of these traditions. In fact, similar festivities are celebrated by
Muslims around the world, only under different names: mawsim in Morocco, ÎaulÐ in
east Africa and Îawl in Indonesia.539 Certainly all these festivities contain local
innovations and influences, but this should not tempt us to ignore their common
denominator, namely the pan-Islamic Sufi tradition with its high emphasis on sainthood
and significant tolerance for syncretisms.
This view is not current in Egypt –  and the same appears to be the case in many other
Muslim countries where similar festive traditions exist –  because it would cause
significant problems to both the criticism of mawlids as a Shiite innovation or pagan
trace and their affirmation as national heritage.540 The historiographies of mawlids are
an indication of their place in the imagery of the nation. To be legitimately represented
in the public sphere, mawlids have to be Egyptian. Even as authentic heritage, however,
mawlids are only allowed a legitimate presence in the imagery of nation in a specific
position.
1.2. Studying popular beliefs
The dissociations that exclude mawlids from the field of true culture also make it
possible to redefine them in ways that might not have been possible otherwise. Once
mawlids are removed from the field of orthodox religion and modern society, they can
be presented and judged in terms that put them in a new light. The two most important
and powerful (interrelated) ways to do so are the construction of mawlids as a part of
popular, heterodox religion and their representation as folklore.
1.2.1. The class of popular things
The public image of mawlids in Egypt is strongly connected to class. While the Sufi
pilgrims’ festive ideology constructs a spiritual unity without regard to class boundaries,
members of the modern middle and upper classes generally see mawlids as something
that is specific to peasants and the urban poor. Mawlids, in the hegemonic public
imagery, are generally categorised as ‘popular’ (šaÝbÐ), something specific to ‘the people’
(aš-šaÝb), lumped together with various other religious practices, beliefs and discourses
under the label of ‘popular beliefs’ (muÝtaqadÁt šaÝbÐya) or ‘popular religion’ (ad-dÐn aš-
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šaÝbÐ).541
These labels are commonly used as a scientific category for a number of beliefs,
including those related to mysticism, the cult of saints, mawlids and other festivals,
agricultural rites and rites of passage, magic, charismatic movements, etc.542 It is not clear
at all, however, what makes these things popular. While the attribute ‘popular’ clearly
refers to class,  it does so in a complex way that cannot be reduced to economic and
social structure.543
Class, we must note, is a complex and ambiguous term that requires some
clarification. First, we have a Marxist notion of class as a group of people sharing a
specific position within the relations of production. While this is a very common
definition of class, it is not directly relevant in the present context. Second, class can be
defined, following Pierre Bourdieu, as the position, marked by habitus, of individuals
and groups in the symbolic structure of society.544 Third, class can be defined in a logical
sense as a classification, the class of things sharing specific distinctive characteristics.
Implied by but more specific than the second definition, this definition highlights the
act of classification. In the following, I use the term ‘class’ to refer to symbolic position
marked by habitus, and the terms ‘class of’ or ‘classification’ to refer to class in the logical
sense.
The conceptual classification ‘popular’ emerged in Arabic usage in the first half of the
20th century. Earlier linguistic distinctions mainly differentiated between elites (ÌÁÒÒa)
and commoners (ÝÁmma). Only with the rise of nationalism and the reception of French
social theories (it is worth noting that šaÝbÐ is almost exactly synonymous with French
populair) did ‘the people’ and ‘popular’ develop into the complex category they are today.
By 1948, in ÝAbd al-LaÔÐf’s as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, the category of popular beliefs appears
fully developed as the class of heterodox religious beliefs that express the consciousness
of the common people.545 The term has become widely used in academic, artistic and daily
usage since the Nasserist period when popular culture was constructed as a part of Arab
nationalist identity and folklore emerged as a subject of academic research and public
sector artistic production in service of the nationalist project.546 Nevertheless the term has
remained contested, and not everyone uses it, notably so Sayyid ÝUways (1913-1989),
author of Letters to al-ImÁm aš-ŠÁfiÝÐ, which is frequently referred to as a standard work on
popular religion.547 ÝUways had good reason to avoid speaking of ‘popular religion’, for
it is a vague and problematic category indeed. In fact, all models of popular beliefs fail
to provide evidence for their existence as an objective field in society and religion.
The most common approach to popular beliefs describes it as a field of heterodox,
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mystical and ecstatic piety of the lower classes that is attached to but not part of religion,
“a system parallel to religion, a parareligion.’548 As such, this interpretation suggests, it is
distinct from the scholarly and legalistic official religion, spontaneous, and anti-
intellectual, and therefore especially attractive to  subaltern classes often framed as ‘the
simple people’.549 A more subtle reading of this view, presented for example by ÝIÒÁm
FawzÐ (see above pp. 76 and 152), focusses on socially embedded religious discourse and
distinguishes between a scriptural, dogmatic and clearly defined discourse of ‘scriptural
religiosity’ and a pragmatic and open ‘popular discourse on religion’.550
The major problem of both approaches is that the classes of ‘popular’ and ‘official’
are themselves not problematised. ‘The people’ are taken to be a fixed category, but this
is not substantiated by evidence. The description of a dichotomy between ÝulamÁÞ and
Sufis that continues to enjoy remarkable popularity among Muslim and Orientalist
scholars alike is in fact falsified by historical evidence. The generalisation of the present-
day conflict between Sufis and Salafis into a central fault line within Islam is a common
but anachronistic enterprise. Recent scholarship on Islamic history indicates that despite
tensions, a clear dichotomy has seldom existed. On the contrary, ecstatic mysticism and
scholarship have often been closely interconnected, and remain so to date.551 The
description of popular beliefs as the piety of the poor and marginalised is based on a
model of class that does not accurately describe the way such classifications work in
practice. The image commonly offered by the media and intellectuals is that the typical
Sufi, or participant in a mawlid, or pilgrim to a saint’s shrine is a poor and illiterate
villager. This image is not empirically accurate, however. Participation in religious rituals
that are generally described as ‘popular’ shows only a weak correlation to income or place
of origin, although it does have a high correlation to educational capital.552 ÝIÒÁm FawzÐ
successfully avoids  most of these problems by focussing on specific ways of speaking of
and practising religion, and yet one key problem remains also in his work: What does it
actually mean for a thing, a practice, a concept or a person to be ‘popular’?.
The contradictions resulting from the scientific use of this commonsense term553
become clear when we look at actual religious practice: People do not really distinguish
between their practice of, say, mawlids and Friday prayers as belonging to different
subsystems. Despite this fact, a mawlid is ‘popular’ and a Friday prayer is not, although
the latter enjoys much wider popularity among Egyptian Muslims. Characteristic of
almost all definitions of ‘popular religion’, ‘popular beliefs’, etc. is that they are
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dissociated from many practices central to the religious practice of ordinary Muslims.554
They go to Friday prayers, save money for a pilgrimage to Mecca and believe in
Judgement Day and Paradise, but for some reason, none of this is popular. This
contradiction was highlighted in a comment from the audience at a conference on
popular religion: If there really was such thing as popular religion, wouldn’t this imply
the existence of two separate creeds (ÝaqÐdatayn)?555
1.2.2. What makes beliefs popular
If there is, from an empirical point of view, no such thing as popular religion, then
what does the category actually refer to? The classification ‘popular’ has, of course, to do
with ‘the people’, a collective entity by no means unequivocally defined. Much of the
ambiguity of the classification ‘popular’ is due to the equivocal character of ‘the people’,
meaning simultaneously the collective body of the nation and the non-elites. 
First, the attribute ‘popular’ is part of the political idiom of parliamentary
representation, suggesting the legitimation of political actors, institutions and policies
through a reference to ‘the people’. Second, the attribute ‘popular’ denotes mainly rural
pre-modern traditional culture: traditional customs and proverbs, communal and mystic
religious practice, folk arts, and the lifestyle associated with villages and historic urban
districts. Third, the attribute refers to mainly urban contemporary lower-class culture and
low quality: informal settlements, cheap domestic food, a genre of music favoured at
weddings, boulevard press, domestic cigarettes.
To characterise something as popular is to associate it with a specific type of habitus.
People who live in a popular district or village, speak a countryside dialect or an urban
lower-class slang, demonstrate traditional communal values in their lives, or wear
traditional Egyptian clothes don a popular habitus. The ambiguity of the popular habitus
becomes clear if we compare it with another, related category, namely that of ibn/bint al-
balad. Although ‘popular’ and baladÐ are synonymous in some cases, there are clear
differences in the use of the two terms. To be an ibn al-balad is to practice a traditional
urban way of life. The classification baladÐ gains its meaning through the schematic
opposition of traditional Egyptian and modern Western-influenced (afranÊÐ) lifestyle.
This bestows the ibn al-balad with a solid degree of authenticity, not only as a positive
self-description but also through the use of the term in modernist discourse in the sense
of the raw material of nationalist high culture.556  Unlike baladÐ, the category ‘popular’
has no fixed reference or clearly defined counterpart.557 Characterised by a strong
ambiguity, descriptive as well as normative, ‘popular’ is not necessarily related to
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al-Wafd, 31.1.1998.
560See, e.g., IbrÁhÐm, BidaÝ wa-ÌurÁfÁt an-nisÁÞ; Tapper, Nancy / Richard Tapper, ‘The Birth of
the Prophet: Ritual and Gender in Turkish Islam, Man 22 (1987), 1, pp. 69-92.
traditional lifestyle the way baladÐ is. Thus it can mean ‘authentic’ at times and ‘vulgar’
at others, and it often means both at once.
Popular beliefs are a relational category defined along a number of schematic
distinctions. Firstly, poor people are expected to have popular beliefs while the middle
classes and the rich are not. This distinction, seemingly self-evident, is neither a sufficient
nor a necessary condition, however. Let us think, for example, of university students who
might live in extremely poor conditions but who often are very eager to define mawlids
as traditional and popular and themselves as modern and educated. The lack of economic
capital becomes important only when connected to other distinctive characteristics.
Secondly, people who have low educational capital are expected to have popular
beliefs. Due to their (alleged) lack of formal education and scriptural knowledge of
religion, people visiting shrines and participating in mawlid festivals are described as
‘simple people’ (busaÔÁÞ) lacking the consciousness that is key to middle class modernist
habitus.558 Oral traditions, but also heterodox interpretations of the scripture, tend to be
popular because of their low symbolic capital vis-a-vis the established educational system
(secular as well as religious) and the legitimate paradigms of reading the scripture. A case
in point are intellectual movements within Sufism that are not considered popular
although much of Sufi practice often is.559
Thirdly, women’s religious practice is much more likely to be popular than men’s.
Egypt is a society with relatively strong gender segregation and many religious practices
are predominantly male (prayer in the mosque, QurÞÁn recitation) or female (shrine
visitation, healing and fertility rituals). Since religious scholarship  and leadership – and
thus the production of religious truth – also happen to be male domains, typically female
practices are very likely to become marginalised.560 The same applies to practices that
relativise gender boundaries, as is the case at mawlids.
Fourthly, popular beliefs are not modern–or to be precise, not modern the way
Egyptian modernists would like it. The social milieu of popular beliefs is typically that
of a village or an old city district. The bodily disposition of popular practices is
ambivalent and emotional, and does not respect the boundaries central to the modernist
or reformist habitus of the self.
Fifthly, popular beliefs are not heterodox vis-a-vis ‘official religion’, but rather plainly
religion. Claiming that ‘mawlids have nothing to do with religion’ (see above p. 128) is a
strong expression of this distinction. Religion, in the hegemonic reading, is a system that
is coherent and rationalised, based on authoritative sources and consisting of pre-defined
sacred rites, a precisely sanctioned habitus of religious self, and a metaphysical, ethical
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562See Bourdieu, Distinction, pp. 168 ff.; Theory of Practice, pp. 15 ff.
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Challenge of Modernity (Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam; 1), Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1998, pp. 87-
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and possibly political doctrine. Yet because religious practice is not actually shaped
according to such a tight definition, the category of popular beliefs conveniently serves
to remove syncretisms, innovation, incoherence, and problematic bodily dispositions
from the field of orthodox religion.561
‘Popular’ is a relational category based on a general scheme of hegemonic, orthodox,
‘high’ culture as opposed to marginal, heterodox, ‘low’ culture.562 ‘Popular beliefs’ is the
class of all religious practices and conceptions that are perceived to be in a marginal
and/or illegitimate position vis-a-vis public, hegemonic definitions of habitus, gender,
civility and religion. This means that while popular religion is essentially defined as
heterodox, not all heterodoxy is popular: Atheism, for example, is not, because atheist
intellectuals fulfill other key criteria of inclusion in the public sphere. Following the
same logic, popular beliefs are also not identical with the religiosity of peasants, urban
poor, women or the illiterate. Insofar as their religious practice follows the scheme of the
legitimate, hegemonic sense of religion–which often is the case–their’s is plain religion,
not popular.563
1.2.3. From a classification to a thing
The attribute ‘popular’ in its commonsense use denotes the specific relation of a
practice towards hegemonic social practices. Popular beliefs are neither a field nor a
system, but a class of things that share a similar position in the symbolic structure of
social space. As soon as this common sense is embedded into intellectual and scientific
discourses we find that a tendency to reify this classification emerges. Although no one
actually practices popular religion as a distinct practice with distinct logic, the term is
nevertheless widely viewed as an objective, distinct category. Popular religion becomes an
independent thing with a position in social space.
This moment of reification is only possible through a gaze from above. The term
‘popular beliefs/religion’ is, although used in all classes of Egyptian society, a
classification produced through hegemonic practices of representation. Those who study,
classify and describe popular culture do not themselves belong to the ‘popular classes’
(ÔabaqÁt šaÝbÐya). They are journalists, intellectuals, anthropologists, religious scholars,
politicians, etc. who construct popular religion as a cultural and social Other. The choice
for them is not between including or excluding mawlids, but between different forms of
exclusion:
‘The millions of people who believe in the miracles of saints and circle around
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article is part of a special feature that is unique among Egyptian representations of mawlids
because it takes a pan-Arab perspective looking at not only Egypt but also Syria, Lebanon, Iraq,
Sudan and Morocco. The reason for this is that al-AhrÁm al-ArabÐ, a glossy magazine expensive by
Egyptian standards,  is produced mainly for international circulation.
565See, e.g., ÝAlÐ, ÝArafa ÝAbduh, MawÁlid MiÒr al-MaÎrÙsa, Cairo: al-ÝAyn li-d-dirÁsÁt wa-l-buÎÙ×
al-ÐÊtimÁÝÐya, 1995, pp. 7 f.
566Sonbol/Atia, Mulid!, pp. 7-8. See also ÑiyÁm, ad-DÐn aš-šaÝbÐ, pp. 210 f.; FahmÐ, DÐn al-ÎarÁfÐš,
p. 18; ÝUways: ‘RasÁÞil’ pp. 306, 313--314.
567See above p. 123-124.
shrines and mawlids [...] express a religion that many call “popular religion” or
the religion of the commoners and the simple people, while others see it as an
embodiment of the elements of ignorance and backwardness in the Arab world.’564
In this account, the option of these beliefs being simply a form of Islamic piety is not
available. Whatever mawlids are, they are not the stuff true modern culture and piety are
made of. The construction of mawlids as an expression of popular beliefs is one of the
many dissociations constitutive of the imagery and habitus of modernism and
reformism. This label is different from others (such as ignorance and backwardness),
however, because of its normative ambiguity. It makes it possible to view mawlids as
authentic heritage and to subject them to scientific study as folk culture while upholding
their exclusion from the hegemonic definitions of religion and nation.565 By their virtue
of being popular, i.e. marginal, mawlids are denied becoming a full and legitimate part
of the imagery of modern society. Only as long as they remain marginal and exotic may
they be appreciated as traces of the ancient past, as part of a nostalgic image of village life,
or as aesthetic spectacles.
This act of classification often goes entirely unquestioned in the representations of
mawlids as popular religion, so for example in a photo book on mawlids whose author
categorically states with a certainty typical to the middle-class modernist common sense
that mawlids, of course, do not have anything to do with real religion:
‘The mulid is often mistakenly labeled a Muslim religious event. It is actually more of a
cultural phenomenon, a community ritual that has been continuously practiced in Egypt
since pharaonic times. 
[...] 
The idea of patron shaykhs is foreign to mainstream, moderate Islam, whose precepts
teach that there is no need for an intermediary, such as a saint or a priest, between human
beings and God. 
[...]
The shaykh’s feasts that dot the average Egyptian’s social calendar remain a mystery to
wealthier, more modernised citizens of this ancient land, as well as to a growing number
of urban and rural Muslims who have come to understand that such celebrations actually
go against the grain of religion.’566
This account bears witness to and simultaneously solves the ambivalence central to the
perception of many Egyptians who find mawlids fascinating and troubling in the same
instance. By defining mawlids as a ‘community ritual’, Tarek Atia is able to exclude them
from the field of religion and bestow them with a potential of authenticity and cultural
value at the same time. This does not automatically imply a positive judgement of
mawlids – we must remember that the classification ‘popular’ first emerged as a term of
exclusion in service of a critical discourse on mystical piety,567 and until today much of
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568The polemic character of some of the academic publications on mawlids is assisted by the
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of the Sufi chains of initiation: ÝAbd al-QÁdir al-ÉÐlÁnÐ, AÎmad ar-RifÁÝÐ, AÎmad al-BadawÐ and
IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ.
571ÝAlÐ, MawÁlid MiÒr al-maÎrÙsa, p. 7.
572E.g. Cairo Times, 19/2000; Cairo Magazine, 10-16.3.2005.
the research on mawlids is characterised by a critical, at times polemical tone.568 But
classification as popular beliefs effectively establishes popular things as separate objects
that are, by definition, distinct from religion and modern society and can, hence, be
studied and appreciated as such independently of their status regarding religion and
modernity. This normative ambiguity of ‘popular beliefs’, often framed in academic
studies as an analytical division into positive and negative aspects,569 permits the view of
mawlids as an element of popular heritage, that is, something with a positive function
and purpose but subordinate to the construction of great heritage.
An important consequence of objectifying popular culture is that its public image,
once dissociated from modern culture, grows increasingly exotic. Once-a-year spectacular
events as they are, mawlids appear fascinating and exotic even for those who have grown
up with them. But the exotic character of the festive experience is quite different from the
exotic representation of the festivity. The exotic character of the mawlid as a festive
experience is founded in its festive time that exists as a promise throughout months of
everyday hard work and as a periodic climax of joy and celebration. It is exotic to non-
festive daily practice but not to the overall life experience and social order it is part of.
The situation is very different, however, in studies on popular religion and folklore, and
in newspaper articles and the accounts of intellectuals who go to see mawlids as an
interesting cultural artifact, a fascinating trace of the past.
‘In this study I have aimed to present a comprehensive view of the reality in order to learn
to know a world with the colours of the banners, flags, lights, legends, maÊÆÙbs, sultans,
quÔbs,570 sessions of Sufi hymns, and a magnificent popular heritage!
I travelled around in time and space, the heart impatient for a gaze, the mind thirsty
for knowledge. How much there is to see in this magic and amazing world! And what I
saw was more exciting and surprising than I could have imagined!’571
It is not a coincidence that this exotic view of mawlids as a time and place far away,
waiting to be  explored by the glance of the intellectual is especially popular in the
English language press directed at foreigners and Egyptian upper classes. These usually
glossy magazines regularly run features on mawlids, sometimes in more analytical tone572
but often in a sensational, almost voyeuristic style searching for the extraordinary and
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the scandalous.573
What is striking in the exotic representation is how it makes mawlids seem somehow
removed from reality, as if taking place somewhere very far away, disconnected from
modern urban life. This exotic image of mawlids is a direct consequence of their criticism
and spatial and temporal exclusion. The political and intellectual elites of the country are
often highly uncomfortable with the public presence of mawlids, and the policies of
public mediation reflect this attitude. But as an exotic object, the mawlid is sanitised. The
exotic mawlid is, much like the ‘primitives’ of early 20th-century anthropology,
constructed by setting it apart in time and denying its coevalness574 with contemporary
society.  It appears as a strange  and different world inhabited by exotic and fantastic
creatures, not at all part of modern time and life, and hence no threat to it – provided
that it remains in its exotic, marginal position.
2. The product of representation
I have thus far concentrated on academic representations that try to rationalise the
ambivalence in the perception of mawlids by defining them as a distinct object  that can
be analytically divided into positive and negative aspects. But the picture will not be
complete without looking at practices of representation that, building on the distinction
described above, reinvent the mawlid as an independent cultural artifact through its
reproduction as folklore and art, and the publicly mediated image of state celebrations.
These products of representation separate mawlids from their controversial and
troublesome character, with the consequence that they begin to live a life of their own,
increasingly independent of festive practice.
2.1. Folklore
In its contemporary Arabic usage, the term folklore refers to popular (šaÝbÐ) culture
insofar as it can be reconstructed as artistic or civilisational heritage: various genres of
popular music, colloquial epics, poetry, proverbs, puppet theatre plays, and rural arts and
crafts. As folklore, they are collected and reproduced in books, films, theatre plays and
public events, re-contextualised and redefined.
Mawlids are a major source of folkloric research, and often are defined generally as
folklore. Yet the image of mawlids as folklore is quite different from their festive practice.
Mawlid as folklore is an artistic and aesthetic spectacle consisting of traditional music,
puppet theatre plays, acrobats and magicians, amusements, dancers and colourful lights.
It contains many elements that have largely disappeared from contemporary mawlids,
such as colloquial epics, female dancers and the qarÁÊÙz puppet theatre play, while other
elements central to contemporary mawlids, such as pilgrimage, Ìidmas, and rowdy youths,
are conspicuously absent.
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575See Armbrust, Mass Culture and Modernism, p. 107 where he argues that ‘folklore is safest as
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576Perhaps for this reason, many Egyptian academics whom I encountered in my fieldwork
automatically assumed that I was doing research on folklore, implying that folklore is the only
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encapsulation of folklore, see FawzÐ, ‘ÀlÐyÁt al-haymana wa-l-muqÁwama’, p. 134.
577Interview with Sheikh YÁsÐn at-TuhÁmÐ, Cairo, 10 October 2002 (interview in cooperation
with MuÎammad SaÝd ŠiÎÁta).
578ÑuÝÙbÐya was a movement in the early period of Islam which denied a privileged position  to
the Arabs (Enderwitz, S., ‘ShuÝÙbÐya’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., Leiden: Brill, vol. 9, pp. 513-
516). Al-ÉundÐ uses this term as a denunciatory label for all intellectual currents that question the
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Most importantly however, folklore is re-contextualised: Sufi music, puppet theatre
and popular epics are reproduced for a public that won’t go to mawlids but will go to the
theatre and concerts. In their original context, epics, songs, and performances are part of
a spectacle without footlights in which  performers and audiences stand in close
interaction and the aesthetic value of artistic production is not separated from the
religious and moral content of the stories that are told, from the ritual in which they are
embedded, or from the lives of the participants. As folklore, however, they are at once
reduced and elevated to art. Even as folkloric art, however, mawlids are not included in
the realm of ‘real’ high culture. The very definition of folklore implies that it is legitimate
only on the condition that it remains in a culturally subordinate position.575
Folklore represents a strategy to handle the ambivalence so characteristic to all things
‘popular’, at one moment authentic and fascinating, the next vulgar and threatening. As
folklore, mawlids can be appreciated as aesthetic items without having to appreciate the
rituals, the lives and the morals to which they were originally bound. As art, they lose the
disturbing impact that real life in popular districts often has on many members of the
upper and middle classes. As a subject of study, they can be appreciated as national
heritage regardless of their problematic status vis-a-vis hegemonic definitions of religion
and modernity. Unlike the anthropological study of popular religion embedded in a
number of political and religious conflicts, folklore is clearly located on the safe side of
the nationalist mission of the social sciences, exploring the national heritage and identity
in the relatively peaceful realm of art and literature.576
Yet folklore has not remained uncontested. Just like people who go to mawlids refuse
to see their religiosity as popular, Sufi singers refuse to see their art as folklore. Well aware
of the inherently marginal position of folklore, Sheikh YÁsÐn at-TuhÁmÐ, Egypt’s most
prominent munšid who can be seen on national television mostly on the programme
FunÙn šaÝbÐya (Popular Arts)  stresses that his performance is a religious mission and not
folklore.577 From a different perspective, folklore is criticised by people who see it as a way
to rehabilitate false cultural influences that pollute true Egyptian Islamic heritage. This
point is most radically expressed by the Islamist intellectual Anwar al-ÉundÐ (1917-2002)
who views folklore as one of the many conspiracies against Islam:
‘The call for the revival of popular heritage (folklore) belongs to the most dangerous calls
for Westernisation, šuÝÙbÐya,578 and the cultural offensive [against Islam] in the modern
age. The forces of Zionism and colonialism have mobilised for it many pens, subsidised
it with great sums of money, held for it conferences and meetings, and published about
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it books and papers. The scope of this call has extended to include the field of arts in their
entirety (dance, narrative, and song) from the stance of colloquial word, naïve thought,
and long past pagan customs that are opposed to the loftiness of the Islamic-Arabic
heritage that is based on eloquent thought, clear expression and fundamental values.579
In a less radical tone, many Egyptian modernists affirm that while folklore is certainly
legitimate national heritage, as far as mawlids are concerned, ‘I don’t recognise these
things as real heritage’;580 ‘they are not real popular folklore’.581 This is a good reminder
of the selective nature of categories such as heritage, folklore, or popular culture:
although they are the product of modernist exclusion, they have to be  exclusive as well
to maintain their potential of authenticity. Categories such as ‘vulgarity’ serve to keep
folk heritage clean of all the disturbing parts of popular culture: commercial mass
culture, abusive language, the subversion of religion and morals, and a range of other
things that for various reasons appear too troublesome to fit into the idealised image of
popular heritage.582
2.2. Artistic production
The most complex representations of mawlids can be found, not surprisingly, in the field
of artistic production. Although the modernist tradition of progressive elitism has been
strongly present among Egyptian artists and intellectuals throughout the 20th century,
it has not lead to a uniform imagery of mawlids in works of art. This is partly due to the
open, complex character of artistic production itself, and partly related to the gradual
loss of modernism’s hegemony as an artistic style since the 1980s. 
The themes of the modernist criticism of mawlids and their re-invention as popular
culture, are strongly present in artistic production. With this background, mawlids
appear in a double role: on the one hand a colourful moment of festivity that brings
together different people in an exotic/authentic popular setting, and on the other hand
a projection of social problems. Yet in artistic production these themes often take on
more complex forms than in the publicly mediated academic, religious and political
debates.
Using the themes of mawlids and the veneration of saints to discuss social problems
is most strongly present in literary fiction, in which the tradition of progressive elitism
has also long been strongest. ÝAbd al-ÍakÐm QÁsim’s The Seven Days of Man (see above
pp. 130-131) and The Saint’s Lamp583 (QindÐl Umm HÁšim) by YaÎyÁ ÍaqqÐ are perhaps the
most prominent examples of this theme, bringing together autobiographic elements,
concern for the progress of society, and the ambivalent experience of the modernised but
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alienated intellectual.584 They are both also characterised by a mixture of criticism,
nostalgia, and sympathy for the communal religious experience: in The Seven Days of Man
through the strong feeling of loss that permeates the book, and in The Saint’s Lamp
through the end in which the hero finally manages to find a way to reconcile religion585
with his European rationalist education. In a more distanced and satirical way, the topic
of mawlids has also been used as a metaphor for entirely different social issues, so for
example in YÙsuf ÝAwf’s theatre play Mawlid SÐdÐ al-MurÝib586 in which people mistake a
displaced nuclear reactor for a saint’s tomb and begin to celebrate a mawlid in honour
of SÐdÐ AbÙ Åarra (‘father of atom’) with fatal results. Mawlid SÐdÐ al-MurÝib is a dark
comedy in which ridiculing popular beliefs serves as a frame to criticise naïve trust in
nuclear power and ignorance of its dangers.587
The use of mawlids for colourful, exotic scenery is especially common in cinema and
photography. Often this very closely follows folkloric imagery, producing an exotic,
colourful image of mawlids that is characterised by a clear distance to its subject. An
outstanding example is the film MÙlid yÁ dunyÁ588 (1975) in which a group of young petty
thieves is re-socialised as a folklore troupe. The mawlid is reduced to dance and folklore,
and it is striking how much the film follows the (then) hegemonic sense of popular
culture, not only showing mawlid as folkloric art (in a style strikingly abstracted from the
art that can actually be found at mawlids) but also showing folklore in the service of
social development. But the mawlid in the cinema also has a more complex function: it
can serve as the place and occasion in which different kinds of people can come together.
This element is central to the beginning of Driven from Paradise (ÓarÐd al-firdaws, 1965)589
when a Sufi sheikh (played by FarÐd ŠawqÐ) meets a dancer girl at a mawlid, dies of a heart
attack while having sinful thoughts of her and, after being denied entrance to both
paradise and hell, returns to earth to begin a new life. The mawlid in Driven from Paradise
is set more realistically than in MÙlid yÁ DunyÁ and has more layers: The mawlid is
characterised by its open and complex character as the place where all elements of society
come together in an atmosphere of piety and flirtation, virtually the only event in which
a sheikh and a dancer might meet.
The predominant image of mawlids in photography is also that of a colourful and
exotic parallel world characterised by striking colours and inhabited by eccentric people.
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Goose Press, 1992; for NabÐl BuÔrus, see Hamani, Laziz et al., Impressions d’Afrique du Nord. Paris:
Institut du Monde Arabe, 1998; for Nermine Hammam, see Karnouk, Liliane, Modern Egyptian Art,
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591Armbrust, Mass Culture and Modernism.
592il-MÙlid  (Lost in the Moulid), SamÐr Sayf (director), with ÝÀdil ImÁm, YusrÁ et al., Egypt 1989.
Image 25:
Sherif Sonbol: 
The RifÁÝÐ procession.
From Sonbol / Atia, 
MÙlid! 
Carnivals of Faith 
(colour original).
This imagery is most strongly present in features published in glossy magazines and in
the photo book by Sherif Sonbol Mulid! Carnivals of Faith (1999). These images, colourful
and vivid as they usually are, do not actually bring the mawlid closer to the reader,
however. On the contrary, they contribute to the distance of their object, constructed as
an exotic world into which the reader, in almost voyeuristic manner, can peek without
risking  further involvement. This style is not the choice of all photographers, however.
The photographs of Niek Biegman, NabÐl BuÔrus and Nermine Hammam590 show
intimate and unspectacular imageries of mawlids. Not only do they demonstrate that the
spectacular and exotic style of photographing mawlids is determined by a specific way
of viewing them rather than related to the nature of the festivals themselves, they also
show how the dynamics of artistic production can shift the focus of representation and
the message carried by it.
The most important shift in focus does not originate in the field of fine arts, however,
but in commercial mass culture. Artistic production in Egypt has been closely connected
to modernism, which, as Walter Armbrust has shown, is not only a cultural discourse but
also an aesthetic convention supported by public sector cultural institutions.591 Since the
1980s, the hegemony of modernism in the field of artistic production has become
contested by commercial mass culture with different aesthetics and a different political
agenda. So for example in the action/melodrama film Lost in the Moulid (il-MÙlid, 1989)592
in which the hero BarakÁt (played by ÝÀdil ImÁm), the son of pious peasant parents, is
kidnapped as a small child by a thief in the mawlid of as-Sayyida Zaynab, grows up as a
petty thief and makes a career as a mafioso and businessman. After numerous adventures
he discovers his true identity and decides to marry AmÁra (played by YusrÁ) after finding
out that she is not his sister after all.
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Image 26: NabÐl BuÔrus: The mawlid of as-
Sayyida Zaynab, 1992. From Hamani et al.,
Impressions d’Afrique du Nord (black and
white original).
In Lost in the Moulid, the mawlid of as-
Sayyida Zaynab stands as a complex image
and metaphor. On one level, it carries the
connotations of popular religion, while
judgement of it is left open: BarakÁt’s
mother, who, desperate to find her son again
undertakes a pilgrimage to as-Sayyida Zaynab
every year, fits well to the image of the
simple and ignorant peasant woman visiting
shrines. But in the end her prayers are
answered and she does find BarakÁt. On
another level, the festival becomes a leading
motif for the entire plot. In many ways
similar to Driven from Paradise, the mawlid is
shown as the place where the pious and the
thief meet: where BarakÁt is kidnapped from
his simple but pious parents and where he,
returning from Cyprus as a rich
businessman, meets his (assumed) sister
again. Finally, the mawlid is the turning
point in the hero’s identity: there he, as a
child, loses his parents and even his name
(the old thief names him IbrÁhÐm and as a
businessman he calls himself ÇarÐb). In a
vision, the hero sees his mother and hears the sounds of the mawlid. And at the end of
the film, he associates the baraka of the mawlid with his return to a happy, honest and
simple life.
Lost in the Moulid works with a complex scale of representations that includes the
folkloric image but also goes beyond it: the mawlid is an ambiguous intersection, a point
of crossing between countryside and the city, the pious and the criminal, and a point of
transformation in the hero’s life: from peasant child to adolescent in an urban slum,
from criminal back to a (more or less) honest man. In a film that shows the new rich of
the 1980s as unscrupulous crooks, the mawlid becomes part of a social vision different
from that of ÝAbd al-ÍakÐm QÁsim or YaÎyÁ ÍaqqÐ: Instead of being the metaphor for
a problematic confrontation with traditional culture, the mawlid becomes the sign of the
‘good life’ BarakÁt returns to after a lifetime of crime.
2.3. The many lives of The Great Night
Yet not only the image an artist draws of mawlids is important for their public
representation. The public mediation of this image is equally if not more important, as
we can see in the case of the puppet theatre operetta The Great Night (al-Layla al-kabÐra),
written by ÑalÁÎ ÉÁhÐn (1930-1986) and composed by Sayyid MakkÁwÐ (1924-1997). First
performed in the 1960s and an enormous success throughout the decades, The Great Night
is the most famous piece of art depicting mawlids. Most Egyptians know parts of the
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(composer), performed by MasraÎ al-QÁhira li-l-ÝarÁÞis. Tape recording: Cairo: Sono Cairo, 1972.
Video CD of television production: Cairo: Flash Video Film, [1999]; for text of the play, see ÉÁhÐn,
ÑalÁÎ, al-layla al-kabÐra wa-Ìams masraÎÐyÁt, Cairo: Markaz al-AhrÁm li-t-tarÊama wa-n-našr, 1992,
pp. 9-17.
594al-Ahram Weekly, 3.1.2002: Amina Elbendary and Youssef Rakha, ‘Night of nights: Al-leila Al-
kabira comes to the Opera’.
595A dish similar to falafel but made of fava beans.
Image 27:
Cairo Puppet Theatre
performs The Great Night.
Cairo, August 2003.
songs by heart. The play is still regularly performed by the Cairo Puppet Theatre,
broadcast on television, and sold as cassette and video tapes.593 In 2001, The Great Night
entered the highest levels of the nationalist art world when a ballet adaptation of the play
was debuted in the Opera House.594
Like a mawlid, The Great Night does not have a clear narrative structure: it is a
cavalcade through the wonders of a mawlid, featuring children, pilgrims from the
countryside, a blind munšid, vendors offering a vast range of merchandise and
amusements, a Sufi procession, a beggar, a dancer girl, the qarÁÊÙz, a café owner and
customers, a circus director, an overconfident youth, a popular singer, women with their
children, and many others. The different voices of the mawlid come together as the
central theme of the play:
Voices:
‘AllÁh! AllÁh! AllÁh!’
‘Pastries with almonds!’
‘AllÁh! AllÁh! AllÁh!
‘ÓaÝmÐya!’595
‘AllÁh! AllÁh! AllÁh!’
‘QarÁÊÙz!’
‘AllÁh! AllÁh! AllÁh!’
QarÁÊÙz & choir:
‘It’s the great night, uncle, and there are masses of people
The tents are full, papa, from the countryside and the cities
Those are from Delta and those from Upper Egypt
Those are from the Canal and those from Rosetta
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596Quoted from the soundtrack of the theatre version.
597‘Brief Biography of Sayyid Mekkawi’, Zeryab Arabic Classical Music Forum, 28.1.2005,
http://www.4allofus.net/zeryab/showthread.php?t=2030, viewed 13.9.2005.
Image 28:
The ballet version
of The Great Night
performed at the 
Cairo Opera. 
Cairo Opera
Ballet Company, 
undated, ca. 2002.
It’s the great night, uncle, and there are masses of people’596
Like in the film Lost in the Moulid, the mawlid of The Great Night is not a marginal event.
It stands at the centre of society, collecting all kinds of people from all around the
country. Written by artists well-versed in the milieu of mawlids (Sayyid MakkÁwÐ began
his career as a munšid and QurÞÁn reciter, for which he carried the title of sheikh
throughout his life),597 The Great Night is a fantastic and yet realistic depiction of the
atmosphere of mawlids from changing perspectives, always funny but never arrogant. The
mawlid shown in The Great Night is not exotic, and yet it can become so when it is
detached from festive practice and turned into a cultural icon. Through its public
mediation The Great Night has come to represent mawlids as an exotic form of traditional
popular culture far from the world of the modern middle-class citizen.
I came to be part of such public mediation in May 2003 when I received a phone call
from a journalist working for Egyptian satellite television who wanted to interview me
for AyyÁm miÒrÐya, a programme that features foreigners who live and work in Egypt. The
interviews are recorded in places that are in some way connected to the life and work of
the people featured. I suggested as-Sayyida Zaynab Square, host to one of Cairo’s greatest
mawlids and many of my favourite cafés and restaurants, but the journalist who prepared
the interview with me considered it a not very suitable location and suggested that we go
to ËÁn al-ËalÐlÐ and al-Íusayn Square instead. I agreed and after some arrangements, the
interview was recorded in al-FÐšÁwÐ, a famous café located in the ËÁn al-ËalÐlÐ market,
one of Cairo’s main tourist attractions. In the interview we discussed my work, what had
brought me to this line of study, what my relationship to Egypt was, which side I took
in the national football league, and the like. Afterwards fill images were recorded in the
alleys of the market and in front of al-Íusayn mosque. In the final feature, the interview
was backed by fill images of the foreigner wandering through the colourful alleys of the
market looking at merchandise with an expression of curiosity and interest, all to the
tune of music every Egyptian would know: songs from The Great Night.
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The feature was well made, and in a fascinating way it managed to present mawlids
without actually showing anything from a mawlid. The person speaking was a foreigner
who discussed Egyptian popular culture with an Egyptian moderator who had never been
to a mawlid herself. The soundtrack was the classicist Arabic music in the style of the
1960s, not the music or sounds one would actually hear at a mawlid. The space was that
of Egypt’s showcase piece of old city: colourful, clean and expensive, well-secured and
organised to welcome tourists and upper class Egyptians. In short, the feature managed
to present a foreigner who studies a colourful and strange part of Egyptian culture
without showing anything that could possibly disturb the official image of Egypt as a
modern, orderly and at times exotic country.
Of course there were pragmatic reasons for doing the feature in this way. The music
of al-Layla al-kabÐra, good and famous as it is, was a likely choice to say the least. The
location of ËÁn al-ËalÐlÐ, a place accustomed to the presence of tourists and cameras, was
an easy place for a television crew to work – unlike places like as-Sayyida Zaynab where
the presence of a television crew would immediately trigger the overwhelming curiosity
of bystanders. But these pragmatic reasons actually point to much deeper forms of
representation and distinction. Television features are produced by middle-class
professionals with certain forms of first-hand knowledge and experience, combined with
the professional aesthetics of what looks good on television. When a foreigner finds
mawlids interesting the subject is elevated to a level of significance it might otherwise not
have. The Great Night is music everyone knows, and although the songs of a munšid like,
say, YÁsÐn at-TuhÁmÐ, might give a better idea of the sounds of a mawlid, it would not
trigger the same recognition effect among the people involved in the production
(although it might have done so among some audiences). ËÁn al-ËalÐlÐ is a place that is
worth showing, and where one can move easily and safely, while the popular districts are
full of noise, dirt and trouble. Representations such as the interesting and authoritative
foreigner, folklore, and popular districts turned tourist-friendly heritage are so self-
evident in the official imagery of nation and modernity and the daily life of parts of the
upper and middle classes that the representations are no longer taken to be so.
Listening to The Great Night is not necessarily separate from the festive practice of
mawlids. Youths who roam the streets of mawlids are often inspired to sing songs from
it, and the crowded streets of mawlids and the songs and images of the puppet theatre
flow together in their festive experiences. But for people with little or no first-hand
experience of mawlids the situation is different. For them The Great Night is the only
mawlid they know. So also for the journalist who prepared the interview with me. She
asked me if I could show her the mawlid of al-Íusayn that was to begin the following
week and I took her around during one of the first nights of celebration that are less
crowded and thus more suitable for taking visitors. She was very interested to see the
festivity, from a friendly distance, somewhat amazed by the people camping on the
sidewalks and in tents, and positively impressed by the recitation of religious poetry. But
at the sight of the swaying Æikr she promptly noted that this kind of practice certainly has
nothing to do with Islamic religion. Before the tour, I had asked her what she knew about
and expected from the mawlid. What she knew, she told, was mainly from cinema and
theatre: the images and sounds offered by al-Layla al-KabÐra and some films. She had
never actually seen a mawlid with her own eyes:
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598Interview with ÀmÁl al-BannÁ, journalist, Cairo, 20 June 2003.
599de Koning, Global Dreams, pp. 162-182.
600See, e.g., Sonbol / Atia, Mulid!, p. 9.
601See above chapter 4.
602See, e.g., al-ÝArabÐ, 31.10.2001: MuÎammad ÝAbd ad-DÁÞim / ÓalÝat ÍassÁnayn, ‘MilyÙn murÐd
šaddÙ r-riÎÁl li-“Umm al-ÝAwÁÊiz”’, RÙz al-YÙsuf, 5-11.10.2002, ÍamÁda Íusayn, ‘ÝAÊÁÞib al-layla al-
kabÐra fÐ mawlid as-Sayyida Zaynab’, pp. 40-47; al-AhrÁm al-ÝArabÐ, 2.11.2002: ‘Min aÃriÎat MiÒr wa-
l-MaÈrib.. ilÁ muÝÊizÁt as-sÙdÁnÐyÐn wa-bukÁÞÐyÁt al-ÝIrÁq wa-LubnÁn: mawÁlid wa-karÁmÁt al-
awliyÁÞ’ (several articles), pp. 1, 38-53.
603See, e.g., al-ÉumhÙrÐya, 6.12.1996; Ñawt al-Umma, 18.7.2001.
‘My idea of a mawlid was always that it’s not a good place, my idea of a mawlid was
crowds, and lots of people, and noise, and maybe thieves, [that kind of] people. So I never
go [to mawlids], unlike the foreigner, who might see something of fantasia in it. He likes
to learn to know it.’
[...]
‘I never went to mawlids because as a child and youth I was a daughter of a good family,
thus a good girl, and wouldn’t be allowed to go to mawlids which were infamous for
harassment and the like. And later as a grownup, I got married to a respectable man who
wouldn’t go to a mawlid either.’
[...]
S: What do you expect to see in the mawlid?
‘I expect to see... (laughs) to see swing-boats, to see many colours, coloured lights and
stripes, to see many children, to see the phenomena of celebration: party hats and puppets,
certain dishes, that kind of things.’598
It is not only the life experience of many middle-class Egyptians, especially women whose
freedom of movement is more limited by class and modesty,599 that makes The Great Night
become the mawlid itself for them. The prominence of the work of art is part of the logic
of exoticisation and exclusion at work in the public representation of mawlids. Artistic
representations of mawlids are strongly present in the public media, and the ordinary
mawlid thus becomes increasingly invisible as the product of representation is
increasingly taken to be the original.600
2.4. The official festivity
The gap between festive practice and its public representation is only partly due to the
representation of mawlids as popular beliefs and folkloric art. Another, equally
important side to the public mediation of mawlids is their press and television coverage,
which is often characterised by a clear distance  between the festive practices of mawlids
and the world covered by the news media. This coverage combines the tendency to
exoticise mawlids discussed above in the case of popular heritage and artistic production
with the tendency to represent one specific part of the festivity – the official celebration
– as the ‘real’ mawlid that can enjoy inclusion in the hegemonic imagery of the nation.
Mawlids are a recurring topic of press features, some of which are fortrightly critical601
while others express a mixture of critical or sarcastic comments, positive appreciation,
and a sense of amazement and fascination,602 and yet others (fewer in number) are openly
affirmative or apologetic.603 But while mawlids are a common subject of press features
and opinion articles, and sometimes may even appear on television in the programme
FunÙn šaÝbÐya (Popular Arts), they hardly ever are perceived to have any news value. One
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604The provincial press in Egypt is very weak and local papers usually appear monthly or
irregularly, which puts them in a marginal position in the field of public media. In ÓanÔÁ, host to
the largest mawlid of Egypt (as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ), local papers often devote half- or full-page
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‘ManfalÙÔ taÎtafil bi-ÆikrÁ aš-šayÌ ÝAlam ad-DÐn al-BawwÁb’, p. 7; SuÝÁd AÎmad, ‘ÑÁÎib miftÁÎ aÒ-
ÑaÝÐd as-sulÔÁn al-FarÈal wa-s-sÐra al-ÝaÔira bi-l-barakÁt’, p. 8.
605A title given posthumously to mystics.
606al-AhrÁm, 16.10.1999: ‘al-ÇarbÐya taÎtafil bi-ÌitÁm mawlid as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ’. In similar tone
also al-LiwÁÞ al-islÁmÐ, 20.11.1997: ‘BadÞ iÎtifÁl bi-mawlid as-Sayyida Zaynab. aš-šayÌ SaÝÐd al-ÝÏlÐ
yaÎtafil bi-mawlid as-Sayyida Zaynab’, p. 2.
seeks in vain to find a reference in advance of  any of the great mawlids of Egypt on
television or in the national newspapers. While hundreds of thousands of visitors crowd
the streets to celebrate SÐdnÁ al-Íusayn, as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ and other saints, national
media often fail to mention them with a single word. Feature articles often appear weeks,
even months after the mawlid took place, underlining a characteristic trait of much of
the coverage of mawlids: While mawlids may be judged in different ways, they generally
(with the exception of the provincial press in which mawlids play a role in establishing
local identity604) appear as taking place somewhere very far away, as if disconnected from
the modern life that is covered by news.
When mawlids do appear in the news, they do so in a curiously selective fashion. So,
for example, in a news item by the semi-official al-AhrÁm:
‘Al-ÇarbÐya celebrates the conclusion of the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ.
Al-ÇarbÐya province celebrated yesterday the concluding night of the mawlid of al-ÝÁrif
bi-llÁh605 as-Sayyid AÎmad al-BadawÐ in a tent that had been erected in the extension of the
AÎmadÐ mosque in ÓanÔÁ. [The celebration] was attended by governor Dr. AÎmad ÝAbd
al-ÇaffÁr, Dr. AÎmad ÝUmar HÁšim, director of al-Azhar university and ÝAbdallÁh an-
NaÎÎÁs, first undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Religious Endowments, who
represented the minister of Religious Endowments Dr. MaÎmÙd ÍamdÐ ZaqzÙq.’606
News of this kind hides more than it reveals. The largest public festival of Egypt is
celebrated in ÓanÔÁ, but the only relevant thing about it for media coverage is the
presence of public dignitaries in an official celebration. The festivity on the streets and
the people involved in it are completely absent. The world of the mawlid is effectively
disconnected from the world that al-AhrÁm, Egypt’s leading newspaper, is covering. The
television coverage of mawlids on regional channels on which mawlids occasionally
appear as local news displays a similar selective glance. What can be broadcast are
religious lectures, official celebrations attended by the governor, Friday prayers (during
or following the mawlid) and folkloric arts (such as mirmÁÎ, a traditional Upper Egyptian
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607The performance of munšids is sometimes shown, especially on Channel Eight, which is
produced in AswÁn, but in all broadcasts I have seen the camera has always been directed at the
munšid, not the audience.
horse race). Neither the street festivities nor the Sufi Æikr sessions607 are shown.
“This image of mawlids that is limited to their official representation is an expression
of a wider media discourse on and conception of public events shared by the state, the
religious establishment, and most political groups and NGOs. Just how dramatically
different this carefully orchestrated image is from the actual festive organisation of
mawlids was exemplified by the festive opening of the Alexandria Library, an event that
was a showcase model of spectacular public festivity. The library, a prestige project of the
Egyptian government funded by UNESCO, was opened on 17 October 2002 with a large
celebration attended by numerous international dignitaries. By coincidence, the mawlid
of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ was celebrated in ÓanÔÁ the same day. The two festivities could
have hardly been more different. While masses of people crowded ÓanÔÁ, Alexandria was
placed under curfew. Only the press and invited guests were allowed anywhere near the
library to participate in a spectacle of artistic performances and prominent guests. The
city itself was turned into part of the spectacle as only select citizens and cars were
allowed to enter the Cornice Road in order to give Alexandria a modern, civilised
appearance and to prevent any unpredictable popular gatherings. The largest public event
in Egypt, the mawlid in ÓanÔÁ, was completely ignored by the media with the exception
of the local press. The library opening was omnipresent in the media: all national
television channels broadcast it live, and all newspapers ran extensive features about it.
From the point of view of the government and the public media, the Alexandria
Library opening was perfect. It had all the advantages a mawlid does not, and none of the
disadvantages a mawlid has: the celebration was a perfectly staged spectacle  in which
everything served lifting the prestige of the government, the meaning of which was fully
under state control, and from which the general public was safely confined to the role of
a passive audience in front of their television screens.
There were practical reasons for the exclusion of the general public. The opening had
been delayed by several months following anti-government demonstrations at the
university campus right next to the library. The government, always highly alert at any
public gathering, was keen to not allow such disturbances to occur during the festive
opening. But more importantly, an exclusive top-down media spectacle is the way
government actors and many of the participants in public debates conceive of public
festivities. Festivity, in this understanding, is a spectacle with a clear distinction between
performers and participants and with a clearly defined meaning. It serves a top-down flow
of information and the establishment, demonstration and consolidation of power
through public presence. The purpose of such festivity is to transmit a hegemonic truth
to the audience, and truth, in the hegemonic understanding of the mind and body, has
to speak in clear and solemn tones.
The Alexandria Library opening was the most prestigious case of a festive culture that
has become omnipresent in the public sphere: It could be observed in the millennium
celebrations in 1999/2000 and frames the openings of major infrastructure projects as
well as smaller events in which the festive form of public conference has gained great
186 Chapter Seven
608Winter, Society and Religion, pp. 15-17.
609al-AhrÁm, 8.8.1930: ‘al-ËÁÒÒa al-malikÐya wa-iÔÝÁm al-fuqarÁÞ fi l-mawlid an-nabawÐ’, p. 1; al-
AhrÁm, 7.8.1930: ‘al-FuqarÁÞ fÐ Îaflat ÝÐd al-mawlid an-nabawÐ aš-šarÐf’, p. 1.
610E.g. al-AhrÁm, 5.4.1907: ‘al-Mawlid an-nabawÐ’, p. 2; al-AhrÁm, 7.8.1930: several news items on
al-mawlid an-nabawÐ. The front page has three images of the celebrations: one of high-standing
politicians present at the celebration, one of the gate to the festive grounds in ÝAbbÁsÐya, and one
of the poor enjoying a free meal at the government tent.
611al-AhrÁm, 3.6.1908: ‘al-Mawlid ad-disÙqÐ’, p. 2. This news telegram refers to the small mawlid
that was held in summer and is today no longer celebrated.
612see, e.g., al-AhrÁm, 13.5.2003: ‘MubÁrak yadÝÙ ilÁ waqfa ÒarÐÎa maÝa an-nafs nuwÁÊih bihÁ
wÁqiÝanÁ wa-nataÞammal mustaqbalanÁ kay nanhaÃ bi-ÝÁlaminÁ l-islÁmÐ’, p. 1; AÎmad BahÊat,
‘mawlid an-nabÐ’, p. 2; ‘ar-RaÞÐs MubÁrak fÐ l-iÎtifÁl bi-l-mawlid an-nabawÐ aš-šarÐf: ÝuÛmat al-islÁm
taÊallat fÐ intišÁr qiyam at-taÞÁÌÐ bayn al-bašar.. wa-sÁdat al-musÁwÁt wa-taÝÁlaat ÒayÎat al-ÎurrÐya
fÐ rubÙÝ al-arÃ’, p. 3; ‘ar-RaÞÐs MubÁrak yašhad ams iÎtifÁl MiÒr bi-ÆikrÁ l-mawlid an-nabawÐ aš-šarÐf:
MubÁrak yamnaÎ ×amÁniyat ÝulamÁÞ wa-ÝÁmilÐn al-awsima baynahum wazÐrÁ awqÁf al-ImÁrÁt wa-s-
SÙdÁn.. wa 7 min aš-šibÁb fÐ l-musÁbaqÁt a×-×aqÁfÐya li-l-awqÁf’, p. 6; ÝAbdallÁh at-TaÔÁwÐ, ‘Bal kÁn
mawlidan li-ÎuqÙq al-insÁn’, p. 10; MaÎmÙd MahdÐ, ‘ÅikrÁ l-mawlid an-nabawÐ: nurÐduhÁ Æikran
success. This festive culture is effectively promoted by television in which primary
domestic news value is given to the presence of the president, ministers, governors, and
other dignitaries holding a meeting, visiting public buildings, or speaking in a public
conference.
Yet presenting festivity as an exclusive spectacle is not inherent to the nature of state
celebrations. Both the presence of the state at public festivities and their coverage in the
media have significantly changed during the 20th century, a transformation we can
observe, for example, in the mawlid an-nabÐ celebrations in Cairo. Since the Mamluk era,
the birthday of the Prophet MuÎammad has always been accompanied by a strong
presence of the rulers608 but until the early 20th century, the popular festivities and state
celebrations were not strictly separate. The festivities that were held at AzbakÐya Lake in
the 19th century and in al-ÝAbbÁsÐya in the early 20th century featured a large tent of the
Khedive and later the King, accompanied by ministers and high dignitaries, and
surrounded by other festive tents in a large festive area open to the public. As an act of
pious charity, food was distributed to the poor at the royal tent.609 The newspapers of the
early 20th century reported extensively  on the celebration, giving attention to both the
government and the public.610 A similar style also prevailed in the coverage of major
mawlids. Official receptions were at the centre of attention but street festivities were also
covered, like in this news telegram on the mawlid in DisÙq from the year 1908:
‘The DisÙqÐ mawlid.
The number of visitors to the mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ doubled on Thursday
and Friday, and brother forgot brother and father forgot son due to the overwhelming
crowds and heat. The Railways Authority stocked up the train service and sent a train
every half an hour. The mawlid ended well and safely without any disturbance of public
order. As for the profit of the merchants, it was huge, and God returned (or: may God
return) it to the celebrators in charity and blessings.’611
Since then, mawlids have become rare in the local news sections of national dailies, and
the mawlid an-nabÐ celebrations have been split into a Sufi celebration at al-Íusayn
Square and a televised state celebration held in a conference hall and attended by the
president. The focus of the media has shifted to almost exclusively covering the state
celebration.612
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li-l-qiyam al-fÁÃila’, p. 24; DÁr al-½berÁ taÎtafil al-layla bi-l-mawlid an-nabawÐ aš-šarÐf.. wa-l-funÙn
aš-šaÝbÐya taÎtafil bi-l-mawlid an-nabawÐ, p. 25.
This shift is part of the development of the modernist public sphere and the
redefinition of piety and festivity. In the early 20th century mawlids were, although
controversial, still part of the public imagery of society. Step by step, less through
criticism and scandalisation than through selective representation and exclusion, mawlids
have been either sanitised or removed from the hegemonic imagery of the nation. This
logic of exclusion is central to the modernist view of society. The image of Egypt offered
by the cinema, state-controlled media, television programmes and advertisements, the
school system etc. is often strikingly different from the life experience of most Egyptians.
Like so many other things in Egypt, mawlids may not fit into the imagery of the modern
nation and yet they are a part of it. The people who gather to celebrate the great night
once a year are the people who crowd the buses, schools, offices and factories day by day.
The exotic character or absence of mawlids in the hegemonic imagery is not given but
produced through the binary dissociations that are employed to construct progressive
modernity and orthodox Islam. The ‘otherness’ of mawlids and their urban settings, even
when framed in positive terms as folklore and popular heritage, serves to uphold and
protect the lifestyle and imagery of a progressive nation against the mess of everyday
urban life.
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613Smaller mawlids are usually organised by local networks or Sufi groups, and the state only
plays a role through the presence of a police force and – if the mosque is subject to the authority
of the Ministry of Religious Endowments – the maintenance of the shrine and mosque. In some
rural mawlids the organisers also take care of security, making the state completely absent from the
festivity. Due to their informal and low-key form of organisation, smaller mawlids often give the
impression of taking place spontaneously, without any central planning. (Reeves, The Hidden
Government, p. 113) This form of organisation of course has an impact on the festivities, which
usually are much less, if at all, affected by the disciplinary measures enforced at large mawlids.
614Provinces, cities and rural districts in Egypt are directly subject to the authority of the central
government. Mayors and governors, for example, are not elected but appointed by the state.
615There are actually two committees: one for planning, presided over by the governor of al-
ÇarbÐya province, and an executive committee presided over by the mayor of ÓanÔÁ. The mayor
and governor are not elected but appointed by the central government. YÁ BadawÐ, RiÞÁsat markaz
wa-madÐnat ÓanÔÁ, Markaz al-maÝlÙmÁt wa-daÝm ittiÌÁÆ al-qarÁr, ÓanÔÁ, 2004.
Chapter Eight: Transformations
1. How to organise a mawlid
If we accept that the discursive construction of objects is a not only a mode of speech but
also a mode of action and that the definition of objects in speech is not distinct from
their treatment in practice, then we must, consequently, turn our attention to the
question of how the description, judgement, classification, and representation of mawlids
influence festive practice. Different understandings of piety and boundaries imply
different festive habitus, and different models of public space and social order imply
different modes of organisation.
The enactment of modernist and reformist commonplaces in festive practice is
typically framed as reform. In the following, I adopt this term without implying
normative judgement by doing so. Reform does not intrinsically connote improvement,
but it does point at the interconnection of normative discourses and strategic action.
Reform, transformation presented as improvement, is a mode of action guided by the
normative understanding of its actors.
Although many voices call for the abolition of mawlids, this not a necessary
consequence of the critical discourse. State-controlled media, a large part of the private
press, state officials, the religious establishment, and the leadership of Sufi orders usually
either remain silent about mawlids or represent an idealised and strongly selective image
of them, emphasising forms of piety and festivity radically different from those
dominant in the mawlid. Rather than abolition, the call is either – implicitly – to
exclude mawlids from the dominant public order or  –   explicitly – to reform them in
order to make them meet their publicly proclaimed ideal.
The organisation of mawlids provides many possibilities for interference in their
form and atmosphere. Especially in large urban mawlids613 that cover entire districts or
even entire cities, centralised planning by local state institutions614 is required in order
to allocate space for Sufi orders’ tents, market stands and amusements, to divert traffic,
provide the festivity with electricity and supplies, enforce law and order, and clean up the
streets afterwards. In the mawlid of as-Sayyid AÎmad al-BadawÐ in ÓanÔÁ, the largest
mawlid of Egypt, the festivity is planned and organized by a mawlid committee (laÊnat
al-mawlid)615 comprising various branches of administration. The tasks of this
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administration are manifold: the preparation of the fields in SÐÊar for the pilgrimage, the
organisation of garbage collection, drinking water, public toilets and additional
electricity, the closure of main streets near the mosque for traffic, the removal of cafés,
trade and amusements from certain streets and squares, the licensing of additional
production of state-subsidised bread, and the construction of tents to house the official
celebration and the following public services: police, military police, supplies, electricity,
public relations, fire brigade, family planning, medical services, and veterinary
medicine.616 In this plurality of administrative branches, the security apparatus has the
final say: Mawlids have to be licenced by the ministry of interior, and all practical
measures to implement law and order in the festivity are undertaken by security forces.617
In a large mawlid like that in ÓanÔÁ, the state provides the physical framework for the
festivity but – with the exception of official celebrations organized by the Religious
Endowments Administration and the Organisation for Cultural Centres (hayÞat qusÙr al-
×aqÁfa) – it does not produce the content of the festivity. Most of the actual celebrations
are organized on a decentralised basis within the framework provided by the state. The
commercial elements of the festivity – cafés, restaurants, amusements, small trade etc. –
are run by countless private entrepreneurs. Most of the religious celebrations are
organised by Sufi orders and Sufi-minded individuals. Last but not least, it is the
participants who decide how the mawlid looks. Depending on the location of the
festivity and the importance of the saint, a mawlid may be dominated to various degrees
by Sufi pilgrims, inhabitants of the districts, or groups of youths.
The state is the most powerful actor in the reform of mawlids, but its power is
restricted to the organisational framework of the festivals. Furthermore, state policies on
mawlids have never been very straightforward. The reason for this lies in the complex
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nature of mawlids and their relation to informal structures of power. From the
perspective of state actors (governors, police officers, the religious establishment etc.)
mawlids present an outright dilemma. On the one hand, mawlids are harmless because
they have not historically been used as a site for political mobilization against the
government, by Islamists or other actors. Moreover, mawlids can in fact be effectively
made part of the clientele relationships that are essential to the functioning of the
Egyptian state (for example, politicians use mawlids and other major festivities to offer
services and demonstrate commitment to their constituency).618 Major pilgrimage
mosques also form an important source of income for the Ministry of Religious
Endowments, which controls the distribution of the money donated as nuÆur at shrines.
But on the other hand, mawlids are public demonstrations of concepts of piety and
civility that constitute a serious embarrassment for the publicly proclaimed image of the
modern city and nation. Furthermore, the informal networks that mawlids are based on
(Sufi orders, local networks of power, tribal structures in Upper Egypt) are also
problematic because they remain to a significant degree beyond state control. Mawlids
are ruled by informal structures of power that, despite efforts to control them, have a
significant degree of autonomy and practice a form of order very different from that of
the state.619 Although mawlids have not been sites of insurgency against the state in the
20th century, they have always been considered an unpredictable potential of disorder:
The problem with mawlids, from the perspective of the state, is not so much that they
could turn against the government as it is their being ungovernable, a parallel order
beyond the control of the state.
In this chapter I argue that the solution to this dilemma, proposed in public religious
and cultural debates and practised in state policies and reformist Sufi rituals, is to civilise
mawlids, that is, to subject  them to a spatial, temporal and moral discipline that makes
them less transgressing and more controllable. Focussing on three lines of reform – the
issue of habitus as embodied in public rituals, morality and hygiene, the attempts of the
state to reorganise the festive space of mawlids, and reformist Sufi ÎaÃras – I show that
while the concrete measures taken in different festivities vary greatly, they all share a sense
of ‘civilising’ the festivity through the enforcement of bodily, spatial and temporal
boundaries. The reform measures are not based on a master plan but instead follow the
discursive common sense of Egyptian modernism and Islamic reformism. This lack of
a master plan, together with the complexity of the festivities themselves, complicates any
attempts at reform. The transformations of mawlids – some planned, others unintended
results of wider social transformations – are thus always partial and fragmentary.
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620See Wallin, Georg August, Georg August Wallins reseanteckningar från Orienten åren 1843-1849:
Dagbok och bref, Sven Gabriel Elmgren (ed.), 4 vols, Helsinki: Frenckell, 1864, vol. 1, pp. 40, 123; see
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621Georg August Wallin (1811-1852) studied Oriental languages in Helsinki and St. Petersburg
and left in 1843 for the Middle East with a travel grant from Helsinki University. He travelled
extensively in Egypt, the ÍiÊÁz, Syria and Iraq until his return to Europe in 1849. Wallin stayed
in Egypt for one and a half years, during which time he travelled in the Nile Delta with befriended
Azhari sheikhs under whose guidance he was studying Arabic in Cairo. During one of these trips,
in July-August 1844 he stayed for a week at the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ in ÓanÔÁ and recorded
detailed observations of the festivity and festive space. His account is a valuable source on mawlids
because Lane, whose Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians is commonly quoted for
ethnographic material from this period, did not personally attend the mawlid in ÓanÔÁ. Wallin’s
account of the mawlid (originally written in Swedish) has so far remained largely unknown because
only his diaries and letters from the ÍiÊÁz have been translated into English. Wallin,
Reseanteckningar; Idem, Tutkimusmatkoilla arabien parissa: Otteita matkapäiväkirjasta ja kirjeistä, Jussi
Aro/Armas Salonen (transl./eds), 3rd ed., Juva: WSOY, 2000 [19661], pp. 5-16; Idem, Travels in
Arabia (1845 and 1848), Cambridge and New York: Oleander Press, 1979.
622Wallin, a bachelor in his early thirties, kept a steadily observant eye on women in his diary.
2. Policing morals, rituals and hygiene
2.1. The first wave
Just as mawlids have been subject to debate throughout history, there have also always
been attempts to purge them of some of their more scandalous elements. But there is no
evidence of systematic attempts to control the behaviour of pilgrims in the Mamluk and
Ottoman eras; the history of systematic festive reform only begins in the second half of
the 19th century.
In the early 19th century, mawlids flourished in Egypt. They formed the most
important markets of the country, were located at central places in the major cities, and
were attended by the political and economic elites of the country. Some critical voices
could be heard, for example that of the chronicler al-ÉabartÐ, but in general mawlids were
not only tolerated but were openly encouraged by the political and religious elites. The
festive atmosphere was far more libertine and wild than anything that can be found at
mawlids today. In ÓanÔÁ, prostitutes, female dancers and transvestites crowded the streets
and cafés, hashish was widely and publicly consumed, respectable scholars of al-Azhar
who travelled to the mawlid saw no offence in the state of affairs, and the mawlid
governor (ÎÁkim al-mawlid) appointed by the ruler was mainly concerned with ensuring
a symbolic presence and preventing outbreaks of violence.620 Georg August Wallin, a
Finnish Orientalist who attended the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ with his Azhari
friends in 1845, provides a vivid description of the festive atmosphere:621
‘But not everyone is drawn here out of religious faith and pious love to this saint. In
addition to the festivity and the accompanying religious ceremonies a fair is held here
which definitely is the most important in this region and perhaps one of the biggest in
the whole world. [...] Others are drawn here by the search for enjoyment and amusements,
and they say that in the whole world there is not as much joy and delight as in Sayyid’s
festival. Women of all kinds,622 both honourable matrons as well as younger wives and
girls, use the occasion and opportunity of ziyÁra to Sayyid in order to free themselves for
this short period of time from all the heavy yoke and tight rein under which they are
usually held. They stream here in large groups, partly accompanied by their husbands,
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628Wallin, Reseanteckningar, vol. 1, p. 123; Mayeur-Jaouen, Histoire d’un pèlerinage, pp. 140 f. What
did occasionally take place in the 18th and 19th centuries was that governors and police chiefs
harassed pilgrims in search of personal profit.
partly without them with their agreement, and certainly attract with them a large amount
of Egypt’s fun-desiring youths. Here is the occasion for free rendez-vous between lovers, and
for many a young man who has long yearned in vain to see the face of his beloved, that
annoying veil is now lifted. Dancers, ghawÁzÐ, singers, ÝawÁlim, and all other entertainer
girls who in Cairo can only be found in greatest quiet and secrecy, practice here their art
with the most unbound liberty. The streets are full of unveiled prostitutes who with
fingers coloured with henna and eyes painted with kohl, with their pretty sheet-iron
castanets in their red palms or a little tambour de Basque in their hands, try to charm men.
It would be seen as an affront to as-Sayyid’s saintly person or perhaps even a sign of
distrust in his ability through his mediation with the Lord to give absolution for the little
misdeeds that his pious visitors make themselves guilty of during the festivity, should one
want to limit the freedom and licentiousness.’623
Wallin’s account is moderate compared to many other 19th-century European accounts
that often draw a picture of wild and pagan debauchery under the pretext of the sacred
occasion.624 However, such images must be treated with due caution. Many descriptions
are strongly influenced by Orientalist harem fantasies and rumours amplified by the
imagination of those who have not been there to see it with their own eyes. Nevertheless,
we can be certain that a highly permissive atmosphere prevailed in ÓanÔÁ, partly due to
the specific association of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ with virility and fertility,625 but mainly
because during this period the specific festive time of mawlids was still largely
uncontested: In the vicinity of the saint different rules applied, and thanks to the
mediation of the great saint, God would forgive whatever sins the participants may
commit.
When Wallin attended the mawlid in ÓanÔÁ in 1845, the first winds of change had
already begun to blow. Eleven years earlier, the viceroy of Egypt MuÎammad ÝAlÐ had
banned female dancers, who used to be a part of all public festivities, from Cairo to
Upper Egypt. These measures never extended to ÓanÔÁ, however, and after some years the
ban was lifted in the capital.626 In the following decades the mawlid flourished, supported
by the construction of the railway from Cairo to Alexandria in 1856 and the cotton boom
following the American Civil War.627 The state was primarily interested in legitimation
and symbolic presence at the mawlid. A large police force was present, but it was
primarily employed to arrest thieves, to prevent outbreaks of violence, and occasionally
to extract money from the pilgrims, but not to discipline the participants in general.628
The first wave of systematic reforms began around 1881, following the modernisation
policies of Khedive IsmÁÝÐl shortly before the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and
simultaneous with the emergence of reformist and modernist criticisms of mawlids. The
event that dramatically marked the beginning of reforms was the prohibition of the ritual
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the Friday following the great night. See Mayeur-Jaouen, Histoire d’un pèlerinage, p. 53.
634Ibid., pp. 175-176.; McPherson, The Moulids of Egypt, p. 286.
635see al-AhrÁm, 10.9.1900: ‘al-Mawlid al-aÎmadÐ’, pp. 1-2; al-AhrÁm, 13.5.1930: ‘al-Mawlid al-
aÎmadÐ aÒ-ÒaÈÐr’, p. 7; Mayeur-Jaouen, Histoire d’un pèlerinage, p. 191.
of dawsa. This ritual is still practised in some mawlids outside the capital,629 but in the
19th century it was a central and spectacular part of the mawlid an-nabÐ celebrations in
Cairo. In the ritual, the sheikh of the SaÝdÐya order rode a horse over the bodies of his
disciples. Despite the weight of the horse and its rider the disciples suffered no injuries,
which was seen as proof of the karÁma embodied by the sheikh.630 The ritual aroused the
curiosity and – often, though not unanimously – condemnation of Europeans, whose
opinions did not go unnoticed among the political and intellectual elites of the capital.
Following a wave of public criticism of the ritual and a fatwÁ by the qÁÃÐ l-quÃÁt (head
magistrate) of Egypt, Khedive TawfÐq prohibited the ritual in 1881.631
The very same year, a circular penned by Sheikh ÝAbd al-BÁqÐ al-BakrÐ (see above p.
140) was published and decreed wide scale restrictions of ritual practice. It became
forbidden to practice snake-charming, pierce one’s cheek, eat broken glass and the like,
use musical instruments in Æikr, wear strange or dirty dress, use flags and banners, allow
women and children to participate in ÎaÃras and processions, and establish new mawlids.
These regulations were reaffirmed in the Sufi Ordinance of 1905, and yet their
enforcement remained largely unsuccessful.
The issue of Sufi rituals did not stand alone. State efforts at reforming mawlids gave
equal, if not higher, priority to public morality and hygiene – both central issues for
Islamic modernism.632 In ÓanÔÁ steps were taken to reduce the presence of prostitutes at
the turn of the century. Prostitution was not at first outright banned, but rather the
spectacular procession of prostitutes was separated from that of the ÌalÐfa,633 which it used
to follow. Sometime between 1933 and 1940 this procession, at that time already
significantly less explicit than it had been in the past, disappeared completely.634634 
Hygiene was a central concern of public debates and policy at the turn of the century.
In ÓanÔÁ, measures were takento build sewers, collect garbage and prevent epidemics
during the festivity.635 In the course of the 20th century, the issue of hygiene lost its
centrality in public debates but remained a central concern for the local authorities. In
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a most recent step, the public circumcision booths that had been a central part of
mawlids – especially that of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, a saint associated with fertility and
virility – were prohibited in 1996.636
These three lines of reform – rituals, sexual morality, and public hygiene– all go hand
in hand with the modernist and reformist criticism of the habitus of participants in
mawlids. Their emergence in the late 19th and early 20th centuries reflects the spread of
new concepts among the newly invented nation’s elites: Rituals now had to express a
rational disposition of piety, especially if they were seen by foreigners. The contingent
and often quite filthy open space of the sÁÎa was turned into the organised and
controlled public space of the modern city. The temporal structure of morality was
shifted from the time of the extraordinary when sins are forgiven in the presence of as-
Sayyid, to universal moral boundaries valid at all times.
Yet the issues of public debate were not translated directly into administrative
practice. Morality and ritual may have been an important topic in the public debates, but
in administrative practice hygiene and public order were given priority, partly because
they were seen as a key task of the state and a measure stick of the government’s success
or failure in the project of modernisation, but also because building infrastructure and
policing public places is much easier than a direct discipline of people’s bodies. The
attempts to reform the rituals, morals and hygienic conditions of the mawlid-goers may
have been inspired by the aim of a Foucauldian discipline of bodies, but their success in
doing so has been limited.
2.2. The limits of reform
Reform attempts to control the bodies of mawlid-goers fell far short of their declared
aims throughout the 20th century. The story of ÉamÁÝat AbÐ l-QÁsim, a Sufi order
established in the early 20th century, is a telling example. The QÁsimÐya, as the group is
also called, is known for liberal Æikrs and rituals, most outstandingly so for their specific
form of Ìalwa637 in which a male and a female member of the group withdraw into
seclusion together and are afterwards considered sister- and brother-in-spirit.638 Whether
these rituals are actually used as a pretext for libertine sexual relations is a matter of
speculation. In any case, they have greatly stimulated the fantasising of journalists and
given the order a very scandalous reputation. Around 1930, the Supreme Council of Sufi
Orders published a ban on the group for promoting immorality. Shortly after the ban,
however, the group was still visibly present at the mawlid of al-Íusayn, and over 50 years
later, in the mid-1980s, the Supreme Council of Sufi Orders banned the group again.
Today, ÉamÁÝat AbÐ l-QÁsim remains active and participates in mawlids around the Nile
Delta, including one in honour of its founder, SÐdÐ AbÙ l-QÁsim.639
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Amusements, similar to the case of Sufi rituals, have not been easily reformed. In the
1930s, dancing, gambling, alcohol, and to a lesser extent  prostitution, remained common
and visible, as observed by McPherson and documented by strongly critical articles in the
Egyptian press.640 In an atmosphere calling for moral and religious reform (‘nothing
against moral and religion’ was a widespread political slogan at the time),641 the Egyptian
government introduced a series of restrictive measures in the 1930s and 40s. The main
instrument of this policy was an indiscriminate police clampdown on festivities. Another
was the prohibition of some mawlids, a measure that during World War II was employed
in great frequency under the pretext of blackouts.642 These measures, although imprecise,
were so far-reaching that McPherson seriously feared they might cause mawlids to
disappear altogether. They were not in fact very successful, however, and after the war,
mawlids continued on in their old form although presumably somewhat weakened. 
Only following the coup d’état of the Free Officers in 1952 did the situation change,
as the new Nasserist government decided to place mawlids in the service of the
revolution. Although the Nasserist government remained distanced from anything
related to Sufism and played (despite its populist appeal) a crucial role in developing the
image of popular culture as folkloristic and picturesque but also crude and backward, it
also very well understood the propagandistic value of public festivals. The late 1950s and
early 60s brought about a wave of reforms aiming to exploit mawlids for propagandistic
purposes.643 This policy was framed as a general improvement of the festivities, as we can
read from the pages of the organ of the Supreme Council of Sufi Orders, MaÊallat al-
islÁm wa-t-taÒawwuf (later renamed MaÊallat at-taÒawwuf al-islÁmÐ). Mawlids are a recurring
topic in issues of the journal from this period. Various articles and small news items
discuss the legitimacy of mawlids, the need to reform them, and the success made in
doing so, all framed in the language of the Nasserist ideology of Arab nationalism and
socialist progress. How much this discourse actually reflected reality is questionable,
however. In a news item on the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ in the year 1958, for
example, the journal declares:
‘The celebration was exemplary this year. It was free of dancing, amusements, percussion,
musical instruments and bidaÝ that used to harm the glory and splendour of the
commemoration.’644
Although it is likely that increased restrictions had been enforced that year it is unlikely
that they extended beyond the immediate surroundings of the official celebration. There
is a long tradition in Egypt of state declarations in general, and apologetic Sufi discourse
in particular, presenting programmatic ideals as accomplished facts. Already in 1892, a
press article had stated that the mawlid of al-Íusayn ‘was free of any of the hashish dens,
brothels, adultery and vice that [otherwise] pollute mawlids.’645 Numerous statements of
this kind have followed during the 20th century, only confirming that controversial
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practices have persisted in spite of news about their end. When Michael Gilsenan
attended the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ in 1964, there was little to be seen of the
above-mentioned ‘exemplary celebration’. The real change, it seems, was the exploitation
of the festivity for propagandistic purposes:
‘Though the various turuq have tents here for members, the scene was dominated in 1964
by the marquees set up by the Arab Socialist Union and by the large firework646 set piece
of President Nasser. On the way to the display ground there were innumerable coffee tents
crowded with people, and fair stalls and dimly lit booths offering everything from the
wall of death and trials of strength to singers, the painted advertisements for whom had
as little to do with religion as with art.’647
Only since the 1970s have the reforms of habitus and morals shown more far-reaching
effects. Spectacular rituals such as snake-charming and cheek-piercing for which the
RifÁÝÐya was once famous have now been banned by the leadership of the order, and in
the mawlid of SÐdÐ AÎmad ar-RifÁÝÐ in Cairo inspectors frequent the ÎaÃras of the various
RifÁÝÐ branches to ensure that the prohibition is observed.648 At many shrines, stricter
regulations have been introduced, most importantly to separate men and women and to
prevent people from circumambulating the shrine. In ÓanÔÁ, the space housing the shrine
is mixed but women are not allowed to sit down (this regulation is often not
meticulously observed, however). In DisÙq, there is a fence separating men and women.649
In Cairo, notably at the shrines of al-Íusayn and as-Sayyida Zaynab, fences also separate
men from women. Until the late 1990s the fence at the shrine of as-Sayyida Zaynab was
removed during the mawlid, but since then it has remained in place permanently. While
many mosques remain open all night during the mawlid to offer pilgrims a place to sleep,
an increasing number is now being closed between ÝišÁÞ (evening) and faÊr (dawn) prayers
to prevent people from eating and sleeping inside the mosque.
In the field of amusements, a major shift has taken place. The sale of alcohol has
heavily declined at mawlids and today it is often impossible to find a single bar at a
mawlid –- the city of ÓanÔÁ even imposes general prohibition during the festivity.
Prostitution has as much as disappeared from mawlids. Most recently, during the 1990s,
female dancers have been banned from performing altogether at most mawlids. The
tradition of transvestite singers and dancers that flourished in the 19th century650 had
begun to decline much earlier, so that McPherson assumed the dancer Íusayn FuÞÁd,
who in the 193os enjoyed modest fame, was a unique representative of his profession.651
In the mawlid of al-Íusayn a tent with transvestite shows persisted until its prohibition
in the late 1990s.652 Of all ‘immoral’ amusements, only hashish and gambling have
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persisted at most mawlids, the first in secrecy and despite its illegality, the second in
public but with only a semi-legal status.653
Why has the reform of morals and habitus been more successful at the end of the
20th century? To answer this question, we must first note that even now, the success has
been limited. Today, like one hundred years ago, music flourishes at mawlids, and the use
of musical instruments in Æikr, so often condemned by the Sufi establishment, seems to
have actually increased,654 influenced by the development of popular music and the
availability of loudspeakers, which have helped to turn public ÎaÃras from small Æikr
circles into concerts with a mass audience. The suspension and inversion of boundaries
is still the characteristic feature of the festive time of mawlids, although the boundaries
and the extent of their suspension have shifted since the 19th century. The atmosphere
in a Sufi Ìidma remains informal and the mixing of men and women usually tolerated.
Pilgrims still kiss the shrine and some dervishes still wear eccentric clothes. At Sufi Æikrs
far enough from the control of the centres of the ÔarÐqa, one can still see people piercing
their cheek with a dabbÙs or holding living snakes in their hands. Transvestites are still
part of many a festive procession, although their shows now have a burlesque rather than
a homoerotic character. Gambling remains a flourishing although low-profile business
at most mawlids.
Several factors have limited the influence of attempts to reform the habitus and
morals of mawlid-goers. First, there has often been a major gap between political
decisions and their implementation, be it for the lack of will or resources, or the inertia
of an inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy. A second and more fundamental limitation
for the reform of morals and habitus lies in the nature of the festivity itself. Because the
festive atmosphere is created in a decentralised pattern by the people who celebrate the
mawlid, a top-down disciplining of the pilgrims’ bodies has been easy to proclaim but
hard to enforce in practice. As shown below, a particular Sufi order may successfully
discipline its own gatherings, and the state may police central festive spaces, but in either
case nothing even distantly resembling total control is accomplished.
How can we explain, then, that the festive time of mawlids in the 21st century is
significantly less libertine than it was in the 19th? The answer is that this development is
not simply a result of attempts at reform; it has followed wider changes in society. If
mawlids were once a rare chance for young women to go out and flirt with the opposite
sex, today they are facing increasing competition by Nile promenades, work floors, and
universities. If in many cities police forces have successfully banned bars and dance tents
from the local mawlid, it has only been after a growing sentiment of religious moralism
has spread among the population – including the mawlid-going public – following the
Islamic revival that began in the 1970s. Furthermore, as mawlids have become
marginalised in the public sphere and in the lifestyle and religiosity of the upper and
middle classes, the structure of amusements has changed. Mawlids are no longer centres
of alcohol, dancing and prostitution partly because these trades and their customers have
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moved to less conspicuous and more profitable locations, for example Pyramids Road
in Cairo.
S: When exactly were dance shows prohibited in the mawlid [of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ]?
‘They were not prohibited, it’s just that there has been progress with amusements. I, for
example, don’t go to the mawlid. I used to but I don’t anymore because of all the
confusion and trouble. There has been progress in science and technology and also
amusements you see, so there have come to be ways of entertainment that are better than
the mawlid. If I want to see belly dancing, I can see it on CD on computer, or by satellite
dish or something like that. If I want to see a film I can see what I want. Why would I go
to the mawlid, to wear myself down, with the dust and the crowds? It’s a matter of supply
and demand.’655
3. From open space to public spectacle
While direct discipline of the bodies at mawlids has turned out to be a very difficult
enterprise, the indirect disciplining of mawlids through the regulation of space and time
has been dramatically successful over the past ten years. During this time, the sites of
almost all major mawlids that take place in urban environments have been substantially
reconstructed by public authorities. These projects of ‘beautification’ (taÊmÐl) and
‘development’ (taÔwÐr) have effectively changed the general atmosphere and structure of
the mawlids involved.
3.1. ÓanÔÁ: enforcing boundaries
The mawlid of al-Sayyid AÎmad al-BadawÐ656 in ÓanÔÁ is the largest and most famous
public festival of Egypt, and has a long history of state involvement.657 Due to the
tremendous size658 of this festivity, the old city district around the shrine of as-Sayyid al-
BadawÐ cannot possibly house all of the celebrations. Thus the mawlid has three main
spaces, stretching over the distance of some two kilometres from east to west: the
surroundings of the mosque in the centre of the city, fairgrounds behind the railway line
along SÐgar Road, and, behind that, the fields of SÐgar where a gigantic tent city houses
most Sufi Ìidmas and celebrations. The focal point of the festive grounds is the ’pole’
(ÒÁrÐ, an originally wooden, now steel mast on a brick foundation) of the mawlid,
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Image 30:
Map of 
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à Tantâ’, p. 248.
symbolising the presence of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ.659
The planning and use of public space became an issue in ÓanÔÁ at the end of the 19th
century, at the same time when morality and hygiene became issues in the policing of the
mawlid. In 1886 and 1896, decrees were issued to ban the occupation of streets by tents
and stalls during the mawlid and other festivals.660 The implementation of these decrees
seems to have been punctual at best, but they set an important precedent in the
understanding of public order: the open space of the city – and the festivity – itself
became a concern of public policy. Here, for the first time, we encounter a concept of
open space that is explicitly not that of the contingent sÁÎa but that of a public place
defined for a specific use and policed by the state.
This development was part of the changing shape of the city at the time. In 1856 the
railway connected ÓanÔÁ with Cairo and Alexandria. Some years later, a new wide and
straight street, as-SikkÁ al-ÉadÐda, was broken through the old city to connect the newly
enlarged mosque with the railway.661 Until then, the state had promoted the construction
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of markets and caravanserais in the district surrounding the mosque.662 The construction
of as-Sikka al-ÉadÐda St. marked the beginning of the creation of spectacular public
spaces that were to become the symbol of the modern city in the 20th century. In the
following decades, a new, Western-style district was built northwest of the old city, and
two types of urban structure began to drift apart: a ‘modern’ city characterised by wide
streets and alleys, functional differentiation, and a middle-class population with a strong
urban identity; and a declining ‘Oriental’ old city whose structures, although still
functioning, came to symbolise chaos, backwardness and poverty – but also tradition and
heritage – in the official imagery of the city.663 Timothy Mitchell has argued that the
creation of this polarity was essential for the structure and image of the colonial city: it
was not only an issue of boulevards versus alleys, but also of hygiene versus filth, morality
and intellectualised piety versus ecstatic and ambivalent festivities, and an abstract layout
of functionally differentiated order versus the organic structure of old cities and
villages.664
In the second half of the 20th century, this opposition shifted as the colonial districts
of the provincial cities became increasingly proletarised and the upper classes moved to
exclusive districts in Cairo and Alexandria.665 But as shown in the following, the basic
point of Mitchell’s argument remains valid as public planning projects continue to
define the city and its progress through planned and controlled spectacles of modernity
that stand in dramatic opposition to the marginalised and/or exoticised popular
districts.
In small steps, the government policies and the growth of the city have changed the
structure of the mawlid in ÓanÔÁ. Until the first half of the 20th century, the mosque of
as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ was surrounded by a covered market that was eventually demolished
to give space to a square in front of the mosque. In the 1960s, as-Sikka al-ÉadÐda St. was
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Image 32: Entrance to the fenced square in front
of the mosque of as-Sayyid AÎmad al-BadawÐ,
ÓanÔÁ, January 2003.
widened at the cost of what had remained of
the covered market.666 Either around the same
time or in the 1970s, the square facing the
mosque was widened. In 1979, with the
support of president Anwar as-SÁdÁt, the
mosque was enlarged, most importantly by
two new minarets and an open extension in
front of the mosque. In 1992, a part of the
square in front of the mosque that used to
host a market and a bus station was
surrounded by a fence and turned into a
sanctuary (Îaram) physically and
symbolically separated from the surrounding
secular space – a structure of space previously
unknown to mawlids.667 Inside the area
marked by the fence is a fountain and a vast
open square. During the mawlid, large tents
of the police, health service, fire brigade and
some Sufi orders stand just outside the fence.
The front extension of the mosque houses the
official celebration and a temporary police
station. The open area inside the fence is
covered by pilgrims’ carpets and temporary
cafés.668
In all parts of the mawlid, there has been continuous pressure to separate different
elements of the festivity, most notably the sacred from the profane and the official from
the popular. Amusements used to be largely mixed with the Sufi festivities in the SÐgar
fields but have been increasingly confined to separate locations along SÐgar Street.
Merchants have been more free to display their goods but have also been facing
increasing limitations in past years. Furthermore, the state celebration has become
increasingly dissociated from the Sufi festivity. In the 19th century, the highest ranks of
government were present in the official reception that took place in a tent next to the ÒÁrÐ.
The fireworks that used to conclude the state celebration669 were suspended in 1967
following the defeat of the Arab armies against Israel in the Six-Day War.670 By the late
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Image 33: The square in front of the AÎmadÐ
Mosque three days before the great night. On the
bottom, tents for government services. In the centre,
pilgrims’ mats and temporary cafés. On top, the
mosque extension with the official celebrations and
a temporary police station, ÓanÔÁ, October 2002.
1970s, the official celebration had moved
from the ÒÁrÐ to the present location in
front of the mosque,671 thus diminishing
the prestige of the area surrounding the ÒÁrÐ
while physically and symbolically
separating the official reception from the
rest of the mawlid.672
A most recent wave of restrictive
measures followed in 2004. All stalls that
used to crowd the front of the railway
station, as-Sikka al-ÉadÐda Street, and the
street parallel to the main square were
barred from using these locations. Shops
were not allowed to extend their stands
beyond the sidewalk. On SÐgar Street, two
of the four locations for amusement parks
were closed, and on the end of the street
facing downtown, no stalls were allowed at
all.673 These measures hit the merchants
hard, and although officially their stalls
were not banned from the mawlid but only
ordered to move to the side streets, they
were not offered alternative locations.
Many pilgrims also suffered from this
regulation as the space outside the fence of
the square became unavailable for small
carpet-based Ìidmas.
The reason given by various police
officers for these measures was traffic. The mayor of ÓanÔÁ argued along similar lines:
‘You may have observed this year that there is a kind of good organisation (tanÛÐm) for
some streets where some tents used to hinder the movement of traffic and pedestrians.
And that is why we banned these tents that hinder the flow of traffic and the movement
of the citizens on the street. Also units of the public utilities police (šurÔat al-marÁfiq)674
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spread around [the city] in order to put a halt to any affairs that are considered to belong
to the negative sides and which deviate from the basic purpose of the celebration of this
occasion in favour of other purposes that may  harm this noble celebration.’675
It is doubtful whether facilitating traffic was really the main reason for these measures.
As-Sikka al-ÉadÐda St. is not a main thoroughfare and the traffic flow was not
dramatically altered by the mawlid in previous years. Along SÐgar St. amusements were
removed from locations where they had in no way hindered the flow of people or traffic.
The mayor’s reference to the ‘basic purpose of this celebration’ indicates that not only
the movement of the people but also the meaning of the festivity was intended. ‘Traffic’
is an argumentative label for a wider spectrum of motives, especially maintaining control
over the appearance of the central streets and directing the festivity towards the
controlled form of a public spectacle.
The restrictive measures of 2004 did not come as a surprise: they followed a long-
lasting debate on mawlids, a shift in their public representation, a long history of small
steps of administrative measures, a transformation of the city and the dominant patterns
of urban civility, and the state’s increased concern with public spaces. ÓanÔÁ is a case of
the slow historical transformation of festive space from the model of overlapping circles
of celebration in the presence of the saint towards an increasingly fragmented and
functionally differentiated conglomerate of different festivities. This has been
accomplished under the increasing pressure of local authorities to highlight the official
and representative elements of the mawlid while marginalising the rest.
No radical restructuring has taken place, however. The reforms of the festive space
have largely followed the pre-existing layout of the mawlid and have mainly resulted in
a far more rigid differentiation between the divisions within the festival. In some other
cities, however, efforts by the state to reform the local mawlid have led to much more
dramatic changes, both in terms of the speed and determination with which the measures
have been taken and in terms of the extent to which they are opposed to the pre-existing
festive order.
3.2. QinÁ: modernising the city, relocating the festivity
Perhaps the most dramatic case of state-initiated transformation of festive space is
found in the Upper Egyptian city of QinÁ, home to the mawlid of SÐdÐ ÝAbd al-RaÎÐm
al-QinÁwÐ.676 This mawlid, one of the most important in Upper Egypt, had traditionally
taken place in the immediate vicinity of the mosque, in the open square in front of the
mosque and in the graveyard behind it. Sufi Ìidmas, trade, amusements and sports677 used
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4 wa-baqÁÞ 6’, p. 1; al-AhrÁm, 29.8.2002: ‘TaÊribat muÎÁfaÛat QinÁ fÐ t-tanmiya al-maÎallÐya
namÙÆaÊ fi idÁrat al-tamayyuz’; for details, see AÌbÁr QinÁ, November 2002: MuÎammad al-BišlÁwÐ
et al., ‘ÝÀdil LabÐb wa-ÎaÒÁd 3 sanawÁt min al-inÊÁzÁt’, p. 5.
679So, e.g., in speeches held at the official festivity of the mawlid of SÐdÐ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm al-
QinÁwÐ on 20 October 2002, and in a question by a local journalist in an interview with the
governor. AÌbÁr QinÁ, November 2002: ÝAbd al-ÍakÐm al-QÁÃÐ / AÎmad BakrÐ, ‘ÝÀdil LabÐb li-
AÌbÁr QinÁ: šaÝb QinÁ yastaÎiqq Ìayr li-annah naqÐ wa-lam yulawwa× baÝd’, p. 4. See also al-AhrÁm,
19.12.2002: MuÒÔafÁ an-NaÊÊÁr, ‘QinÁ.. zahra fÐ l-ÊanÙb!’, p. 23.
680E.g. for the poor state of the educational system, see al-MiÒrÐ al-Yawm, 30.9.2004: MuÎammad
ÍamdÐ: ‘Sadd il-ÝaÊz fÐ al-madÁris bi-Îamlat ad-diblÙmÁt’, p. 4.
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to spread over this area, side by side. All this changed, however, when the city of QinÁ
experienced a large-scale development campaign after the new governor, State Security
General ÝÀdil LabÐb, assumed office in late 1999.678
Equipped with additional funding by the central government, General LabÐb was
assigned with the task of turning the poverty-stricken province of QinÁ, base to much of
the militant Islamist movement in the 1990s, into a representable case model of
modernisation and development. Three years later, in October 2002 when I first arrived
in QinÁ, the development campaign (which was in many ways similar to measures that
had recently been undertaken in Alexandria) was being celebrated as a unique success. In
the festive speeches and articles in honour of the governor his work was described as
nothing less than ‘a miracle’.679 Most of the campaign was cosmetic, however. Streets of
the provincial capital were paved, houses were given fresh paint, and public spaces were
cleaned up and widened. Fountains, photographs of president ÍusnÐ MubÁrak, statues
and murals were positioned in important public places. These measures have granted the
governor great popularity among the citizens even though the development of
infrastructure, education and economy has not kept pace with the new cleanliness of the
streets.680
One part of this campaign involved the restructuring of the pilgrimage site of SÐdÐ
ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm and the reorganization of the annual mawlid. The mosque in which the
shrine is located was renovated and extended by an open extension in the front, similar
205Transformations
681The Middle of ŠaÝbÁn is commonly interpreted to commemorate the changing of the qibla
from Jerusalem to the KaÝba. See Rispler-Chaim, ‘The 20th Century Treatment of an Old BidÝa’.
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in structure to the one added to the mosque of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ in the 1970s. The open
square around the mosque was extended 800 square metres by demolishing a part of the
graveyard at the back. The open area created behind the mosque was then separated from
the graveyard by a wall.  The square in the front was surrounded by a fence and became
accessible only by two gates facing the main street. Most of the square was turned into
a park surrounded by an additional fence, permanently closed to the public. The old
square that had hosted a small park and a bus stop on ordinary days and the mawlid once
a year was replaced by a spectacular representative space carefully separated from its
environment.
These measures of ‘beautification and development’ also extended to the organisation
of the mawlid. During the mawlid, no tents or stalls are allowed inside the passage
marked by iron fences (one to separate it from the streets, the other to separate it from
the park). The merchants’ stalls have thus wandered to the streets parallel to the fenced-in
main square while Ìidmas have had to move even further away to the side streets. The
amusements, most of which had been located in an open space in the graveyard, were
moved to the stadium some half a kilometre away. The graveyard, which had hosted
much of the mawlid in the past, was largely cut off from the rest of the festive grounds
and has come to host only smaller Ìidmas. Further fragmentation of the festive space is
– at least for the time being – off the agenda since a proposal to remove the cemetery to
the desert and use its site for new buildings was withdrawn after protests by influential
families whose graves would have been involved. 
The most dramatic change, however, was brought by the official festivity held in front
of the mosque on the great night. There is nothing new about an official festivity in itself:
Major mawlids have always been accompanied by official receptions attended by the
political, religious and economic elites of the region. What was new in QinÁ was the way
the official celebration came to exclusively dominate the centre of the mawlid. This
celebration, primarily held on the occasion of the Middle of ŠaÝbÁn681 and only
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secondarily on the occasion of the mawlid, is attended by the governor, high-ranking
local politicians, religious dignitaries, persons of public prominence, and honorary guests
(šayÌ al-Azhar in 2002, former governors of QinÁ in 2004). Before the arrival of the
governor (usually at the time of maÈrib, or sunset, prayer) the entire area inside the fences
is closed to the public, which regularly leads to heated exchanges of words between
policemen and citizens wanting to pray in the mosque. For some two hours, the centre
of the mawlid is inaccessible but for a small number of invited guests and those among
the general public who have arrived well on time to secure a seat. The imagery of the
festival is dominated by the brightly lit and almost completely empty central square,
standing in stark contrast to the surrounded streets crowded with people and merchants’
stalls. Even after the governor leaves and the general public is allowed to enter the
mosque again, this image remains in force through the shining emptiness of the park that
occupies most of the square.
The reactions of the mawlid-going public in QinÁ have been twofold. People generally
agree that the square in its new form is clean and beautiful, in the same way they generally
appreciate the new cleanliness of the city. But they also complain that the festive grounds
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have drifted too far apart, and that the streets around the mosque are too packed because
there is too little space left for the festivity. Many Sufis complain that their Ìidmas have
become cut off from the crowds and are thus able to draw fewer visitors than in the past.
Not everyone is unhappy though. People who run the amusements consider the new
amusement area at the stadium a good location although some complain about the
higher fees collected by the local administration. The new location of the mirmÁÎ (Upper
Egyptian horse race) that had to move away from the graveyard after the street where it
was held was paved in 2003, is generally considered much more suitable because of its
larger size allowing the jockeys to undertake more spectacular manoeuvres.
Officials of the local administration of course hold to very positive assessments of the
new form of the pilgrimage site and the mawlid. The secretary-general of QinÁ province682
argues that these measures have turned the mosque and the mawlid of SÐdÐ ÝAbd al-RahÐm
into a beautiful and modern Islamic pilgrimage site:
‘Now the place has come to be considered one of the very important pilgrimage sites, that
is, it [already was] an important Islamic pilgrimage site but [now] its aesthetic form has
come to show dignity and respect for his Eminence Sheikh SÐdÐ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm.’
–What was the reason for the relocation of the amusements to the stadium?
‘The amusements [have been restricted to] the stadium [...] because, for the sake of
development and beautification and dignity and respect, respect of the place, and
considering that it’s a mosque; it’s not allowed that there are any transgressing activities
(aÝmÁl muÌilla).’
–So the market and amusements are transgressing activities?
‘And all [such] activities and gambling and so on. We refuse that, since the place is
supposed to be for people to perform ziyÁra and to listen to religious hymns and lectures
and the life story of SÐdÐ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm and his pupils who learned from him.’
–And was it also for this reason that the park was closed to the public?
‘That was to keep it in an aesthetic shape for the people to enjoy: a green open area. And
there is additionally a large open area behind the mosque which is as big as the area that
used to be in the front. That is, the change that took place is that earlier people used to
sleep and sit on the ground in the open area in front of the mosque. Now we have cleaned
it up and reshaped it and turned it into a park which suits the place. And the extension
[of the square] was completed in the back [of the mosque] for the use of the public, but
without there being any amusements or transgressing activities.’
The secretary-general’s account is exemplary of the modernist and reformist discourse on
festivity: The sacred is in need of protection, the mawlid should be an occasion of
learning and discipline, and the ideal festivity is a public spectacle.  QinÁ is, in fact,
perhaps the most striking example of setting modernist critical discourse on mawlids to
work. The restructuring measures not only express the concern for clear boundaries and
solemn truth; they also contain the same modernist logic of representation and exclusion.
On a wall next to the mosque, a colourful mural – one of the many that have been
spread around the city as a part of the development campaign – represents the mawlid.
A mosaic in folkloric style, it shows a colourful procession with musicians, Sufis,
children, women and men in traditional costumes passing to a mosque along a
flourishing Nile valley landscape. The contrast is striking. The procession that functions
as the overarching storyline of the mural was prohibited in the mid-1990s following
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683The tribe of al-AšrÁf, which traces itself to SÐdÐ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm al-QinÁwÐ, claimed a privileged
position in the procession, which was not accepted by other tribes. The conflict escalated and led
to gunfights during the procession. Interview with FatÎÐ ÝAbd as-SamÐÝ, QinÁ, January 2003.
684For the biography of IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ, see Hallenberg, IbrÁhÐm al-DasÙqÐ; al-ÉÁÝfarÐ, RaÊab
aÔ-Óayyib, ŠayÌ al-islÁm ad-DisÙqÐ: quÔb aš-šarÐÝa wa-l-ÎaqÐqa, Cairo: Maktabat Umm al-QurÁ, 2001;
al-QÁÃÐ, SaÝd, al-ÝÀrif bi-llÁh SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ, Cairo: DÁr al-ÇarÐb, 2001.
685In a twist of fate, the governor died of a heart attack on 5 November 2002, (al-Wafd 6
November 2002: ‘WafÁt al-mustašÁr ÝAlÐ ÝAbd aš-ŠakÙr muÎÁfiÛ Kafr aš-ŠayÌ’, p. 1) only five days
after the mawlid, which many Sufis immediately interpreted as divine punishment for his
restrictive measures.
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outbreaks of tribal violence.683 The different elements of the mawlid are allowed to persist
in the mural as representations of colourful folklore, while in the square facing the wall,
they have been suppressed or pushed to the margins. No tents or stalls stand in front of
the mural. The mawlid is not allowed to interfere in its representation.
This tension of folkloric representation and excluded festive practice is part of a
spatial arrangement that, in a way analogous to the nationalist project of society in
general, has not led to a general disciplining of the festivity but rather to the creation of
a spectacular presence carefully dissociated from the popular festivity. The dramatic
involvement of the state in the spatial organisation of the mawlid in QinÁ has not been
accompanied by measures to discipline the rituals and morals of the visitors as has been
the case at many other mawlids. The shrine remains mixed not only during the mawlid
but throughout the year, and in the amusement areas dancing and gambling flourish.
This is a sound consequence of the logic of ‘beautification and development’: The proper
public festivity is created by dissociating it from the popular celebrations that, once they
cease to influence the public image of festivity, are left on their own.
3.3. Control and spectacle
Similar measures have been undertaken at most major mawlids in Egypt, for example in
the mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm al-DisÙqÐ in the city of DisÙq, the second biggest mawlid in
the Nile Delta region.684 In 2002, by order of the province governor ÝAli ÝAbd al-ŠakÙr,685
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686This square was expanded to its present size in the mid-1990s. Since then, the spacious new
square had hosted the main part of the mawlid. The tents of the Sufi orders had stood in front of
the mosque and the rest of the square had been filled with trading stands and pilgrims’ carpets. The
amusements were located in a nearby street where they have remained since the restructuring
measures. Interview with Brigadier-General Sayyid AÎmad, member of the National Assembly and
former police chief of FÙwa who has many years of experience in the mounted police at the mawlid
in DisÙq, Cairo, 18 January 2003.
687This measure is part of the modernisation and cleanliness campaign initiated by the governor
General MuÎammad ÝAbd as-SalÁm al-MaÎÊÙb (in office since 1997) that served as a blueprint for
the modernisation campaign in QinÁ. However it is probably also related to the location of the
Alexandrian mawlids. Unlike in most other cities where mawlids are connected to old city districts,
the major mawlids of Alexandria – most notably that of SÐdÐ al-MursÐ AbÙ l-ÝAbbÁs – are celebrated
in middle-class neighbourhoods whose inhabitants are often less tolerant towards a very loud
festivity lasting until the morning. 
Image 39: Changes in the use of open space in al-Íusayn Square during the mawlid of SÐdnÁ al-
Íusayn, Cairo, 1994-1996 and 2003. Data on 1994-1996: Madoeuf, Anna, Images et pratiques de la
ville ancienne du Caire: les sens de la ville, PhD thesis, Tours: Université de Tours, URBAMA,
1997.
it was forbidden to put up any stands or tents at all in the vast square facing the mosque
of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm during the mawlid.686 As a result, the square was only sparsely crowded
during the festival, and the celebrations moved to the crowded side streets. The emptiness
of the central square was further underlined by an unusually heavy security presence.
The pilgrimage sites and mawlids of Alexandria have undergone similar restructuring
but the most radical interference has concerned the temporal rather than the spatial side
of the organisation. Mawlids usually continue until faÊr prayer, sometimes even until 8
a.m., but in Alexandria loudspeakers have to be turned off between 12 and 1 a.m., and
police units assure that this regulation is observed.687
In Cairo, also, such measures are mainly concerned with the central, visible spaces of
the mawlid. Since 1998, all major pilgrimage sites at prominent locations have been
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688ÝAqÐdatÐ, 10.2.1998: ‘IÝÁdat taÌÔÐÔ maydÁn as-Sayyida NafÐsa’, p. 2; al-LiwÁÞ al-IslÁmÐ, 29.5.2003:
ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz AÎmad, ‘TaÔwÐr wa-tanmiyat mazÁrat Ál al-bayt Ãimn mašrÙÝ siyÁsÐ kabÐr’, p. 5.
689al-ÉumhÙrÐya, 20.7.2001: ÑalÁÎ FaÃl et al., ‘FÐ l-layla al-ÌitÁmÐya li-mawlid al-Íusayn: tam×Ðl
ramzÐ li-Ô-Ôuruq aÒ-ÒÙfÐya li-sabab ÃÐq al-makÁn’, p. 15.
690Schielke, Samuli, ‘Policing Mawlids and their Meaning’, in Diane Singerman and Paul Amar
(eds), Cairo Hegemonic, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006, forthcoming.
691al-QÁhira, 28.9.2004: BayyÙmÐ QindÐl, ‘Íada× fÐ l-layla al-kabÐra li-l-iÎtifÁl bi-mawlid raÞÐsat
ad-dÐwÁn wa-ÈafÐrat MiÒr’, p. 8; Cairo Magazine, 10-16.3.2005.
692The year 2005 saw an unprecedented amount of anti-government demonstrations. The state’s
strategy has been to isolate demonstrations through a massive police presence and prevent them
when possible.
Image 40: View over al-QalÝa Square to
MaÎmÙd BÁšÁ Mosque during the mawlid
of SÐdÐ AÎmad ar-RifÁÝÐ, Cairo, 12 March
1987. Niek Biegman.
reorganized to some degree, most recently in the
context of the government-initiated Ahl al-Bayt
Project designed to attract religious tourism from
abroad.688 Mosques have been either enlarged or
demolished and replaced by new ones.
Surrounding open spaces have been restructured,
typically by creating parks and open spaces
separated by iron fences. At the mawlid of al-
Íusayn tents have been banned from the central
square since 1999, save for a small fenced
enclosure next to the mosque.689 The mosque of
as-Sayyida Zaynab has been vastly enlarged and
the surrounding square has been fragmented by
numerous fences. Again, the Sufi tents have been
confined to a small fenced enclosure and the side
streets during the mawlid. In the mawlid of as-
Sayyida NafÐsa, tents and stalls were banned in
1999 from the square facing the recently expanded
mosque.690 The mawlid of SÐdÐ AÎmad ar-RifÁÝÐ
has gone through the severest changes: it is
practically cut into three isolated parts since the
entire mosque was surrounded by fences and tents
and stalls were banned from the street and square facing the mosque. Also in Cairo, the
year 2004 saw a wave of new restrictive measures. Following the appointment of a new
governor, police presence at mawlids was upped, what remained of vendors’ stalls in front
of  mosques was banned, and early closing hours were enforced in smaller mawlids.691
Most processions have been confined to much shorter routes than in the past, and in
summer 2005, security officials prohibited the procession of as-Sayyida NafÐsa citing the
risk of demonstrations and the proximity of presidential elections.692
All these attempts at reorganisation result from an understanding of public space and
the sacred that opposes the traditional model of mawlids based on baraka of the shrine
and overlapping circles of celebration. State authorities tend to organize mawlids
increasingly on the basis of a model of separate spheres. In ÓanÔÁ, this is done by
sharpening the boundaries of the existing spatial arrangement, in QinÁ through the
radical relocation of the festivity, conceived of as part of the modernization of the entire
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693Drieskens, Living with Djinns, p. 247.
694Urban Development in Egypt, [Cairo]: Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities,
undated [ca. 2001].
695These routes can mean significant detours, which is why people either climb over the fences
or sooner or later someone breaks a gap into the fence to make a shortcut.
Image 41: View over al-QalÝa Square to MaÎmÙd BÁšÁ
Mosque during the mawlid of SÐdÐ AÎmad ar-RifÁÝÐ,
Cairo, 7 August 2003.
city. In other cities, such as DisÙq
and Cairo, the measures have been
mainly concerned with creating an
empty representative space in the
centre of the festivity.
Turning the mawlid into
separate spheres of celebration
involves much more than merely
changing the location of some tents
and stalls. The formerly contingent
space of the mawlid is restructured
in accordance with a functionally
differentiated system of order. In
this new order, the sacred and the
profane and the official and the
popular celebrations are separated.
Everything (i.e. everything that the
planners consider important) has its
distinct place. The state symbolically
takes possession of the mawlid by creating an empty, representative space in its centre.
Participants often describe these changes as a loss of space although the squares around
the main pilgrimage sites of Egypt have been, in purely quantitative terms, vastly
expanded during the 20th century. But while the squares have grown in size, the use of
this space has become increasingly restricted. The contingent space of the sÁÎa has been
replaced by the functionally differentiated, controlled and presentable space of the public
square. The centres of mawlids have been placed under control (both symbolic and
physical) of the state, most visibly through the empty spaces of the central squares. Iron
fences and green areas closed to the public have become a characteristic feature of public
places in Egypt since the 1990s.693
Fences and empty spaces are instruments of visible order and domination that are not
restricted to mawlids. They represent a general trend in urban planning favouring
spectacular spaces, vast green areas, wide streets, motorways, bridges, prestigious
construction projects, functional differentiation of space, and the development of ‘new
cities’ created in the desert according to this pattern of order.694 At most public places,
ornamented iron fences regulate the movement of pedestrians, preventing them from
entering green areas and forcing them to follow certain routes.695 When these measures
are implemented in old urban spaces, they tend to create a strong contrast to the
surrounding streets, underlined by the policy of giving a fresh paint to buildings around
a newly restructured site while leaving anything away from the central area untouched.
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696al-AhrÁm, 20.7.1999. See above pp. 102-103.
697After the opening of the al-Azhar tunnel in 2001, the bus stop at al-Íusayn was closed, and
the buses to and from ad-DarrÁsa had to take a new, significantly longer route via BÁb aš-ŠaÝrÐya.
This measure has not eased traffic in the area because the buses have been replaced by numerous
taxis that cause serious traffic jams.
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A prominent case of these measures has been the restructuring of Cairo’s Ramses
Square, whose crowded and chaotic shape had inspired a journalist to compare it to a
mawlid in a critical article in 1999.696 In 2004, its minibus and bus stations were moved
to a new site behind the railway station and their previous sites were turned into green
areas surrounded by iron fences and wide sidewalks. Because a second line of fences
separates the sidewalks from the streets many of them effectively lead nowhere. These
measures give the impression of being planned by people who do not actually use this
space, who do not walk or take the bus, and consequently see no problem in making
pedestrians take long detours, or in replacing or simply removing697 a bus station. A bus
station, in their perception, is a source of disorder, and creating a representative space
more important than, for example, having the bus and metro stations connected.
What is the purpose of these fenced spaces, then? What kind of public order do they
represent? The secretary-general of the QinÁ provincial administration cited above offers
us an important clue when he argues that SÐdÐ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm Square, in its new ‘aesthetic
shape’, was there ‘for the people to enjoy’. In this context, ‘to enjoy’ obviously does not
mean to use the space but to view wide green areas in which no one is allowed to sit (to
prevent them from spoiling it and filling it with garbage), vast spaces organised in
geometric patterns, with different areas specified for different uses: park, street, sidewalk,
fenced enclosure of a mosque, parking lot, etc. ‘To enjoy’ means to be the spectator of an
aesthetics of spectacular public space that is identified with a specific kind of order and
discipline. It is striking how often the attributes ‘organised’ (munaÛÛam) and ‘beautiful’
appear together in the accounts of state officials and religious dignitaries who describe
these spaces. Public order, in this understanding, is an aesthetic quality, and imposing
it is not separable from beautification, and hence the connection of ‘beautification and
development’ so common in the official discourse on public planning. The key concepts
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Religious Endowments Administration in Kafr as-ŠayÌ province, Kafr aš-ŠayÌ city, 21 January
2003.
699Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, pp. 79-81.
here are niÛÁm, meaning the habitus or quality of order, discipline and organisation in
people and things, and tanÛÐm, meaning the practice of ordering, disciplining and
organising. niÛÁm and tanÛÐm are the opposite of what mawlids are perceived to be by
their reformist and modernist critics. They stand for clear differentiation between spaces
and practices, embodied in a restrained and educated upper or middle-class habitus, and
accompanied by the aesthetics of embodiment and habitualisation, identifying an
appearance of order with moral improvement and social progress.698
This form of order is a powerful tool of practical and symbolic domination of urban
space. Fences and empty green areas turn previously contingent urban squares into
demonstrations of state presence. In doing so, these spaces serve two purposes:
representation and control. They should give the image of Egypt as a modern, clean and
well organised country (remember how sensitive Egyptian elites are about the image of
Egypt abroad), and they should provide a matrix of order, helping to control the
movement of citizens.
As the case of Ramses Square shows, this order very often turns out to be highly
dysfunctional. So also at mawlids. The new spatial order of the mosques and the
surrounding areas looks prestigious and is suitable for official ceremonies. However, it
is dysfunctional for the large crowds that attend the festivities. Fences and police
roadblocks often cause worse bottlenecks than tents and trade ever could. Moving the
celebrations to the margins actually makes it more difficult to control them. Do these
measures really serve to control festivities or only to establish symbolic domination? Or
do decision makers take the one for the other?  What does control actually mean here?
This tension is based on the very way control and public order are conceived of and
practised by state actors. To control the mawlid is not only about the movement of
people and the form of space. It is about controlling the meaning and public image of
festivity and social order. The contingent and ambiguous space of a mawlid is turned
into a prestigious, (apparently) well ordered space in an (apparently) modern city
(apparently) inhabited by well disciplined citizens as apparently conceived by planners
of such projects.699 It is no coincidence that the projects to ‘beautify and develop’ the
space of pilgrimage sites go hand in hand with forms of festivity that emphasize official
representation and didactic discipline. All attempts to reform mawlids, most strongly so
those concerning public space, are involved in moving the power of definition and
representation from the hands of the mawlid-goers into the hands of religious and
political elites. State officials, accompanied by some elements in al-Azhar and, as shown
in the following section, the Sufi establishment, are trying to turn mawlids from a source
of chaos – or alternative order, depending on the point of view – into a vehicle of
ideological hegemony, that is, framed in the language of the hegemonic discourses,
consciousness and correct knowledge. 
This is how the restructuring measures are framed by many state functionaries, among
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700FuÞÁd ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz MuÎammad, in an interview in Kafr as-ŠayÌ, 21 January 2003.
701Interview with Brigadier-General Sayyid AÎmad, Cairo, 18 January 2003.
them the director of the Religious Endowments Administration in the Kafr aš-ŠayÌ
province who found the restructuring of the mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ a great
step forward in creating a true Islamic mawlid:
‘The square of the mosque of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm this year [2002]: a wonderful square! Before,
you wouldn’t have been able to walk there [because of the crowds]. And some disturbances
could happen because of people who have no morals. But now, in agreement with the
security apparatuses which played a magnificent role, and in agreement with the religious
establishment, it has become a place where religious people go to acquire scientific and
cultural knowledge. It has become easy for them to move there and to gain knowledge;
and they have begun to transmit it to others. So thank God, there is progress in this
practice, and the broad base of the sons of the Arab Republic of Egypt increasingly
understands the true meaning of the mawlid. In my view, we have eliminated as much as
90% of the errors that are committed in the mawlids.’700
This is the mawlid as the state institutions would like to show it: a well organised and
precisely orchestrated festivity for the propagation of official religious discourse.
Religious dignitaries, not the ordinary visitors, are the focus of attention. The festivity
is turned into a medium of religious propaganda, possibly enriched with some elements
of folklore.
In this form, the mawlid finally corresponds to the hegemonic representations of
festivity. But we should keep in mind that similar statements have been repeatedly made
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Is the mawlid really under control? In the centre,
it evidently is. Unlike the disciplining of bodies, the restructuring of festive space has
been successful albeit with a significant limitation: this transformation only concerns the
visible centre of the festivity. As the state attempts to organise the mawlid according to
a model of separate spheres, the mawlid in its old shape does not disappear. It is merely
moved out of sight.
‘The mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm was beautiful and very organised/disciplined (munaÛÛam)
this year. Compared to previous years it was much less chaotic and crowded.’
S: But some merchants complained about the measures.
‘The merchants’ interest is in the chaos, the chaos brings people who buy. Now that the
square is empty of stands and there are less people they of course make less money. The
interest of the merchants is not the interest of security and order. The mawlid was
organised this way so that there will be less crowds in the centre, in the square in front of
the mosque and in the main streets, and it was very successful. In previous years the square
was very full and so were all streets. Now the centre was closed for traffic, cars had to pass
by the ring road, and the crowds were moved to the side streets. So there is now much
more space and a beautiful view.’
S.: But the crowds are still very bad in the side streets, what about them?
‘That’s intended. The point is to reduce the pressure in the places of vital importance:
main streets and the square in front of the mosque by moving the crowds into the side
streets.’701
By symbolically occupying the centres of prominent, visible festivities, the state
demonstrates its version of civic order while simultaneously allowing the margins of the
festivities to follow an order of their own. This is a matter of both resources and will.
Brigadier-General Sayyid AÎmad, the police officer and parliamentarian speaking in the
above quote, is a person committed to Sufi tradition and attends the mawlid of SÐdÐ
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702For example the governor of QinÁ General ÝÀdil LabÐb who in an interview underlined to
me that he never attends mawlids (and pointed out that his presence in the official celebration is
different from attending the mawlid) and expects them to decline and disappear. Interview in
QinÁ, QinÁ 15 January 2003.
703Interview with Brigadier-General Sayyid AÎmad.
704This does not necessarily have anything to do with the size of the festivity: In QinÁ, the
provincial administration has hardly shown interest in reorganising the mawlid of MÁr Girgis (St.
George), the second largest mawlid in a province with a large Christian population:
S: Have there been measures to reorganise other mawlids in the province, like that of MÁr Girgis
[St. George] in RuzayqÁt?
‘RuzayqÁt is far from QinÁ. It belongs to the province [of QinÁ], but it’s far from the city.’
 S: So how is it organised?
‘It’s in the countryside so it’s a different issue of administration, while SÐdÐ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm is in
the middle of the city. And the square is a very important place. And it’s a place of trade, and all
people go to the mosque and it’s a place with lots of crowds so there must be organisation
(tanÛÐm).’
Of course, there is trade and lots of crowds in the mawlid of St. George, too, and organisation
would be needed there as well. But because it is in the countryside – that is, out of sight – the local
administration does not see the need to interfere in it the way it does in the province capital. The
fact that it is a Christian mawlid may also play a role. Whether it is organised according to
modernist and reformist ideals may not have as much importance for a Muslim governor.
(Interview by FatÎÐ ÝAbd as-SamÐÝ and the author with secretaries of general ÝÀdil LabÐb, the
governor of QinÁ, QinÁ, 15 January 2003).
IbrÁhÐm on his free time. Although there certainly are other persons in authority who
profoundly dislike mawlids,702 for Brigadier-General Sayyid it is a matter of finding a
balance between two legitimate interests: control and representation on the one hand,
and a festive atmosphere on the other:
‘We could make the mawlid even more ordered. We could go to the side streets and
organise them the same way [i.e. restrict trade and amusements and decrease the pressure
of the crowds], but that would make the mawlid lose its flavour. It’s the crowds that make
the mawlid (il-mÙlid fÐ zaÎmituh).’
The same logic applies to the organisation of mawlids that are out of sight, that is,
festivities that do not occupy central visible locations in the capital or the provincial
cities. In Cairo,  mawlids that are located in the alleys of the old city or in the suburbs
are subjected to significantly less pressure by the authorities. The mawlids in the
countryside hardly gain the attention of the state:
‘Similar measures are not necessary in smaller mawlids because they are not such mass
occasions like SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm with large crowds and people coming from different parts of
the country and important visitors such as the governor who comes to pray on Friday
[following the great night] with the director of Religious Endowments Administration
and others, and the television broadcasting it.’703
It is not just the lesser crowds in the countryside but the representative presence of state
functionaries and television in urban mawlids that makes government involvement
necessary in the city but dispensable in the villages.704
Why this process of restructuring mawlids is increasingly taking place since the 1990s
– since the general clampdown of the 1930s and 40s there have been no other attempts
to suppress mawlids – is related to two factors: availability of international loans for
infrastructure projects including the restructuring of streets and squares, and the way the
Egyptian state is redefining its role in society, moving from the Nasserist social contract
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705In the Nasserist system, the state was a provider of services: subsidised groceries, free
education, public sector jobs. Today, these services have dramatically deteriorated and are
increasingly being replaced by prestigious projects that are mostly directed to a small globalised
segment of the society. See, e.g., Amin, Galal, ‘Globalisation, Consumption Patterns and Human
D e v e l o p m e n t  i n  E g y p t ’ ,  E R F  w o r k i n g  p a p e r  9 9 2 9 ,  [ 1 9 9 9 ] ,
http://www.erf.org.eg./uploadpath/pdf/9929.pdf, viewed 11.11.2005.
706For example in the Šamm an-NasÐm procession in Port Said that has been under heavy
pressure from the state in recent years. al-AhÁlÐ, 3.5.2000: ÝImÁd FuÞÁd / ÍamdÐ ÉumÝa, ‘al-I×nayn
al-aswad fÐ BÙr SaÝÐd’, pp. 1, 4.
towards providing spectacles of global modernity.705 These spectacles – new cities, up-scale
districts, flyover bridges, socially exclusive spaces, spectacular public projects – are a
spatial expression of the definition of modern Egypt and orthodox Islam through the
exoticisation and exclusion of a social reality that falls short of its ideal image. 
Like its colonial predecessor, the hegemonic city of the early 21st century is marked
and defined through its opposition to the popular districts and the countryside. But
through the policies of ‘beautification and development’, this opposition enters popular
districts and provincial cities as the state inscribes its presence in central public spaces
in the form of spectacles that stand in a striking contrast to the surrounding streets and
alleys: new mosques, wide squares and parks, iron fences, empty spaces, a strong state
presence and restrictive measures at mawlids and other public festivities.706 Neither the
will nor the resources exist to subject mawlids – or any other parts of the popular
districts and villages – to full civilising discipline. Instead, the distinctions between up-
scale and popular Egypt are reproduced and reinforced in the festive space and time of
mawlids. Other definitions are pushed to the margin but not erased.
It is this logic of spectacular, distinctive presence that has lead to the conflation of
control and representation. Control of public space in present-day administrative
practice is a complex form of power that extends not only to the movement of  citizens
but also the meaning and the representative image of that space. It implies anti-
insurgency planning designed to prevent uncontrollable movements of crowds even at
the cost of everyday functionality, but it also involves a more profound power over the
use and appearance of space. In a way similar to the modernist understanding of the self
and habitus, this power of definition is conceived in aesthetic terms, along oppositions
such as cleanliness and filth, order and chaos, or calm and noise. A public place that falls
short of these aesthetic criteria is out of control because it is not functional in the
imagery and structure of the hegemonic modern city. But it is the same logic that also
makes this control incomplete. Because it is so much conceived of in aesthetic terms of
spectacular presence, it cannot be total. The margins, by definition, cannot and need not
be subjected to the same order and discipline the centre is.
4. The reformist ÎaÃra and the respectable mawlid
Sufi gatherings, especially Sufi Æikr, have been the focus of criticism throughout the
20th century. It is thus no wonder that the Sufi establishment and many Sufi orders have
given the reform of these gatherings high priority. How exactly these reforms ought to
look, however, has not been very clear. The circular of sheikh ÝAbd al-BÁqÐ  al-BakrÐ from
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707Sic. De Jong quotes a contemporary English translation of the circular. The Arabic original
is not available.
708De Jong, Óuruq, p. 196.
709Luizard, ‘Le rôle des confréries soufies’ pp. 29-31.
710Interview with Sheikh ÝAlÁÞ AbÙ l-ÝAzÁÞim, sheikh of the ÝAzmiyya order and a member of
the Supreme Sufi Council, who complained that the government authorities would not take
seriously the Supreme Sufi Council’s proposals to eliminate deviations from mawlids. Cairo, 17
February 2002.
711It is common for living Sufi sheikhs to have no formal order of their own, only an informal
circle of friends and disciples. For an analysis of the ÎaÃra of one such group, see Schielke, Samuli,
“On Snacks and Saints: When Discourses of Order and Rationality Enter the Egyptian Mawlid”,
in Stauth (ed.), On Archaeology of Sainthood, pp. 173-194, here p. 186.
712See Frishkopf, Sufism, Ritual and Modernity, pp. 1035-1076.
1881 (see above pp. 140 and 193) that marked the rise of Sufi reformism in Egypt was
highly detailed concerning the practices that were to be abolished but rather vague on
how a proper ÎaÃra actually ought to look:
‘It is necessary that the “zikrs”707 be performed with due reverence, respect, and quietness
as becomes the presence of Almighty God and to refrain from bad behaviour and
everything contrary to religion such as joking, indecent words and the like; and in short,
“zikrs” must be restricted to the praise of God.’708
But what does it mean, in practice, to perform a ÎaÃra ‘with due reverence, respect, and
quietness’? This ideal of ritual embodying a constrained and conscious state of mind has
become a central issue for reformist Sufi orders that attempt to enter the debate with the
very weapons of Islamic reformism and modernism: discipline, rationality and
authenticity. As shown in chapter six, involvement in this debate has very often meant
the acceptance of the underlying commonplaces concerning civility, piety and festivity,
and consequently a radical redefinition of Sufi rituals and traditions. In the following
I argue that this takeover of reformist standards is not confined to the level of apologetic
discourse. For reformist Sufi groups, collective ritual is an essential part of their response
to modernist criticism.
In many cases the Sufi apologetic discourse on these issues remains on the level of
mere declarations, but often enough Sufi groups have actually set out to implement this
discourse in practice by enacting the rationalist habitus of piety. The most prolific
proponent of ritual reform is the Supreme Council of Sufi Orders.709 In reality, however,
the Council has only limited influence on the actual course of mawlids; it acts primarily
as a vehicle for a reformist Sufi discourse.710 Actual reforms of festivities and rituals are
implemented by reform-minded Sufi groups.711 And just as there are different Sufi groups
with different social and ideological backgrounds, there are many different ways to make
a Sufi ÎaÃra fit the requirements of hegemonic religious discourses.
Reformist Sufi gatherings vary greatly depending on the goals and constituency of
their organisers. Some try to attract a specifically middle- and upper-class public while
others seek a wide social spectrum of adherents. While some are satisfied with creating
a degree of discipline, others go further and aspire to be included into the hegemonic
imagery of public festivity. Common to all is their tendency to intellectualise the content
and prioritise discipline over emotional, ecstatic and ambivalent elements in order to give
the whole event an organized, morally respectable, and modern appearance.712
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713Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi, pp. 11-19, 35-41.
714See ar-RÁÃÐ, SÐdÐ SalÁma, QÁnÙn aÔ-ÔarÐqa al-ÍÁmidÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya, Cairo: DÁr mašyaÌat wa-
siÊÊÁdat aÔ-ÔarÐqa al-ÍÁmidÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya, 1965.
715See, e.g., Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi, Íasan, aÒ-ÑÙfÐya wa-s-siyÁsa, Frishkopf, Sufism, Ritual and
Modernity; MuÒÔafÁ, FÁrÙq AÎmad, al-BinÁÞ al-iÊtimÁÝÐ li-Ô-ÔarÐqa al-ÍÁmidÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya fÐ MiÒr:
dirÁsa fÐ l-an×r½b½l½ÊiyÁ al-iÊtimÁÝÐya, Alexandria: al-HayÞa al-miÒrÐya al-ÝÁmma li-l-kitÁb, 1980.
716Interview with Michael Gilsenan, Leiden, September 2001.
717It is important to distinguish between ÎaÃras at the zÁwiyÁ of a group, which have a more
intimate atmosphere, and those held at mawlids, which function as a public display and
mobilisation site. Depending on the group, the mawlid ÎaÃra can be more spontaneous and open
to all, or very strictly organised to transmit a ‘correct’ public image. Chih, Le soufisme au quotidien,
p. 254; Frishkopf , Sufism, Ritual and Modernity, pp. 171 f,; 263-332.
718To be precise, this is only accurate for one of the two main branches of the order. The
ÍÁmidÐya was always active in recruiting members from the upper and middle classes, but has also
remained rooted in the popular milieu of Cairo’s oldest working class district BÙlÁq AbÙ l-ÝIlÁ
where the first zÁwiya of the order stands. In the 1970s a new, more socially distinctive zÁwiya was
built in the up-scale district al-MuhandisÐn, which effectively led to a split between the MuhandisÐn
branch and the BÙlÁq branch. Gilsenan, Regognizing Islam, pp. 236-240.
719It is likely that this distinctively elevated (rÁqÐ) habitus has also been instrumental in making
the ÍÁmidÐya a showcase piece of Sufism the Egyptian government thinks can be shown to
foreigners without compromising the image of Egypt as a modern nation.
4.1. Al-ÍÁmidÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya: the ‘Soviet model farm’
One of the earliest, and until today most prominent, representatives of reformist Sufism
is the ÓarÐqa al-ÍÁmidÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya. This order, established in 1927 by sheikh SalÁma ar-
RÁÃÐ (1867-1939),713 follows a consciously modernist and reformist agenda not only
concerning its rituals but also its doctrine and administrative structure.714 For this reason
it has long served as something of a showcase Sufi order, and has become the probably
most intensively studied Sufi group in Egypt.715 It is not really representative for Egyptian
Sufism though, as Michael Gilsenan, author of the standard work on the ÍÁmidÐya, Saint
and Sufi in Modern Egypt, has pointed out: In the Nasserist 1960s it was, in fact, the only
Sufi order he was allowed to research at all, a kind of ‘Soviet model farm’.716
The ÍÁmidÐya, though well known, is not the most innovative reformist Sufi group.
Their mawlid ÎaÃra717 stands in a long tradition of more stern and contemplative Sufi
gatherings that have always existed side by side with more ecstatic and spontaneous ones.
The ÎaÃra begins with collective recitation of religious poetry and invocations, followed
by a collective Æikr in rows, led by a munšid. No musical instruments are used, and
women and children are forbidden from participating. There are no speeches or lectures.
The gathering is based on Æikr, ecstatic but disciplined through the collective,
orchestrated form of the gathering.
What distinguishes the ÍÁmidÐya is not so much the form of its ÎaÃra as the way it
is embedded in a socially distinctive setting.718 The Ìidmas of the order stand out at
mawlids. They are large and elaborately decorated, and have doormen guarding the
entrance to the tent and refusing entrance to women, children and potential
troublemakers. This exclusive character is also reflected in the way some members of the
order distinguish themselves from other Sufi groups, claiming to be the more or less sole
representatives of true – i.e. ethical, disciplined, intellectual and refined (rÁqÐ) – Sufism:719
‘There is a clear difference between an educated [sheikh] who has a murÐd who follows the
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720Again, the animal body is emblematic of the criticism of the cult of saints. For the related
topic of the fertility of water buffalos, see pp. 90 and 95-96.
721For a discussion of sulÙk as a concept for mystical habitualisation of piety, see above p. 98.
722Associating the term rÁqÐ (refined, upper-class) with an intellectual disposition is, as shown
above on p. 151, a key element of middle-class distinction. It is worth noting that the class described
by this list of professions is not the neo-liberal upper middle class based on private profit, but the
old Nasserist one based on public sector and intellectual self-image.
723Interview with a member of al-ÍÁmidÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya, Alexandria, 24 July 2003.
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path to God and the Law of the Prophet, God’s blessings and peace be upon him, and that
someone who goes to a sheikh and says: “Read the FÁtiÎa for me and heal my calf.”720 [...]
This point may be the fundamental difference between the ÍÁmidÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya and any
other Sufi order: the only ÔarÐqa that teaches sulÙk (the conduct and disposition of a
mystic; mystic path721). [...] Part of the sulÙk of a person who belongs to the ÔarÐqa is that
he expresses the Law of MuÎammad in society. There’s no way that I could be a dervish,
no, we don’t have ÊaÆb (state of divinely inspired madness), and neither do we have
dervishdom. With us, the murÐd has to be conscious, committed to his daily work, to live
from the income of his work. At the same time, his heart is with the powerful and exalted
God. 
[...] 
It’s unlike the mawlids that are basically about dance and percussion. You feel the
difference when you go down to the square. Look: The ÎaÃra here is munaÛÛam
(organised/disciplined). The people are very organised/disciplined.
[...]
Another important point that is important for you to know: all the classes that belong [to
the order] are intellectually refined classes (fiÞÁt rÁqiyat al-fikr) That is, judges, officers,
engineers, civil servants, high intellectual levels, not commoners.722 There is not one
commoner, and even if there is someone without education, SÐdnÁ [SalÁma ar-RÁÃÐ]
ordered them to learn the QurÞÁn. [...] This you will find in no other ÔarÐqa.’723
The reinterpretation of sulÙk to include the acquisition of a modern, civilised and
educated disposition, the emphasis on organisation/discipline (tanÛÐm), and the strong
drive towards social distinction (framed as knowledge distinction), are common features
of most reformist Sufi orders, most of which consciously try to attract educated middle-
and upper-class followers. As a result, their gatherings often stand out from the general
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724Interviews with Ašraf ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz FayÒal, son and prospective successor of a Sufi sheikh,
mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ, DisÙq, 1 November 2002; and with sheikh Íasan ad-DirÐnÐ,
mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ, DisÙq, 30 October 2002.
725The order is formally a branch of the ŠÁÆilÐya but does not make reference to it in its
banners.
726McPherson, The Moulids of Egypt, pp. 140-144; Luizard, ’Le rôle des confréries soufies’, p. 37;
AbÙ l-ÝAzÁÞim, al-IÎtifÁl bi-mawÁlid; Idem, IslÁm aÒ-ÒÙfÐya huwa l-Îall; interview with Julia Schlösser,
anthropologist, Cairo, 13 October 2004.
lower-class milieu of mawlids. Just like criticism of mawlids is a form of social
distinction for students with rural backgrounds, the intellectual atmosphere of reformist
ÎaÃras is a strong marker of class distinction. Some groups go further than the ÍÁmidÐya
and combine a constrained, intellectual atmosphere with material symbols of class
distinction: seating people on chairs and offering individual meals framed by symbols
of restaurant service. Other Sufis often show a mixed relationship to these gatherings,
admiring them for their orderly character and rich material resources but also criticising
them for their exclusivity. They are not only associated with the outspoken criticism of
the more ecstatic and emotional forms of Sufi practice, but also the clear statement of
class difference they make is opposed to the temporary suspension of class distinctions,
a central motif of the Sufi mawlid.724
4.2. Al-ÝAzmÐya: the mawlid as conference
Other reformist Sufi groups are not satisfied with representing a disciplined and sober
ÎaÃra. They radically reshape their festive practice to distinguish themselves from the
general atmosphere of mawlids and to approach the hegemonic imagery of public
festivity. An outstanding example is the mawlid of the ÓarÐqa al-ÝAzmÐya.725 The order,
founded in 1933 by the prominent anti-colonial activist Muhammad MÁÃÐ AbÙ l-ÝAzÁÞim,
is known for its radical anti-Salafi polemics and outspokenly modernist orientation. The
ÝAzmÐya, with a social base mainly in rural and small town middle classes, defends
mawlids vehemently against Salafi criticism while simultaneously calling for a reform of
the celebrations.726
The mawlid of al-imÁm al-muÊaddid (as he is considered to be by his followers)
Muhammad MÁÃÐ AbÙ l-ÝAzÁÞim is consciously organized as an exemplary instance of
a true and correct mawlid and in clear contrast to an ecstatic Sufi gathering. The entire
festivity consists solely of a religious-political public conference. There are no
amusements, no public Æikr, and no trade save for a stand selling photographs of
successive generations of sheikhs. 
The mawlid lasts four days. In 2002, the first day was devoted to a conference
discussing the contribution of Sufism to religious discourse. On the second day, which
was also the day of al-isrÁÞ wa-l-miÝrÁÊ, a celebration was held in the order’s mosque
involving a short Æikr – seated and without musical instruments – followed by some
learned and many highly nationalist speeches. The main public celebration took place on
the two following nights, first in a tent in front of the mosque, and in the final night in
a theatre. During the public celebrations on the last two nights of the mawlid, all of the
people were seated on chairs. Women were allowed to attend the celebration but were
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separated from men by a metre-high wall. In the final celebration in the theatre, women
were seated in the balcony and men on the floor. There was also a clear separation
between the seated audience and the order’s dignitaries, who were seated on the podium.
The atmosphere of the entire festivity was very formal. There was no Æikr during the
public celebration and the first part of the celebration consisted entirely of speeches and
poetry praising the founder of the order and discussing political topics (mostly sharp
attacks on Israel and Jews in general, and Saudi Arabia and Wahhabis in general). Awards
were given to outstanding members of the order and persons of public prominence.
Music finally followed the three and a half hours of speeches. Performed by an orchestra
and a uniformed choir, the music was much softer and more elaborate than the music
performed by most munšids at mawlids. It represented the officially recognised and more
orchestral form of religious music that can be appreciated as high art and broadcast on
the radio.727 The only opportunity for public participation was through applause.
This gathering was organized in conscious opposition to traditional mawlids and did
not even look like a mawlid. It did look very much like the many official political and
religious gatherings shown on Egyptian television, however. In fact, it represents a clear
attempt to fulfill the norms of the modern official public sphere: the form is that of a
conference, the public is disciplined and passive and the content is intellectual,
educational and rationalistic. It is not intended to be fun.
Its form of celebration notably exhibits an important feature of most reformist
gatherings: the prevalence of rhetorical speech. While most Sufi ÎaÃras (also some
reformist ones, notably those of the ÍÁmidÐya) mainly make use of ritual speech (prayers,
recitation of QurÞÁn and liturgic text, etc.) and vocal performance, most reformist
gatherings contain a great deal of rhetorical speech, that is, speeches, lectures, and
preaching, characterised by an argumentative or suggestive character. This follows a
central topic of reformist Sufi discourse: the interpretation of mawlids as occasions of
learning and education. Following the example set by state celebrations and conferences,
learning is conceived of as a top-down relation between authoritative speakers and a
passive audience.
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728See, e.g., al-AhrÁm, 6.12.1996:’ al-IÎtifÁl bi-mawlid al-imÁm AbÐ l-ÝAzÁÞim’, Friday supplement,
p. 11; Another mawlid that enjoys similar public prominence is celebrated in honour of Dr. ÝAbd
al-ÍalÐm MaÎmÙd, former šayÌ al-Azhar. The celebration is very similar to that of Imam Abu l-
ÝAzÁÞim, also in terms of size. al-AhrÁm, 28.8.1998: ‘ÝAbd al-ÍalÐm MaÎmÙd .. al-ÝÁlim wa-l-faqÐh
al-Îaqq’, Friday supplement, p. 2; ÝAqÐdatÐ, 24.7.2001: IslÁm AbÙ l-ÝAÔÔÁ, ‘ÂawÁbiÔ ÒÁrima li-iÎyÁÞ
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al-karÐm wa-muÞtamar dÐnÐ wa-ÊamÁhÐrÐ’, p. 15.
729At the crossing of MaÊlis aš-ŠaÝb and Port Said streets in the district of BÁb al-Ëalq in Cairo.
730Interview with Kazuhiro Arai, anthropologist, Cairo, 13 October 2004; Frishkopf, Sufism,
Ritual and Modernity, pp. 375-391.; 542-621; Hoffman, Sufis, Mystics and Saints, pp. 147, 152, 247;
Johansen, Sufism and Islamic Reform, pp. 82-88.
731In Upper Egypt, a region characterised by conservative values, strong local identity, and a
different structure of class distinctions, ecstatic Sufi Æikr enjoys higher social esteem than in Cairo
and Lower Egypt. For example, Channel 8 (AswÁn) is the only state TV channel that regularly
broadcasts Sufi inšÁd.
This mawlid is thus a successful attempt to be included in the hegemonic public
imagery of religion and festivity. Despite its small size – the total number of visitors does
not exceed one thousand – it is one of the very few mawlids that regularly get extensive
(and always positive) coverage in semi-official newspapers such as al-AhrÁm.728 Successful
as this form of festivity may be in terms of public representation, however, it remains
problematic in terms of mobilisation. Sufi groups have always used mawlids to attract
new members, and offering a good, spiritually and aesthetically appealing ÎaÃra has been
instrumental to this purpose. Compared to most public Sufi gatherings, the mawlid of
the ÝAzmÐya is extremely formal and vapid, and despite its visible location729 and public
prominence, it only draws a small number of participants.
4.3. Al-ÉÁzÙlÐya: some emotion, some discipline
A very different solution is presented by the ÓarÐqa al-ÉÁzÙlÐya al-ÍusaynÐya aš-
ŠÁÆilÐya. The order, established in 1951, adopts a highly innovative approach to making
Sufi gatherings more in tune with the dominant religious discourses while at the same
time offering a festive and emotional atmosphere in its gatherings.
The ÉÁzÙlÐya, established by Sheikh ÉÁbir Íusayn AÎmad al-ÉÁzÙlÐ (1913-1992) and
now led by his son SÁlim, has been built on significantly different premises. The
organisation of the ÔarÐqa is based on the absolute power of the sheikh over disciples who
are largely equal among each other. The brotherhood does not have any of the detailed
regulations or administrative and spiritual hierarchies of the ÍÁmidÐya. More noticeably,
however, the rituals of the ÔarÐqa show a unique mixture of reformist discipline together
with an ecstatic atmosphere and extensive use of melodic and emotional music.730
The ÉÁzÙlÐya organises Ìidmas at most major mawlids in Egypt and also has a
significant presence in Upper Egypt where other reformist groups have had difficulties
gaining ground.731 The ÎaÃras of the ÉÁzÙlÐya are carefully staged to make them attractive
to participants and bystanders alike. In QinÁ, for example, the tent housing the ÎaÃra is
surrounded by a low fence that separates participants from bystanders but also offers the
latter a good view of the first. The space for these gatherings is brightly decorated and
balloons and strips of coloured paper underline the festive atmosphere. At mawlids,
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732A building containing a mosque and other premises of a Sufi group. In rural context this is
also known as sÁÎa.
733In the mawlid of SÐdÐ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm al-QinÁwÐ, QinÁ, 20 October 2002.
734Frishkopf, Sufism, Ritual and Modernity, p. 573.
Image 45:
ÍaÃra of 
the ÉÁzÙlÐya 
al-ÍusaynÐya order,
mawlid of SÐdÐ 
ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm
al-QinÁwÐ,
QinÁ,
20 October 2002.
female members of the order are seated outside the tent and merely watch the ÎaÃra
without actively participating in it. In ÎaÃras held at the zÁwiyÁ732 of the ÉÁzÙlÐya,
however, women do participate. The most outstanding feature, however, is the uniform
dress of the participants, which is unusual in an Egyptian mawlid. There are white
gallÁbÐyas and caps for normal murÐds, green caps for the performers, and blue caps for
nuqabÁÞ (sg. naqÐb), ‘representatives’ who organise and run the Ìidma. A member of the
order wearing a green cap explained that the dress code is adopted ‘so that there is some
kind of organisation/discipline (tanÛÐm),’733 so that different functions are clearly
distinguished and members of the order are distinct from the crowd.
The ÎaÃra itself consists of a mixture of speeches and different styles of inšÁd. The
speeches are short and the emphasis lies on the Æikr. Munšids, accompanied by a band
consisting of tambourines, Ôabla, flutes, and ÝÙd, perform in styles that vary from
traditional Sufi inšÁd to elaborate melodies similar to those of commercial pop music.734
Some members of the order participate in performing the inšÁd while others, seated on
the carpet in rows, participate in the Æikr. Bit by bit, the atmosphere slowly gains
intensity and many of the participants clearly fall into an ecstatic state. Sometimes the
music gets faster, the melody less elaborate and the rhythm stronger, following the style
of traditional inšÁd. Then some people spontaneously rise to participate in a standing
Æikr of rhythmic movement. After a while the music changes or a speech follows, and
people sit down again. As a result of this arrangement, the atmosphere is far more
emotional and ecstatic than at other reformist Sufi gatherings, however there remains a
clear sense of discipline created through the carefully orchestrated appearance of the
event, the seating arrangement that is only for short moments interrupted by individual
ecstatic movement, and the functional differentiation based on the uniform dress.
Unlike the ÝAzmÐya, which abandons popular mawlid celebrations in order to be
included in the hegemonic public sphere, the ÉÁzÙlÐya deliberately targets the mawlid-
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735Interview with Kazuhiro Arai, Cairo, 13 October 2004. Urban middle classes nevertheless
form the main constituency of the ÉÁzÙlÐya. Frishkopf, Sufims, Ritual and Modernity, pp. 469-471.
736Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi, p. 174.
737As suggested, for example in Rahman, Islam, p. 128-166; Gerholm, Tomas, ‘The Islamization
of Contemporary Egypt’, in Westerlund/Rosander (eds), African Islam and Islam in Africa, p. 143;
Sirriyyeh, Elizabeth, Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modern
World, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1999.
738Sedgwick, Saints and Sons, e.g. pp. 123-131.
739The ŠÁÆilÐya, like most of the major Sufi orders (e.g. AÎmadÐya and BurhÁmÐya), is not an
organisation but a conglomerate of independent branches that share allegiance to their founding
sheikh SÐdÐ AbÙ l-Íasan aš-ŠÁÆilÐ.
740See, e.g., Mayeur-Jaouen, Histoire d’un pèlerinage, p. 88.
741Although ŠÁÆilÐ groups have the general reputation of being more intellectual and
constrained while, for example, RifÁÝÐ groups are associated with a rural milieu and spectacular
rituals, there is no necessary link between the affiliation of a group to one of the large orders and
its rituals and social base. There are plenty of ecstatic ŠÁÆilÐs and reformist RifÁÝÐs.
going public and does so with great success. Its gatherings are always full of murÐdÐn and
draw large crowds of bystanders. They have enabled the ÉÁzÙlÐya to garner a wide
spectrum of supporters from different regions and social classes.735 
The ÎaÃras practised by the ÉÁzÙlÐya are a successful attempt to act out an aesthetics
of order and discipline while being festive and ecstatic at the same time. This is an
innovative solution to a central problem common to all Sufi gatherings but more urgent
to those keen on presenting a ‘correct’ appearance: reform-minded Sufis must strike a
balance between the aim of presenting a ‘pure’ and disciplined gathering and the
expression of festive and ecstatic tendencies that are central to the individual spiritual
experience and instrumental for mobilisation. This tension between ecstatic states and
group discipline, which is present in every Sufi Æikr, has been analysed by Michael
Gilsenan as the polar tension between ‘freedom and control, between unrestrained
emotional ecstasy and formal regulation, between the individual and group experience
which must be one, though the first always threatens the second.’736
4.4. Strategies of adaptation
It would be too simplistic to describe this balancing act in terms of the opposition
between ‘popular’ vs. ‘orthodox’ or ‘neo-’ Sufism.737 Different styles of ritual have always
existed side by side in the Sufi milieu, even within the same ÔarÐqa.738 All the groups
described above stand in the tradition of the ŠÁÆilÐya,739 a  ÔarÐqa that has been associated
with urban middle classes and constrained rituals throughout its history. The ŠÁÆilÐya,
distinctive though it has often been, has never been separate from the wider Sufi
milieu,740 and some of its other branches are very ecstatic and inclusive.741 The reformist
orders share the same Sufi cosmology and doctrines of more ecstatic groups, venerate the
same saints, go to the same mawlids, and are rooted in the same Sufi milieu, even if some
of them try to dissociate themselves from it. The limits are not, and have never been,
fixed. Many ecstatic Sufi gatherings based on open musical Æikr include elements of
rhetorical speech in the beginning of the ÎaÃra to frame spiritual experience with
educational goals. Many smaller ÎaÃras attended by the middle-class public combine the
intellectual habitus of reformist gatherings with the informal atmosphere of the Sufi
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742So, for example, the gatherings of al-ÍÁÊÊa SihÁm at the mawlids of Alexandria. See above
p. 87.
743For example, Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi, MuÒtafÁ, al-BinÁÞ al-iÊtimÁÝÐ, and Íasan, aÒ-ÑÙfÐya wa-s-
siyÁsa on al-ÍÁmidÐya; Johansen, Sufism and Islamic Reform on al-ÀšÐra al-MuÎammadÐya; Chih, Le
soufisme au quotidien on al-ËalwatÐya; Frishkopf, Sufism, Ritual, and Modernity on al-BayyÙmÐya (not
a reformist group), al-ÍÁmidÐya, al-ÉaÝfarÐya and al-ÉÁzÙlÐya.
744Frishkopf, Sufism, Ritual, and Modernity, passim.
745Ibid., p. 1074.
746See, e.g., Ibid., p. 1074 f.
747Gilsenan, Recognizing Islam, p. 241
748al-ÍÁÊÊ ÝAlÐ (1934-1998) stood out by the fact that he did not take an Ýahd from a living
sheikh. According to a hagiography written shortly after his death, he received an Ýahd directly
from the Prophet. Al-ÍÁÊÊ ÝAlÐ has been succeeded by his son-in-spirit Sayyid aš-ŠarÐf (despite the
identical family name, they are not close relatives) who has successfully continued the Ìidma and
constructed a shrine for al-ÍÁÊÊ ÝAlÐ in Íumay×ara next to the shrine of SÐdÐ AbÙl-Íasan aš-ŠÁÆilÐ.
Ìidma.742
In academic studies on Sufism in Egypt, reformist groups have received much more
attention than ‘traditional’ ones.743 One reason for this focus is that reformist groups
more often have a strict formal organisation that corresponds to the researcher’s
expectations of a mystical order. The Sufi milieu is full of groups loosely organised
around charismatic personalities, but these are not orders in the organisational sense and
have remained largely outside the focus of research on Egyptian Sufism, with the notable
exception of Valerie Hoffman’s Sufism, Mystics and Saints in Modern Egypt. Another factor
is the common but seldom substantiated assumption that while Sufi orders generally are
in decline, reformist groups have been able to adapt to modernity. While it is true that
Sufism has lost its centrality in Egyptian society and that reformist orders have created
successful ‘adaptive strategies’ (Frishkopf)744, we need to remain aware that this is only
valid for certain levels of society.745 Reformist Sufi orders typically try to attract an urban
middle- or upper-class constituency, and to do so they have shaped their doctrines and
rituals according to the hegemonic cultural discourses that are so central to middle-class
habitus. Only a few reformist groups have been able to compete with ecstatic Sufi orders
and Salafi movements in the countryside, among the urban lower classes, or in Upper
Egypt. Furthermore, as Michael Gilsenan has noted in a revision of his earlier research
on the ÍÁmidÐya, the creation of a centralised bureaucratic organisation so emphasised
in research on reformist Sufi orders746 does not guarantee  its success:
‘The tacit attempt at an embourgeoisement of sectors of street Sufism in alliance, or what
is seen to be an alliance, with the state largely disqualified itself. It failed, and it seems to
me that the members were implicitly refusing that kind of incorporation into an ideology
and form of Sufism that was alien to them and the position in the social order that the
vast majority of them occupy.’747
The focus on reformist groups has often concealed the continuity and dynamics of
ecstatic Sufi rituals and communities. While it is true that many Sufi orders based on
rural networks are in decline, this does not apply to all ecstatic Sufi rituals and
charismatic Sufi leaders. There are many Sufi groups that organise highly successful and
innovative gatherings based on an informal atmosphere and ecstatic rituals open to all
to participate in. So for example the Ìidmas of al-ÍÁÊÊa LaylÁ (held in the name of the
late Sheikh MaÎmÙd al-ÝAzm) and al-ÍÁÊÊ ÝAlÐ aš-ŠarÐf748 that stand at prominent
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Al-HarÁwÐ, UsÁma, Min awrÁd aÔ-ÔarÐq.
749At the Ìidma of al-ÍÁÊÊa LaylÁ in the mawlid of SÐdnÁ al-Íusayn, 120 people eat at a time
in shifts of little more than five minutes. Food is served over several hours, so that there are
thousands of people eating for free on one day.
750And they may stay one day longer only to see him. Sheikh YÁsÐn’s fame has reached the
extent that at major mawlids he usually does not sing on the great night because it would lead to
total chaos. At least at the mawlids of al-Íusayn, SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ, as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ and
SÐdÐ al-FarÈal, Sheikh YÁsÐn’s ÎaÃra concludes the mawlid on the layla al-yatÐma (the night
following the great night) on a stage right in front of the mosque. 
751Frishkopf, Michael, ‘Tarab’.
752Lawyer by training, Sheikh YÁsÐn is best known for interpreting the poetry of ÝUmar ibn al-
FÁriÃ, but he also performs poems by other mediaeval Sufi authors.
Image 46: Poster portraying Sheikh YÁsÐn at-TuhÁmÐ at
a music store in ÓanÔÁ during the mawlid of as-Sayyid
AÎmad al-BadawÐ, October 2004.
locations in most major mawlids of
the country. Both these gatherings
have included speeches and lectures
to introduce the ÎaÃra but have
otherwise remained strongly attached
to the atmosphere of mawlids. They
stand out, however, through the fact
that neither Ìidma is officially
affiliated to a Sufi order. Their
mobilisation and success are based on
their charismatic leaders and strong
presence at mawlids where they
feature famous munšids and offer
large scale services of free food.749
The most impressive case in
point, however, is Sheikh YÁsÐn at-
TuhÁmÐ, the uncontested superstar of
Sufi inšÁd whose ÎaÃras draw
audiences reaching several thousand.
For many people, the ÎaÃra of Sheikh
YÁsÐn is the ultimate culmination of
the mawlid.750 At mawlids his
concerts always take the form of an
ecstatic public ÎaÃra. Sheikh YÁsÐn,
usually accompanied by a band of
violin, flute and percussion, is not only the star of an artistic performance, however: he
is simultaneously a charismatic sheikh leading a mass Æikr. This ÎaÃra is not bound to
any given Sufi group. Sheikh YÁsÐn is a professional munšid who sings for various
customers at various events: mawlids, private celebrations, and even concerts in Cairo and
abroad. He is also one of the very few munšids who can be seen on state television.751
Sheikh YÁsÐn’s fame is not based on the standards reformist groups so meticulously
strive to fulfill. He is well educated and sings very highbrow classical Arabic poetry752 but
he has always remained committed to the melodic and ecstatic tradition of Sufi inšÁd. His
art is recognised and loved both in the popular Sufi milieu and among middle-class
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753For the transformation of religious authority through mass mediation and celebrity cult, see
van de Port, Mattijs, ‘Priests and stars: Candomblé, celebrity discourses and the authentication of
religious authority in Bahia's public sphere’, Religião e Sociedade 25 (2005).
Image 48:
Audience at a
RamaÃÁn concert 
of Sheikh YÁsÐn at
the Bayt al-HarÁwÐ
cultural centre,
Cairo,
November 2004.
Image 47:
Audience in the 
ÎaÃra of Sheikh
YÁsÐn at the
mawlid of
as-SulÔÁn al-FarÈal,
AbÙ TÐÊ,
19 July 2003.
intellectuals. Sheikh YÁsÐn’s unique success in combining religious authority with the
fame of a superstar753 is based on three factors: the choice of texts he sings (classical Sufi
poetry that can reach both Sufi and intellectual audiences), his extraordinary artistic
talent, and his ability to adapt to different audiences. It is the latter factor that makes
Sheikh YÁsÐn at-TuhÁmÐ more successful than any reformist Sufi group. At mawlids, he
is the leader of an ecstatic Æikr, his music rhythmic and fast. At RamaÃÁn concerts in
distinguished locations such as the Opera House and the Bayt al-HarÁwÐ cultural centre
in Cairo, he is the  gifted interpret of mystic poetry.
Al-ÍÁÊÊ ÝAlÐ, al-ÍÁÊÊa LaylÁ, and Sheikh YÁsÐn are all very modern figures with
innovative and successful strategies of adaptation. Sufi groups that are not able to
develop such successful strategies do in fact decline, but successful strategies are not
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754With the difference, compared to most other civil servants, that they belong to the most
powerful, privileged and best paid segment of the public sector.
necessarily contingent on the standards set by reformist Sufi discourse. While reformist
Sufi groups have been successful in reforming their own gatherings, they have not
replaced others. They have made a difference, however: With their tendency towards
social distinction and their criticism of ecstatic rituals, they have contributed to an
increasing fragmentation of the Sufi festive experience.
5. Transformation, decline and dynamics
All attempts to reform mawlids give a somewhat incomplete, inconsequential impression.
There are moments of strong pressure and times of great lenience. Concrete measures
often fall short of the goals set by public declarations. Measures taken at different
mawlids share a same sense of civilising the festivity but vary greatly in their details. This
is a consequence of the way the reform of public festivals works in Egypt. Just as there is
no official opinion on mawlids (state religious authorities prefer to remain silent on
mawlids because they cannot agree on them) there is also no master plan and no central
government policy concerning them. All relevant decisions concerning the organisation
of mawlids are taken on the province level; there are no guidelines issued by the central
government. The same goes for other actors who influence the course of mawlids: Sufi
orders shape their own rituals, merchants base their trade on supply and demand, and
individual participants are free to choose how they celebrate the mawlid, if at all.
Still, the general similarity of the measures is striking: as if there were a master plan
after all, not one dictating what to do, but all the same informing what kind of objects
exist and what kind of actions are possible. This phenomenon is not specific to the
debate on mawlids in Egypt. It is inherent to the general way discourse is enacted as
practice. Various actors behave according to a diffuse common sense of the meaning of
the mawlid, how a religious festivity ought to look, what relation the sacred and profane
ought to have, and how a public festivity is to be organised.
This is best demonstrated by the training of the most powerful actors in the game of
reform and reorganisation: officers of the security apparatus who have the final say on
the implementation of any policies. All higher ranks of the various branches of police,
security forces, state security etc. are educated at the Police Academy, and throughout
their career they regularly attend training courses to acquire new techniques and
strategies, including those concerning mass public gatherings such as demonstrations,
football matches, and mawlids. Add to this that they are also bestowed with the habitus
and class consciousness of the middle classes,754 and there is no need for a master plan.
The shared class habitus and central training provide security officers with a set of known
problems and possible solutions for how to administer a public festivity. Their concrete
solutions vary, and yet they all express the same discursive common sense influenced by
their education, socialisation and training.
Modernist discourse is thus articulated as administrative and festive practice, but with
some delay and in unpredictable ways. All three fields of reform –  habitus, festive space
and Sufi gatherings – have fallen short of their declared aims. And yet the criticism of
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755Mayeur-Jaoeuen, Histoire d’un pèlerinage, pp. 162, 208.
756Ibid. p. 204 f.; Baer, Studies in the Social History, pp. 145, 176.
mawlids has brought dramatic changes to the festivities. Partly following the reform of
morals and habitus, and partly following a general development in Egyptian society, the
festive time of mawlids has shifted. It is still characterised by the suspension of
boundaries, but it is far less permissive and wild than it was in the 19th century. Partly
following the effect of  reformist Sufi gatherings and state intervention in festive space,
and partly due to the increasing number of participants who do not believe in sainthood,
mawlids have become increasingly fragmented. They have always been characterised by
a multitude of different celebrations, but it is now clear that the physical separation of
different spaces of festivity, the development of official and reformist festivities that are
openly opposed to other forms of festivity, and the growing number of participants who
like the festivity but distance themselves from the beliefs it is based on, all contribute to
a growing distance between different festive experiences.
The discourses and practices of reform have been effective in transforming mawlids
only when they have been connected to popular discourses and wider transformations
in society. In fact, conscious reforms are only a part of the complex transformations
mawlids have undergone since the 19th century.
Although mawlids at the beginning of the 21st century still gather huge crowds, they
went through a substantial decline during the 20th century. While the amount of people
attending mawlids was stable or slowly growing throughout the century, the population
of Egypt was growing at an explosive speed.755
Sufism and communal religious and festive traditions have lost the central position
they once had in Egyptian society. Just as it is impossible to estimate how many people
really go to mawlids, it is also impossible to quantify this decline. One also needs to be
careful with accounts that tell of a past glory and present-day decline, because nostalgia
often makes the past look grander than it actually was. Nevertheless, a clear trend of
decline is evident, and since the 1990s also in terms of absolute numbers. This is most
visible at small mawlids, some of which have dramatically decreased in both size and
duration: less people come to the mawlid, and those who come stay a day or two instead
of a week. 
This process of decline is related to several factors. It is not possible to quantify the
importance of individual factors, and only in a few cases, most notably trade and class
distinctions, is it possible to establish a direct relation between these factors and festive
practice. The following list should be thus taken at face value: a tentative list of probable
reasons for the decline of mawlids:
– Changing structure of trade: Since the end of the 19th century, the importance of mawlids
as markets has been declining. The changing structure of trade has deprived the seasonal
fairs of the significance they once had.756 Today, the mawlid is still a time of flourishing
trade in places like ÓanÔÁ or DisÙq but this trade is of primarily local significance.
– Changing forms of religiosity and class distinction: With the emergence and successful
hegemonic reach of Salafi Islam, mawlids have lost much of their credibility as a
pilgrimage. With modernist habitus and simplified Salafi piety also gaining ground as
forms of distinction in rural and urban lower-class milieus, mawlids are losing much of
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757Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen has argued that this development is actually more important than
the spread of Salafi Islam, the latter often serving as a retrospective rationalisation for social
change. Mayeur-Jaouen, Histoire d’un pèlerinage, pp. 209-220.
758So for example MuÒÔafÁ, son of a devout Sufi father (in an interview in Cairo, 7 August
2003): 
‘I heard you were in the mawlid yesterday. My father was also yesterday in the mawlid of as-Sayyida
NafÐsa, and he’ll be today in ar-RifÁÝÐ wearing a baladÐ style ÊallÁbÐya. He loves mawlids very much.’
S: But you didn’t go?
‘I didn’t go, I had other things to do, had to help a friend and anyway, I don’t go much to
mawlids.’
S: You don’t believe in them? (miš muqtaniÝ bihÁ)?
‘Yes I do believe in them, but they are not my passion (hiwÁya) like they are my father’s passion.
My passion is computers. Maybe it has to do with a difference of generations and age.’
759ÝAbd al-LaÔÐf, as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, p. 167.
their former constituency. In many families a clear generation gap can be observed
between Sufi parents and children who distance themselves from Sufi spirituality and
communal traditions. If this trend continues, which is likely, it will lead to a simplified
and selectively applied Salafi doctrine becoming the popular Islam (if one is to take the
term ‘popular’ on its face value and measure it on popularity) of Lower Egypt while
Sufism will increasingly become the individual choice of a devoted few. In consequence,
the display of a rationalist and constrained habitus of the religious self will lose its
distinctive character. If everyone has it, then it is no longer useful to establish modernist
middle-class identity through the exclusion of backward countryside and lower classes.
– Cultural and social change in the countryside: It needs to be questioned to what extent the
spread of modernist/Salafi disposition is the cause and to what extent a result of the
decline of festive traditions. In rural settings, not only mawlids are in decline but also
other communal traditions (ÝÐd celebrations for example) that have never faced any
significant opposition from the modernists. With changing social structure
(individualisation, a move towards the nuclear family, increasing mobility etc.) some
older communal traditions are losing their importance and power, which is often
experienced as alienation and loss by the people involved. A modernist/Salafi disposition
allows the interpretation of the felt loss as an accomplishment.757
– Individualisation of the pilgrimage. With the decline of communal traditions, a growing
number of people no longer see participating in mawlids as a collective duty but an
individual choice. Even people who are principally sympathetic to mawlids may not feel
the necessity of attending.758 Increasingly an affair of the devoted few, mawlids remain
dynamic but are becoming smaller and changing in character.
– Changing forms of entertainment: On the level of amusements, mawlids face heavy
competition from popular music, cinema, television and computer games. This process
began in the 1920s when the emergence of the modern music industry made mawlids lose
their centrality as a venue for popular music.759 In provincial cities, mawlids remain an
important source for amusements, but in Cairo they have largely lost their significance
as amusement areas.
– The economic crisis: Since 2000 Egypt has undergone a  serious economic crisis that has
hardest hit those who already are poor. This has not only had an effect on trade, which
suffers from stagnating income, but also on Sufi Ìidmas that require donations to be able
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760Interview with MuÎammad, Arabic teacher, Cairo, October 2004.
761Mayeur-Jaouen, Histoire d’un pèlerinage, pp. 237-239.
762See, e.g., Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints, pp. 16 f.; Biegman, Egypt, p. 7.
763See Mayeur-Jaouen, Histoire d’un pèlerinage, p. 209.
to offer their services free of charge, and on the pilgrimage that can be a relatively
expensive affair for the people involved.
– Reforms: The attempts to make mawlids more acceptable for modernist and reformist
discourses make mawlids less attractive to many of their participants. For the pilgrims,
the spiritual experience is often troubled by administrative restrictions. For many of
those who are primarily interested in amusements and a taste of the illicit, the mawlid
becomes boring: ‘They’ve spoiled the mawlid. In the past everyone knew it was the place
to meet girls and see dancers. Now it’s become just a little bit of chickpeas.’760
Amidst all this decline it is important to point out the persistence of mawlids. Despite
their substantial decline they are a dynamic custom that has demonstrated a high ability
to adapt to changing circumstances.761 Many craftsmen and small businessmen of old city
districts and small towns are still prepared to spend their money on organising a
communal celebration because it remains an effective way of proving commitment to
their local community. Sufi orders have proven able to mobilise members in changing
circumstances, and they will not give up their most important occasion of mobilisation
and self-representation. Although mawlids are certainly losing their centrality in Egyptian
religious culture they are not going to disappear; they are, however, definitely going to
change.
Predicting the future of mawlids is a hazardous enterprise. In the 1930s, many
observers either feared or hoped that mawlids would soon disappear altogether. In the
1960s it was commonly assumed that Sufism and mawlids were in a process of
unavoidable decline. Towards the end of the 1990s, just as the news that Sufism and
mawlids are not in a state of decline after all reached the world of Western research,762
mawlids entered a new phase of decline, this time not only in relative but also in absolute
numbers.763 Still, keeping the many surprises of mawlids in mind, it is possible to predict
that the future of mawlids is closely connected to the general development of religious
and cultural discourses, the economic situation, and the development of class
distinctions, especially those that mark the middle classes.
As long as these factors remain in their present state mawlids will further decline but
not disappear altogether. They will increasingly lose their importance as communal
traditions and become events for committed individuals, naturally fewer in number. The
extent of this decline will be related to the economic situation. Mawlids will not suffer
so much a loss of visitors – people will keep going to mawlids for the fun of it even if
they think they are ÎarÁm – than of organisers who are ready and able to spend time and
money on the event. Small mawlids without a strong foundation in one or several Sufi
groups will disappear after losing their base of organisation and mobilisation. With
growing state pressure, some festivals may face outright prohibition. In the mawlids
remaining, the festivities will concentrate in the side streets and there will be an
increasing gap between Sufis for whom mawlids are a part of their spiritual practice and
spectators for whom the festivity is a curious, even ridiculous piece of amusement and
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764The most recent example is an anti-government demonstration organised on 15 June 2005
by an opposition group that, drawing on the high status of as-Sayyida Zaynab in Muslim piety and
the rite of sweeping the dust from a saint’s shrine as an act of devotion, organised a demonstration
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folklore.
If there is a change in the hegemonic patterns of religiosity and/or class distinctions,
then a rediscovery of mawlids as a communal tradition is possible. Mawlids would then
be conceived of as  a matter of local identity and national pride, and the question of
them being ÎalÁl or ÎarÁm would move to the background, which would diminish the
gap between different festive experiences. There are signs of such development,764 however
they are currently limited to small intellectual and activist circles. Should this
development eventually take place it would lead to a repositioning of mawlids in the
symbolic structure of class society, which in turn might lead to wide-reaching and
unpredictable transformations in the festive atmosphere.
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions
In the first pages of this thesis I phrased a question to guide the analysis: Why do some
people criticise mawlids, and why is it a matter of importance to them? In the course of
the analysis, this seemingly straightforward question has turned into a complex and far-
reaching one involving the organisation and use of urban space, the temporal structure
of moral norms and social boundaries, the relationship of festive time and the everyday,
the concept of the self, the relationship of aesthetic criteria of behaviour and public order
with ethical dispositions, the redefinition of religion and the invention of society and
nation in the 19th and 20th centuries, the emergence of professional urban middle classes
and their struggle for hegemony, the construction of cultural and civilisational heritage,
the role of the state in society, and the transformations of urban space and festive
practice.
In consequence, the answers that this thesis has delivered reach further than the
original question. They do not stop at showing the points of conflict that feed the debate
on mawlids; they also concern its emergence, functionality and implications: How
criticising mawlids is a distinctive part of the modernist project, how attempts to defend
mawlids have to work within the terms set by the critics, how the exclusion of mawlids
from the field of religion and modern society makes it possible to redefine or reinvent
them and show them in a very different light, and how the debate on mawlids has shaped
attempts to reform the festivities.
1. Festivity and the everyday
In this thesis I have taken an approach on festivities that emphasises the contingency of
their relationship with daily life. Festivities are created by the people who participate in
them and have no ‘true’ meanings prior to festive practice. Festive traditions do, however,
have their own dynamics that cannot be manipulated at will, at least not in a short period
of time. The openness and ambivalence of mawlids and many other pilgrimages enables,
as Eade and Sallnow have argued in the context of Christian pilgrimages, the coexistence
(albeit often troubled) of highly different festive practices and ideologies. But this is not
merely an inclusive capacity; it is in itself a characteristic feature of mawlids – and other
similar festivals and pilgrimages – that clearly sets them apart from other festive
traditions and the rhythms and routines of the everyday. This is why its openness
notwithstanding, the mawlid is not an empty vessel that can contain any number of
forms of festivity. The openness of mawlids and their character of the extraordinary are
not compatible with attempts to employ them in the service of public education and
discipline. The attempt to impose clear hierarchies and a central programme of public
representation upon mawlids changes their character, making them less open and
ambivalent, more exclusive and fixed, and, consequently, festivities of a different kind.
Through their stark contrast to the everyday, festivities like mawlids always stand in
implicit, and often explicit, tension to the social and moral order of the everyday. It is
this tension that has compelled me to analyse the festive time of mawlids through the
concept of festive utopia, the imagination and temporally limited practice of a better
world free of some of the restraints and imperatives of the everyday. While it would be
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mistaken to depict festive utopia as a purposeful resistance or subversion of hegemonies
– it can, after all, play an important role in establishing and maintaining clientelistic and
charismatic power –, the fact that so many Egyptians view mawlids as a threat should
persuade us that a functionalist model of festivity as a way to keep society in balance also
fails to explain the complex relationship between festivity and social order.
The relationship of festivity and the everyday is a political one, subject to negotiation
and struggle and dependent both on the character of the festivity and on the hegemonic
order of the everyday. In other words, the meaning of a festivity cannot be detached from
the meanings that are given to its social world in general. A given form of festivity can
have very different implications for forms of social order. In a given situation, a festivity
can be functional for the stability of society, or a serious and real threat to hegemonic
practices of public order and morality, or –  most often – an ambiguous factor
comprising something of both. The relationship of a festivity to the daily order of society
is never a given; it is continuously negotiated as social order and festive culture
transform.
Festivities that, like mawlids, are characterised by a marked contrast to daily life, are
always to some degree problematic to most forms of religiously legitimated moral and
social order. However, mawlids are much more problematic for some forms of social
order than they are for others. Mawlids are embedded in practices of piety and social
order that were once hegemonic in Egypt but, during the past century, have become
increasingly marginalised by new hegemonic forms of religion and society. The Islamic
spirituality of Ottoman Egypt was able to handle the ambivalence of mawlids because it
was itself embedded in a communal concept of religion and a vision of society in which
times of celebration appeared as legitimate moments in the circle of life. But for a
discourse promoting top-down modernisation and development in the footsteps of
colonial rule and in confrontation with it, festivities must have a constructive function
and serve the progress and education of society. It is in this context that ambivalence and
the time of the extraordinary become a threat to social order.
Mikhail Bakhtin has argued that festive time should be understood as a time in its
own right with no utilitarian purpose.765 This claim (unlikely as it may sound to those
of us accustomed to a commonsensical form of functionalism) is supported by the
findings of this thesis. A key to the success of mawlids throughout the centuries and the
problem they constitute for the project of modernity and reform is precisely the fact that
mawlids, open to different people and festive practices, elude definite categorisation and
clear functionality. While the people at mawlids can give them various purposes, it has
turned out to be very difficult to employ them for any great project of development or
reform. Hence the people celebrating mawlids have come to appear as idle when they
should be productive, restless when they should be calm, subversive when they should be
conservative, and reactionary when they should be revolutionary.
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2. The politics of habitus
The potential of mawlids for controversy lies both in their character as festivities with a
stark contrast to many of the boundaries of daily life and in the crucial importance of
these boundaries to a specific understanding of religion and society. The festive
atmosphere of mawlids is not in itself un-Islamic or uncivilised. It has only become so
since the emergence and increasing hegemony of a discourse on society, religion and the
self that I have referred to as modernist and reformist. The debate on mawlids cannot,
therefore, be understood within the often cited opposition between Islamist and
secularist currents. Both these movements share a significant common ground in the way
they conceive of religion and modernity as interdependent, based on the unity of rational
progress and authentic ethical and civilisational heritage. That heritage, however, first
needed to be constructed to fit the project of national progress. And it is this
construction of ‘true’ heritage as opposed to ‘false’ traditions that has made mawlids so
significant. Mawlids became an Other of the modernist project, criticising them a
distinctive marker of modernist and reformist disposition.
The debate on mawlids is embedded in the struggles over hegemony that surfaced in
the past century and in the way these struggles have been projected onto and carried by
the bodies of citizens/believers and the visible structures of the society they live in. The
debates and attempts of reform surrounding mawlids and other communal religious and
festive traditions are primarily concerned with appearances and rituals. This is not merely
because they can be seen and thus easily subjected to practices of censorship and reform;
appearances and rituals matter because they are equated with beliefs and attitudes. For
pilgrims, sitting in a tent and sharing a plate of food provides a moment of spirituality
(see p. 36). People critical of the festivities point at the people in the tent and refer to the
scenery as ‘beliefs’ (that is, the enactment of false beliefs – see p. 103). Government
officials order removal of the tent to the back streets and phrase this measure as raising
the sophistication of the citizens’ consciousness (see p. 214).
The forms of festivity, piety, and social order that are practised at mawlids matter
especially to the modernist and reformist view of society because the modernist and
reformist project, since its emergence in the late 19th century, has been directed at
elevating and developing the nation through the disposition of its citizens and believers.
While its emphases have shifted throughout the 20th century (for example the ‘liberal
age’ in the 1920s and 30s, the emergence and rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, the
Nasserist socialist experiment, the Islamic revival, and the current politics of economic
liberalisation and public morality), the hegemonic modernist project has always been
concerned with the appearance of citizens and the society they live in because this
appearance has been seen both as an indicator of the civilisational and moral quality of
the nation as a whole and as a way to improve it. The relationship of snacks and saints
is a grave issue because it marks some of the boundaries that are constitutive of the
hegemonic practice of social and religious normality and with it, the development of the
nation.
This form of struggle over the structure and values of society – and the power to
determine them – through the bodies of people and the social space they inhabit can be
described as the ‘politics of habitus’: the association of ideology with embodied practice,
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and the contestation and redefinition of the two as interconnected fields. On this point,
the results of this thesis support the findings of Saba Mahmood, who has argued that
habitus should be seen as way to form the self and its ethical dispositions through bodily
habit.766 However, they point in a somewhat different direction, calling attention to the
contested nature of habitus.
Both the associations between specific practices and dispositions and the kind of
relationship between embodied practice and ethical dispositions are subjects of
contestation. These issues are of crucial political importance because they also imply (or
follow from – it is not within the scope of this study to determine the causal relation)
specific kinds of social order and power. The communal or Sufi view that is constitutive
of the festive atmosphere of mawlids is based on a vision of social and moral order in
which boundaries are subject to temporary change, the sacred is an inclusive force that
can contain and legitimise temporary shifts of boundaries, and appearances do not allow
conclusions to be drawn about inner states. The form of power that goes with this view
is one based on clientelism, personal allegiance and shared communal practice. This view
presumes a model of the self based on an ambivalent coexistence of rÙÎ and nafs (spiritual
and animal soul), which in turn corresponds with an understanding of piety exemplified
by the mystic path (sulÙk): to reach an esoteric, mystically enlightened state of mind one
has to start by fulfilling exoteric religious requirements although the spiritual progress
of a mystic is not necessarily reflected by his or her appearance. Thus while virtues can
be learned through habitualisation, appearances do not allow conclusions to be drawn
about ethical states, and are, thence, not central to social order, and nor is disciplining
them an effective instrument of power.
This view is (often successfully) contested by a modernist and reformist view stating
that the boundaries that mark social and moral order are universal and valid at all times,
that the state of a society is either one of progress or retrogression, that the sacred is an
exclusive, transcendent sphere that is inherently connected to its rational interpretation,
and hence incompatible with the profane, and that appearances do in fact allow
conclusions to be drawn about inner states. This view implies a model of power in which
visible practices of order are markers of and constitutive of the moral and civilisatory
discipline of the people. The corresponding model of body and self is one of a
disciplined but usually fragmented self whose piety is expressed through rational,
constrained worship and moral uprightness. While there are different interpretations as
to whether and how such a virtuous, disciplined state of mind is reached through
virtuous practice,767 the appearance (especially an unvirtuous or ambiguous one) of a
believer and citizen is taken to be a truthful expression of his or her state of mind.
Displaying a disciplined and rational habitus is, in this view, to have ‘consciousness’, and
failing to do so is to lack it.
Consciousness, in its Egyptian modernist reading, is an aesthetic disposition. This is
why I have preferred to translate waÝy as ‘consciousness’ rather than  ‘awareness’. Having
consciousness implies more than active knowledge: it is a disposition that is opposed not
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only to being ‘ignorant’ but also to being ‘simple’ (that is, incapable of critical reflection).
Consciousness, in the Egyptian debate on mawlids, is a moral and rational capacity based
on the ability to  perceive a specific kind of relationship between ideologies and attitudes
on the one hand, and embodied practices on the other. Embodying this aesthetics of
consciousness is what marks the ‘religious, rational, civilised human’ (see pp. 80 and 105)
who is so central to the reformist and modernist project.
Perhaps most central feature of the aesthetics of being ‘conscious’ is a general tone of
seriousness combined with the search for definite, authoritative and clear truths. Truth,
for the ‘conscious’ taste, must speak in clear and solemn tones, while fun and ecstatic
emotion are considered mere distraction that, legitimate though it may be, should be
kept strictly separate from the realm of truth. Thence the scepticism of middle-class
reformists and modernists towards ambivalence and their search for strict and clear
boundaries, their indignation about chickpeas, sweets and children’s play at religious
occasions, and their need to state that they ‘have nothing to do with religion.’
Yet this ‘consciousness’ is a fragile construct because it is based on two contradictory
demands. On the one hand, it is an element of the modernist and reformist mission to
transform the nation and elevate its citizens, as a collective, to a sophisticated level of
consciousness and thus to new power and glory. On the other hand, it is a marker of
distinction that legitimises the modernist and reformist claim for hegemony, thus
offering a promise of empowerment and social ascent to those who cultivate it. If
everybody did, in fact, have ‘consciousness’, it would cease to be a marker of distinction
and a means of empowerment.
This inherent contradiction of the modernist and reformist programme can be seen
in a number of issues that extend beyond the debate on mawlids and communal/Sufi
religious practice. Very similar problematics can be observed in the debates on,
representations of and attempts to reform Upper Egyptian tribal society, urban informal
settlements (ÝašwÁÞÐyÁt), or rural culture. Their otherness is needed to mark the limits of
orthodox Islam, the modern city, and middle-class urban civility, but it also threatens to
compromise the universal validity that is key to the legitimacy of the modernist and
reformist project. While the people who celebrate mawlids seldom openly defy the
hegemonic structures of debate and practice imposed by the nation-state and modernist
and reformist discourse, through their practice they continuously demonstrate different,
often competing configurations of power and legitimation.
3. Whose hegemony?
During the 20th century, modernism and reformism have gained a hegemonic position
in the definition of festivity, piety and modernity, while mawlids, along with the forms
of piety and social order that are constitutive of them, have become increasingly
marginalised. For those who attempt to defend mawlids against their critics, this means
that they have the choice between taking over the reformist criteria of reverent and
civilised behaviour and trying to prove that the real mawlid would actually be perfectly
in line with them, or remaining excluded from the public debates in which the
hegemonic definitions of religion and society are determined. But the criticism of
mawlids has also opened the way to reinterpret and appreciate them through their
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exclusion. The same people who criticise mawlids for being un-Islamic and backward
often express fascination with and appreciation for them, but instead of taking this as an
occasion to question the criticism, they redefine mawlids as something that is distinct
from religion and modernity and thus potentially valuable in its own, separate, context
as popular heritage. The criticism of mawlids does not, after all, mean that one cannot
like mawlids. It only means that mawlids, the way they are being celebrated, may not be
recognised as what their organisers and many of their participants claim them to be: true
expressions of piety and joy, and equalitarian gatherings for all people of society.
A number of researchers, among them Timothy Mitchell, Afsaneh Nadjmabadi, Lila
Abu-Lughod, Annelies Moors, Kamran Ali768 and others, have pointed out that the
projects of enlightenment and emancipation so celebrated in the nationalist narratives
and sometimes uncritically reproduced in academic studies, cannot be accurately
described as one-dimensional movements of inclusion, emancipation and empowerment.
The findings of this thesis clearly support their line of argumentation, while casting
doubt on other lines of research that, currently centring around the labels of civil society
and the public sphere, focus on the search for a counter-hegemony against the power of
authoritarian states (such as Egypt) and established religious institutions (such as al-
Azhar) and emphasise the empowerment of those who are involved in it.769 Such
approaches, my findings indicate, are based on problematic divisions that may not
accurately describe what is actually going on. ‘Counter-hegemony’ implies a claim for
power, not the questioning of hierarchic relations of power. ‘Empowerment’ does not
mean that relations of power are abolished, but that previously hegemonic relations of
power are replaced by new ones. Instead of asking how participation in ‘civil society’ or
‘the public sphere’ challenges or fragments the power of authoritarian states and
traditional religious institutions, we must ask how shifts in the public definition of
religion and society are related to changing configurations of power.
Rather than a site to contest hegemonic power, the public sphere is, as Talal Asad has
put it, ‘a space necessarily (not just contingently) articulated by power’ (emphasis in
original).770 And civil society is not necessarily ‘counter-hegemonic’ or opposed to the
state. In fact, the hegemony of reformism and modernism in Egypt is civil as much as it
is state-based. Although state actors are the most powerful when it comes to the
dissemination of modernist common sense and the reorganisation of mawlids, it would
be mistaken to place the modernist and reformist hegemony in a dichotomy of state vs.
society. State and society are not separate spheres, at least not in contemporary Egypt
with its centralistic system of governance and socialist legacy of a large public sector that
employs, among others, many of those who belong to ‘civil society’. State and civil actors
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are overlapping categories. When a province governor initiates reforms to ‘civilise’
mawlids, he does so not only in his position as a functionary of the state, but also on the
basis of a discursive common sense of what it means to be civilised.  Conversely, not all
modernists and reformists act in the framework of the state apparatus, and while they
claim and often have a degree of cultural hegemony, their political power in the state
apparatus can be very limited.771
The hegemony of modernism and reformism is a cultural one, focussing on the
signifying symbols and values of society as a key to power. While it is shared by many of
the most powerful state actors and plays an important role in the official project of
development, it has also been tremendously important for groups with limited access to
political and economic power. The criticism of mawlids is part of the cultural hegemony
(and the claim for political hegemony) that is practised by a large proportion of the
intellectuals (in the wider sense), professional middle classes, and Salafi-oriented religious
movements. Being part of “the public”, that is, speaking in the name of religion, reason,
and the common good by the virtue of having ‘consciousness’ is a way to claim (not
necessarily to have) a share of this hegemony. Not an opposition between state and civil
society, nor a division between Islamists and secularists, but rather the competition
between different forms of power and social order forms the central line of conflict in
the debate on mawlids.
This emphasis on competing forms of power rather than on divisions such as
authoritarian state vs. civil society or traditional authority vs. public sphere also implies
a critical revision of two assumptions associated with these divisions and which have
become current in the recent debates on Islam: the privatisation of religion and the
fragmentation of authority.772 The invention of the religious, rational and civilised
Muslim citizen has not led to a privatisation of religion. While it has led to a shift from
communal towards individual religious practice, the focus and significance of religion
have moved from individual salvation towards the moral quality of the (imagined)
collective. Religion in a secular (but not necessarily secularist) Middle Eastern state is a
matter of public concern. Furthermore, the struggle over the configurations of power,
including the power to determine the religious Truth, has not lead to a fragmentation of
religious authority but to a shift within it. In Sunnite Islam, religious authority has
always been fragmented, and while in the 20th century it has shifted from the monopoly
of a professional class (the ÝulamÁÞ) to become a domain of intellectuals and political
activists, this has not necessarily meant that Muslims have become more free to interpret
their religion. While the professional monopoly of the ÝulamÁÞ has been weakened (but
never abolished), two tendencies have actually contributed to a partial de-fragmentation
of authority: the codification of šarÐÝa as positive law (which is beyond the focus of this
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thesis),773 and the reinterpretation of Islam as a rationalised, ideological system by
contemporary social movements (which is a central issue of this thesis), both which have
diminished the plurality of religious judgement that was norm throughout the preceding
centuries.
4. The Christian debate
I have insisted on the link between Islamic reformism and Egyptian nationalist
modernism, and one question this raises has so far remained unanswered. To what extent,
one might ask, is the criticism of mawlids specific to Islam? Are, as could be argued, saint
veneration and ecstatic rituals much more problematic for the strict monotheism of
Islam than they are for other religions? To answer these questions, we must take a brief
excursion to a parallel debate taking place among the Christians of Egypt and see whether
similar or parallel lines of argumentation are being used.
At first glance, Christian saints-day festivals seem less controversial than Muslim ones.
Christian mawlids generally receive very positive coverage in the press. Sainthood and
miracles are officially sanctioned by the Coptic Orthodox church, and pilgrimages to
Christian saints are much less associated with lower-class habitus than local Islamic
pilgrimages.
On a closer look, however, it turns out that Christian pilgrimages, too, have been
subject to criticism and wide-scale attempts at redefinition and reform. Protestant
missionaries have questioned the fundamentals of sainthood and successfully established
a growing Coptic Protestant community whose relationship to the cult of saints varies
from distanced indifference to open hostility. But even among Orthodox Copts for
whom the veneration of saints has never stood in question, the festivities in their honour
have also been subject to debate. In the early 20th century, the same period when the
criticism of Islamic mawlids gained momentum, some modernist Christian intellectuals
began to speak out against what they saw as undignified and immoral behaviour incited
by the festivals.774 The direction of this criticism and consecutive reforms have been
somewhat different than in the case of Muslim festivals, though. Among Orthodox
Copts, only the form and atmosphere of the festivities has been subject to a great deal of
debate, not pilgrimage itself.775
The most important issue in the debate on Christian mawlids has been the
elimination of syncretisms, beginning with the name of the festivities. The term ‘mawlid’,
many Christian Egyptians argue, has been borrowed from Islam and should not be used
for the commemorations of the death of Christian martyrs and saints:
‘The only mawlid there is in Christianity is the birthday of Lord Christ. The term
“mawlid” is an Islamic influence, a compromise to society. The proper term is ÝÐd niyÁÎ
(feast of passing) or ÝÐd istišhÁd (feast of martyrdom).’776
The renaming of mawlids as festivals of martyrs is part of a wider redefinition and
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reorganisation of Christian pilgrimages. Shrines that previously had attracted both
Muslim and Christian visitors have been distinctively Christianised in the last decades,
most typically by building churches and monasteries around them. Christian mawlids
have been clearly separated into a religious festivity within the walls of a church or a
monastery and a fair outside. The festivities themselves have been subjected to increasing
moral discipline along similar lines to those taking place at Muslim mawlids. While the
mixing of men and women is seen as much less problematic among Christians, the same
kind of measures concerning alcohol, gambling and dancing have been imposed at both
Christian and Islamic festivals.777
The Christian debate on mawlids in Egypt is characterised by the same key issues as
the Muslim debate: the rejection of ambivalent festive time and habitus, the attempt to
impose clear, universal boundaries through the bodily discipline of  pilgrims and a
visible matrix of order, and a social distinction undertaken by parts of the middle classes
through the criticism of communal festive traditions. There are two clear differences,
however, that make Christian mawlids less controversial and more attractive for middle-
and lower-class audiences alike.
The first difference is based on the minority status of Christianity in Egypt. As
occasions where Christians can gather in large numbers and demonstrate their presence
and identity, Coptic pilgrimages play a key role in the construction and celebration of
communal identity. For this reason, they have in fact experienced a revival following the
growth of confessional tensions since the 1970s. Christian mawlids are powerful markers
of confessional distinction that are capable of overriding the power of class distinctions
that might otherwise be expressed through the criticism of popular festive culture.
The second difference is related to the different confessional structures of Islam and
Christianity in Egypt and their correspondingly different hierarchies of authority.
Neither Sufism nor Salafism have a sectarian character in Egypt, although both sides tend
to accuse their opponents of sectarianism. The absence of an institutionalised authority
that might define the limits of ‘normal’ Islam once made it possible for Sufi orders to
become a central element of Islamic piety in Egypt and today has made it easy for Salafis
to proliferate their interpretation of Islam as being the true orthodox mainstream.
Christianity in Egypt, on the other hand, consists of clearly demarcated confessions that
all have their own distinct hierarchies. The only Christian group opposed to the cult of
saints is the Protestant church, which, although it has had some success in recruiting
support in urban middle-class contexts, has not been able to seriously challenge the
hegemony of the Coptic Orthodox church. Because Protestantism is a distinct confession
clearly outside the framework of Coptic Orthodox Christianity, it lacks the power that
Islamic reformists have and which allows them to more credibly claim to present the
mainstream of Islam. To oppose sainthood is, in the Egyptian Christian context, to
identify with a sectarian minority. Although many Orthodox Christians might
disapprove of the habitus and atmosphere of Christian mawlids, such critique of popular
festivals is much less powerful if it is not supported by a critique of beliefs.
In following, there is indeed a specifically Islamic element in the Muslim debate on
mawlids and yet it is not located in the position first suggested. The veneration of saints
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is not inherently alien to Islam, just as it is not inherently a part of Christianity. The
atmosphere of popular pilgrimage has been a problem and a marker of distinction for
20th-century reformists of both faiths. What is specifically Islamic about the debate,
however, is that through the absence of confessional boundaries or a strongly personified
religious authority, the 19th-century Islamic orthodoxy of maÆhab-based scholarship and
ÔarÐqa-based Sufism was not able to withstand the dynamics of rationalist, anti-mystical
reformism the way the Coptic Orthodox church was. With its primary reference to
scripture and individual charismatic and intellectual authorities, and neither clear
hierarchies nor an institutionalised authority like the patriarchy to give a definite final
word,778 Sunnite Islam is capable of containing dramatically different currents that, under
other circumstances, might have developed into separate confessions. It is this plurality
of religious authority and truth in the framework of a unified confessional identity that
has facilitated successive waves of redefinition and reform throughout the history of
Sunnite Islam, of which the Sufi wave in the late mediaeval period and the contemporary
scripturalist-rationalist wave are just two examples.779
5. Genealogies of reform
The focus of this thesis has been on conflicts and transformations rather than shared
anticipations and continuities. This is why I have not, although it would have been a
likely choice, employed Talal Asad’s concept of discursive tradition that in  recent years
has gained great popularity in the anthropology of Muslim societies. In fact, the findings
of this study suggest that the concept of discursive tradition is more useful when it comes
to grasping continuities than to understanding transformations.
Asad’s paper The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,780 presented in 1986, has since gained
great currency in the study of modern Islam, and it has become  commonplace among
researchers to refer to Islam as a discursive tradition. Critical of both nominalist and
essentialist notions of Islam, Asad argues that Islam should be understood as a tradition
consisting of
‘discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of
a given practice that, precisely because it is established, has a history. [...] An Islamic
discursive tradition is simply a tradition of Muslim discourse that addresses itself to the
conceptions of the Islamic past and the future.’781
Describing Islam as a discursive tradition has become highly popular in recent years
because it offers a way to say what Islam ‘is’ without falling into the trap of essentialism.
It connects the historical sources of Islam with their contemporary interpretation and
recognises the heterogeneity and contingency of such tradition while still offering
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something concrete for the researcher to grasp.
Empirically, describing Islam as a discursive tradition is as equally accurate as it is to
say that Islam is a religion. The epistemological range of the concept of discursive
tradition is restricted, however. This is of course the case with all scientific concepts and
theories, and yet when a concept becomes ‘trendy’ in academic discourse, researchers are
tempted to apply it indiscriminately in fields where it may or may not have the heuristic
value it had in its original context of application. This is what has happened to the
concept of discourse analysis since its popularisation in the 1980s and 1990s, and the
same process appears to be taking place with Asad’s concept of discursive tradition.
Although Asad’s discursive tradition clearly bears some similarity to Foucault’s
discursive formations,782 the two show one significant difference. While Foucault
primarily focussed on contradictions and discontinuities,783 Asad’s emphasis lies on
continuity. Asad states that the study of Islam as a discursive tradition should 
‘seek to understand the historical conditions that enable the production and maintenance
of specific discursive traditions, or their transformation – and the efforts of practitioners
to achieve coherence.’784
But although transformation is mentioned here it remains secondary, notably so in the
phrasing chosen by Asad  but more importantly in the overall problematic that the
concept of discursive tradition is designed to solve. To ask what Islam ‘is’ means, by the
logic of the question, to search for continuities, the factors that contribute to the
‘maintenance’ and ‘coherence’ that make it possible for Muslims and non-Muslims to
identify things as Islamic throughout history. In this context, the fairly obvious
statement that Islam as a discursive tradition ‘has’ a history becomes very problematic.
If we interpret it to mean that a tradition exists throughout history and through
contemporary reference to its past, as Asad seems to suggest, then we must take this
history to be a more or less continuous process, even in its transformations. But if we
interpret ‘having’ history as the construction of heritage according to the expectations
and circumstances that prevail in a contemporary setting, then tradition falls apart into
discontinuous discursive formations that, despite shared textual references, elude the
analytical scope of ‘discursive tradition’ in the singular. Asad is, of course, well aware of
the discontinuities of history, as his sharp analysis of the secularisation of law in 20th-
century Egypt shows. But it is worth pointing out that in that analysis, Asad’s own
concept of discursive tradition is only featured in secondary role.785
While the concept of discursive tradition may be very valuable in explaining the
persistence of certain topics and forms of argumentation in Islamic piety and
scholarship, it is not very useful when it comes to accounting for change. Certainly, we
can recognise discursive traditions, in the plural, for example in the tradition of ritual
and moral reform that is evoked by contemporary Salafis who, to put forward their
interpretation of what is Islamic, refer to select passages from the QurÞÁn and the Sunna,
the mediaeval genre of kutub al-bidaÝ, the 18th-century WahhÁbÐ reform movement, and
the Salafi modernists of the 19th and 20th centuries. But recognising that we indeed have
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a discursive tradition here – and I must underline that it is only one of many competing
traditions within the wider, highly heterogenous field of Sunnite Islam – does not really
add to our understanding of what has happened to it. On the contrary, discursive
formations have a tendency on the one hand to erase the transformations that lead to
their emergence (for example by projecting a contemporary understanding of religion
onto the past), and on the other hand to construct dramatic breaks where there were
actually gradual shifts (for example in the Sufi genealogy of Islamic reform). The strong
scriptural references of contemporary popularised Salafi Islam, to stick with the example,
should not mislead us to ignore how much it involves a thorough reinterpretation of
religion, society, and the self, a reinterpretation that has been as equally inspired by the
older Islamic traditions of legal scholarship and mystical spirituality as by colonial and
post-colonial political and social conflicts, the discourses of rationalism and Victorian
pietism, and the development of modern technologies of power.786 Neither should the
contemporary image of a struggle between scripturalist orthodoxy and ecstatic mystic
heterodoxy make us overlook the shifts in orthodoxy that have occurred throughout the
history of Islam. In other words, the discursive traditions of Islam are often to a
significant degree invented, and it is this invention, and the shifts and contradictions
that become invisible in the invented tradition, that we have to focus on if we are to
understand how traditions change.
Taking contradictions and transformations as the primary analytical focus, this study
presents an approach to the study of Muslim societies that does not contradict Asad’s
concept of discursive tradition but rather points in a somewhat different direction. It is
concerned with the formation of discourses that leads to the invention and re-invention
of traditions and the consolidation of the products of invention as objective,
authoritative Truth. This is why the issue of genealogy – that is, the conditions of
emergence and transformation of discursive formations – rather than discursive tradition
has been central to my analysis of the critical debate on mawlids.
The genealogy of the debate on mawlids cannot, evidently, be reduced to any specific
line of transmission. In this study, I have pointed to three concrete links for which good
evidence is available: an Islamic tradition of ritual and moral reform, the Victorian
moralist view and colonial administrative practice of internalised and embodied piety
and rationality, and French social theories standing in the rationalist and systemic
tradition of European enlightenment. Future research is likely to provide evidence of
further links, but more crucial than the exact links is the way the transmission has
worked. What we have at hand is not so much a transmission of theories and ideas
(although, in the case of the reception of the works of Ibn TaymÐya, Demolins and Le
Bon, that has happened as well) but of discursive constructions of objects, (for example,
what religion is, what a nation is, what qualities they require to flourish, etc.). European
discourses served a double role as a hegemonic order that imposed its logic upon its
opponents (similar to the way the logic of reformism has found its way into the defence
of mawlids), and as a source of inspiration for attempts to counter and overcome that
hegemony. Acting within and against this hegemony, modernist and reformist
movements have been engaged in the active redefinition of religion and society that,
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rather than providing concrete answers and strategies, have come to determine the kind
of questions that can be asked, the kind of arguments that can be made and the kind of
measures that can be taken.
In this light, we need to critically question one enduring theory on the nature of
Islamic reform. The Salafi wave in Sunnite Islam has often been parallelled to the
emergence of Protestant Christianity in 16th-century Europe, and it has become a popular
enterprise to search for an Islamic Reformation in analogy to the Christian one.787 Such
trans-historical comparisons are always at risk of being stricken by anachronisms, but in
any case I am interested not in structural similarities but the question of genealogy. As
this thesis has shown, the common sense – of which Protestant conceptions of piety,
ethics and reverent behaviour were, in some cases, a part – of colonial officials, Christian
missionaries, and social scientists whose work was translated into Arabic, did in fact play
a key role in the discursive shift that took place at the turn of the century. This common
sense was not always a Protestant one, however, and some of the most powerful impulses
may have come from different directions.
Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen has suggested788 that it was the tradition of Catholic
counter-Reformation transmitted through missionaries and, in a secularised version,
French social theory that, in Arabic translation, formed a major source of inspiration for
the emerging discourse of Islamic reform. The Islamic reformist project does, in fact,
show some striking similarities to the counter-Reformation: notably the opposition to
carnival and the attempts to ‘purify’ pilgrimages and rituals and the emphasis on strict
segregation of men and women and separation of the sacred and the profane. Most
importantly, however, the counter-Reformation turned the souls of the believers into an
issue of social order. Unlike the privatisation of religion that, perhaps anachronistically,
has been associated with Protestantism,789 counter-Reformation implied the sanctification
of society according to an understanding of the sacred very similar to that of Islamic
reformists: in need of protection from banality and profanities, but omnipresent as a
moral discipline of the everyday.790
This is not to suggest that we should opt for a counter-Reformation analogy instead
of a Protestant one. Firstly, the links of transmission are too many and too diffuse to
allow for any direct analogy. Secondly, Islamic reform and nationalist modernism, in
their attempt to bestow religion and society with a rational and progressive spirit, were
never based on a simple takeover of European concepts, but rather developed in
confrontation with and inspired by them, just as they, in their construction of true
authentic heritage, were never based on a simple reference to the past but rather invented
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and interpreted it anew. No matter what its sources of inspiration, then, the outcome of
this selective reinterpretation was historically new, and cannot be reduced, in causal or
structural terms, to the traditions it drew upon by evoking or opposing them.
What this alternative genealogy does suggest, however, is, firstly, that we should
withstand the temptation to associate reform and Reformation with the liberal agenda
of reason, freedom and democracy.791 Religious and moral reform, the counter-
Reformation analogy reminds us, is a rigorous exercise of discipline, and projecting the
agendas of democracy and human rights onto Islamic reform and Christian Reformation
does not do justice to their complex character.  Secondly, it implies that the parallels that
we can observe in the debates on and reforms of pilgrimage may be genealogical rather
than structural. Popular pilgrimages that unite spirituality, communal experience and
entertainment are not specific to Egypt, and neither are the controversies surrounding
them. If we look at the debates on communal festive traditions around the Muslim world
we very often find that similar traditions are being criticised and represented as local
customs based on pre-Islamic – Pharaonic, Christian, Hindu, Animist – cults. The
critique of ambivalent festivities and ecstatic rituals and the definition of religion and
society through rational discipline of the self and progressive development of the nation
unites Muslim modernists around the globe. And if we broaden our scope further we see
that saints-day celebrations have also been commonly subject to debate and attempts at
reform in, for example, Christian contexts in which a number of confessions have
emerged and defined themselves, in part, through their opposition to sainthood, while
Catholic and Orthodox pilgrimages and festivals have been subject to waves of criticism
and disciplining measures. It is not within the scope of this thesis to establish how and
why the search to discipline the souls of believers through the regulation of their festive
and ritual behaviour and the visible structures of their society has developed such
dynamics in the past centuries. But the fragments of evidence offered by this thesis
suggest that this development has been a trans-confessional and trans-religious one
(thence not specifically “Protestant”) that, often but not always aligned with the projects
of enlightenment, colonialism, and modernity, has offered new kind of questions to ask
about religion and society in different confessional settings.
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—ÕanÁÞullÁh, Pakistani PhD student at al-Azhar, a devout Sufi and regular visitor of mawlids,
Cairo, 13 August 2003.
—Umm NÙrÁ, mawlid of SÐdnÁ al-Íusayn, Cairo , 22 June 2003.
—Vivian MuÎammad, head of the public relations department, ÓanÔÁ city administration,
ÓanÔÁ, 15 October 2004.
—WaÊdÐ, member of the Sufi circle around Dr. AÎmad Íalaqa, mawlid of as-SÁda as-ŠahÁwÐya,
ŠuhÁ (near al-ManÒÙra), 18 September 2002.
—Sheikh YÁsÐn at-TuhÁmÐ, Egypt’s most popular munšid, Cairo, 10 October 2002 (interview in
cooperation with MuÎammad SaÝd ŠiÎÁta).
—Zaynhum, interior painter who participated in the procession of as-Sayyida NafÐsa, Cairo, 13
August 2003.
8.2. Anonymous, by date
—Muslim members of the AbÙ ÍaÒÐra tribe, Gaza City, June 1999.
—Leading activists of the Muslim Brotherhood in a village in Kafr aš-ŠayÌ province, 21
February 2002.
—Two men in a Sufi Ìidma in the mawlid of as-SÁda aš-ŠahÁwÐya, ŠuhÁ, 19 September 2002.
—State security officer, ÓanÔÁ, 15 October 2002.
—regular Sufi visitors to the mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, ÓanÔÁ, 15 October 2002.
—Students in a café near the university, ÓanÔÁ, 15 October 2002.
—Brother of late Sheikh ÉÁbir al-MadanÐ, mawlid of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, ÓanÔÁ, 16 October
2002.
—Middle-aged man working for a television production unit to broadcast the Friday prayer
from the mosque of as-Sayyid al-BadawÐ, ÓanÔÁ, 18 October 2002.
—Member of al-ÉÁzÙlÐya al-ÍusaynÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya, mawlid of SÐdÐ ÝAbd ar-RaÎÐm al-QinÁwÐ,
QinÁ, 20 October 2002.
—Man from QinÁ, QinÁ, 22 October 2002.
—Man working at a Ferris wheel, mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqi, DisÙq, 30 October 2002.
—Student of medicine at al-Azhar, mawlid of SÐdÐ IbrÁhÐm ad-DisÙqÐ, DisÙq, 31 October 2002.
—Secretaries of general ÝÀdil LabÐb, governor of QinÁ, QinÁ, 15 January 2003 (Interview in
cooperation with FatÎÐ ÝAbd as-SamÐÝ).
—Egyptian academic, Cairo, 23 January 2003.
267Interviews
—Male Sufi pilgrim to the mawlid of as-Sayyida FÁÔima an-NabawÐya, Cairo, 26 May 2003.
—Family sitting in front of their house, mawlid of FÁÔima an-NabawÐya, Cairo, 2 June 2003.
—Group of men sitting in chairs in front of a house during the mawlid of FÁÔima an-
NabawÐya, Cairo, 3 June 2003.
—Goldsmith in the ËÁn al-ËalÐlÐ market, mawlid of SÐdnÁ al-Íusayn, Cairo  23 June 2003
(Interview conducted by UmnÐya MihÁnnÁ).
—Male teenagers at the mawlid of al-Íusayn, Cairo, 24 June 2003.
—Man from BÁb aš-ŠaÝrÐya, mawlid of as-SulÔÁn AbÙ l-ÝIlÁ, Cairo, 26 June  2003.
—People who saw or participated in the processions of as-Sayyida SakÐna and as-Sayyida NafÐsa
in July and August 2003.
—Woman running a fish restaurant, mawlid of SÐdÐ al-MursÐ AbÙ l-ÝAbbÁs, Alexandria, 24 July
2003.
—Member of al-ÍÁmidÐya aš-ŠÁÆilÐya, mawlid of SÐdÐ al-MursÐ AbÙ l-ÝAbbÁs, Alexandria, 24
July 2003.
—Bookseller, Cairo, August 2003.
—Civil servants in ÓanÔÁ city administration, ÓanÔÁ, 15 October 2004.
